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ABSTRACT
2
This is an account of those aspects of British Near Eastern policy 
which concerned Sir Henry Bulwer at Constantinople. By 1856 the policy 
of aggregate reforms for the Ottoman Empire had heen discarded. Bulwer 
tried to persuade the Porte to carry out simple administrative reforms, 
to give the provinces considerable autonomy, and to maintain a nominal 
suzerainty. The Porte did not see its interests in this way. British 
policy was reduced to bringing the changes which took place in the 
relations between the Sultan and his vassals, within the letter of 
treaties. Russell worked with France as far as possible to accomplish 
this. Where British interests were especially threatened, in Egypt, he 
refused to compromise and lost ground to the French. If Bulwer’s voice 
had been hearkened to this would have been avoided. Though he had 
previously shown a lack of judgment at critical moments, at Constanti­
nople, at the height of his powers, there was a moderation and grasp 
of realpolitik in his views on the function of the Empire, and on 
Egypt, which made the occasional instances of of bad judgment, chiefly 
to do with Moldo-fallachian affairs, appear no more than odd lapses, 
let, though a reliable agent, he was not the reflex of his government, 
and this joined with his unfortunate public image brought about his 
eventual fall. No praise was forthcoming for the intelligent way he 
worked out adjustments to the new diplomatic situation. Harsh words 
for his independent line over the Suez canal were inevitable. He had to 
be hastily consigned to an oblivion1 from which he has been sometimes 




Sir Henry Bulwer and his Office
Sir Henry Bulwer was the accredited ambassador or minister at
Madrid, Washington, and Constantinople, at important junctures for
a period altogether of fifteen years, sufficiently long for him to
deserve more attention than has been given to him. Unfortunately,
the aura of silence which uncomfortably surrounds his name is a
direct result of inadequate material touching upon the more intimate
and more controversial aspects of his life. Prom C.K. Webster's
references to him in his Foreign Policy of Palmerston one may suppose
him to have been an efficient subordinates while from Jones Parry's
sketch of him in The Spanish Marriages it appears that he was spas-
modioally clever, unscrupulous, of ordinary judgment and at critical
moments blinds and T.W. Riker in The Making of Rumania makes him seem
clever and nasty. Each of these accounts is tentative and with the
exception of Jones Parry's study, slight; and of course,had to be
owing to the tenuousness of the material which might have provided the
substance for a description in depth. To make matters worse the kind of
material which there is has to be approached with a scepticism which
prevents the drawing of anything more than tentative conclusions^.
^ The Dictionary of National Biography is not trustworthy as an inter­
pretation,nor is the only sizeable biography, of Bulwer by l£.B.
D'Auvergne - Envoys Extraordinary any better. For the bare details 
Burke *s1 Complete Peerage is the best souree.' The Bulwer Papers;offer 
scant information except on two important issues,namely the sale of 
the Isle of Plati and the Laing conversion scheme; these having some 
bearing on Bulwer's eclipse,see below p.3V. Otherwise they but give 
» added support to an interpretation of Bulwer which one would have 
put forward only tentatively without them. The Russell Papers though 
giving material which adds a little to the picture of Bulwer as a 
person, are chiefly important for explaining the unsatisfactory 
relations between,on the one hand,two cantankerous old men in charge 
of Foreign Affairs,and on the other,perhaps the slyest British 
representative at any Court then, namely Bulwer.
4
We have to rely chiefly on what certain contemporaries said about 
him; and he was, for reasons which we shall have to examine, the 
sort of person who readily excited some sort of comment, and moreover, 
easily provoked ill-will and irritation, objective observations 
couched in moderate language are not easily found. Further, Bulwer 
himself, in his own writings when his own reputation was at stake, 
did not hesitate to twist the evidence.
Perhaps of less significance, though certainly deepening the 
mystery, is the impossibility of deciding for or against the criticisms 
of Bulwer in two books by the American missionaries Cyrus Hamlin and 
the Reverend G. Washburh, which not only berate Bulwer for what they 
termed duplicitousness but also make damaging remarks about him as 
a person. The former, a smaller edition of Benjamin Franklin, 
saw him as a new Judas. He wrote:
"England showed a strange, unpardonable weakness in falling 
in with Louis Napoleon’s policy, withdrawing Lord Stratford 
de Redoliffe, and sending as his successor Sir Henry Bulwer, 
a man of infamous morals, whose whole career in Turkey 
seemed to be inspired with the mad determination to undo 
everything de Redcliffe had done...but his notorious ’ ;
reception of a bribe from the Pasha of Egypt, for which he 
betrayed England’s interest, compelled England to recall 
him...his name and Louis Napoleon's, when they come to 
the judgment seat of,history, will be cast out into outer 
darkness."1.
The other missionary, in his Fifty Years at Constantinople, after
referring to Bulwer's change of front over Bebec College went on:
^*My Life and Times, p.407» Presumably Hamlin connected the sale of
the Isle of Plati with Bulwer's Suez policy. Otherwise, I am
at a loss to know what he referred to by *a bribe'.
2. ■■■■■■ • ■ • - -All the evidence suggests that Bulwer behaved very properly
towards the American missionaries, and supported them in their
attempts to set up an American College on the Bosphorus. The
Exeter Hall set - and Cyrus Hamlin had close contacts with it -
was determined not to forgive Bulwer for not being Stratford.
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"This bribery affair cost Bui war his place, and he was 
recalled. Bulwer was a man of the most infamous morals, 
but he was such an adept in his craft and intrigue, and 
was so successful in cajoling callow statesmen into 
treaties injurious to them but advantageous to England, 
that the English Government so valued his services as to 
condone his moral character."l
An attempt to solve the mystery, to give a full picture of 
Bulwer is beyond the scope of this chapter and more than the material 
available would allow. However, certain aspects of his character 
need to be dwelt on for two reasons. Since British Near Eastern 
Policy during the years 1858-65 was so blatantly illiberal, and, in 
one instance, dangerously unimaginative, an explanation of it 
requires some knowledge of the kind of man on the spot. An 
assessment of Bulwer's character and ability naturally involves some 
reflection on the competence of his chiefs. Secondly a visual 
impression of the.representative is necessary to appreciate fully the 
nature of British influence in a country where appearances had only 
second place to real strength in accomplishing things. This is not 
an attempt to provide a rounded picture of Bulwer, rather a sketch, 
of him as will be most useful for explaining the quality of.British 
diplomacy in the Near East.
It was a time when diplomacy Itself was undergoing a vital 
change. Telegraphic communication with Constantinople and Alexandria 
was already effective in 1858, the year Bulwer commenced his seven 
years embassy. Personal dislikes and plain idiosyncracy were not 
as likely to affect the implementation of policy, as they had been 
when Ponsonby and Stratford occupied the magnificent palace at *
*P.458 and p.ll, Fifty Years at Constantinople»
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Therapia. In fact the telegraph ushered, in an age which demanded
of diplomatists a different set of values. The man who refrained
from exaggerating his own importance in some particular business
and from expanding on his connections, who would not delay in
reporting the significant development, whether or not a reverse,
and who would unhesitatingly perform the unpleasant task at the risk
of losing ground, was the person required under the new system.
He did not have to be a policy-maker, rather a good executive with
a marked capacity for being loyal to his chief, and sufficiently
imaginative to take note of fresh developments and to change ground
as soon as policy required it. Stratford de Redcliffe was an
unconscionably long time in ’retiring* even though he demonstrably
failed to fulfil these exacting requirements. On the other hand, when
old habits had been quite discarded, Sir William White would have
been quickly dismissed as soon as a divalence between his views and
1 ■those of his chief became apparent • Sir Henry Bulwer's embassy was . 
undoubtedly the transition period in this respect. He was appointed 
irrespective of the kind of demands which the telegraphic system made
and kept at his post by men too long in office and in,the old ways
2to appreciate fully what had happened . A sketch of Buiwar’s back­
ground is thus particularly germane to an assessment of his;merit as 
a diplomatist as of the quality of British diplomacy. Bulwer was so 
evidently a misfit.
There was between Russell and Bulwer a marked difference in
^‘He died before Salisbury got round to the unpleasant task.
2‘Russell dimly perceived the error though Palmerston certainly did 
■ not.
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intensity in the approach to.the general problem of Turkish integrity 
and reform. Tensions also arose over the implementing of official 
policy-towards the United Principalities and especially towards 
Egypt with, in the last case, unfortunate results. Though they were 
stimulated by the complicated and fluid international situation 
they were emphasised by the peculiar relationship between the 
representative at Constantinople and the Foreign Minister, responding 
inadequately to the requirements of diplomacy by telegraph. By the 
nature of his peculiarities and background Bulwer was condemned to be 
in a false position some of the time.
There is little we know of Bulwer before he entered Parliament 
in 18J0, beyond the fact that he was educated at Harrow, and Trinity 
College,5 and Downing College, Cambridge, which he left in the Autumn 
of 18241. As befitted a young gentleman, a second son with.some 
social standing and small expectations, he became an officer in the 
1st. Life Guards, 1824, and two years later in the 5Qth. foot.. The 
less formal part of his education might have involved a more or less 
Grand Tour. However, for lack of funds, one suspects* rather than 
through lack of inclination, he had to be content with a trip to 
the Morea, as one of the representatives of the Greek Committee sent
to obtain information about conditions in Greece, end to give Prince
...  ■ - x - ’ -Mavrocordata the sum of £80,000-• This journey probably, quickened
Complete Peerage» D.N.B.t suggests that he left at the request of 
? the Greek Committee in London.
‘William Henry Lytton Earle Bulwer born in February 1801 was the 
second son of General William Earle Bulwer of Wood Dalling and Heydon 
Norfolk, by Elizabeth Barbara, daughter of Richard Warburton-Lytton 
_ of Knebworth,' Herts. C.P. •
^‘D.N.B. Memoirs of William second Viscount Melbourne - W.M. Torrens, 
Vol. 1, p.213.
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his ambition as much as his artistic impulses for he socn published
An Autumn in Greece.*an amusing volume of letters descriptive of his
sojourn in the classic land of conflict'^. Whatever the motivation
of this tentative venture into the realm of letters,he did gain
'credit by the good use he had made of his powers of observation 
2and judgment' . He was now persona grata with the Whigs as is 
evidenced by William Lamb's adoption of him as a candidate in the 
election for the borough of Hertford in 1826 • It was a rough 
experience for Bulwer who was easily beaten at the poll in a 
constituency 'by this time thoroughly demoralised by rancour, money 
and beer*^. 'Rather effeminate in appearance and voice, and with 
more fine appreciation of sarcasm than capacity for rough-and-ready 
humour, he was never able to overtake the headway made by his dandy 
competitor' • A son of. the county, Bulwer seems to have taken it 
for granted that he would win, and passed the time 'reporting progress 
in delicate little notes to Panshanger and Knebworth, till most of 
his money was spent, and a good deal of the confidence of his,
g -j ■discerning friends' * Bulwer, himself, as Lamb indicated, was at 
this time_already a dandy, a caricature of disciplined Regency 
elegance. The pencil sketch of him by the Count, d'Orsay - 'the last 
of the dandies as a ruler of young men* - shows us a fashionably 
dressed young man, with a careless aristocratic.hauteur, presumably
j/D.N.B. Torrens, Vol. l,p.214 
,Ibid.
'•Ibid, p.213,
4*Ibid. p.214. A Radical, a Mr. Duncombe, and a Tory, a Mr. Byron 
c were returned.
5*Ibid.
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cultivated, adopting a languorous pose^. The Count d ’Orsay lived
at the house of Lady Blessington 'which was an agreeable house for
2men, although not visited by Englishwomen’ • Here the Bulwers and
X .Disraeli were frequent visitors'7. An intimate attachment grew 
“up between the rootless Jewish rebel and Bulwer. Disraeli first 
met Henry Bulwer at a dinner party given by Lytton Bulwer at his 
house in Hertford Street^. Disraeli, Bulwer recollected ’wore green 
velvet trousers, a canary coloured waistcoat, low shoes, silver 
buckles, lace at his wrists, and his hair in ringlets...If on 
leaving the table we had been severally taken aside and asked which 
was the cleverest of the party we should have been obliged to say 
"the man in the green velvet trousers’” • Bulwer was obviously 
fascinated. The friendship between the two, though in the nature 
of things operating over long distances, lasted into the ’50s, and 
with profit to both Bulwer and Disraeli, the latter making a point 
of defending his friend whilst attacking Liberal foreign policy
■ &during the critical debates following Bulwer’s expulsion from Spain.
Having entered the diplomatic service, he began his apprentice­
ship as attache’at Berlin 1827» then in Vienna 1829, and finally at 
the Hague in 1830.^ He quickly consolidated his reputation as a 
dandy, by adding to his other qualities a remarkable skill at 
gambling . What else he learned, apart from, the knowledge of the way
^ ‘Ibid. The sketch in E.B.D’Auvergne, p.2?2,shows us an incredibly 
_ young looking Bulwer. He was 44 when the sketch was made in *45» 
f‘Torrens,Vol. l.p.214,
¿‘Ibid. t
‘Monjiypenny and Buckle - Life of Benjamin Disraeli,Vol l.p.124»
'g Ibid.
‘Op.cit. Vol.II,p.73,151|Vol.III,p.599jand for reference to debates 
Vol. Ill,p.182.
¿‘D.N.B. & C.P.
. D.N.B. . ■ . •
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the office was run, one may only surmise from what Bulwer was 
thinking on certain problems in the middle 'thirties. Certainly 
he must have acquired some insight into the psychology of a 
European middle-class composed chiefly of people of the professions, 
who were revolutionaries manque's* and, for the cosmopolitan culture 
then in vogue, a feeling at once respectful and flippant as became 
a man more interested in history than in theory, and in politics 
than'in ideas. His attitude to the faint stirrings in Europe was a 
result of very acute observation. His judgments on the contemporary 
scene in France which he recorded in the Notebook have the kind of 
moderation and authority which clearly resulted from mature thinking 
over a period of years.*
Then while still a Member of Parliament Bulwer was sent on a 
special mission to report on the growing disoontent in the Belgian 
province. Then he was attached to the Paris Embassy much to lord 
Granville's dismay.
'May there not be some inconvenience in Mr. Bulwer (an 
author as well as an orator) having the privilege of coming 
over from London to Paris when it suits his fancy, to rummage 
the archives of the Embassy and then return to his 2
Parliament duties as soon as he has gratified his curiosity?' .
Bulwer had hinted that he did not intend to do much work. Our
picture of Bulwer as a man playing at being the dandy, popular enough
in the society of wits, but, essentially, a person who liked to plAy
at politics, would be filled in by an examination of his role in
'These conclusions are based on Bulwer's Notebook, Points written 
for introduction', Sept. 30th 1832 - Mid. Jan. I833. Entry Sat.
0 ctober '32, Bulwer Papers, G/l. Evidently the data in this 
Notebook provided the material for his book, published in 1834» 
France» Social, Literary, and Political.and another published in 
„ I836, The Monarchy of the Middle Classes. - 
•ffebster-The Foreign Polioy of Palmerston Vol. 1, 70.n.l,26 Nov. '32, 
Granville-Palmerston.According to one authority a strong friendship between Bulwer & Palmerston dated from this time.See D'Auvergne.
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English politics. Bulwer, one may hazard a guess,had slightly
extreme views not only because he knew which way the wind was blowing
but because they were congenial to his temperament, he being something
of the connoisseur. He was in favour of extending the measure of
Catholic emancipation, of the partial disestablishment of’ the Church
in Ireland, and of an Irish Poor Law. He looked favourably on the
demands of Dissent, and hoped that Jewish disabilities might be
dealt with. It is interesting in view of a certain aspect of Bulwer's
diplomatic technique that as early as 1836 he was given to indulging
in academic politics, confidently attempting to secure what no one
. 3and no party had the inclination or power to secure. ; His pamphlet,
'The Lords, the Government, and the Country. A Letter to a Constituent
on the Present State of Affairs', was an irenieon its purpose being
to induce the Radicals and others with sympathetic notions to sink
their differsnces with the Whigs in order to present a united front
Before the danger threatening from the Tories. As a non-party man
he felt obliged to justify his own support of the Whigs. f The
apologia is revealing, illustrating not only Bulwer’s general
attitude to politics, but also the justification of a technique which
was to earn him so much notoriety in the diplomatic world, namely
"'■'Bulwer sat in the Commons as a Liberal M.P. for Wilton 1830-1, for 
2 Coventry 1831-5, and for Marylebone 1835-7*  C»P»
*Bulwer Papers, T/38» Fenton-Bulwer several letters. Perhaps of 
significance was Bulwer's desire to furnish the Embassy house with 
copies of portraits of famous men like Dante, Machiavelli, Pietro 
- Perugino, Rembrandt and Rubens.
^*See below p 333.At Madrid Bulwer tried it in I846, and was disavowed 
by Aberdeen. At Constantinople during his embassy, he had 
a marked penchant for this kind of gamej witness his attempts 
to reconcile the irreconcilable Porte and Viceroy, and his 
taste for constitution making when there was no possibility 
of the Powers enforcing a new constitution on the Principalities.
that springing from an ability to compromise easily. He wrote*
*1 am not one of those who - like the child that throws 
mamma's gingerbread into the fire, and cries for a piece 
of the moon, which looks prettier - would refuse what is 
. good and possible, for what might be better and is 
impossible'. 1
Bulwer's manner in the Commons seems to have struck observers
in the way Bulwer himself would have wished it to. The debate
concerned the recently concluded Quadruple Alliance of 1834.
— 'With the easy patronage of an acquired reputation, Bulwer 
began conveying in muttered interruptions to his more 
youthful neighbours what he thought might be said in reply 
to the points brought up by successive orators on the 
other side.'2
As Bulwer, rose to speak so did Lord Leveson who reproduced Bulwer's 
own arguments. ,, ; ■■■■>■■.
'It must be added that when Henry Bulwer had recovered 
from his surprise he enjoyed the joke as much as anybody, 
and was among the first to join in the general applause 
accorded to the Member for Morpeth on the success of his 
maiden effort.' 3 ......... '
Afterwards Bulwer wrote to Lord Granville and, though tempering his
praise, suggested 'that the Ambassador had only to give his son a ■
hint as to "chusing" his next time of speaking well to confirm and
fix a most favourable impression*.^ Here was all the easy, grace
and insinuating charm which contemporaries found so appealing. ,;
Joined with his other qualities, however, it was just as likely to
5incur suspicion and hostility.
Bulwer's general approach hardly changed with the years. The
2*'The Lords, the Government etc.'
‘Lord E, Fitzmaurice - The Life of Granville George Leveson Gower 
, Second Earl Granville. Vol. l,,p.27 
^‘ibid. ■ . .
c*Ibid. .
‘>*See below for Comments by Thouvenel, p b y  Melbourne p.li, and 
by Palmerston, p.J*> .
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waning of his youth meant in his case, however, that what was once 
appreciated as detachment and grace, albeit grace spiced with a 
colourful and not unattractive sarcastic manner and cultivated 
ebullience, came*to be regarded as a facade for the concealed motive 
and a manner too facile to be taken at its face value. Bad temper 
was a natural development from the earlier sarcasm, if only because 
of persistent ill-health. It was while Bulwer was at his peak and 
had the respect of the leading politicians of both large parties, that 
his manner was imperceptibly becoming the one we recognise in the. 
Ambassador at Constantinople, 1858-65* If we quickly peruse his 
diplomatic career-during these formative years we shall notice traits 
which were to become those normally associated with Bulwer's name.
During November 18J5 Bulwer returned to Brussels as Secretary of
the Legation, and as Charge d’Affaires there negotiated a treaty of
commerce with the new kingdom. Palmerston was impressed enough by
Bulwer's work to have him sent as Secretary to the Embassy at
Constantinople to help Ponsonby bring about a commercial treaty with
Turkey.^- The Treaty of Commerce between the Porte and England was '
the result. In view of French hostility and the marked lack of
co-operation amongst all the embassies, Bulwer was obliged to act in
silence and secrecy. His success, chiefly due to Ponsonby's work
Beforehand, perhaps gave him an unbalanced view of the value of such
methods. He described the incident in his Life of Lord Palmerston, 1
1‘Webster, Vol. II, p«554. Though objecting to a Secretary, Ponsonby 
liked Bulwer well enough. , Bulwer's correspondence with Palmerston 
aoted as a corrective to his chief's reports: Vol. I p.70*
To Ponsonby he was useful in getting the right contacts with the 
Sultan's officials. Bulwer was now initiated into the eastern 
mysteries of communication.
1 4 .
where he pours scojirn on -the lack of imagination of the French 
representative, emphasises how easy it all was to him, and fails to 
explain how vital the Treaty was for the success of Reschid's plans.̂ 
Bulwer's interpretation of himself as a kind of Don Juan of diplomacy 
is adequately illustrated hy his emphasis of the minor details in 
this coup de theatre of 1838*
:'My intentions were seconded by the accident of my having 
pitched a large Persian tent in one of those beautiful 
• valleys of the Bosphorus which boast a fountain surrounded 
by centenarian, trees? and to this retreat - there not 
being at that time a great deal of general business in the 
Chancellerie - I used frequently to resort.
Some verses I had written in two or three ladies' albums 
gained me credit of being a poet. Pera talked of my 
romantic tendencies in particular, and of the eccentricities 
of Englishmen in general'. 2
Within the fortnight Bulwer had negotiated the details in the cool 
of the tent, 'but he never realised the political conditions of his 
work since he did not believe Mehemet could be overthrown and indeed 
¿id not desire it'.^ In short, he simjbly did as he was told, 
without being aware of the complexities,of,the situation.
Subsequently the restored Whigs posted Bulwer, recently -
recovered from fever, to Paris as Secretary there.^ In this position
XT“ — :----------— — — ----- :----— — ----- -----:— — — -------’The value of this book is slight when it is used as a source of 
material for Bulwer himself. It savours too much, sometimes of 
special pleading,at other times of righteous self-defence. See 
Parry.The Spanish Marriages.280. and Webster.The Foreign Policy 
of Palmerston,Voi. 11,554» which describes Bulwer's claims to be 
the principal agent in bringing about the treaty as 'nothing but a 
2 fairy tale'.
_*Bulwer - Life of Palmerston. 261.
^'Webster, op.cit. Voi.II,555. An early instance of Bulwer's faulty 
judgment when it was a question of active polities rather than 
detached observation. The egotism which seemed to motivate him 
so strongly would inevitably cripple his judgment sooner or 
. later.
^SiP. 1839-43.
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and as charge d ’affaires in the following year, - i.e. 1840 - he was 
an important moderating influence. Such was his opinion of his own 
importance confirmed by his natural talent for compromise, that he 
attempted to assume the role of mediator whenever the opportunity 
offered, and even when it did not. So from Paris he tried to calm 
the irritation in London when it was learned that Thiers had encouraged 
a compromise between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan. Later (September 
1840) he sent in a modified version of Thiers' statement to himself 
at Auteuil, which had been a blunt intimation that a non-aceeptance 
of Mehemet's terms would probably produce a war between Prance and 
Britain.1
1 6 .
We are permitted a single glimpse of Bulwer in action in Paris.
His hauteur on this occasion seems almost to have cost him his life.^
During an Embassy ball, he offered his services to Lady Cowley who was
at a loss to discover the identity of one of the guests. Bulwer
is reported as sayings ~ '• >
"I am sent by Lady Cowley to know your name".^
The 'Marquis D-' replied, - v
'Before I gratify you with mine, perhaps you will let me know 
yoursj for your manner is excessively impertinent, and you 
require to be made an example of'.
The narrator concluded, *
‘Major J. Hall - England and the’Orleans Monarchy, p;245. Bulwer was 
generally in favour of concession to the French view-point regarding 
Mehemet. Also Webster, op&it. Vol.II,649-5^1 669>718. However, 
Palmerston depended much on Bulwer now that Granville was failing 
(Webster, Vol.1,67) and the relations between Bulwer and Palmerston 
2^were very close at this time. (See Hall,p^.298, J07) •
Bresson in Spain would complain of Bulwersairs. In 1857 Stratford was 
greatly irritated by them. ' "
The Reminiscences and Reoolleotions of Cantain Gronow, Vol. II, 266.
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'The following morning this nobleman called upon me, 
and mentioned what had occurred the previous evening; he 
swore that he would run Bulwer through the body for the 
insult offered him, and requested me to be the bearer 
of a challenge to the offender'.l
Gronow tactfully arranged the matter and prevented the two from
meeting.
By this time, in the stock-exchange of reputations, the Foreign
2Service, Bulwer had been assessed and catalogued. In 1841
Aberdeen and Lord Stanley joined forces to try to persuade Bulwer
3to go to Canada as Secretary to the Governor. Aberdeen, anxious
though he was to please Stanley was only too aware of the value of
Bulwer in Paris. He wrote to Princess Lievens
'We were near taking Bulwer from you* but much to my 
joy he is returned to Paris'. 4
Having received already a negative reply to his request Lord Stanley 
wrote to Bulwer again*
'...in the full persuasion that your abilities can no where 
be exerted more beneficially to the public service, nor 
with a fairer prospect of adding to your reputation as a 
public man, than in the situation, at this critical moment, 
of Secretary to the Governor General of Canada, I have no 
hesitation in renewing to you the request communicated to 
you in my former letter, that you would give to the 
Government the benefit of your services'.5
Assurances were freely given that Bulwer's career in the diplomatic
service would in no wise be hampered by such a move. On the contrary
2*Ibid. .
‘Melbourne was sufficiently impressed to think that it might be a 
good idea to send Buiwer* to Constantinople again in order to press 
upon the Sultan the French terms for a settlement of the Eastern 
question should they prove satisfactory.cf.The Letters of Queen 
3 Victoria.Yol. 1, 297>Melbourne-Victoria,9 October,1840.
^‘Bulwer Papers,S/40,Lord Stanley-Bulwer,28 Sept.1841jAberdeen-Bulwer 
. 16 September '41|S/2.
c*Lady Francis Balfour-Life of George Earl of Aberdeen,Yol.11,124. 
^‘Bulwer Papers,S/40, Lord Stanley-Bulwer,28 September,'41•
his present sacrifice would win him the favour of Her Majesty's 
Government whatever its colour. Even so, Bulwer, possibly indulging 
in a fancy that he was indispensable, had been quick to assume that 
here was some intrigue to get him safely out of the way, and offered 
his resignation. Aberdeen responded in the generous manner of which 
only he was capable in similar circumstances:
'...you will understand that there is no person whom I 
should so much desire to see at Paris as yourself.
You will never be removed from it by me, except to some 
post of activity and importance.
I have been anxious to say this much, because with 
the opinions I expressed in my former letter, your 
proposal of a resignation struck me as singular, and as 
almost indicating some doubt of my sincerity. On this 
head, however, I trust that none can now exist; and that 
you must believe me to be quite incapable of entertaining 
any other object than that which I profess'. 1 ■
Melbourne writing to the Queen likewise felt that Bulwer was a good
man for Canada though his remarks show a keen awareness of the
subtleties of his character.
1 8 .
'Your Majesty,'he wrote to the Queen,' knows Bulwer well.
He is clever, keen, active, somewhat bitter and caustic, 
and rather suspicious. A man of a more straightforward , ; ; 
character would have done better, but it would be easy to . 
have found many who would have done worse’. 2
Russell and Palmerston would echo this last.sentiment years later
when Bulwer's Constantinople embassy was coming to its wretched end.
In our attempt to discover what the quality was of Bulwer as a 
person,it would be remiss to overlook female opinion which tends to 
confirm the view that he was basically a merourial nature.
His acquaintance with a certain Mme. Allart of Montlheri near
1.
2.3/2 Aberdeen-Bulwer, 27 September '41.?he letters ®f Queen Victoria Vol. I, 419» Melbourne-Viotoria, 
let October, '41.
Paris covered most of his career after 18J2.^ This lady, clearly
infatuated by Bulwer, never ceased to press upon him the attractions
of some idyllic paradise which would be theirs should he agree to live
2with her in a ’lien intellectuel, au-dessus du mariage*. In
Florence she would pursue her studies while he - apparently of
delicate health even in the ’thirties - would write a history of ^
that town, as a kind of positive convalescence. She pleaded:
'I begged you to come here, to see Florence street by 
street, palazzo by palazzo, for its history is in its 
streets. Be good and let me lead you. You quite see 
that there is nothing for me in this but study in Florence 
for I call you to it, this is the proof, and do not think 
but that honour always guides me. Come then with 
confidence, or call on me, and believe that the affections 
of eight years thus tried and shaped are worth more than 
the amours of a moment *. 3
Bulwer it appears, was more attentive to the demands of his car»<»r
and perhaps the loves of the moment. But this lady's attachment
to Bulwer never seems to have wavered} hence the value of her
comments. She once protested at his lack of depth s
'I may not meet a lady without hearing of your galanteries...
Mme. Hainchin says that you are a new Don Juan...that you.
have drawn back the limits of Dandyism, that it is a new 
Dandyism, limitless, strange; and speaks of the horses 
ready at eight o’clock for the whole night, and an ease 
at work, an excellent business mindl...She also says that 
you are leaner than ever, a shade, a pure ghost...(that) 
you have taken on the dress, manners and language of our men; 
there is no more English in you'. 4
Later she spoke with nostalgia, and presumably exaggeration, of
his eyes 'still wandering, never fixed on anything for a second’.'*
1. The first reference to Mme.Allart is in the Notebook,0/1,10 Oct.'32.
Her correspondence with Bulwer continues almost to the end of 
2# Bulwer's Constantinople embassy.
3# G/3»Allart-Bulwer,19 April,and clearly 1838 from internal evidence. 4* Allart-Bulwer,26 April '38, ibid.
Allart-Bulwer,1838-50,Personal Letters,ibid. This one is evidently 
c of the period of Bulwer's secretaryship in Paris, 183^-43.
Allart-Bulwer, 23 Sept. '64, (T/81).
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The appointment of a man of such slight character to the 
important embassy of Spain in 1843 when Spain had become the touch­
stone of Anglo-French relations, would appear to have been a mistake: 
and no matter what criteria one refers to in order to evaluate 
liis achievements, his career should have finished in 1846. But 
Aberdeen's choice was severely restricted. Only too conscious 
of the difficulties inherent in his own policy and of the delicate 
nature of that tender plant the 'entente cordials', Aberdeen in any 
case presumably placed Bulwer's skill at a premium.
He went out to Madrid in December 1843 as Envoy extraordinary 
and Minister. He had instructions to work in concert with his 
French colleague and yet 'to promote, if he properly can, the 
interests of Don Francisco'.^ Parry neatly sums up the 11
relationship between Bulwer and his French colleague: ]
.1
'Bresson's passionate, nervous temperament and his jealousy 
of all interference and opposition made him at best a !
most difficult colleague to handle.•.Unhappily, Bulwer's 
own peculiar qualities were not calculated to promote j
harmonious co-operation. His conceit, his aristocratic“ 
disdain for his colleague's more humble origin, irritated 
the susceptible Bresson'. 2
.]
Given British policy which condemned Bulwer to act as a mere 5
commentator, there was nothing Bulwer could do to further the interests
2; ' , ■ j'The conclusions arrived at here are based on Jones Parry - The !
Spanish Marriages, which contain a fair if speculative analysis 1
of Bulwer. The evidence in the Bulwer Papers might perhaps qualify
this appraisal only by emphasising the subtleties of Bulwer's mind
and his impatience.See S/44»Bulwer-Clarendon,12 Sept.*46.This is
a particularly explosive letter in which Bulwer soundly berates
English politicians for ignoring him,for not having a policy,and at
the same time for having the wrong policy.Bulwer's dangerous
dallying with a completely Coburg solution,which he should have
realised was impossible in the international context,reflected an
unhealthy preoccupation with his own dignity,an impression further
2 reinforced by his suggested alternative, a completely French solution.
'Parry,p.170.
of either Don Francisco, the elder, or later his sons."*" Where he 
did attempt a contribution to policy-making he made serious errors of 
judgment on broad issues. After only a week in Madrid he advocated 
"the return of the Queen-mother, although he had recently convinced 
Guizot in Paris that he would be embarrassing Aberdeen by promoting 
such a scheme. Five months later Bulwer realised that he had taken 
too ’confident a view of her powers of decision’. Again, at a 
critical juncture, when Aberdeen at the Chateau d ’Eu,in September ’45» 
bad allowed Guizot to interpret his silence as tacit approval of an 
eventual Montpensier marriage, Bulwer instead of pointing to all the 
dangers involved, that is if he was aware of them, expressed pleasure 
with the development.^ During the summer months of 1844 Bulwer, 
lulled into a sense of security by earning the gratitude of Bresson 
and Narvaez, counselled Aberdeen not to mistrust French motives
‘P.169, ibid. When at Constantinople Bulwer found everything conspired 
to reduce him to a similar role, which was particularly galling 
because he knew that Palmerston, Russell and the swelltg number 
of dissident voices in Parliament were irritated - if for different 
reasons - by the Turkish administration and therefore by association 
by Bulwer. Nor did it help that the prop of the ministry, Gladstone 
failed to conceal his arrière pensées, see Appendix A. ■ It was 
difficult to know what to expect of a representative in these 
conditions. Aberdeen 1843-5 was conscious of the difficulties 
and was generous to Bulwer, even when he would have been justified 
in not being so. On the other hand Russell in the last period 
2 was demanding and suspicious.
,*Ibid, p.161-2 .
4*Ibid, p .176 .
‘Until a son - the laws of succession with reference to females 
were still capable of being changed - of Isabella and a Bourbon 
husband, not French, had established himself on the throne of Spain, 
the threat of a French prince ruling at Madrid would always remain. 
England and the Orleans Monarchy, f.373* Since such a marriage 
could have been ’safely’ contemplated only after a long lapse of 
time Aberdeen ought to have realised how dangerous it was not to 
have squashed the idea at the time.
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in Spain.4 He was also ignorant of the urgency of French designs
2to bring about a quick marriage. Then returning to Madrid xn 
September he suddenly perceived that he was being made a fool of. 
With unwonted zest he conjured up schemes for bringing the French
low.4 He conspired to bring about a Government favourable to a
5Coburg marriage?and sadly misjudging Aberdeen’s character, tried 
to force the Foreign Minister's band by presenting him with a fait 
accompli. Bulwer raised the Coburg bogey. The eclipse of what 
remained of British prestige was so complete that the French would 
find it a comparatively easy task to bring about the Montpensier 
union.
Jones Parry's assessment of Bulwer is judicious and does justice 
to the extenuating circumstances. He has to conclude however that 
’a diplomatic representative who chooses to guide himself by an 
unscrupulous interpretation of his instructions, obeying one 
injunction - i.e. not to be active in favour of the French-sponsored
Trapani marriage - and disregarding another equally vital to his
!• Parry,p.188. It is interesting to notice that while there had been 
a lull in the marriage question during the summer months of '44 
Bulwer was able to settle Moroccan problems quickly and with 
considerably skill. His successes resulted directly from his 
being able to exploit fully British hegemony in Morocco and the 
2 good-will of all parties, France inoludecl.“"
2* Ibid, pp.199-202. *
Ibid, pp.241-2 and p.290. According to the malicious Bresson there 
was little danger to be apprehended ffom a man who spent his time 
in his country-house,away from the capital 'cultivating the last 
dalias, the last roses of autumn, and less perishable flowers'. 
Ibid, p .243*
5* Ibid, pp.240-1. Aberdeen quickly declined to favour them.
* Ibid, pp.279 & 280. Bulwer similarly underestimated Russell's 
intelligence in I863. See below Egypt, p.15^,.and Chapter IV, 
p.UV .
1»
Government's policy, * i.e. to remain strictly neutral - is deserving 
of the most severe censure. Bulwer...must he condemned for rank 
d i s o b e d i e n c e * L a s t l y  he comments on the Coburg project 'if it 
be not permissible to entertain a suspicion that he had hoped the 
scheme would be too far advanced to permit his Government to counter­
mand it, then he must be indicated as a blunderer as well as an 
insubordinate diplomatist'.^
What happened aftswards is not relevant here, though it is 
significant that Bulwer continued in his dangerous ways, but this 
time with Palmerston's approval.'5 Aberdeen, strangely enough, 
magnanimous to a ridiculous degree, maintained his favourable 
impression of Bulwer.
Nevertheless, the unfavourable impression others were forming 
about him were confirmed by his activities 1846-8. Peel had already 
become critical, though in 1848 he held back from attacking Bulwer's 
part in the affair.^ In 1848, after his expulsion, which was chiefly 
a consequence of Palmerston’s handiwork, Stanley too, was to be found 
unfavourably disposed."5 Palmerston and the Court, which was already 
incensed by the I846 debacle, were violent against'him,^ Palmerston
unjustifiably so considering how he allowed Bulwer so much licence in 
Spanish internal politics.^ Even though Bulwer had ignored instructions
Parry,p.289* The parenthetical clauses are mine.
3* Ibid, p.290.
Hall,p.327»andp.411i 'French and British rivalry was actively main­
tained by Bresson and Bulwer,who,with the full knowledge of Palmers- 
. ton,was deeply involved in all the intrigues of the palace'.
5# Parry,p.290, and Greville, Vol.VI, 174.
6. Greville, Vol. VI, 174.
Prince Albert-Duke Ernest,26 May'46.Letters of Prinoe Consort.p.102-3. 
Palmerston-Bulwer,8 May,S/l*'You have roused a monstrous clatter 
about your own head and mine by your Note of J April to Sotomayor. 
Palmerston-Bulwer, 10 May *48, No.49»S/l. Palmerston-Bulwer,
12 May *48, S/l* 'You really are too bad'.
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he had not "been expelled from Spain for this hut for Palmerston’s 
interference. The Queen hit off the whole situation in a hlunt 
hut not exaggerated summary of Bulwer's last three years in Spain:
’He invariably boasted of at least being in the confidence 
of every conspiracy, though'he was taking care not to be 
personally mixed up in them, and after their various 
failures generally harboured the chief actors in his 
house under the plea of humanity. At every crisis he 
gave us to understand that he had to choose between *a 
revolution and a palace intrigue’, and not long ago 
only he wrote to Lord Palmerston, that if the Monarchy 
with the Montpensier succession was inconvenient to us, 
he could get up a Hepublic. Such principles are sure 
to be known in Spain, the more so when one considers the 
extreme vanity of Sir H. Bulwer, and his probably 
imprudence in the not very creditable company which he 
is said to keep. Lord Palmerston will remember that 
the Queen has often addressed herself to him and Lord 
John, in fear of Sir H. getting us into some scrape? and 
if our diplomatists are not kept in better order, the 
Queen may at any moment be exposed to similar insults as 
she has received now in the person of Sir H. Bulwerj 
for in whatever way one may wish to look at it, Sir 
Henry still is her Minister.’ 1
And the Queen refused to consider having Sir Henry Bulwer at
Madrid again.2 Greville called on Bulwer ¿ust after his arrival
from Spain and heard him giving his account of events to Delane.
Greville commented: 'The thing that struck me was the knowledge
which he betrayed of the plots or intrigues that were going on
against the Government, and it does not appear.•.that he ever gave
the benefit of his information to the Spanish Ministers. For
example, he knew of the military insurrection, the day on which,
the place at which, it was to take place, who was t<£ command it, and
I*Victoria-Palmerston, 23 May *48, Letters of Queen Victoria,
Vol. II, 207-8. .
"Ibid, p.211, 15 June '48.
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in short, particulars which implied familiarity, if not complicity 
with the conspirators'.^
But he survived primarily, one suspects, "because Palmerston's
2own prestige was involved in his survival. Bulwer went to 
Washington as Minister to negotiate an agreement to do with commercial 
relations, especially those between Canada and America.^ 
Characteristically, without instructions he came to an agreement, 
the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 19 April 1850, which was an attempt to 
determine the attitude of both Powers to actual problems and questions 
which were likely to arise as their interests clashed in the Central 
American zone.^ The treaty was a compliment to Bulwer's finesse.
In spite of the weakness and vacillation of the administration —  and 
^0 an extent because of this —  and in spite of his own lack of 
guidance on the subject, though presumably he must have previously 
known Palmerston's personal predileotions, Bulwer achieved a settlement 
which after years of haggling provided America and Britain with a 
ffleans of dealing with their problems in Central America in a peaceful 
way. Bulwer's success may be attributed chiefly to that talent for
backstairs diplomacy which had brought about his downfall in 1848.
l.„ ~ “-------------------- :------------------------- -----------------G-reville, Vol, VI, 185* and see Lord Canning to Malmesbury, from 
2^Madrid, Entry 21 Oct. *47» Memoirs of an ex-Minister, Vol. 1, 200.
3 .See above, p.2.3 .
By this time Bulwer had married, Dec. '48, Georgians Charlotte Mary, 
daughter of Henry Wellesley, 1st Baron Cowley and grand-daughter 
of James Cecil, 1st Marquis of Salisbury C.P* This might have been 
a useful match for Bulwer, but in the event it was a never ending 
source of friction, not only taxing Bulwer's strength but also one 
, suspects acting as a bar to the furtherance of his social ambitions. 
The Palmerston Papers may one day reveal the importance of the 
constant and ill-concealed friction between Bulwer and his wife in 
preventing the former obtaining the peerage he so ardently sought 
¿^during the last three years of the Constantinople Embassy.
R.W. Von Alstyne, 'British Diplomacy and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty *, 
Journal of Mod. Hist. XI (1939) p.155»
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Later he himself wrote*
'In America nothing is done with the Government. One must 
influence the people who influence the Government, without 
which the papers that pass between the Secretary and the 
British minister were better thrown into the fire'. 1
Acting upon this precept Bulwer had quickly ingratiated himself 
with potential enemies. By his success and quite possibly because 
of the valuable information on the Mosquito Question he continued 
to give several ministers, notably Lords Granville, Clarendon and 
Palmerston, even as late as 1854,Bulwer may have overcome to some 
extent the suspicions which had been entertained against him before 
he left for Washington.^ Be that as it may, after a quiet but 
successful interlude at Florence as Minister 1852-55» he retired 
la anticipation of the Embassy at Constantinople which was his great 
ambition.^ Instead of this, however, several diplomatic missions 
were entrusted to him in the Levant, the most important of which was 
as Britain's representative in the Commission appointed to implement 
the 23rd Article of the Treaty of Paris. The Commission was to examine 
the conditions of the Danubian Principalities.
As a participant in the actual working out of the details of the
Treaty of Paris, Bulwer in a very real sense was quickly brought up
against the new facts of the international situation. They were such
2.?u^wer“Clarendon, 24 Jan. ’45» Ibid, p.155.Alstyne, p .155-6, and see Envoys. and Levant Herald, 4 Oct. *65» in 
an article on Bulwer's retirement explains that for his successful 
^diplomacy on this occasion he was made a G.C.B.
4>Alstyne, p.152-3, 175 and 179.
^ith reference to Florence see Mon/ypenny and Buckle, Vo/.Ill, 399-401. 
Levant Herald, 4 Oot.'65, suggests that Bulwer went to Florence at his 
own request for reasons of health. For reference to Constantinople 
se® Memoirs of an ex-Minister« Vol. II, 118, Entry 11 May *58»and 
Stanley (Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)- Bulwer,6 Sept. 
'46,8/40* 'I would certainly have been very glad to have done 
everything in my power to have promoted your wishes with regard to
Constantinople'.
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as to render his influence nugatory. For two reasons Bulwer 
reacted strongly against the inertia enforced on the Commission: he 
was loath/ to co-operate with Stratford de Redcliffe, hoping to make 
him seem, if not foolish, at least inadequate} and secondly, he 
genuinely resented the false position in which the Commission was 
placed.^- The upshot was that Bulwer distinguished himself during 
■this period in a way which further underlined his incapacity for 
an important post such as the Embassy at Constantinople. Not only 
was he disloyal to his immediate superior - as he had been to 
Granville and Ponsonby - he also made a point of demonstrating the 
divergence of opinion existing between himself and Stratford. 
Warranted was his anxiety to be given the; documents which concerned 
the problems in hand, and to be informed about British policy, 
especially in view of its ambiguity; less justified was his 
provocation of Lord Stratford in front of all the European
commissioners and the corps diplomatique when the Firman relative to
2the Convocation of the Divans was read.
Reduced to powerlessness, Bulwer tried to maintain his own 
dignity during the crisis of the early months of 1857» by losing his 
temper in the sittings of the Commission, absenting himself entirely
Riker,p.l09. Palmerston-Russell, 10 May *65» PRO.50/22.22:
'Bulwer is a great intriguer. He worked hard to upset Stratford 
2^and get his place'.
This was before the Commissioners left for Jassy. Thouvenel 
shrewdly commented: *Sir Henry Bulwer and Lord Stratford have 
given us the entertaining speotaole of the struggle of a serpent 
with a lion'. Thouvenel-Benedetti, 8 Jan. '57» Trois Années, 
P*65. Riker - The Making of Rumania, p.82, makes the point:
'It would have behoved the new arrival to seek his end by 
personal interviews, instead of writing wordy and meticulous 
complaints*,
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from Bucarest,* attempting to acjs the role of mediator between the 
factions there, and trying to point out to Stratford and his
Government thecmockery which was the policy he was expected to
2uphold. Bulwer objected to the hastening of the election while
3there was the least suspicion of irregularity. However, because of 
the limitations imposed upon him by official policy Bulwer could 
only insist that the Commission could not take action by itself, but 
must await-instructions from-Constantinople. In this manner he 
gratified his desire to play a distinctive role, and to keep within 
the letter of his own instructions.^ During his stay in the
27;
Principalities we may remark Bulwer’s penchant for attempting the 
smart manoeuvre, and for trying for a middle position which he 
lacked substantial power to sustain. It is significant that Bulwer
was already reacting to the diplomatic situation by becoming something
of a legalist, a trait which we shall have cause frequently to observe
5during his seven years as ambassador. *
**Riker,p.98 and 101.April 1857»His ignorance in the interpretation of 
the Firman-which had failed to comprehend the differences between 
Wallachia and Moldavia,-assisted those influences-Austrian,Turkish, 
and Stratford-hastening the elections in spite of the general 
knowledge that the Moldavian electoral lists had been faked. See 
Riker,p.105-7.
Clarendon,to whom Bulwer had expressed his fears without reserve,was 
ready to accept the result of the elections to the divans ad hoc in 
spite of irregularities.Riker,p.114 and 11J.
^‘Riker,p.ll7.Yet Bulwer wrote to Stratford about the suspect nature 
of the lists,and told him that Prokesch was not to be hearkened to. 
Quotes Bulwer-Stratford,no.96,8 July’57,F0.78/1281* ’My impression 
is that if the Russians,Frenoh,Sardinian,and Prussian cabinets carry 
out the positive threats of their commissioners not to recognise the 
Moldavian divan,they will have a strong case for the public,while the
. Porte will stand in an awkward position*.
^*Riker,p.84,119*94 and p.lQ9s .Bulwer,chafing as he did under the 
restrictions thus imposed,was nevertheless so anxious to preserve his 
’balance of power* that he preferred to shelter himself behind a 
screen of academic rectitude instead of joining those members of the 




Frmm the first Thouvenel had been able to count on the
differences between Bulwer and Stratford.^- The French agent in
Jassy, commenting on the strange unanimity of the Commission,
rejoiced in ’the savoury spectacle of Sir Henry Bulwer at Bucarest
lending his support to a view violently attacked by Lord Stratford
2at Constantinople. Baron Talleyrand-Perigord, amused with Bulwer,
described him as one 'who searched a quarrel with everyone in his
> 3fits of crotchety temper.
Riker, though pointing to Bulwer’s deranged liver as1an 
extenuating circumstance/, submits that Bulwer was 'something of a 
busybody' and 'oversensitive on the point of dignity’.^ And 
whatever the merits of Bulwer as a diplomatist at this time, and 
these would seem not to have been extraordinary, the impression we . 
receive of him as a person does nothing to make one question the 
image already in mind. Sly, disloyal and a little ridiculous, he 
lacked the qualities to be expected in a reliable representative.
A lack of integrity was a considerable failing not to be excused 
by the conditions under which Bulwer laboured, the difficulties 
with Lord Stratford, and his own ill-health.
Bulwer's marriage to Georgianci Charlotte Mary Wellesley** only
brought serious disadvantages which in turn influenced his health
|«Trois Années p . 6 5 ,  Thouvenel-Benedetti, 8 Jan ’57»
,Ibid, p.109.
'‘Ibid, p.129*
j!*Riker, p.82 and 83s 'Eulwer's liver was periodically deranged'. 
^‘See above, pas,note 3 •
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and temper. It has to he said, however, that as far as one 
can tell, this had no adverse effect on his actions during his 
Constantinople Embassy.1 But it almost certainly influenced 
Bulwer's relations with Palmerston and Russell who must have 
known about the state of Bulwer's marriage.
lady Bulwer turned out to be as extravagant as her
husband who was himself extravagant and constantly beset by 
2money troubles. The financial advantages which Bulwer
ki/nanticipated from the marriage, causing^to increase his 
wife’s allowance and to allow himself some greater luxuries^ 
were never forthcoming. The situation which developed as a
*0n one occasion his absenting himself at Scutari for health 
reasons laid him open to charges of conspiracy against the 
Sultan. See below, p.3>9Ln. *2. .
2#Stanley (Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) —  Bulwer, 
8 March '47 and others T/40. Stanley was evidently alarmed 
at the expenditure of Bulwer on his residence, see Jones 
Parry, p.289» ’Bulwer's pride was engaged in this 
enterprise (i.e. the Coburg match)} and he no doubt had 
visions of putting to good use the grand equipage, consisting 
of eight horses, a chariot, and a state coach, which he 
had brought back with him in 1845 in preparation for the 
Queen’s wedding day'.
Meynell (Banker) - Bulwer, St. Remo, 8 May '65 and others T/8t 
'I cannot consent to accept by instalments the money I lent 
to you on bloc...'
H.P. Fenton-Bulwer, several, T/38, for post-1861, Bulwer 
had this agent rummaging around for the;best copies of 
: famous portraits. In his situation, thus to furnish a 
house on an island which he seldom saw, was, to say the 
least, Bohemian.
Judging from the reference in Sir E. Hornby- Autobiography 
p .15 3 , Bulwer also kept a stable for horse-racing. -
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consequence showed up Bulwer in a mean light, As time passed
e** 2his health detiorated, and his marital relations became morer
sharply disturbed, with the result that he spent many a night 
at Pera unable to sleep because of his intense
’Bulwer- Lord Salisbury, 15 May ’61 T/52* 'You know that during 
Lady Cowley's life-time I had to meet all the expenses of our 
joint establishment. This together with my being some time out 
of employment and having to pay from my official income when at 
Washington, occasioned debts which for the last three years 
I have been endeavouring to, and succeeding in paying off..
At Lady Cowley’s death I expected a great increase of income, 
and allowed Lady Bulwer to augment the expenses of the House in 
oonsequence, and was not so scrupulous as to my own - not one 
farthing however has yet reached mel Counting, as I have said... 
(on an increase in fortune)...(having otherwise allotted as I 
have stated my offioial income) I made engagements with the 
Bankers here accordingly. These by the present unexpected 
delays I break, and the only thing I can do is to settle them 
by paying from 8 to 10 per cent for the advance*.
Bulwer - William Bulwer, 29 May *61: 'It is all very well talking 
of my interest but it was not my interest to take the interest... 
Neither is it my interest to delay the payment of Lady B's 
annuity in order to throw a greater burden on me. The whole 
affair of the family is to screw me down to the last point and
.has always been so, both in the marriage settlement and'Lady 
Cowley's will, which was in fact a swindling evasion of an 
agreement. I must say Lady B. joins in nothing of this kind, 
but the family should know that if they act in this way they 
separate Lady B. and myself because I will not be so treated, 
and then, because I am ruined by the expenses of a marriedmenage - 
reproached for extravaganoe. Either Lady B's income must 
assist mine, or she must not create a charge upon it.
...in the meantime...we are in great distress since I have gone 
on apportioning my own income to the settlemént of old accounts, 
and spent nevertheless more in the Household, conoeiving I had 
a larger income which has been taken from me*. It was not 
until late in 1864 that the difficulties arising from the 
marriage were settled. See Barnes and Elliss (Bulwer's lawyers) - 
Bulwer, 22 Sept. '64, T/81.
p’There are several letters from different sources commiserating 
with him, or complimenting him on a recent recovery. Especially 
warm were the letters from Baron Prokesch, the Austrian 
Internuncio. e.g. to Bulwer 23 Nov. ’64» and 7 Deo. T/77.
The’letters cover the whole of the Constantinople Embassy, 
see also Bulwer - A'ali Pasha, 20 Feb. 65 T/IO5 and Bulwer - 
Layard, 9 July '63, and Hyde Clarke from Smyrna, 28 Oct. '64,
T/84 which suggest Bulwer to have been a martyr to sciatica.
irritability.'* 1' How far this diminished his efficiency it is
impossible to discover. Certainly the sudden flurry of activity
with which., much to his personal credit, he brought the Servian
difficulties to a satisfactory conclusion, followed immediately
2on a nearly fatal illness. The anxiety to travel to different
parts of the Empire, chiefly to Syria and Egypt, seems to have been
caused at least in part by his genuine need for a better climate
and his hypochondria.^ Further he was far better informed as a
^Bulwer - Lady Bulwer, 5 May 1861, T/52. ’I passed the whole 
night with fever in consequence of this constant agitation.
...I...suggested merely as a friendly and practical expedient 
your going to London to settle our affairs, since you said you 
were always so bored here - or if that did not suit, taking for 
the summer months a small house at the islands - so that one 
might find some excuse for breaking up the establishment:.,.
I am in hopes your good sense and reflection will ultimately 
come to your aid, and that through these means you will not 
render a casual difference which I have not desired to provoke, 
one of a very serious nature, which it would naturally become 
if you persevered in your present behaviour'.
Ibid, 4 May, Bulwer - Lady Bulwer: 'I cannot bear this conduct 
any longer and will not see you again whilst here, if you continue 
to behave in this way...I beg you to allow me to shut up the 
house for a short time.
...Is there any idea or plan which strikes you? I am 
willing to agree to all that is possible or reasonable - but I 
cannot assent to keeping up a large establishment, because it 
will not only prevent my getting quit of thé debts here which - 
ought really to be paid, but because I could not meet the 
demands which it would occasion.
...Has any wife even the least blameable a right to treat 
her husband as you do me?...to be worried and teazed and abused 
without a rational motive, I will not and cannot (submit)...'
^*See below Ch. IV, p.2.i"3 .
 ̂* Eg. B.P., Bulwer - Layará, 9 Jnly *63, T/70: 'I am not quite 
certain whether I shall go to European waters wfcicl Doctors advise 
for two months..»or whether I shall content myself with a short 
Turkish trip. I want some break in this daily work. Perhaps 
in Winter I could go to Egypt*. „
And Buker - Nubar Pasha, 29 Nov. '64, T/83* Bulwer intended to go 
to Egypt for health reasons} and Bulwer - A'ali, 20 Feb. *65, 
T/102, from Suez, and Prokesch - Bulwer, 5 July *64, T/77. The 
internuncio expressed satisfaction that Bulwer had gone to the 
Archipelago, for he felt Bulwer was too depressed these days.
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consequence. Even so, one wonders how much more efficient he 
might have been with good health and more orthodoxy.^" He would 
not have been obliged to visit Scutari so often. A natural
pconsequence might have been improved relations with the Sultan.
The sudden outbreaks of irritation and temper over some petty mistake
of a member of the embassy staff might have been less frequent.^
And since British prestige in the Levant was so much a question of
•face* a more solid, healthier, and less capricious person might
have succeeded better in preserving the dignity and respectability
the lack of which could provide useful material for gossip in official
^'Bulwer - Lord Cowley, 16 Oct. *61 T/52. Bulwer had been on a trip to 
various parts of the country around Broussa in spite of his own 
admission that he had more work piling up than he was capable of 
dealing with. 'One finishes however by becoming like the Hackney 
coach hors$, who has hardly a leg to stand upon, but is sustained 
„ by his harness'.
'Exactly what influence an Ambassador had in this respect one cannot 
discover. On one occasion only we are allowed a keyhold glimpse 
into the life of the corps diplomatique. We see the effects mere 
absence could entail in an atmosphere peculiarly tense owing to 
the psychological in-breeding, induced by too close proximity in a 
locality where it was indeed difficult enough for Europeans to 
keep unimpaired their sense of proportion and western civility.
The events took place laterin August. (See Bulwer - Ludolf 17 and 19 
Sept, and Bulwer Memo, T/91)» Bulwer had a habit of going to 
Scutari on Tuesdays or Wednesdays, chiefly to find the fresh air.
He states himself (see Memo, ibid): *1 had there the tranquility 
that is not always at Therapiaj I had no Pera hills to climb under 
a burning sun.•.As the air and the situation of Scutari pleased me 
and as it is nearer to the Porte and affairs than Therapia, I stayed 
sometimes a day more than what was really necessary*. Unfortunately 
for Bulwer he was entertained there by Dr. Pieipio (usually referred 
to as Marco Bey) himself, Aziz Effendi's own doctor* Previous to 
this Bulwer had arranged at El-Hami Pasha's house (the Sultan's 
brother-in-law) to meet him on his yacht the next day. On leaving 
the Pasha, Bulwer, walking home in the gloom of the night had 
accosted, as he thought, the captain of El-Hami's yacht as he passed 
the ship, and told him that he and El-Hami would join him the next 
day. It was however Aziz Effendi's yacht. The Sultan *of course, 
linking together Bulwer's intimacy with the doctor of the heir- 
apparent and this incident,expressed displeasure and asked for an 
explanation.Rumour had it that Bulwer had been mixed up in a 






circles. The urgent need for a peerage from 1862 33.surely reflected
Bulwer's awareness of something lacking in his ambassadorial
equipment. The tense relations with Russell were also in part a 
consequence of the Foreign Minister's deeply felt dissatisfaction 
with Bulwer's ’goings on'.1
If Bulwer explained correctly regarding the intrigues against
2him, and Russell obtained his information from reliable sources, 
one may only conclude that Bulwer's dismissal, was a mere matter 
of time after 1862. Though the reasons, expressed as justifying 
it were completely at odds with the actual facts, they were neverbe- 
less a response to a sure intuition on Russell's part that Bulwer 
did not fit into the Victoriaii social cosmology.
It was unfortunate that Bulwer's policy towards Egypt, though
more intelligent and imaginative than the official one, diverged
*from Russell’s and especially Palmerstonts views. Again Bulwer 
had an approach to the general problems of Turkish reform that was
decidedly more experimental than Palmerston’s, Russell being some­
what indifferent.^
Yet these differences might easily have been overlooked by >
1#Bulwer - Russell, 29 Jan '63, T/70. Russell had referred Bulwer's 
request to Lord Palmerston, who had strong feelings in the matter 
Palmerston - Russell, 10 Jan. ’63, PRO.30/22 I4i »You may tell 
Bulwer I oannot make him a Peer, but I- havp t*Upon reading U s  latter to y o i T i C t  hU ilsh
I wrote to him to say you had shown it mes and that it bid me to 
do what I had long intended but had always.put off as a disagreeable 
thing, namely to tell him the unfavourable reports of his private 
goings on which almost everybody who comes from Constantinople 
brought with them, but I urged him to mend his ways...You asked me 
to write to him about these matters a year ago, but I am sorry 
to say I put it off from time to time till the other dav'.
'See Appendix A. . * *
‘See below Ch. V, p.Y37 
*See below Ch. Ill, p •11S
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Russell had the tension between himself and his agent been less
rooted in the deeper, ineradicable, personal antipathy. In the -
event both Russell and Layard,1 reacted violently to Bulwer*s
rumoured participation in a private scheme for converting the public
debt of Turkey, and to his alleged dunning of the Viceroy in the
sale of the Isle of Plati. Their immediate desire was to see
' 2Bulwer as a culprit, and they gave him short shrift. Here no 12
1*A.H. Lay'ard, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
2*Bulwer had discussed with Mallet and Hottinguer in Paris in general 
terms the idea of a Conversion of the Debt of Turkey. On J1 March 
*65, a Contract was signed between the General Credit Co. and the 
Turkish Government. A few careless words from some acquaintances ! 
of Bulwer, especially S. Laing of the London Offices, and Sir H. 
Drummond Wolff, though harmless in themselves, persuaded suspicious 
minds that Bulwer had taken part in negotiations on the side of 
the General Credit Co. to produce the scheme which was eventually ... 
successful in spite of the hostility of the British backed 
Imperial Ottoman Bank. In fact, of course, Bulwer’s chat with 
Mallet had nor.aonnection whatsoever with other developments taking 
place simultaneously. Bulwer judiciously refrained from interference i 
Bayard’a first accused Bulwer and later asked for explanations, j
finally making a lame apology. Bulwer returned with interest j
accusing Layard, perhaps rightly, of being privy to his own notice j 
of dismissal, and of not being a gentleman, Buiwer-Layard, 23 Sept. 
•65, T/102.
Concerning the Isle of Plati whioh Bulwer received as a gift from 
the Sultan, there is not a doubt that Bulwer sold it at a price j
which merely covered his expenses in improving the island and the j 
residence on it. !
Regarding the Laing Conversion Scheme the case for Bulwer may be ] 
found in the following letters* T/102, Bulwer - Philip Rose, 1 July j 
•65} Bulwer - Russell, 12 April *65 no. 38; A ’ali Pasha - Bulwer, i 
26 April '65; Bulwer - Merton 25 Aug. *65$ Louis Merton - Bulwer, j 
28 Aug. '65 which is the definitive explanation of all the events;
Mr. Sansom - Bulwer, 22 Aug, '65* Bulwer - Layard,'20 May *65*
Wolff - Laing 14 April *65* Bulwer - Wolff, copy, 19 May *65* 
folff •* Bulwer, 22 Feb and 2 Feb* against Bulwer* S. Laing - 
Palmerston, 17 March ’65* S. Laing - Palmerston, 30 March »65* 
Russell - Bulwer, 30 April *65, no.9* extract from Mr. Bayard's 
private letter of 20 July '65.
The explanation of the Isle of Plati deal may be found in the 
following letters* T/99, Henri Oppenheim - Bulwer, 1 Aug. *65*
R.L. Stevens - Bulwer 28 Feb. '65* Alberti Oppenheim,23 July '64*
H. Oppenheim,25 Jan.*65,and most important G & D 30/22 14»12 July 
,’65, Palmerston to Russell,where the former assumes Bulwer's 
innocence.
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question of policy was involved. Justified as were Bulwer’s 
heat and intensity, as he tried in vain to exculpate himself, 
there was something hypocritical in his righteous indignation. 
He had been po paragon of virtue; he had not invited respect.
Russell and Layard did not need to have sound pretexts. Bulwer was
an easy victim.
Bulwer was a hangover from the Regency period, the sort of 
headache which Queen Victoria and the newly conformed Palmerston 
could hardly forgive. Respectability seemed to have taken him
The above sketch of Bulwer's public image - rather than his character- 
is confirmed by contemporary opinion which is consistent and tells 
its own tale.
Bulwer’s talents are unquestioned but there is a general 
agreement that as a person he was not all that he might have been.
’A brilliant but unprincipled man', he was in the Reverend
2 'Washburn#’s eyes. Lord Clarendon seemed to have expected the
worst, and said so in a letter to Bulwer’s brother-in-law, Lord
Cowley*
’...it would be impossible not to feel that the state 
of the Embassy and the doings of Bulwer were a scandal 
and. that the name and interests of England in the 
East were grievously injured. X have not heard what
unawares. His way of living brought him into conflict with Russell 
 
and Palmerston, and Layard, while the Queen had never liked him.1
■̂ ‘Palmerston - Russell, 27 July 1865, (0 & D 30/22 22).
o‘Fifty Years at Constantinople, p.438, and p.ll,
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was the determining point of the Earl’s resolution - 
whether it was some particular act of Bulwer’s or the 
accumulation of them, hut he has more than once told 
me that he would recall him, only Palmerston would 
not hear of it *• 1
Russell thought Buiwer's’ talents 'very considerable', hut 
wondered that he could not have been 'more discreet, more prudent, 
and more moral'. Palmerston had to tell Bulwer in January of 
1863 what he had been intending to say for the previous twelve 
months, namely that everybody knew of his private goings-on at 
Constantinople and that he should mend his ways. He was appalled
2by Bulwer's lack of dignity of character and his tremendous conceit. 
An appraisal of Bulwer's embassy 1858-65 would be incomplete
without this picture of Bulwer. It contributes to an explanation 
why, for example, he was slow in winning over the Foreign Office 
to his Suez policies, and more generally, why his voice was not
so impressive at home as it might have been in the matter of Turkish
l.The Paris Embassy during the Second Empire.p.285.As Clarendon 
remarks^Palmerston and Russell were divided over Bulwer.The last 
was the wrong man for the post as I have already pointed out(above, 
p ,6 .),and Russell must have dimly perceived why.Palmerston tended 
to approve of Bulwer's interference in the forming and unforming of 
Turkish cabinets.Palmerston also viewed with a good deal of scepti­
cism the rumours about Bulwer in connection with the sale of the 
Isle of Plati.In the letter quoted above Clarendon went, on to sayi 
•I suppose,however,that Palmerston got afraid of upholding him 
any longer for Delane is, or pretends to be,in possession of some 
ugly facts about money matters,and secrets in such keeping might at 
any moment become public.B. must have been living in a fool's ]
Paradise, and (sio)believing that he had made lapLuie et le beau ! 
temps at Constantinople'. ■ : i
^‘Ibid.Why his talents were unquestioned one is at a loss to discover. 
The Tories,of course,lacked men for diplomatic postsjhence Bulwer*s 
promotion at their hands was explicable.The Queen thought he was a j 
shady intriguer,Melbourne considered him to be clever,keen,and j
suspicious,by which he may have meant too clever by far,and Palmers* j 
ton isk 1865 had misgivings about Bulwer as an effective diplomatist. ; 
Palmerston-Russell,12 July'65»(Q&D 30/22 14)* ’As to Bulwer I very 
much agree with you.He is a very clever man,and according to his own 
statements he directs everything*all that goes aright is due to him, all that goes wrong is the fault of others.He has no dignity of^ .
Sharacter ana it may be doubted.whether he has as much influence at onstantmople as he represents' .Russell for a change was being generous.After 1841 the Whisrs alwavs inherited Bulwer.
reform. It explains his actual downfall, consequent on those 
qualities in his make-up which in the full-tide of Victorian 
humbug could not but make a man unpopular. At a time when another 
concept of the good diplomatist was being acknowledged, if only 
subconsciously, a man like Bulwer of necessity acted like grit in 
the diplomatic machine. The image which he projected on to the 
diplomatic screen was not one likely to make the hard business of 
daily routine, so much a part of the representative’s task, an 
easy one.
Yet, despite the contemporary opinion, it will be seen that 
Bulwer's achievement at Constantinople was not unpraiseworthy, 
even though it brought him no acclaim. From the analyses of his 
contribution to the problems which arose, it will become apparent 
that with the assumption of pfcwer at Constantinople, Bulwer, at the 
age of fifty-seven, had reached the peak of his powers. . His 
astuteness in negotiations remained, likewise his talent for 
producing compromise solutions. The inability to take the large 
view, the bad tactical judgment which he had shown in Spain, and 
his tendency to be disloyal would all be in evidence in the final
phase. Yet, by reason of the telegraph Bulwer was kept very much 
under Bussell’s keen surveillance. Further, on occasions, Bulwer 
showed a breadth of view, chiefly in his attitude to the general 
problem of Turkey’s continued existence, and in the prolonged Suez 
crises, which may be explained only by the experience which he 
acquired at that most responsible of posts.
This does not answer a less important question which naturally 
poses itself. How had Bulwer, despite the known weaknesses in his
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character, been able to rise to such an eminence? This is
answered simply. He was lucky. After 1841 the Whigs always
Inherited Bulwer.^ And, generally, he was more whole-heartedly
appreciated by Tory-ish politicians like Lord Stanley, Aberdeen,
and Disraeli, than by the Whigs. The tone of familiarity and
confidence which Aberdeen 1843-46, even Sir Robert Peel, and then 
2 -Disraeli, adopted towards Bulwer contrasts strikingly with
Palmerston’s casual and official attitude 1846-48,^ and, later,
with Russell’s aloofness and readiness to carp. The Tories, it
has teabe said, suffered from the disadvantage of having few
candidates to choose from,^ In 1856, the Whigs considered sending
Bulwer to Victoria as Governor, which as far as Bulwer was
concerned would have been a disappearing act par excellence. He •
5declined. I mention this because Bulwer is traditionally 
associated with Palmerston as ’one of Palmerston's most brilliant, 
2*See above, p.“34n.2..
‘See Mon^ypenny & Buckle,Vol. 1, 124} Vol. Ill,182,and 399-400.
^ ‘After a brief and impulsive consideration of the idea of returning 
Bulwer to Spain in 1849» a scheme squashed by the Queen,Palmerston 
discreetly disposed of Bulwer by sending him to Washington as 
Envoy extraordinary and Minister. He wrote: 'I am authorised to 
offer you this post, and under existing circumstances I strongly 
advise you to accept it....though you would not wish under 
ordinary circumstances to cross the Atlantic yet it would have the 
advantage of getting you honourably out of all embarrassment as to 
the question of returning or not returning to Madrid. It would 
be a public proof of the confidence which H.M.*s Government 
reposed in you...' (S/1,26 January ’49)» From this one might gather 
that it was Bulwer and not Palmerston that was the objeot of the 
attacks in the Commons. (See Greville Memoirs Vol. VI,194 and S/2, 
Aberdeen-Bulwer,23 June'48; 'You must have seen that there is no 
. disposition in any quarter to fix the blame personally on you'). 
4*Even so, it was a Conservative minister that enabled Bulwer to 
return to an epicentre of international affairs in 1858-after a 
c period in the wilderness from Bulwer's point of view.
^ Letters of Queen Victoria, Vol. II, 242.
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if also unsafest, pupils’.1 In fact, though Bulwer's notions
on politics, as indicated in his writings, corresponded very closely
with a recognisable core of liberal-Whiggish notions which were
the inheritance of both the Conservative and the Whig parties, it
is significant that he had an admiration for Sir Robert Peel only
surpassed by his veneration of Canning, both Tories and one a great
2hater of Palmerston.
Prom this story of his career, to complete the analysis,perhaps
some conel\isions may be drawn about him as a person. Tradition
has it that he was in some way an oddity, while the more substantial
studies of him make him seem unattractive and of ordinary talent.
On the whole the last part of the description is fairly accurate.
To explain the first part it is necessary to make one or two
inferences about Bulwer in his social context.
He was a product of a time when sense and sensibility were
competing for the soul of the ruling clique. Romanticism acted
on a society esentially cynical, rational and earthy, to induce
in the short run a startling subversion of ideas of social
responsibility. The effects on genius might have been felicitous,
but on mere competence they were distinctly unfortunate. Bulwer,
an adequate person who in another age would have achieved nothing
in politics, might have become apolitical commentator or collector
of specimens. His writings on the social and political scene,
especially the sociological ones, indicate a power for mature and
Murray-Ednmnd Hornby,An Autobiography, Intro, p.9.
*’Sir Robert Peel', 'Canning',in Historical Characters-H.L. Bulwer,
^‘Jones Parry and Riker.
d e t a c h e d  o b s e r v a t i o n .  B u l w e r  was  a t  h i s  b e s t  when he w a s  n o t  
i n v o l v e d .  As  s o o n  a s  h e  b e c a m e  i n v o l v e d  h i s  s e n s e  o f  r e a l i t y  
d e s e r t e d  h i m .  I n  t h e  p o s i t i o n s  w h i c h  he a t t a i n e d  t h i s  h a d  
r e s u l t e d  o c c a s i o n a l l y  i n  a  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  c o m p r o m i s e  when i t  was  
w e a k n e s s  t o  d o  s o , "  o r  i n  s o p h i s t r y  i n  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  
i n s t r u c t i o n s , 2 o r  i n  i n t r i g u e . ' ’
The y o u n g  B u i w e r ’ s  c u l t i v a t e d  h i g h  s p i r i t s ,  h i s  c a u s t i c  w i t  
a n d  s a r c a s t i c  m a n n e r  -  l i k e w i s e  t h e  m a r i t a l  an d  f i n a n c i a l  
e x t r a v a g a n z a  -  w e r e  p o s s i b l y  r e a c t i o n s  t o  a n  i n n e r  f r u s t r a t i o n ,  a n  
i n a b i l i t y  t o  f i n d  t h o s e  c e r e b r a l  p l e a s u r e s  w h i c h  i n  a n o t h e r  t i m e  
he m i g h t  h a v e  b e e n  o b l i g e d  t o  c u l t i v a t e .  The  d a n d y  a f f e c t a t i o n s  
w e r e  a  p o o r  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  t h e  d e l i g h t s  o f  t h e  i m a g i n a t i o n  w h i c h  
h e  h a d  n e i t h e r  t h e  w i l l  n o r  p e r h a p s  t h e  f u n d s  t o  s e e k  a f t e r .
F u r t h e r  t h e y  c o v e r e d  up h i s  l i m i t e d  t a l e n t .
H i s  p r o g r e s s ,  t o o  r a p i d  f o r  a  man o f  h i s  q u a l i t y ,  a c c e n t u a t e d
w h a t  o n e  s u r m i s e s  was  a  f e e l i n g  o f  i n s e c u r i t y .  He p r a i s e d  h i s
t r i u m p h s  a s  u n u s u a l  o n e s ,  an d  e l e v a t e d  h i s  own i m p o r t a n c e ,  when i n
f a c t  t h e  s u c c e s s e s  w o u ld  b e  s m a l l ,  a n d  h i s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  a f f a i r s
4
n o t  i n d i s p e n s a b l e .  H i s  r e p o r t s  on h i s  i m m e d i a t e  s u p e r i o r s ,
w h e t h e r  G r a n v i l l e ,  P o n s o n b y ,  o r  S t r a t f o r d  d e  R e d c l i f f e ,  c o m p e n s a t e d
f o r  h i s  r e l a t i v e  i n s i g n i f i c a n c e .  D u r i n g  h i s  l a s t  e m b a s s y ,  when a
q u i e t  a s s u r a n c e  a n d  m o d e r a / t i o n  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  h i s  g e n e r a l  c o n d u c t
o f  a f f a i r s ,  e v e n  t h e n  t h e  p a i n s  h e  t o o k  t o  p a i n t  a  p i c t u r e  o f
^ ‘See above, p . ' s ,  n .  5  , p . , n . l  , an d  p . 2_/.
‘ S e e  a b o v e ,  p . 1 1 ,  and b e l o w  Ch.  V, p 28S-# a n d  Ch.  1 7 ,  p 7 i 7 - ? .
^ ‘ S e e  a b o v e ,  p
' S e e  a b o v e ,  p . ( 5  , f o r  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  1 8 J 8  n e g o t i a t i o n s  a n d  
b e l o w  C h .  7 ,  pl9%  f o r  h i s  r e a c t i o n s  t o  h i s  d i s m i s s a l .
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himself surrounded hy intrigues, disloyalty, and of himself, ill 
hut triumphing over all by a manly straightforwardness, revealed 
again his inner dissatisfaction. Probably a similar motivation 
kept him actively movig around the Levant, acting as an agent for 
the Societe des Travaux publics et Banque d*Orient, till his death 
in Naples in 1872.
The basic egotism tended to prevent him achieving an harmonious 
working relationship with people outside the narrow circle of the 
corps diplomatique. Fortunately for his own reputation, the coming 
of the telegraph meant that the preoccupation with dignity could 
not involve him in the kind of embarrassments which were a feature 
of his Spanish embassy.
As will be seen, his period of office at Constantinople, was
one of relative quiescence in which negotiations tended to resolve
themselves into small-change bartering.^- Bulwer was thus not
entirely unsuited to his post at Constantinople. His previous
success had all been a consequence of his talent for hard bargaining.
He had been able to intrigue and manoeuvre to his heart's content
2to settle the Central American and Moroccan problems. Especially
had he excelled in the latter when the personal element had been
reduced to a bare minimum. It was to his advantage in 1858 that he
had an opportunistic approach to all problems. In every way he was
a light allegretto after the ponderous, and searching andante of
Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, a great initial advantage. These were
^'Lords Cowley and Lufferin settled the major problems, the
Principalities and the Lebanon, while even the Suez business was 




reasons why he should have achieved some success at Constantinople. 
Thirty years in the diplomatic service had equipped him with the 
techniques necessary in such a place. Given the growing Ffench , 
ascendancy and England’s general impotence in Europe, his 
profuseness in devices would he very useful. Despite his bouts 
of ill-temper, he generally succeeded in maintaining a sophisticated 
facade. Even at the end of his Embassy when he was eaten up by 
the thought of having to leave, Lord Lyons had to remarks
'He has been so friendly and agreeable, that I half 
blame myself for not being more willing to see him 
again here.’ 1
;L• To Russell, 25 October I865, G & D J0/22.
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CHAPTER II
Factors of British Foreign Policy
A significant change took place in the Near Eastern situation 
during the years 1854-6. France msbed Britain from its 
preeminent place in Turkish counoils. French victories and 
efficiency in the war had impressed the Turks, most sensitive 
to arguments based on power. The remarkable drive shown by 
French diplomatists, during the years immediately following the 
Treaty of Paris, reinforced Napoleon Ill's diplomatic strength 
based on the intimacy developing between Paris and Turin, and 
Paris and St. Petersburg. At Constantinople, Thouvenel, despite 
his wit and good humour, fought a grim battle with Stratford de 
Redcliffe for influence over the Porte. Some time before de 
Redcliffe's dismissal the Turkish ministers, including the most 
pro-British, Reschid Pasha, were irritated by the English 
ambassador's bullying methods. His eventual withdrawal from the 
scene of his triumphs was welcomed by them. The manner in which 
it came about underlined the triumph of French policy in establishing 
the hegemony of France in the area.
The period of transition, thus, might be considered as 
terminated with the change of English ambassadors. For, 
significantly, Sir Henry Bulwer, almost certainly chosen for the 
Constantinople embassy because of his practical acquaintance with 
the difficulties inherent in the new situation which had developed, 
was not the strong man in the traditional mould, like Ponsonby and
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Stratford de Redcliffe. He was a man with remarkable powers 
of endurance in committee, and, perhaps, an even more valuable 
facility in finding compromise solutions. Certainly Sir Henry 
Bulwer saw himself cast in this role; and, however much his policies 
may be criticised, his diagnosis of the diplomatic dtuation was sound. 
In explaining the difficulty he had in trying to persuade the 
Porte to do something about reform, Bulwer remarked that up to the i 
Crimean War Stratford de Redcliffe and Reschid Pasha had had things 
their own way, but unfortunately the tremendous increase in the 
reputation of the French arms had enoouraged the young and aspiring 
politicians to look to the French ambassador for patronage. He 
went on*
'I arrived here at that time. Had I been disposed to 
pursue the previous policy of Lord Stratford I should 
have committed an anachronism (sic), for the grounds on 
which that policy had been based and supported no <
logger existed*. 1
To attempt a friendly understanding with Thouvenel, French 
ambassador, and the politicians whose star was in the ascendant, was 
naturally Bulwer's interest.
Of course, neither Bulwer nor any other person of affairs 
could have appreciated how radical was the change taking place in 
European politics. And only experience would show how it would 
affect British interests. Adjustment would have to be slow owing 
to the weight of that heritage, traditional policy towards the 
Ottoman Empire. It had been formed to cop© with different 
contingencies. Bulwer himself at least sensed this when he emphasised
^■*Bulwer - Russell, 20 August *60, FO. 78/1637.
1how different Russian methods were, though not their objectives.
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In analysis here of the factors in British foreign policy 
in the Near East, and then of the altered international situation 
in 1854-6 will explain Bulwer's difficulties, and provide a means 
of assessing the ambassador's own reactions to a novel problem.
Prom 1827-33 Russo-phobia had been the dominating influence
in British policy towards the Ottoman Empire. The advance into
Georgs* and upon Erzeroum, the key to Asia Minor, and the defeat of
Persia making the Caspian Sea into a Russian lake, had brought
Russia dangerously close to the lines of communication with India.
The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi completed Russian triumphs by giving
the Tsar's government a diplomatic ascendancy at Constantinople.
The threat to Bagdad and the influence Russia acquired by the
Treaty of 1833 had persuaded Palmerston that Turkish integrity
was vital to the security of the British Empire. During the
years 1839-41 Palmerston acted upon this assumption, seizing the
opportunity not only to undermine Russian hegemony, but also to
curtail French influence in the area, which though of secondary
importance, was nevertheless hostile to British interests in the 
2Mediterranean. 1
1. Bulwer-Malmesbury,21 June'59,PRO 30/22 88:'Egypt, the Princi- 
palities,and Servia,might easily be severed from the Ottoman 
rule by foreign interference.Serious troubles might in the same 
way be excited in Bosnia and Bulgaria.In short,if one or more 
great European Powers were to attack Turkey,and others did not 
come to her support, she would fall to pieces...I do not believe 
that the Russian Government will lose an opportunity like the 
present of regaining the position she occupied previous to the 
late war...whatever may be the course she may finally adopt,to 
maintain a state of things menacing to the Turkish Empire,and to 
soothe the Turkish Cabinet by friendly assurances appears not 
2 unnaturally her policy for the moment*.
* Puryear-France and the Levant,p,143.Wellington and Aberdeen made 
a similar choice. ■ :
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The Russian thrust through Georgia, and the Egyptian
acquisition of the four pashaliks, had emphasised the strategic 
0significance of the area where the Mesopotamian lands adjoined 
Syria and eastern Anatolia. This region assumed an importance 
which it was not to lose until the construction of the Suez Canal. 
Confronted by the difficulties involved in the preservation of a 
favourable political authority over these territories, Palmerston's 
determination had been that a rejuvenated Turkish Empire, directed 
from Constantinople, should be the guardian rather than Egypt 
sponsored by France.^'
Developments in the 1840s gave further justification to this
policy. At this time the Suez Canal projects became plausible.
The Foreign Office quickly showed its hostility by pushing forward
the idea of an Alexandria-Cairo-Suez rail-track. Then in the
mid-fifties a Mediterranean-Persian Gulf line through the Euphrates
Valley, a revival of a plan discarded in the '30s, was advocated.
The political significance of this was as a piece to counter French
influence in Egypt and Syria, and to forestall the Russian advance
2 ■on the Persian Gulf. *
X. Puryear,ibid, though failing to establish a connection between the 
increase in French trade in the Ottoman Empire and particularly 
in Egypt, and Anglo-French hostility, shows clearly the conflicting 
political and strategic interests of the two Powers.
Throughout the period up to the denouement of 1841 French interests j 
and prestige required a reassertion of the traditional authority 
of France in the Mediterranean. North Africa was the sphere to 
which her efforts were directed for there French and Egyptian power j 
oould be extended without dangerously compromising Turkish integrity1 
These were pernicious developments for Britain,for from the late \ 
months of 1829 .the possibilities of transporting mail to India,via ; 
_ Syria and Mesopotamia,were being seriously considered.-
* cf.Hoskins.-British Routes to India,which gives a too complicated 
interpretation of the effects on railway strategy of the Osborne , 
meeting. It was simply the traditional dislike of guaranteeing 
future returns on capital outlay that prevented these schemes from 
ever becoming practicable in England.
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Thus, the strategic interests of Britain determined that
policy which required Turkish control over the Straits, and over
an irreducible minimum of territory, if not necessarily over the
whole of the region traditionally under Ottoman sway. During the
period under consideration the area controlling the routes of
communication, actual and probable, coincided with Egypt, Syria,
Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and the south-west of the Arabian
Peninsula. By 1841 the broad lines of policy had been settled,
and were not to change until after 1880.
The policy had necessitated vigorous diplomatic activity
against Russia at Constantinople. It precluded sympathy for
communities struggling for independence, for it was felt that the
Turkish Empire could not long survive any violent shock.1 The fate
of the whole was involved in the fortunes of the parts. It had
meant keeping a watchful eye on French activities in Egypt and
Syria, countries where, traditionally, France had taken a great
interest for commercial reasons, and in the latter case because of a
religious sympathy. The divergence between French ambitions and'
British interests,.which was scarcely hidden by international
complications such as the Greek Revolution and the Egyptian advance
into Asia Minor, would manifest itself during the Syrian crises of
the 'forties, during the Crimean War, and increasingly so afterwards
when it would become clear that France did not place much faith in
2Turkish integrity as the best means of furthering her interests.
1#cf. Puryear-International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near 
..East, v.b5. '
C. •
See below, p .55 •
In a word, while the maintenance of Turkish integrity, and the 
support of Turkish power at the Straits provided the ideal solution 
to problems involved in the threats to British strategic interests 
whether from France and Egypt, or Russia, such a policy demanded a 
favourable political situation for it to be feasible as in 1841 and 
1854. An adverse diplomatic situation, as in 1833» would counter­
balance maritime supremacy.
The flourishing state of British commerce profited from the 
policy which laid so much emphasis on the Porte's maintenance of the 
capitulatory system and a trqde tariff remarkably favourably, to 
foreign commerce, as part of the price for British friendship. However, 
this was incidental, and not a determining factor in British 
foreign policy.^
1 -ptn'ortble* ■In 1825 Britain's^trade balance equalled some £12,111,389 of which 
the trade with Turkey contributed some 1$. By 1853 Britain's trade 
ivf/>UesB amounted to £118,893»000»The Turkey in
1852 was over six million pounds sterling, some 6$. After the Hansa 
towns and Holland, Turkey was the most important export market for 
English goods.
The political implications of this growth in trade were incidental to 
policy rather than causative. Undoubtedly, for example, if Russia 
won first place in the central Asian markets,, political domination 
might follow, and not only would Britain's transit trade through 
Trebizond be destroyed, but the security of the route to India would 
be gravely imperilled.
After 1854 trade with Egypt became especially Important, cf. Landes - 
Bankers and Pashas.p.329. for the complete table of Egyptian exports 
and imports, 1849-75» m
Landes, ibid, p.85 n.l. Egypt wasAthe twelfth place as a British 
customer in I860, compared with 1848 when it ranked as twenty-sixth 
as an importer of-British products. Between,1854-60 Egypt rose 
from the tenth to the sixth position as a source of British imports.
Its importance in French trade was reflected in the rise from 15th 
to 12th as an exporter from 1847*56 to 1857*66, and from 15th to 
11th as an importer during these years. French trade in Turkey 
as a whole had doubled during the two decades previous to the war. 
Here was clearly grist for the mill of traditional Anglo-French 
rivalry and conflict in the area.
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After 1856 the political and diplomatic context did change 
drastically. Because of the new situation Britain's influence 
in Turkey would, he seriously curtailed. However, the dominating 
influence in Europe, the Franco-Russian alliance,would he so 
uncertain as to leave considerable room for manoeuvre to Britain.
A brief analysis of the post-1856 situation will explain this.
At Constantinople, by reason of their preoccupation with the 
central European questions, France, Prussia and Russia would work 
towards new diplomatic alignments. Prussia, anti-Austrian in 
German affairs, by the same token was inclined to support the Franco- 
Russisn entente in the east, especially during Bulwer's embassy 
when a rabid Turco-phobe, Goltz, was the Prussian representative at 
Constantinople. In Russia’s case it would only be through the 
French alliance that the Tsar's government could prevent a 
deterioration of its interests in Europe, and achieve a revision of 
the humiliating neutralisation clause in the Paris Treaty. Otherwise 
the alliance with France would be embarrassing. For the Tsar's 
government, Naples, Italy, and then Poland, marked successive . 
stages of disillusionment with France. Napoleon III could not
afford to abandon altogether the English tie, nor give over Italy 
to the exclusive influence of Britain. In any case, France would ,
no more view with unconcern an increase in Russian power and prestige
in the Balkans and at Constantinople, than a Russian government
could passively look on should France wish to destroy the 1815
settlement of Europe.
There was, thus, a constant tension in the relationship
between the two imperial governments. Prom April 185$» after
troubles in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro,^ Russia tried to
have the general question of the condition of the Christians dealt
with by the Powers. Prince Napoleon's visit to Warsaw . . , ,
(September 1858), the two missions of La Ronciere le Noury (January
1859)» and the talks between Colonel Reilly (September ’59) and the
Tsar, 'kept Russia in the hope, forever put off, of finding a
2premium for a deal over the East'. The disturbances of March 
1860 amongst the Slavs of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro,^ 
stimulated the Russian government to take diplomatic action. It 
placed Thouvenel in an embarrassing dilemma. To prevent a radical 
break with Britain and to preserve French preponderance at j
Constantinople, he could not afford to go all the way with Gortchakoff; 
whose proposals for an international enquiry, and reorganisation 
of the provinces with effective guaranties for their security, 
were too drastic.^ Similarly in the settlement of the Lebanon, ,■
1860-1, Gortchakoff created difficulties for France, justifiably 
believing that there was one law for eastern Turkey and another for '
Kthe western half.v Symptomatic of the precarious nature of this 
Frsnco-Russian rapprochement was Thouvenel’s; Memorandum of 
September I860, prompted by fears of a revival of Austro-ftussian 
friendship, and to keep Gortchakoff in line.^
p* See below, Ch.IV. p.HO,
-‘Charles-Roux, Alexandre II.Gortchakoff. et Napoleon III, p.288.
^‘See below, Ch. IV, p./?<2L. .
4*See below, Ch. III.
2 * Charies-Roux, op.cit., p.295*




However, in spite of Russian resentment against French 
hegemony at Constantinople, and towards certain policies, 
namely towards' the Christians generally, reform, and the 
Catholicising movement in Bulgaria and Crete, the agreement 
worked well enough over matters related to the Principalities - 
that is, until the final developments in the Dedicated 
Convents question - and in Montenegro, Servia and Syria.
As far as Britain was concerned, the situation at Constanti­
nople tended to reduce the role of England to one of accepting 
the substantial changes in certain parts of the Empire, while 
fighting to preserve Turkish nominal sovereignty over them.
A short survey here of the way the Powers grouped themselves 
over the important issues will illustrate the necessity of a 
policy, which, as will be seen later,^ was occasionally irksome 
to Bulwer, but yet was rationalised by him and made to appear 
a fairly liberal policy.
In the settlement of the Syrian issue, Russia, France, 
and Prussia eventually came together in support of one policy, 
but Lavalette and Lobanoff had difficulty in co-operating with 
one another, so Bulwer was still able to insist on the 
ambassadors' accepting in toto the report of the Syrian 1
1. ... . „
See below, pp.(>S"£, , ■
Commissioners 1 At a preliminary meeting of the Representatives
Austria clearly supported the French idea of a native prince, with
a native army and without the three local councils for the Maronite,
"*■ ’An examination in detail of British policy towards Syria is not 
within the scope of this thesis, for the tasks of settling the 
administration of the Lebanon, and of working with Fuad Pasha 
for the pacification of the province, were confided to Commissioners 
on the spot. Lord Dufferin of Ava represented Britain. The accounts 
in H. Nicolson - Helen's Tower.and in C.H. of British Foreign Policy 
Vol. II, Ch. X, are not to the point as accounts of British foreign 
policy and what it achieved over this matter. Mange - The Near 
Eastern Policy of Napoleon III is better on this count. The 
settlement of the 1841-5 Lebanon crisis deprived,the country of its 
autonomy under the native Shehab dynasty - a direct result of 
British policy. By force of circumstances Britain had become the 
patron of the Druses to counter French influence over the expanding 
Maronite tribes. In I860 the Druses, much provoked, had, with 
Turkish connivance, massacred the Christians. Though Fuad Pasha, 
with Turkish troops, had quickly pacified the country, France 
insisted on a European expedition to secure order, and Russell 
apprehensive of joint Russo-French action had to agree eventually, 
(Mange, ibid p.88 n.88). The expedition was entirely French, 
though the other Powers could have contributed troops. As was to 
be expected, advantage was taken of this to harry the Druses, and 
generally to attach the Maronites to France by ties of gratitude. 
Whatever the paper guarantees, nothing would off-set this palpable 
gain by France. The second defeat, again occasioned by French 
and Russian pressure, enabled France to extend the period of her 
occupation, which should have ended in February, according to the 
Protocol signed 3 Aug. '60, to 5 June according to the Convention 
of 15 March ’61 (Mange,ibid, p.97). French and Turkish objections 
to setting up a Syrian vice-royalty, of which the Lebanon would 
have been an administrative sub-division, provided the third defeat 
( Dufferin-Russell, 20 April 1861. PRO 30/22 94). By May'6l France 
had succeeded in bringing all the Powers to agree to one Governor 
for the Lebanon, though Dufferin had been able to temper their 
success somewhat by having the Commissioners favour an administrative 
arrangement dividing the country between Maronites, the Greek 
Orthodox, and the Druses. The inexperienced Dufferin¿thought- he 
had achieved a considerable success in thwarting the French project 
of a native Shehab as Governor for the Mountain. Dufferin - 
Russell, 20 April, PRO. 30/22 94. Bulwer was rightly sceptical.
'My own opinion', he wrote, 'is that the efforts made by France 
in favour of a Shehab are not sincere. She knows these will not 
be successful,.and her policy is to push apparently for something 
which she will afterwards concede: her object is to unite the 
whole Mountain under a Christian whom she would name here'.
Bulwer - Russell, 15 May *61, PRO. 30/22 89. If Bulwer's view 
was right then the French were completely successful.
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Druse and Greek Orthodox elements 1
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Lobanov strongly supported
Bulwer against tampering with the Commissioners' second Report.
2Goltz claimed not.to have instructions. A week later, at a full 
meeting of the Representatives of the Powers and of the Porte,
Lobanov and Goltz backed the French advocacy of a native Christian ' 
Governor.^ Bulwer made the most of the strain between Lobanov, 
obviously chafing under the restraint of his instructions, and 
Lavalette, and-supported A'ali against every measure tending to give 
legal sanction to future discussions of the question of a native j
ruler for the Lebanon. The upshot was that Goltz and Lobanov 
naturally assumed the role of mediators between the two extreme ■
views.^ The success in preventing the adoption of the principle 
of a native prince, was slight, but it gave time, three years, at ;
the end of which there was no telling how the several Powers would 
view their interests in Syria.^ >
French ascendancy in Bucarest was too complete to be vulnerable 
to the shifting and uncertain nature of the international situation, 
though, even here, France was remarkably lucky in the way the balance 
of diplomatic pressure favoured her^policies. From June I860, when 
in a detailed and cogently reasoned Memorandum Couza explained to
his agent in Constantinople, Costache Negri, the difficulties of
1. See above, p.S9.n. I •
Bulwer-Russell, 29 May »61, PRO.30/22 89.
'* Ibid, 29 May.4* Bulwer-Russell, 12 June, no. 412, F0,78/1570» .5* Mange,op.cit.p.105.According to the Firman,9 June'61,the Governor,
a Christian,was to be selected by the Sultan for a term of 3 years.
3 months before this period would elapse the Porte would seek the 
, advice of the Powers on the question of the success of the new regime •
In the event French influence increased in this region.See Mange, i 
ibid.The autonomy of the area had been secured,and the British 
attempt to deprive it of its immunities and to subordinate it to j 
the Pasha at Saida had failed.As a last resort, to counter French 
influence,the idea of a Greek Orthodox candidate as Christian Gover­
nor of the Lebanon was mootedlRussell-Bulwer,17 May 1861,F0.78/1571»1
governing with two administrations, to the late months of 1862, 
Russian policy towards the Principalities was very erratic owing to ' 
the distinct incompatibility of Russian and French interests in the 
area. Afterwards, from the moment Couza pocketed the Convents' 
funds, Russia consistently opposed the regime of Couza, so blatantly 
pro-French and anti-Russian. However, to counter this, Britain 
strongly supported the Couza government until the expropriation of 
conventual properties in November 1862, and even this did not make 
Britain immediately hostile, owing to Bulwer's sympathetic under­
standing of Couza's internal difficulties. In addition, Austria
■ 1 tended to support France in the Convents question.
In the matter of reform the Powers took the line of least
resistance, countering the efforts of each other so that no one Power
should obtain too much influence with the Porte. France and
Russia failed to co-operate owing to the disposition of the former
2not to alienate Britain unduly. In fact, the only concrete attempt 
to do anything about the chronic inefficiency of Turkish adminis­
tration resulted from the friendly co-operation of Britain and France 
in a Financial Commission (1861)^, and in the Imperial Ottoman 
Bank, established in 1863»
Clearly, so fluid was the political situation at Constantinople
that, as Bulwer recognised, there was little to be done, especially
in view of French hegemony. There was no way of maintaining a
strict observance of the status quo as it was in 1858 when Bulwer
■̂‘Bulwer - Russell, 1 Jani '63» No. 2. FO.78/1732. .
2*Mosse,pp.89-93»
^*See below, Ch. Ill, p.^'7.
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took up hst post. The administrative and financial ineffectiveness 
of Turkish rule, giving rise to disturbances in the various 
provinces, kept the Near Eastern situation simmering, to the 
advantage of the nationalist movements and their patron, France 
Further, the Treaty of Paris had placed Servia and Moldo-Wallachia be­
hind a wall of immunities. Austro-Russian rivalry for political 
predominance in Montenegro made the fate of that country almost 
exclusively thé business of those two Powers, so that even after the 
Turkish victories over the mountaineers in 1862, Turkey could not
alter anything. Britain remained, of necessity, aloof* Egypt and 
2Syria were the special concern of France, and there, again, British 
policy would not be able to subtract anything from the solid French 
gains.
An account of Bulwer’s reactions to what was going on, the
ideas which he wished to implement, and what effect, if any, the
adverse political context had on his ideas, will serve as an
introduction to the succeeding chapters where the policies actually
adopted to meet certain contingencies will be examined.
The striking feature of Bulwer’s general approach was the
paternalism, which was not so much temperamental as calculated.
There were three contributing factors. Particularist tendencies
in the Empire engendered, perforce, a legalistic approach to Turkish
integrity. For this to be plausible Bulwer had to believe that the
Vpebidour - Histoire Diplomatique, Vol. IX, 159.
^*See Dufferin - Russell,PRO 30/22 94 several, commenting on the 
effectiveness of French consular representation compared with 
British lethargy.
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several vassals would be glad to do their duty towards Turkey in
return for certain favours from the Porte. Secondly, Bulwer's 
solutions to the problems of reform all depended on the Porte's 
being aided by Europeans. Indeed, the Porte's administration and 
finances would have to be under European direction. Lastly, Bulwer 
found that the only way a Turkish representative could be persuaded 
to stand his ground on certain issues was by constant moral support 
and prompting from himself.
To take the last point first, the instances unrecorded must
have been far more numerous than the ones recorded of Turkish
representatives having to be truly held up to take a stand upon
issues which affected the welfare of the Ottoman Empire. It would
seem that Turkey, oppressed as much by the European States as by
internal discontent which, given a free hand, it could have speedily
crushed, had withdrawn within itself. Maybe the Porte had resigned
itself to the loss of the outer portions of the territory nominally
subject to the Sultan. As early as June '61 Bulwer, describing
his efforts to check Moustier's exuberance in the Committees on the
Lebanon at Constantinople, had to remarki
'I myself may have exhibited some warmth, but the quiet 
and somewhat passive manner of A ’ali Pasha rendered 
it necessary...' 1
Throughout 1863-4 his handling of the Porte and the Viceroy was
2nothing short of patronising. Similarly over the Servian
fortresses issue, Bulwer was as much embarrassed as strengthened by
A'Bulwer - Russell, 12 June '6l,PB0. 30/22 89.
^*See below Ch. V, Egypt, p.Wf-7i
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the Porte’s absolute reliance on his resolution and. single- 
mindedness in the committees. Bulwer commented, as he had had 
occasion to many times»
'The Sultan and the Porte are likely to accept whatever 
I propose, and I am therefore hound within reasonable 
limits to sustain their interests’. 1
On the subject of Reform, which is dealt with in the next
chapter, it will suffice to note here that from very early in his
Embassy to the- last, Bulwer insisted that nothing would be done if
Turkey were left to its own devices. As financial riform preceded
everything else, in Bulwer's mind, so European expertise would have
to be used to ensure that good measures did not founder in the
morass of Turkish corruption and sheer incapacity. An examination
of all the factors involved forced him to concludes
'Turkey has in fact to be Europeanised to cope with 
its enemies or rivals in Europe; and I own I do not 
see any way in whicji it can be so with sufficient 
rapidity to be in time to meet coming events, unless 
by the agency of Europeans'. 2
And by this he meant the employment of Europeans at every level in 
the administration.
To come to the first point, the basic idea was the preservation
of Turkish sovereignty.^ There were historical reasons, Bulwer
was willing to admit, that justified a fair measure of independence
for the different communities, the meaning of this independence
defined by hatts and treaties in all cases. In addition, the interest
■'■‘Bulwer - Russell, 6 August '62, PRO.30/22 90» and see Bulwer - 
Russell, 27 June '62 Tele. PO.78/1644, and Bulwer - Russell, 9 July 
62.PRO.30/22 90.' .
^Bulwer-Russell, 26 July '59, PO. 78/1637.
'"‘Though Bulwer did not explain his notions in detail,evidently he
gradually reacted to a difficult situation by substituting in his own 
mind sovereignty for integrity in the phrase 'the maintenance of 
Turkish integrity'.It was a legalistic approach,a rationalising of 
weakness, and in the circumstances, very intelligent. ___
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of certain Powers made more urgent the question of the growth in 
'.national feeling among the Balkan races. A sensible interpretation 
of the treaties would quiet the provinces. ^ T h e  great object, the 
elevation of the importance of Turkey, could readily be achieved,
Bulwer thought, by a generous attitude towards those treaties which 
governed the Sultan’s relations with his vassals. By allowing
i j
the latter to develop in peace and without embarrassment to the 
Empire as a whole, foreign intrigue and violent nationalism would be j 
nullified. The circumstances which encouraged both would have 
disappeared.
In the Principalities, for example, the issue at stake was not 
whether the Roumanians should be unified in a national state, but 
rather should the Roumanian people be allowed with impunity to 
provoke international tensions. Bulwer did not object to unity as
j
such, which he thought to-be neither here nor there, but rather to ]
letting the Roumanians defy treaties, and the wishes of the Porte and 
the Powers. 'Should national unity be a desirable end, which he j
doubted, Bulwer was for granting it immediately and with independence. I 
Otherwise the Porte, as he foresaw, was going to be humiliated, and 
the Powers periodically thrown into a state of disturbance^ friction 
between France and England would be persistent, while the upshot would 
the predominance of France or Russia, not only in that area but 
throughout the empire. In February 1859 he was recommending:
’...standing firmly by the late Convention^, induoing the ,
Porte to propose modifications in it under the proviso f
that the execution of the Convention thus modified will be 
clearly provided for by a special arrangement as to ,
Intervention, or the total abrogation of the guarantee of j
1. Convention of 19 Aug. 1859 determining fresh elections for the Divans! 
ad hoc which would express the wishes of the inhabitants. ,
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the Convention in favour of much extended concessions 
as may give the Principalities at once all that they 
desire; and which if neither restrained nor satisfied 
they will assuredly seek to obtain’. 1
In Servian which Bulwer feared would he only too easily affected 
by the evil example of the Roumanians, Bulwer was quick to advise - 
his government that it would be wise for both it and the Porte to 
give as great a latitude as possible to the Servians in their 
choice of rules and the framing of their institutions. It was not 
a subject of great importance that the election of Milosh might 
involve independence for Servia. The question did not present 
itself to Bulwer in those terms. He assumed the Porte could be 
persuaded to use tact and discretion in its relations with the 
various vassals, Milosh included, and give them no cause for feeling 
the Sultan’s suzerainty to be irksome. The Porte was obliged by 
its treaties just as much as the vassal states, and should in the 
difficult circumstances give them a generous interpretation. What 
was of greatest importance, as Bulwer saw it, was the prospect of 
the Powers’ constant interference in Turkey’s internal affairs, the 
results of which were so evident in the Principalities. With 
characteristic over-simplification Bulwer posed the problem to 
Malmesbury*
•If the Porte can resist the Milosh family it is by the 
present reigning family. All other combinations seem 
to me mere intrigues. Milosh would soon lose his 
popularity if accepted} but his family may become a 
national watchword for Independence if he is refused.
This Government, however, seems disposed to the deposition 
of Prince Alexander, and refusal of Milosh, and 
establishment of a Kaimacamie, and appeal to the guaranteeing 
powers: thus losing its identity by referring everything 
to foreign interference, which if hostile defeats its
"'■‘Bulwer - Malmesbury, 22 February 1859» FO.78/1423.
60
immediate object, and if friendly, destroys its 
Sovereign independence and individual prestige*. 1
Bulwer's thinking in 1862 in the next Servian crisis was along
similar lines. It was important that the Turks and not the
Serbs should determine which works were necessary for the defence
of the Belgrade citadel. The Porte could have no motive for
locking up in Belgrade a larger foroe than was necessary, so Bulwer
would reason. This being the case there was plenty of room for
compromise, and the Sultan might be maintained still in his
suzerain rights, and the Serbs might be pacified by the settlement
of other details in their favour.
A similar attitude codditioned his thinking on Montenegrin
issues 1861-2 when, though instructed to keep a silence on the
topic, Bulwer hoped the Porte would have the sense to give the
mountaineers an outlet to the Sea, and some territory for which the
Prince would do homage and, needless to say, for which the Prince
2 'would be everlastingly grateful to the Porte.
Concerning Egypt the official line emphasised the need to
maintain the connection between the Sultanate and Egypt. Bulwer,
on the other hand, strained to have Egypt treated as if it were as
independent as in fact it was, and to have its rulers paid the
respect it was in British interests to pay them. Naturally the
Viceroy would repay this attention by placing himself in a more
agreeable relationship with his suzerain.^ At least Bulwer was
hopeful of such a result until his prolonged stay in Egypt (Jan-July
p’Bulwer-Malmesbury, 26 December *58,F0.78/1352.See below Ch.IV p. 
^*See below Ch. IV, p . m .
■'‘See below Ch. T, p.2>0.
'65)1 when he at last acknowledged*
’As to Turkey indeed, she has now but a faint interest 
in Egypt. She is here a shadow'. 1
Then, having seen the fruits of his previous year's efforts to 
bring the Porte and the Viceroy together, wasted by the nerveless 
diplomacy of the Porte at Paris, he decided the only way to remedy 
the weakness springing from the Porte’s and the Viceroy's subordination 
to Prance, was for Britain to state bluntly to the French government 
that it could not allow the fate of Egypt to be controlled solely 
by Prance. Cowley's agreement to the French demand for a French 
representative on the Commission,which was to decide how much land 
the Canal Company was to have akmg the Canal banks, incensed Bulwer 
who had suggested that a Commission be composed of representatives 
of the Viceroy , the Porte and the Company. He could hardly refrain 
from directly criticising Russell*
'I should never have admitted in the eyes of the world 
and the East that France had in the matter a greater 
' interest than England...we may be compromising by 
diplomacy what we shall subsequently be obliged to 
contend for at the point of a bayonet'. 2
However, by this late date Bulwer had long been aware of the
ineffectiveness of his notions. From the early Summer of 1864 when
developments in the Dedicated Convents Question were at a critical
stage,^ when the Lebanon settlement was due for reconsideration, and
when the Porte and the Viceroy were dancing to a tune called by the
French piper, Bulwer's earlier pessimism had soured into irascibility,
an admission of failure. The tentative alighment of Austria with
^•Bulwer-Russell, 26 April '65,PRO. 30/22 93. '
_*Bulwer-Russell, ibidi
_*See below, Ch. IV, p.ftffl fn.l.
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Russia and France over Montenegro in the Winter of 1862-3* had 
"become in the Spring of *64 an Austro-Russian alignment over the 
Syrian and Dedicated Convents questions. Drouyn de Lluys, French 
Foreign Minister, anxious lest there might be a direct Russian 
interference in the Principalities, caused Moustier to be obstinate 
in the committees on the Convents, and later to be more conciliatory, 
in the hope that in one way or another a settlement between the 
Convents and Couza might be quickly brought about. Perhaps, too, 
it was already suspected that French predominance at Constantinople 
was slipping away. Moustier overplayed his part. Bulwer wrote of 
hims
’Apart from the usual obliquities and presumptions of a ;
French diplomatist, Moustier is par excellence a casuist 
who can never look at any matter in a plain straight­
forward way, and constantly undertakes to show you that 
a horse-chestnut and a chestnut horse are one and the 
same thing’. 1
At first Bulwer resented the 'bullying of the French, on all
matters', which made it 'necessary to show every now and then that we
2are not all mlel or disposed to let the flies eat us up*. He 
warned A'ali that he should march in step with him if the Porte
3wanted his approval on Egyptian affairs. Yet Bulwer soon learned
that Moustier's performance was not directed towards him. It
reflected his fears of Austrian and Russian action in the
Principalities*^ Owing to Fuad Pasha's unfortunate position between
the two obstiiiate parties, Bulwer had to take his part, less from
2 *Bulwer-Russell, 16 March '64»PRO. JO/22 93»




inclination - though Moustier certainly provoked him - than to
support Turkish authority, which, in the struggle, seemed likely
to he dispensed with."** In the event Bulwer and Russell were forced
to admit that there was no British interest involved, and policy
altered accordingly. The deeper feelings, however, betrayed that
Bulwer was simply recognising his own helplessness to effect 
2anything. Jean Alecsandri, in a letter to Couza reporting on his 
mission to Paris and London to persuade these two governments to 
see Couza's coup d'etat in a favourable light, expressed astonishment 
at the strength of feeling shown by Russell and Palmerston at Couza's 
policies. Though Russell tended to be restrained and politic, 
Palmerston launched into a tirade. ’ On the Convents question he 
declaredi
. 'He (Couza) has despoiled the Orthodox Patriarchs of their 
legitimate properties by acts which, in civil law, would 
have received the condemnation of the courts, and which 
in the eyes of the guaranteeing Powers have been equally 
signs of an unprincipled policy (une politique sans probite).' 3
Though by August the problem had been narrowed down to a matter
of how much indemnity the Principalities should pay the Convents,^
still Couza's inability to co-operate worried Bulwer because of the
false position it placed the Porte in and therefore himself.
'What is the Porte to do?' he queried. 'She cannot please 
the Convents and please the Principalities, any more than 
she can please Prance and Russia* . 5
More and more Bulwer looked to a withdrawal from the business.^
^‘Bulwer-Russell, 24 March '64»ibid.
*See below, Ch. IY, p.*?4» . r a l
' * Bui wo r Russet*-, ep-rci* cj. P. '
¡TBulwer-Russell, 17 Aug. '64,PRO.30/22 93.
5*Bulwer-Russell, 16 0ct./J3 “ PRO.30/22 93
Bui wer-Russell, 12 and 16 Oct. '64, PRO,30/22 95»
6 ? .
Tile occasion to review the Lebanon settlement and, if necessary,
to provide another Governor, stimulated a similar grouping: France
vehement against Austria and Russia, and the Porte too hard pressed
to be able to take a middle course such as had provided Bulwer,
on other occasions, with his small triumphs. Bulwer wrote*
'I should say, as to the affairs of Syria, that the 
French will keep Daoud if they can, since, in spite 
of the praise of Eldridge* who is in his pocket, he 
is the best agent France can have* and he and Hecquart 
and Outrey are gaining over all the populations as 
against the Turks'. 1
Austria and Russia were anxious to see this Armenian Catholic 
Governor, the French proteglji, replaced. But the situation allowed 
no room for manoeuvre, and it was easier to let things remain 
as they were.^
Finally, all hope of reforming Turkey had gone. The obstacles
in the way of reform loomed even more hugely than before. European
loans had accomplished little, and the administration remained as
inefficient as it was when Bulwer first arrived on the scene. He
had always advocated the concentration of authority* now,
despairing, he suggested dividing the Empire up into four or five
autonomous provinces. He argued* _ ’ ~
'The only possible mode of introducing order is by 
dividing European Turkey into four or five divisions 
with a semi-central Government in each, thus 
relieving the Porte from the business it never attends 
to, and constituting on general principles, subject 
to some local modification^ new system of taxation 
and administrations.'
He then went on to make a serious admission*
2*Bulwer-Russell, 14 April '64, ibid.
^Bulwer-Russell, ApriJ“Jun6Ssfveral, ibid. In June '64 Daoud was 
appointed for another five years.
+ English Consul. ++ French Consuls.
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•Economy beyond a certain point is impossible in a 
great Empire, surrounded in Europe by military 
states and in Asia by warlike and nomadic tribes.
What Turkey has to do as the sole condition of her 
existence is to seek for revenue, and work it out 
of the improved and improvable condition of the 
country. A plan of this kind cannot even be 
attempted under the existing organization'. 1
What Bulwer said, that the concern was too large and unwieldy
and indefensible, was substantially what Gladstone and Salisbury
2would be thinking in the late '70s. Oddly enough, Bulwer had
never been Very enthusiastic about the prospects of Turkish
" ' 3reform* Further the paternal policies,even if he had been given
the opportunity to enforce them, would have depended for their
successful application on harmony between the Powers, if not on the
good-will of the local rulers in the Balkans, the Lebanon and
Egypt. Bulwer had never been deluded on the first score.^ Yet,
during the years I858-63, when, judging from his activity and
general reports, he appears to have been inspired by a quiet
assumption that he would achieve some modest successes congenial
to his ideas, there was always a peculiar inhibition which prevented
his ever resolving the tension between what was and what mightbbe.
Couza's domestio troubles, Prince Michael's need to be assured
that he could pursue a provocative policy with impunity, the
weakness of Montenegro before a determined Turkey, and Said’s need
for money, these and other considerations implanted in Bulwer's
mind a false appreciation of the importance of European good-will
g'Bulwer-Russell, 28 April '64, PRO.30/22 93.
,*cf. Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury. Vol. II, 85-87 
^*See below, Ch. III.
*He almost certainly did not consider the second point 
important.
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to the provincial rulers. Unfortunately^for Bulwer, Constantinople
was the most conspicuous centre for the rivalries of the Powers,
and his policy depended on their co-operation. It was to give the
provinces considerable autonomy in internal affairs; to reduce
as much as possible the interference of the Sultan; and thereby
to secure the friendship of these provinces, which would then make
common cause with the Sultan in defending the integrity of the
Empire. It was a policy conceived in a paternal spirit; to
inculcate afresh into the provinces, not; at an awkward stage in their
development like the difficult adolescent, the necessary duty of
filial respect. - Whatever might be said about this policy, that it
was an illiberal one is a criticism which may not apply for it would
be an over-simplification. That it was too idealistic is a valid
criticism. Bulwer was not quick to react to changes in the
international situation which he was nevertheless quick to see*’*'
Such factors never induced Bulwer to modify his vision of a multi-,-
■*■‘During the Italian war Bulwer sensed the slight unease of the
Russian representative at French policy. He wrote to Malmesbury,
21 June *59»PRO.30/22 88* *1 have thought that I have lately
observed some symptoms of difference between Count Ballemand and 
Prince Lobanoff’, and to Russell, 20 July *59,ibid: ’The swift and 
decided successes of the French army here have evidently taken 
the Court of St. Petersburg, as other parties by surprise’. Again, 
after the eventful Winter of 18§9“60, Bulwer wrote, perhaps with 
too much emphasis* ’Here it would. be perhaps wrong to judge from 
appearance, but I should say Austria and Russia seem less adverse 
and Russia and France less friendly*. Bulwer-Russell, 28 Feb.ibid. 
Bulwer’s comments on Prussian activities were uniformly critical 
and resentful,e.g. Bulwer-Russell, 28 Feb ’60,ibid* ’The Prussian 
Minister here, Coltz, ’tho I do not dislike him personally,he is 
too evidently in all matters Russian, and I ought to say that so 
are all the second rate Prussian functionaries in these countries’. 
Buiwer obviously sensed,those tensions in the Prussian-French- 
Russian relationship which Bismarck would so easily exploit later. 
There are numerous letters on the same theme and on the growing 
intimacy between Prussia and Russia.Bulwer advised a connection with , France to counter the Russian attraction(Bulwer-Russell,25 July,op. 
cit.).These and similar comments reflected the practical working 
out of the fair degree of co-operation between Russell and Thouvenel
. .. „.cent.• ...
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racial Rechtstaat. Apparently,for a time he hoped it would come 
to pass in spite of these rivalries.
However, this is entirely to do with the intellectual basis 
of Bulwer’s attitudes. His actions and his practical suggestions 
were always imbued with a pronounced'pessimism, even quite early 
in his Embassy. In I860 he was writing:
’What I confess I am most afraid of, is this Empire 
slipping away, as it were, by degrees, the consequence 
of successive incidents, over the guidance of which we 
should have no control. ...the defence of Turkey is 
confided to the hands of a body, the greater portion of 
which is, perhaps, predisposed to destroy it, and its 
prolonged existence depends upon so great and so prompt 
a change in its internal condition as it requires no 
common degree of energy to produce, and no common 
hopefulness to expect.’ 1.
2Further, Austrian influence had been ’annihilated*, and in 
any case she wavered in her policy. When an idea of Bulwer’s 
was acquiesced in by Russia and France, the Porte immediately
■Zsuspected it. These considerations made Bulwer emphasise haste 
in coming to the Porte’s aid with a loan, and made him occasionally 
remind Russell of the necessity of his getting the Powers to agree 
on something or of*
’taking a separate line with her (Turkey), by saying 
clearly, ”We will support you against such and such 
contingencies, providing you do such and such things”} 
making it evident to the Turks that they must do what 
we tell them to do, and assuring them that if they do, 
they may then rely upon us’. 4 *1
(U.l,p.66,conti) in the affairs of the Balkans, and at the same time 
the consistent preoccupation with breaking the Franco-Russian 
alignment, (eg. Russell-Bulwer, 26 April ’61,FO.78/1560, and Bulwer-
1 Russell,PRO 50/22 88 1 May ’61). 
t*Buiwer-Russell, 16 Nov. ’60^0.78/1637.
"Bulwer-Russell, 22 Jan. ’61, ibid.
Buiwer-Russell, ibid.
Buiwer-Russell, 22 Jan *61, PRO.30/22 88. :
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This pessimism did not have the astringent affect on 
Malmesbury’s and Russell’s extraordinary detachment whici^pahaps, 
Bulwer may have hoped.
When Turkey was not seriously and directly threatened by j
Russia, a British Foreign Minister had always to consider, unlike j
his ambassador, the latent hostility in England to Turkish rule over 
the Christian races. During Bulwer's embassy there was also 
considerable irritation, shared by Russell himself, at the thought 
of the large sums of money which were being poured into the Sultan's 
coffers."*" The absence of a direct Russian threat naturally 
encouraged the Liberal Ministry not to be violent over Eastern issues, 
though, of course, Gladstone and Russell, as members of Palmerston’s 
ministry quietly accepted the general lines of policy based on the
experience of preceding years. This was despite Gladstone’s and j
■ , ijRussell’s espousal of anti-Turkish policies, in their support of |i■ ' IMoldo-Wallachian union and the construction of the Suez Canal, when j
2 Ithey were out of power. No amount of fatalism on the part of an
ambassador could persuade a government to change from a known policy j
to one untried} certainly nothing could make it attempt what it j
had not the power to accomplish. There was, too, something to be
^■*See Hansard Vol. 171 ,p.136,for a characteristic debate, a remarkable 
feature of which was the brilliance of Cobden in utterly 
confounding the House with statistics and logic in support of his 
thesis, which was that Turkey would collapse as soon as western 
capitalists ceased to participate in Near Eastern floatations.
The irritation partly resulted from the feeling that since they 
were financing the Empire they were also responsible for its good 
government. See Hansard Vol. 171» May-June I863 from p.6, for an 
_ especially good illustration of this poin$.
'Hansard Vol. 150» 44-104, for a debate on Union in 18571 and 
Hansard Vol. 150,1360 for debate on the Canal. Even Disraeli 
favoured its construction. .
said for the maintenance of traditional policy, while, unobtrusively^ 
the practical alternations and adjustments were made by the man 
on the spot. No matter how great the odds against Britain, or 
how futile might appear the orthodox line, no statesman could have 
afforded to advertise Britain’s withdrawal from the Near Eastern 
arena. New changes and fresh European alignments might once 
again offer new opportunities.
In the event, during Bulwer's embassy, the Empire did slip 
away by degrees} and Bulwer could do nothing other, than negotiate 
over the details when the substance had already been achieved by 
the discontented party, Prince, Viceroy, a Company, or a whole 





Bulwer's approach to the general question of the reform of - 
the TurMsh Empire was conditioned by the needs of British diplomacy, 
especially in the years 1860-61, and by Bulwer's awareness that 
little could be done to save the Empire* It is clear he did not 
understand, any more than his contemporaries did, the enormity 
of the task which confronted the few enlightened Turks who were 
trying to modernise their country* It will be useful here to 
glance at the history of the Turkish reform movement in order to see 
Bulwer's ideas in their proper perspective.
s'The basic difficulties in the way of real and lasting reforms 
sprang from the manner in which Turkey had been obliged to tackle 
the problem of military weakness* The initial impulse had come, 
late in the day, from defeat at the hands of Russia, 1770-74*
During the ensuing years, witnessing the apparent disintegration of 
their realm in Asia and Europe, Sultan Selim III, 1790*1007, and 
more notably Mahmud II, 1808-39» had turned to Western military 
ideas in the hope of improving Ottoman fighting strength and of 
modernising tactics* The immediate need was a military one.
However, military reform involved administrative, financial and 
social changes, for a professional fighting force on a western model 
was expensive, and, since it was a western model, the long-established 
habits of the ruling caste had to be changed. Mahmud, seeking to 
achieve his ends by concentrating all power in his own hands, broke
7/
the resistance of those privileged groups determined to defend the
old ways."'- To reinforce the central government, and in the hope of
obtaining an increased revenue, certain drastic administrative
reforms were carried out. By 1839» the year of the Hatti-Scheriff
2of Gulhani, or Law of Tanzimat, the tempo had speeded up under 
Beschid Pasha, chiefly because the urgent need was to impress the 
Western Powers, whose alliance Beschid looked for to counter the 
threat from Mehemet Ali of Egypt. Yet, though the work of subjugating 
the Asian provinces went forward successfully, by 1850, Kurdistan, 
the provinces of Syria, Armenia, Erzeroum, Mosul, and Bagdad having 
been secured by Turkish arms or European diplomacy; and the army 
reorganised in 1843» and fresh measures taken to improve provincial 
administration and to make the revenues more productive, by the time 
the Crimean war had broken out the results of so much effort by a 
few progressive individuals were very disappointing from the Western 
point of view.
How far Beschid’s ruthless suppression of corruption had really
affected traditional ways had to be judged from the collusion of
Turkish officials with the marauding Druses, in 1841 and 1845» in the
massacres of the Maronites. Though the western model of army
service had been adopted,-five years in active service (Nizam), and
seven years in the regional reserves (Bedif), this creating a standing
army of 120,000 regulars- it meant no more than a change of forms.
Officer cadres there were none. A general staff, a supplies and
medical system, transport, all the services and administrative
■'■'The details of this background account are from Engelhardt - 
? La Turquie et le Tanzimat. Vol. 1»^’Text in Holland - The European Concert in the Eastern Questiontp.323-.
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expertise upon which the western army depended, were non-existent*
To summarise, the half-century prior to the Crimean war 
witnessed an attempt, at first on the part of a Sultan, then of a 
few ministers around the Sultan carrying on the Mahmudian tradition, 
to centralise administration, to increase revenue, and for the sake 
of the west, to liberalise institutions, practices and manners*
When the war broke out Turkey was in dire financial straits, its 
administration was in a chaotic state, the local officials corrupt, 
weak, or bewildered because of the new local councils* constant 
interference, and finally the Mussulman population was restive. For 
all the frock coats, fezes and black boots some of the officials wore, 
Turkish reform remained pretty much at the chrysalis stage* Great 
principles had been announced in the Law of Tanzimat* which deolared 
that new institutions must have reference to three ideast
1. The guarantees which ensure our subjects a perfect 
security as to life, honour, and property;,
2. A regular mode of assessment and of collection of taxes;
3* An equally regular system for recruitment and determining 
the duration of service. 2
But a whole complex of difficulties prevented these aspirations from 
being realised* A society so removed from the days of its pristine 
vigour, and whose vitality had depended on the continuance of war, 
how could it be rejuvenated by a handful of men at odds with the whole 
of society, Mussulman and rayah, and, more immediately, with the forces 
behind the Sovereign, the harim and the favourites? The problem was 
bigger than anyone imagined. An industrial and agricultural revolution
2*The word meant orders or organisation.
‘See Holland, p*323*
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directed by a powerful leader were the bases for successful reform.^ 
Only by these means could Turkey have overcome the serious disadvan­
tages arising from underpopulation and a lack of cheap credit 
2facilities* Furthery the drain on Turkish manpower continuedy for 
the army preserved its exclusive Islam character, drawing constantly 
on the cream of Turkish manhood while the non-Mussulmans prospered 
and increased.
Even before the period 1854-65,  ̂which might conveniently be
described the prelude to European financial control, Turkey was being
4undermined by Vestera economic penetration* The advent of the
steamer naturally changed the trade routes to their former horizontal
direction across the Mediterranean. It was an event which might
have revived the Levant, but for two conditions* One was the
Anglo-Turkish commercial Treaty of 1858 which formed the basis of
subsequent treaties between Turkey and other European Powers* The
other was the capitulatory regime. By the first, in lieu of the
various duties on goods on entry and in transit, Turkey imposed a flat
2*See Toynbee - A Study of History. Vol. VIII, p.249.
'See Pavet de Courteille et Ubicini - Etat present de l*Empire Ottoman  ̂
p *19-20. The non-Mussulman races increased in numbers, but this 
merely underlined the problem. In 1866 there would be about 28-£- 
million people in the Empire, more than half of whom were non- 
Mussulman, and of the 13 millions of the conquering race only 2 
millions were to be found in European Turkey. The rest were in 
Asia Minor. Toynbee, Vol. II, 228, emphasises that the Turks were 
originally a handful ofrefugees amongst an Orthodox Christian 
people whom it was their policy to assimilate. They had only 
, imperfectly succeeded in this.
^‘From the first loan from the West to the general conversion of the 
. public debt._See Woodward - War and Peace in Europe. 1815-ffOt *It is possible 
to see most clearly in the Near East the disastrous effeots of the 
policy of laisser-faire and the transition between the earlier and 
later developments of the century. Here on the fringes of Europe 
and the borderland of western civilisation some measure of 
international control was most necessary*.
rate of 3$ ’ad. valorem* on all imports, leaving the internal
duties on her own produce as they were and adding an extra 9%
export duty on such produce. As Puryear puts it, ’the foreign
problem was how to extend "the most favoured nation* idea until
it placed foreign merchants on a "most favoured subject” status'.^
The implications for British trade were far-reaching, especially
after the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. By 1851 imports of
Turkish grain had risen from a negligible quantity in 1838 to equal
those from Russia. The consequences for Turkey were disastrous.
As she paid her dreditors with products valued in their own currency,
the returns on the nation's exports were reduced, for the exchange
2was always against her. Turned into a veritable free-trade area,
the first step towards economic dependence on the West had been
taken. So restricted by Treaty, also by the same measure denied
valuable revenues from its former monopolies, the Porte was
forever denied the opportunity of encouraging home industries.^
In time of war it would not be able to raise extra revenues from the
customs. Further, owing to the tremendous physical obstacles, not
to mention the internal duties, in the way of internal trade, cereals
^"International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East, p.122. 
^'Bailey - British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement, p 77-8. 
^*See Toynbee and Kirkwood - Turkey. p»5°* .'It is true that the 
level of productivity and the volume of foreign trade increased 
as the 19th century advanced} but this increase was due to the 
efforts of the subject Christian elements and of Western entre­
preneurs rather than to the efforts of Turks and Egyptians'.
In short, by reason of their exemption from army service, their 
greater industry, their financial strength and business acumen, 
the Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and certain privileged communities 
like the Maronites of Syria, were bound to reap what few advantages 
there were to be had from this dependence on those Western 
countries increasingly in need of grain.
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and. other foods tended to leave the country, thus reducing 
Turkey's self-supporting capacity, and, other things being equal, 
making its incorporation into the Western economy a matter of 
time. More to be apprehended, the day was not too distant when 
because of this treaty Turkey would be dependent on the Western 
money markets - as the Turks certainly realised.^-
The second condition, the capitulatory system, likewise
2diminished the real possibilities for reform. Foreigners under 
this regime were exempted from all taxes except the export and 
import duties. As they - or the protegéis had the biggest share 
of the trade in their own hands, the loss to the Turkish revenue
was incalculable. Indigenous merchants who were unable to obtain
*See F.S. Rodkey, 'Ottoman Concern About Western Penetration in the 
Levant, 1849-56', J.M.H. vol. XXX, no.4 Dec. '58,p.348» '(the Turks) 
had to be on guard against Western economic penetration of the 
Levant, as well as against the political and military challenge 
o f the Russians. As a result, the Ottomans moved circumspectly 
in making commitments to the West for loans - the 'sine qua non' 
of reforms and of active participation in the Crimean war - and 
especially in the years 1849-50'• See Puryear - International 
Economies. p.l04s 'Turkey, therefore, later became a borrowing
2^power'•
*The juridical significance of it will be discussed in connection 
with Bulwer's views on reform. See P.M. Brown, 'The Capitulations', 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. I, 72» 'The regime of the Capitulations has 
sometimes been characterised inaccurately as one of ex-territoria- 
lity,, implying that foreigners by a legal fiction were on their own 
territory and subject only to their own laws. (They are) more 
correctly to be characterised as immunities of jurisdiction such as were subsequently conceded to other foreigners'. In fact, the 
privileged position of foreigners and proteges was such that the 
former definition more accurately describes how the system worked 
i n practice.
The Sultan after 1535 had granted as a favour certain 'capitula' or 
artioles, primarily to encourage the commercial development of 
Turkey with the help of foreign assistance.Privileges had to be 
granted then to attract western entrepreneurs.As the Sultan also 
regulated his own tariff and was feared too much for his favours 
to be abused, the system benefited his realm until the Ottoman
, Empire began to decline. ,3«A dissefcasfied subject could become a subject of a foreign„power by obtaining a passport from a consul.lt was not difficult,xf a man
f !rSe£i°I IonU®ioadai8UsSI S5°i\?M“oSrfEl
foreign protection could not compete on such unfair terms, so that 
what little home industry struggled on in the early part of the 
century disappeared. Moreover they could hardly succeed against 
the low prices'of western manufactures. Enjoying tax-free the few 
municipal amenities a town might provide, perhaps, even, through a 
legal fiction possessing property in Turkey, for which however the 
fictitious owner had to pay a tax, foreigners had become a liability 
to the Empire.
There were other reasons, which Bulwer would have to concentrate 
on,^ why the Empire grew weaker, but the ones above indicate the 
radical causes of the failure of the reforming movement. The Empire,
already exploited by the West, could not afford to pay for its new
2army. The concomitant administrative reforms outran the amount of 
administrative talent available. Islam society reacted strongly 
against the subversion of its culture, and the old order became 
reactionary as it was forced on to the defensive. Least important 
in view of the other considerations, too much depended on too few 
which would beoome more apparent on the accession of the wayward 
Sultan Abdul Aziz in 1861.
The Palmerstonian belief, therefore, was a mistaken one, that
fiscal, administrative and military reforms would revitalise the
Empire. It was a mistaken assumption also, that Turkey was capable
of administrative reform without a constitutional revolution. In the
'thirties Palmerston had thought the Sultan Mahmud the living proof
that Turkey could be given a new lease of life without any radioal
Clearly a diplomatist had no business to be pressing for violent 
2 change•'Hence it was unfortunate, though inevitable, that westernization had 
to begin with the army. See Toynbee - Study. Vol. VIII, 249»
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constitutional change.^- However, long before the outbreak of the
war, even Palmerston had come to realise that it was impolitic and
2pointless to press for any ’great or aggregate system of reform*•
'The great game of improvement is altogether up for the present’, 
commented Stratford de Hedcliffe, by which he meant that as far as
3British foreign policy was concerned the subject should be avoided.
During Buiwer's embassy neither Russell nor his ambassador showed 
any awareness of the fundamental issues mentioned above. let, their 
comments on the subject of Turkish reform betrayed a pessimism 
indicative of what they actually expected. They did not even expect 
the Turks to overcome what they took to be the difficulties in the 
way of the Empirels salvation. As Bulwer put it, the continued 
existence of Turkey ’depends upon so great and so prompt a change in 
its internal condition as it requires no common degree of energy 
to produce, and no common hopefulness to expect'.* 234 Further, in the
diplomatic context"* there was little to be done except to check 
Any Russian attempt to embarrass the Porte on the subject. The 
Porte itself, now a member of the European Concert resented any
"'■‘Since, in any case, the integrity of Turkey had become an
important factor in British foreign policy, constitutional reform, even if feasible - which was doubtful owing to the limited 
number of capable men - was dangerous and consequently not 
to be encouraged.2‘Temperley - England and the Near East, p.242,
3‘Ibid.
4‘Bulwer -Russell, 16 Nov. *60,FO.78/1637.
3*See above, Chapter II, p . ^  •
attempted interference in its domestic concerns.^ This situation
forced upon Bulwer the policy he would have to pursue. It would
mean that his influence, likewise that of the French ambassador,
■̂‘The very manner in which the Turks had conceded the famous Hatti- 
Humayoun of 18 February 1856 illustrated their sensitivity on 
this score. Stratford had tried to substitute for the pledges to 
Russia before the war a pledge to all the European Powers that 
rayahs should be given full rights of citizenship. See Rodkey, 
’Ottoman Concern about Western Penetration in the Levant, 1849-56', 
J.M.H. no.4 Dec. 1958» Vol. XXX,352. Only with great difficulty 
was the compromise solution embodied in Article 9 of the Treaty 
of Paris agreed upon. By this, 'The Contracting Powers recognise 
the high value of this communication (i.e. the Hatti-Hu$ayoun)• It 
is clearly understood that it cannot, in any case, give to the said 
Powers the right to interfere, either collectively or separately, 
in the relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, nor 
in the internal administration of his Empire.' The old shibboleths 
were repeated in that Firman for the comfort of Turkey's allies - 
just as the edict of 1839 had been part of a diplomatic manoeuvre. 
Article 1 reaffirmed the validity of the ideals of Gulhand and 
Article 8 stated explicitly that, 'Any word or expression or 
appellation tending to render one class of my subjects inferior to 
another, by reason of religion, language or race, are forever 
abolished and effaced from administrative protocol'. See Holland, 
p.329 for text of the Firman. Apart from these and similar ones 
emphasising the equality of treatment to be handed out in judicial 
tribunals (Art. 16), educational institutions (Art. 15), and the 
civil and military schools of the government (Art* 13), the clauses 
more likely to cause difficulties in the near future were those 
pertaining to.the millet system, taxation, and the possession of 
property by fcceigners, to the establishing of banks and a reform of . 
the monetary system. How the Porte tried to fulfil its promises 
on these subjects will be seen above. It is sufficient to remark 
here, with regard to property, that alterations in the laws affecting 
property holding were so closely linked with the Porte's desire to 
change the capitulatory system that the subject was not seriously 
tackled. The Porte could hardly have allowed foreigners to own 
lands without their being subject to Ottoman laws. See Article 28, 
Treaty of Paris. As for the reforms to be effected in the 
organisation of the non-Mussulman communities, the millets, and in 
their relations with the Sovereign power, these were naturally a 
subject entirely outside the scope of foreign interference. The 
greatest obstacle in the way of the development of fresh ideas was, 
after the ignorance of the mass of Muslims, the Greek Orthodox 
Church, a state within the State. It would take the Bulgarian 
agitation of the years 1860-1 to induce it to agree to a new 
organisation in 1862, this despite its propaganda and appeals 
abroad. See Engelhardt, p.146. This reform topped in importance 
even the establishment of the Imperial Ottoman Bank in 1863*
would be limited to financial questions on which he would he able 
to offer his advice with some effect. Thus, the following account 
of Bulwer's contribution to British policy on reform will be mainly 
concerned with his ideas. It will show him to have been a keen 
observer, and willing to accept the logic of his situation. A 
loan guaranteed by France and Britain, Bulwer would reason, would 
enable Turkey to overcome its temporary indebtedness, provided Turkish 
finances were.supervised by a European commission. This was the 
first step. Then, as Turkey could not reform its administration 
owing to the lack of capable men, its government must employ Europeans - 
a condition of a loan - in all branches of the administration. The 
natural corollary of this would be the abolition or drastic revision 
of the capitulations. In short, he considered European interference 
'should either be direct, clear, and effective for fixed objects, or 
altogether avoided'.*’ 'All indirect and inefficient interference*,
" 2he went on, 'will do harm rather than good'.
Briefly, his notions on Turkish reform and the actual policy he 
implemented put Bulwer's embassy at the end^ of that phase of British 
policy begun in 1830, and made it the tentative beginning of a 
development which would be dramatised in 1881 with establishment of 
European control of the finances.
The first occasion for the Powers to be concerned at the lack
of Turkish initiative in working out reforms was in the late months of
Bulwer-Russell, 12 Nov. '60, FO.78/1513«
ÎT'Ibid -^'Engelhardt, p.221. In the Near Eastern crisis of 1867 Britain 
abstained from broaching the subject of reform and invited the 
other Powers to follow her example.
1858. The excessive issue of paper money in the war, and its
gradual depreciation, had caused a critical situation after the peace* 
Discontent focussed on the Sultan. Bulwer noted ’the serious
causes for alarm in the state of the public mind'. Unfortunately
the ministers lacked the courage 'to make it known to His Majesty ,
the dangers, that were to he apprehended from a persistence in the
system of reckless extravagance which has been, especially for the
last two years, pursued'.^- Bulwer and Thouvenel who, despite Moldo-
Wallachian difficulties, tended to act together on the subject of
2consular pretensions in the provinces and kindred affairs, obliged 
A'ali to present a memoir to the Sultan^. Subsequently, the Sultan
Aissued an edict curtailing the expenses of his Household* He
explained to Bulwer that he had just been informed of the extravagance -1 
5of his Court* Yet despite the ambassadors' efforts, the relatives
2'Bulwer-Malmesbury, 18 Aug. 1858, FO.78/1366.
*A certain scepticism coloured Bulwer's attitude to consuls and their 
efforts. Consequently he tried to restrict the scope of their 
activities. The example of Be Hedcliffe, always energetio in 
keephg the Porte on its toes, had left an evil legacy. It was 
Bulwer's policy to bring his agents more immediately under his 
surveillance. The idea behind it was to enhance Turkish authority. 4 
See Bulwer-Malmesbury, 28 Aug. '58 FO.78/1367* 'The Consular 
body indeed, though animated by the best intentions, is, generally 
speaking, a little too apt to assume the powers which more properly 
belong to the local Governments, and to depreciate their means of 
performing the governing functions with which they are entrusted*. 
Malmesbury - Bulwer, 11 Nov. '58, FO 78/1352, accepted all Bulwer's 
suggestions providing the usual system of consular correspondence 
, was carried on.
5'Bulwer-Malmesbury, 20 July '58 FO.78/1365»speaks of the 'understand­
ing M. Thouvenel and myself have come to, that in all matters which 
seem properly to admit of it, we should act as much as possible in 
, concert'•
^'Bulwer-MalmesburjriJ^J^_J^a^F_Q.78/1366.See Engelhardt,p.156-7.
^'Hulwer-ííaIme^ury7^^^G^g• '59 FO.78/1350*This latest edict is in 
Bulwer-Malmesbury, 27 Aug. F0.78/1367»It expressed characteristically 
penitent sentiments: 'Numerous unnecessary disbursements,delapidations, 
donations,and salaries have occupied the place of such useful and 
fruitful outlays (on reforms), whilst even Ministers of State,plunging ; 
into extravagance beyond their means,have contributed to impoverish 
the public Exchequer'.
w
quickly returned to office, and Bulwer, exasperated, considered it 
’all fatal to the Sultan’s character and public affairs' and 
consequently a 'swindle upon English bondholders'.* He expressed 
the hope that English officers be withdrawn from the Turkish navy 
to teach the Sultan a lesson, and that Malmesbury should insist ’ 
on the reconstruction of the Ottoman Ministry as Bulwer proposed.”*
*A resolute stand must be made against a combination of tricksters',
4he declared. .. The advice did not receive a ready hearing in London
and the upshot was that Bulwer had learned his real function. He
could only be little more than a commentator. He might discuss
schemes of reform with the Porte, and make suggestions, but the
methods of Stratford were no longer in vogue. Also he had taken
full measure of the Turkish ministers and their master, not appearing
over-impressed by the combination, though for Fuad and A’ali Pashas
5individually he had great respect.
'To give the abilities of these men their full 
value', he wrote, 'a firm, honest, and 
intelligent man should connect and control 
both. Were the Sultan such a man, things 
here would soon assume a different aspect, 
but, with good intentions as to things, his 
manner of dealing with persons is that of the 
Harem. He employs one man against the other.••
The union in his cabinet which would make
** Bulwer - Malmesbury, 22 October,* FO.78/1369.
2* Ibid.
Bulwer - Malmesbury, 6 February '59 FO.78/1422, 
4\ Ibid.
■** Bulwer - Malmesbury, 2 February *59» FO.78/1428,
it powerful, would make it, in his opinion, dangerous*• 1
Unaided "by his Government, Bulwer resorted to intrigue, success-
pfully getting Safeti Pasha, ’Minister of Finance*, dismissed.
'Exactly how essential Â'ali and Fuad were it is impossible to 
know. The confidence of the Powers was their great asset. It is 
to be suspected that more than anything else this kept them in power 
most of the time in spite of intrigues by the fanatical party to 
get rid of them. Certainly they did little enough in the years 
1856-59 to earn them the posthumous praise which has been accorded 
to them. See Engelhardt, p.156: 'Yet, while admitting the good 
intentions of A'ali and Fuad Pashas, it is justifiable to complain 
of the continuance of a system of government which, in centralising 
affairs in the hands of the chief of the State, left them at the 
mercy of his erratic will and the subterfuges of an entourage of 
intriguers'. This is simplified, perhaps; nevertheless, as Fuad 
had fought to keep his Sovereign's will absolute in internal affairs 
he and A'ali must share the blame for the apathy of the years 
I856-9. They should have known what obstacles would have to be 
overcome to make the Sultan co-operate in their work. Apart from 
the counter-influence of the Harem and relatives, there was the 
friction in the reforming party. Riza Pasha and Mehemet Kibrisli 
lend the traditionalist group which wanted reform in small instalments 
Reschid, A'ali, Fuad and their nominees at the European courts 
favoured more drastic measures, See Ubioini - La Turquie Actuelle. 
p.l6l. See also ibid p.168-9 and pplJ7“182 for excellent pen sketches 
of Fuad and A'ali. From these it becomes clear that neither man 
had the right qualities for leading the country. Fuad's excessive 
laisser-aller attitude and A'ali's weak constitution reduced their
_ effectiveness.^‘Bûlwer-Malmesbury, 2 Feb. *59,FO.78/1428. Bulwer complained of his 
corruption. Bulwer-Malmesbury, 7 March FO.78/1429« The Minister;
• of Finance was really the Treasurer. Bulwer evidently co-operated 
with the traditionalist faction to get rid of Safeti, likewise 
to have appointed the Mixed Financial Commission. See L. Thouvenel - 
Trois Années p.323-4. The Frenoh ambassador commented* 'Safeti 
Pasha, minister of finance, has given in his resignation as a 
consequence of Bulwer's intrigues. He knew Safeti to be stubborn, 
refusing to lend his hand to any underhand dealing. Mucktar 
Pasha has declined the honour of assuming control of the finances 
in the difficult circumstances in which they are at the moment.••
(the Sultan), his harem, and his entourage, were overjoyed with the 
opportunity to bring back Hassib. You know how detestable his 
administration was* He was the friend of Reschid...' From this 
and the comment that Bulwer had co-operated with Mehemet Ali, the 
Captain Pasha, it becomes evident that the British ambassador did 
not quietly accept the position Stratford bequeathed him - see above, 
Chapter II, p.44-* Further, if all the men Bulwer and Thouvenel 
considered corrupt or inefficient had been exiled to Bagdad, only 
A'ali and Fuad would have been left in Constantinople.
This change he hoped would facilitate certain reforms he had been 
turning over in his mind, and which, during the next two years, 
he would develop at length in his despatches to Eussell.^ In view 
of the fact that, with the exception of the institution of a 
Conseil du Trésor, they were not translated into measures, to do 
Justice to these ideas in the same generous manner of Bulwer, would 
he pointless. However, the following resumé may give à good idea 
of his line of thought.
Already Turkey was in the throes of the financial crisis which 
would only abate in the summer of 1862 with the withdrawal of most 
of the paper money. With the prospect of an Austro-French war
before him Bulwer pressed the Forte to take measures to re-establish
2 , its credit. The Mixed Commission had been suggested with this
in view for to it, 'he wished to be immediately paid the customs
at Constantinople, then in the Government hands, and which were
• 5pledged as a guarantee for the last loan raised in England'. This
body would also have had the duty of paying the interest on that
loan. He suggested a scheme for withdrawing some of the paper
money, the caimés, with the aid of the above-mentioned loan, while
witn a part of the loan, he wished to constitute a 'sort of "caisse"
or bank 'whose notes would have driven the devalued currency out of 
*
circulation. By a similar procedure in the provinces the debased
metallic currency, he hoped, would be withdrawn. Thus the basis
of the National Bank, envisaged in the Hatti-Humayoun, would have 1
1*Safeti*s dismissal heralded the appointment, entirely at Bulwer's 
instance,of a Commission'for introducing reforms and improvements 
in the financial system of Turkey'. Bulwer-Malmesbury,7 March F0.78/ 
_ 1429. The Commission would duly become the Conseil du Trisor 
?*Bulwer-Hussell, 20 July, PO.78/1433. '->,Ibid.
been made He added:
'It would be necessary, however, that the execution of 
such a scheme should be confided to able, honest, and 
experienced men such as could only be found in France,
Germany or England'. 1
There was a great deal of public or ecclesiastical property which
he believed ought to be put on the market instead of being left
idle. A new loan ought to be obtained by allowing the Mixed
Commission to collect additional taxes, and this would be used
to facilitate additional monetary reforms. More money would be
acquired, he thought, if each province had not to send revenues,
in specie, all the way to Constantinople whence, in all probability, <
it would be transferred to another provinoe to discharge its debts
there. Though he expected no Turkish official could obtain as
much from the revenues as the Armenians and Greeks did by the
2system of farming, he wished the Turkish government would hand
over certain pashaliks to Europeans who would operate them as
'model-systems'. The most important suggestion was that the
capitulations should be thoroughly examined 'with a view to lowering
the duty on exports and raising that on imports, the latter to no
great degree'. But, he warned, 'I would not recommend Europe
to listen to Turkey on such questions, unless under circumstances
that made it likely the temporary aid required would be permanently 
xuseful'. Bulwer meant that European supervision and control in 
the manner he had suggested must be effective before loans could be. 
Had his proposals been taken up he anticipated an improvement in
the Government's credit and immediate gains to the Treasury by means
1. Ibid. ' — —  ' “ "" ” : '
2. The ilitzams had been resumed at the same time as the Firman of 
1852 had reinforoed the authority of the local Valis. Mahmud's 
centralising measures had broken down.
3« Buiwer-Russell, 20 July*FO.78/1433•
of which the salaries of public servants would be increased, the 
army kept in a better condition, and certain public works begun.*' 
In the ensuing months Bulwer continued to argue in this vein, 
concentrating on two things, a loan to release the Porte from its
onerous short-term obligations to local bankers, and persuading ;
2Russell to reconsider the capitulatory system. Yet it needed the
stimulation of the discovery of a conspiracy against the Sultan to
3galvanise the Turkish ministers into making a «Ssplay of energy.
And that passed. Conceding the Sultan’s tastes to be extravagant, 
Bulwer still felt that ’even the expensive tastes Abdul Medjid
indiges in would be but of small importance, if the Porte would
only introduce general order into its economy’.̂  He and the other
1. ibid. 1 ' ' : ! : 1 1 i
2. Bulwer keenly felt the injustice of it, apart from believing it
prevented the release of potential energies in the Turks. He 
remarked on foreigners’ exemption from taxation* 'I cannot think 
it for a moment tenable that foreigners should have, in a country j 
not theirs and which is independent, benefits the nature of which ; 
must be to place all the branches of native industry in their ;
hands to the exclusion of the people of the country.I do not think i 
such a pretension is consistent with the ordinary notions of j
justice or International Law,nor sustainable in the present state
of public opinion in Europe’. Bulwer-Russell,24 Aug.'59>FO.78/1434»j 
Russell conceded that foreigners should be taxed and Turkish 
export tariffs lowered. Russell-Bulwer,8 March *60,FO.78/2436.
3« As A'ali, Grand Vizir,and Fuad Pasha threatened to resign should 
the representatives address a collective Note on the need for j
reforms (Bulwer-Russell,4 Oct.’$9,FO«78/1637)»the representatives, ] at Thouvenel's instance, merely addressed the Grand Vizier separa­
tely.See Engelhardt,p.l58,on the conspiracy*'I could prove that 
most of the high functionaries in the provinces were morally 
implicated in the movement prepared in the Capital'.Neither react­
ionary Turks nor progressive ones seemed to have inspired it. It 
was a blind reflex of popular discontent.
4. Bulwer-Russell,14 Sept.FO.78/l637.Thouvenel disagreed entirely with 
this view judging from his remarks in his letters to Paris.See 
Trois Annees p.357-8.Thouvenel-Benedetti.(direotor of political 
affairs in the French Foreign Office)*'The Turks,who see the bottom 
of their treasury empty,begin to get restive,and I am present on a sad occasion,that of a penitent dying.In the East dead things
oont...
U
ambassadors made separate remonstrances, and communicated to the
Grand Vizir a short memorandum expressing, ’regret at seeing Turkey
did not help itself, that it did not proceed to a gradual and
determined application of reforms, and that it showed no energy in
pursuing the goal indicated by the Firman of 1856’. The Sultan's ,
ordering an investigation of financial conditions by a new Conseil
du Trésor which was actually constituted in November, and consisted
of most of the members of the Mixed Financial Commission, raised :
2Bulwer's hopes. But already it was too late. More urgent business 
confronted the Turkish ministers.
With the moves by Gortchakoff in May to have the condition of the 
Balkan Christians investigated by a European commission, and the
(note 4, p.85. cont.)» is that nothing is being done while everything 
disintegrates. Lately, there was a great stir at the discovery of j
a vast conspiracy which menaced the days and power of the Sultan, j
neither of which, between you and me, deserving of much respeot... 
Turkey has many ills, but it is by its Sultan it is menaced with j
death’. See p.36l for details of the Sultan's lunatic expenditure 
on his daughters, on purchases of land sanctified by their marriage !
1 on them, and gifts to the doctors.
2*  Engelhardt, p.l6l, - i
* The leading members were Falconnet, director of the Ottoman Bank, j
Lachenbacher, of the Austrian ministry of Finance, and the Marquis j 
de Ploeuc, the French delegate. The Turkish 'Minister of Finance' ] 
had ignored entirely the previous commission. Bulwer thought things j 
would now move. Buiwer-Russell, 21 Feb. '60^0.78/1637* 'The Turkish j 
government has recently been acting up to its promises, and in some ! 
degree according to the system 1 some time since suggested, that is 
to say, a regular budget is being drawn up through the aid of the 
Mixed Financial Commission appointed last year at my recommendation, | 
and the depreciated paper money called caimis, the existence of which 
has tended so prejudicially to influence the exchange, is on the 
point of being withdrawn} an arrangement being also made for 
withdrawing gradually, and, as I think, too gradually, the beshliks, 
or present silver currency which is current in the provinces, and 
which ranks much.higher than the caim4, though it is considerably, 
lower in real value than the sum for which it passes’. An optimistLc 
assessment this proved to be. In 1865 the paper money and the 
metallic currency, still causing the Treasury much embarrassment, 
circulated despite perennial loans contracted with the object of 
withdrawing them.
*7
news coming into the capital of terrible massacres of Christians 
in Syria, government credit slumped. In an effort to bolster it 
and to make a loan more feasible to western capitalists the Conseil 
du Tr4»sor was yet again reconstituted, in June, 'with considerable 
solemnity, and with the understanding, expressed publicly and to 
foreign Powers, that it was to take an active and most important part 
in the administration of affairs, as a deliberative body, especially 
charged with the reform of the fiscal system, and with the future 
control and regulations of the Empire'.^ By itself it was a futile 
gesture, and fooled none as to Turkish intentions, as Bulwer knew.
He consequently strained every nerve to make good this deficiency 
in Turkish credit, hoping Russell would come forward with a proposal 
of a guaranteed loan with conditions as to its employment. He never 
lost an opportunity of raising the question in this form, and never 
hesitated to give a slightly misleading picture of Turkish opinions.
*1 can', he explained, ’see no way out of the existing 
embarrassments but a general plan reposing on the better 
management of the public resources, and on augmentation 
given to those resources on the one hand, and an 
immediate supply to meet immediate and urgent wants, to 
fee found from foreign capital on the other...But, however 
necessary this supply is, I could only advise or encourage 
its being given, if it were part and complement of a 
general system which, if really adopted with a probability 
of being persisted in, would produce a totally new 
condition in Turkish finances'. 2
He promised A'ali he would use his influence with Russell if
Turkey's mines, forests and special securities were given over to a
Mixed Commission.^ He also angrily warned the Porte that he would
■̂’’Report on the Financial Condition of Turkey by Mr Foster and Lord 
Hobart*, 7 Dec. '61, Parliamentary Papers,1862 (2972) LXIV,475. 
**Bulwer-Russell, 4 July '60,FO.78/1637.
^*Bulwer-Russell, 18 July^ibid.
withdraw entirely from all discussion of financial affairs unless 
it 'fairly' exposed its whole condition to the European members of 
the Financial commission or Conseil, and used their advice.^ And
with an extraordinary confidence in the possibility of his success,
he expressed to Russell his certainty of Turkish co-operation $n
giving the requisite securities for a loan which, then, 'might be
safely advanced, and would assist the Government in its new reforms,
3as well as relieve it from its present distress'* Russell's 
laconicism was quite equal to Eulwer's urgent manner. He replied*
'If no money is obtained by loan, there may come a day of 
reform; if money is obtained by loan, and there is no 
change of system, there will surely come a day of 
revolution'. 4
5In the event Bulwer's extravagant demands and Russell’s
unhelpful attitude, obliged A'ali, acting Grand Vizir, to resort to
v 6a second-rate French banker, Mires^for a loan. Turkey would have had
1*Bulwer-Russell,15 Oct.*60,FO.78/1512.See also Du Velay-Histoire ^
2 Financière de la Turquie, p.156.
*He realised Turkish objections could not be overcome.Bulwer-Russell,
, 11 July PRO*30/22 88,
^'Bulwer-Russell, 18 July,F0*78/l637«Moreover,the loan should be osten­
sibly Anglo-French *torkeep the Governments together'.Bulwer-Russell,
. 27 Aug. *60, FO.78/1510.
4*Russell-Bulwer,ll Sept</F0.78/l637»He added later that the reform of 
the Turkish finances'ought to be an easy matter'.To Bulwer,18 Oct. 
ibid.He was more interested in Turkey's continuing to pay dividends 
c on the private loan of 1858.Bulwer-Russell,2 Dec.'61.F0.78/2433,
2*See Du VelayAHistoire Financière p*156.
'Despite the 1858 loan to effect their liquidation,an official communi­
cation by the Porte had indicated,20 Feb.'60,that 15 million francs 
worth (£500,000) of caimés circulated in the capital.In May I860 the 
pound sterling equalled 200 piastres,i.e.it was at 85$ above its 
value in Jenuary.In the previous 12 months to pay the debts of the 
Sultan a great deal of stock had to be issued on such generous terms 
that a further depreciation in the currency resulted.Needing 200-250 
million francs to liquidate the internal debt and to pay the dividends 
on foreign loans,the Porte, frightened by Bulwer’s exacting demands, 
had to accept Mires' offer.Nominally totalling 400 million francs, it would have furnished 164 million francs.Bulwer was staggered by the 
enormity of this gross extortion,tersely describing it.as follows*
cont...
2
to pay 15$ for this loan. However, in February 1861, Mires was
arrested in Paris. Panic resulted. Galata merchants began to
shift their specie to Marseilles, at the same time pressing the
Treasury for payment on matured coupons. Under this pressure all
Turkish securities weakened, finally the Turkish exchanges in London;
and Paris cpllapsing under the strain of heavy selling of discounted
bills.^ Confronted with the total collapse of Turkish credit,
2France and Britain stepped in at this point. Russell had already 
fielded enough to suggest that he contemplated sending someone, 
possibly Sir Charles Trevelyan, to advise the Government, should it 
determine to reform its finances according to Bulwer's proposals.^ \
APresumably he had been impressed by the drawing up of the budget,
5 Jand by Bulwer's highly coloured account of distress in the capital.' j
ing*tii Birst^year it (the Porte) will furnish £1 million out of .; 
the £6 millions it receives'. Bulwer-Russell, 16 Nov.*60,'Correspon- j 
dence on Reforms in Turkey, 1858-61*, Parlt. Papers,1861,LXVII, 599*
' He surmised a close connection between a continuance of the French i 
occupation in Syria and the willingness of France to come to Turkey's 
« aid with money. Bulwer-Russell, JO Aug.'60sFO.78/1510.
«‘See Du Velay, p.l64<
,See Du Velay, p.166.
“I'Russell-Bulwer, 25 July and 19 Sept. *60,FO.78/2456.
4'It was not a budget at all,merely a general statement of the expendi­
ture and income for the year 1860-61.Inevitably, it balanced, Bulwer- 
Russell,20 July '59»FO.78/1455» Russell, less anxious than his agent 
to obtain a loan for the Turks,had no illusions about this statement* 
'The budget is moreover a fallacious one as far as the statement of 
income is concerned, inasmuch as the revenue for several months,if 
not for a whole year,is made over by anticipation as security for 
_ loans raised and already spent'.Russell-Buiwer,17 Jan.'61,FO.78/2456,
''Bulwer-Russell,16 June '60,FO.78/2456* 'It is no exaggeration to say 
that almost all the capitalists and tradesmen in this city are at 
this time creditors, directly or indirectly,of the State. On the 
other hand,the poorer class depends almost entirely on the capital­
ists and tradesmen, and thus from the highest to the lowest there is 
a general cry on the Government for money, and a general discontent 
at not getting it. The army and navy are likewise dissatisfied and 
badly off, and the funds coming in which should go to their support 
are already in the hands of parties to whom they are given for old 
accounts'.
In May, at Russell’s request, Lord Hobart and Mr Foster arrived 
to co-operate with the Conseil du Trésor to examine the financial 
situation* This and the accession of the new Sultan Aziz, in June, 
temporarily relieved the pressure. By December of that year the 
commissioners had produced an economic survey of the Empire whose 
favourable conclusions helped France and Britain to induce their
capitalists to support a loan for the withdrawal of the paper money. 
Russell would cpntribute to the success of this loan by allowing a 
letter of his to appear in the prospectus given out by Devaux and 
Company of London, March 1862.^ The survey should have opened the
peyes of European statesmen to the real situation in Turkey. Hobart 
and Foster made the usual remarks and criticisms, such as Bulwer had 
been abounding for two years? that the verghi (income tax) bore
heavily on the poorer people, while its reassessment and reapportion­
ment would increase its yield; that the dimes and aghnams (taxes on
sheep and pigs) be collected, not by farmers but by local conseils 
de dimes composed of all the cultivators who paid the tax; and that
the duty of on all goods of native manufacture be abolished. All
taxes, it was considered, should be collected by government officials,** j
and stiffen penalties be inflicted for smuggling. It proposed that
all mines, and forests be sold to western capitalists. This would
^'Despite denials in Parliament (see Hansard CLXVL,May 1862), he !
clearly did feel partly responsible for the success of this loan-it 
was oversubscribed- and subsequently bracketed it with the guaranteed ; 
loan of 1855 ia Lis future communications to Constantinople on the 
subject of dividends.eg# Russell-Stuart(Chargé d’affaires) 3 May 1865, 
FO.78/1853**1 Lad used all my personal influence to facilitate the 
advance made by British Capitalists to Turkey. •..you will state to 
his Excellency(A*ali Pasha) that whatever liabilities the Porte may 
have incurred,the Revenues already assigned for the payment of the
charges of the guaranteed loan and that of 1862 shall be strictly appropriated to the discharge of the obligations contracted by the « Forte under those loans’. " :2»'Report on the Financial Condition of Turkey', 7 Dec. '61 Parlt.OOI1 v • • • •
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increase the revenue considerably, according to the Report. The 
remedy for administrative inefficiency and downright corruption, of 
which the Report gives several instances, would be a Finance Minister 
in the English style, without whose sanction no expenditure would be 
permitted. The Report concluded:
'It only remains for us to express our confident hope that 
the Porte will, without further delay, by a prompt, systematic 
and comprehensive measure of reform, avail itself of the ample 
means at its disposal for the re-establishment of its credit 
and the permanent improvement of its financial condition.
The case with which it has to deal is not the hopeless one 
of a tax-imposing power stretched to its utmost limit, and 
yet inadequate to meet the demands of a large and inevitable 
expenditure; but simply of financial disorder, caused 
chiefly by inattention to the ordinary rules of political 
economy and fiscal administration'. 1
The easy confidence of the report and the letters of Hobart to 
2Russell, belied the evidence in the report. In the absence of 
statistics, the whole thing had been conjectural. Even so, it made 
apparent that the major sector of the economy was inelastic, and 
too dependent on good weather. Half the taxes were taken in kind, 
half in cash, the latter always taking a long time to be collected 
since a commodity had to be sold first, which was no easy matter in 
the provinces. Secondly 'the Mireot taxes were of negligible
3importance, and could not be made more remunerative'. In fine, the
Turkish Treasury was incapable of taking for long the strain of the
(cont. note 2, p«?o«)s Papers, 1862 (2972) LXIV.475»cf• Du Velay,p.l83.: 
(cont. note 3» p.?o .): From the days of Sultan Mahmud attempts had 
been made to abolish the ilitzams system. Not until 1862-5 would it 
, be restricted so that it only operated in Asia Minor.
*lt is to be suspected that the whole bent of the Commissioners' 
thinking had been conditioned by the knowledge that expenditure had to 
be increased greatly if brigandage,and smuggling were to be checked, 
and if the army were to be increased to a size which would enable it 
to defend the frontiers against marauding tribes.They could only have 
2 looked to the obvious means of increasing revenue.
,*'Report, etc.' op.cit. p.503,
^*Cf. Du Velay, p.184.
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real floating debt with its exorbitant rates of interest. Every 
small war would necessitate a fresh loan, until in a short time the 
whole structure, overweighted by the strain of the western style 
army, the vicious, capitulatory regime, and the perennial wars 
killing off the best Turks and sapping the national will, would 
collapse leaving the European creditors only one resource.^- Bulwer 
never lost sight of this possibility. At the height of the crisis 
in 1660 he had warned, as he did on other occasions!
'If the Porte keeps its engagements, which chiefly concern 
English houses, as to the bills given on the revenue, it 
will be in the difficult situation of employing soldiers 
and functionaries to collect funds which are at once 
handed over to others, whilst they, already in arrears, 
will receive nothing from these funds* . 2
As Bulwer added, either a loan or bankruptcy was the logical
corollary. He never appreciated that this would always be the
situation.
By policy, or through simple inadvertence the Porte had 
burdened the money markets in Europe with the Turkish internal 
debt.^ To deal with the mischievous caimis^, it had resorted to
2*The Cralata merchants were less fortunate in this respect. 
¡T*Bulwer-Russell, 14 July '60 ,F0.78/2436 .
^*In the summer of 1863, Fuad implemented his scheme for 
converting it. See Poulgy, p.54-55» The intention was 
that the bonds of the consolidated internal debt should circulate in the European markets, like other securities. Fuad anticipated that in time this would result in the 
influx of foreign currency into the Empire. A more 
important consequence, if the scheme had succeeded, which 
it did not, would have been the flooding of Europe with 
securities of progressively decreasing value. This was not 
. inadvertence.
4*See Dictionary of Islam on the history of these short-term 
stocks.
western loans.^ At last in 1865, a loan of 150 million francs
(£6 million), contracted by the Imperial Ottoman Bank rang the
final alarum, if only speculators and statesmen had been able to
hear it. It was'the first loan to pay the dividends on previous
external loans. let, though by 1865 it had mortgaged its entire
revenues in the effort to liquidate the pernicious internal debt, the
financial situation remained unsatisfactory. The great change
from 1858 lay in the fact that Turkey could not even call its revenues
its own.^ Worse, the financial situation hardly corresponded with a
far more serious economic one.^ Moreover, for all Bulwer's
^*Cf: Poulgy - Les Emnrunts de l'Etat Ottoman, p.43* Western loans were 
cheaper. 'The minimum interest on the loans of the period which 
begins in 1854, &**d the year of the first Ottoman loan, to 1876, 
oscillates between 7 and 12$ for the external debt and rises up to 
20 to 25$ for the internal debt'. The loans were: a) 1854*£5 million 
aotually producing £2̂ - million; security was the Egyptian Tribute, 
b) 1855*Guaranteed,£5 million secured on revenues of Smyrna and 
Syrian customs and remainder of Egyptian tribute. 0) 1858,£5 million 
secured on octroi and customs of Constantinople, d) 186l,£2 million, 
e) 1862,£10 million supported unofficially by the British Government, 
yielding little more than £5 million, and secured on salt,stamps, 
tobacco, stamps and patents jteixes, the new taxes imposed in 1862
to bring in more revenue. f)*ATwo loans totalling £8 million secured 
2 on the revenues not already pledged.
*In the Repirt of December 1861, Hobart admitted the urgent need for a 
national Bank. Otherwise the 'vacuum in the public treasury' at the 
beginning of each financial year would have to be filled in by 
ruinous internal loans, r̂̂ njLjj. less ruinous external loans, or a 
resumption of the ilitzamsjl&ett'restricted to the collection of dimes 
in Asia Minor. EvidentlyA<rlhe Imperial Bank had not fulfilled its role 
_ In fact it had given the government a fictitious credit.
^’Cobden told the House of Commons in I863 that 'from the moment you 
•cease to lend to Turkey she must cease to pay the interest on her 
.debt'. Hansard Vol. 171,-136*
4*The 1862-3 budget had balanced,but had nothing to do with eoonomio 
facts* It grossly flattered the financial situation too. eg. Hobart 
who had helped to compose this budget said of it* 'The estimate of 
the receipts is far from being verified by the actual experience of 
the year. The measures respecting tobacco and salt were to a great 
extent anticipated by dealers in those articles; and others of the 
new taxes...will produce considerably (my underlining) less than 
was anticipated'. Hobart-Russell, 27 Nov.*62,FO.78/1790.of Du Velay 
P.179.
Vf-
expenditure of ink, mere modifications had been effected in the 
capitulatory regime, and these were in the new trade tariff of 
1861, the main features of which were the 8% duty on imports, and, 
diminishing yearly at the rate of 1$, an. 8% tax on exports. So 
the economic plight of the Ottoman Empire, as described earlier, 
persisted. Bulwer had posed the only possible solution, a loan from 
the governments of Europe, in effect from France and Britain, to be 
employed by their own agents to projects decided upon by these same 
governments. Russell rejected an idea which, though the ambassador 
failed to perceive this implication, meant subjecting the Sultan to 
European control.^ In 1859 Bulwer had hoped that a little might be 
done. He wrote*
'The most that we can hope from Turkey is that within the 
next few years it will establish a regular system of finance, 
a tolerable army, and tribunals more adequate for the end 
of justice*. 2
Sound finance was the basis for all other reforms< By 1863 the
follies of the Sultan, the lack of energy of his ministers, and the
only too obvious inadequacies in the military administration,^
especially in the matter of the mere payment of troops, had destroyed
■̂‘Temperley's description of British policy up to 1914 states the 
dilemma: 'Because British statesmen did not believe in economic 
imperialism or financial penetration, they prevented any such foreign 
control over Turkey while renouncing it for themselves'. 'British 
Policy towards Parliament Rule and Constitutionalism in Turkey,
„ 1830-1914’, C.H.J• 1933, Vol. 17, No. 2,p.l65.
,*Bulwer-Russell, 16 Aug. *59,70.78/1637.
^’Turkish fighting strength did not concern the Foreign Office in this 
period as much as the administration of the army, and the payment of 
troops. The few comments on the forces were uniformly critical, 
e.g. Buiwer-Russell, 21 Aug. '60,F0«78/1510: 'As to the forces of 
Turkey in the present condition of the Empire, they are hardly to be 
counted upon...* E.C. Grenville Murray (Consul at Odessa) - Bulwer 
28 Nov. '63.T/67* 'There is nothing at all to prevent Russia repeating 
the Sinope business any moment. I doubt whether there are more than 
one or two Turkish admirals who could hold these waters against her*.
Bulwer's optimism, and even his interest. In any case British 
policy did not contemplate any more, it seemed than keeping before 
the lurk the need to pay its debts. He had realised from the first 
that nothing would be done without either foreign control, or 'a 
Sovereign or a Grand Vizier with great power, stern, just and 
enlightened'Later, he appreciated that, as the strong ruler, 
the saviour, had not appeared, then radical decentralisation and 
autarky were the-only solutions to the administrative and financial 
problems. *9hat Turkey has to do', he declared, 'as the sole 
condition of her existence is to seek for revenue and work it out 
of the improved and improvable condition of the country. A plan
2of this kind cannot even be attempted under the existing organization'.
There was a certain contradiction between Bulwer’s idea of
reforming the finances by means of a European directorate holding
Turkish sovereignty in trust, and his schemes for judicial and local
government reform where the major preoccupation was with making a
reality of Turkish sovereignty. However, by playing down the subject
of Christian privileges, paying great attention to the Porte's rights
in the diplomatic crises, and by emphasising the role the Turks had
to play in his schemes for reforming the Empire, Bulwer appears to
have been satisfied, not, presumably, that he had an intellectually
sound position, but that he had a strong moral one. For Bulwer, the
diplomatist, this was sufficient.
i’Bulwer-Russell, 30 Nov *59, F0.78/1457 •
Buiwer-Russell, 28 April *64, PRO 30/22 93«
His thinking was Metternichian in its scope, if not in
thoroughness, embracing questions of consular interference,^ the 
2dragoman system, the British legal establishment in the Levant, and
the protegee's, questions tending to be the exclusive concern of
himself and his own government* With Turkish deficiencies he
concerned himself more urgently. He felt it was imperative the
Porte should provide criminal and civil courts where rayahs and
Muslims alike would receive justice. He hoped for an improvement
in local government and that opportunities would be given to all races
3of taking up high administrative posts. The central problem was how 
to hold the allegiance of the various races nominally under Turkish 
rule* and the solution which presented itself required, in Bulwer's 
opinion, this broad, and, in the event, impractically broad, view of 
the Turks' plight. As the exercise of sovereignty was impeded at 
2*See above, p.&>
*Bulwer wished to preserve the dragoman system whereby most of the 
preliminary work requiring the ambassador's interference, was done 
by accomplished orientalists. As much of this work required conversa­
tions with the Capudan Pasha, or the Seraskier, or the Minister of 
Finance, posts filled by men not so fluent in French as Fuad Pasha, 
the dragomans were a vital part of the diplomatic machine. Both 
Malmesbury and Russell wished and insisted that political business 
be carried out as much as possible by the ambassador and the Grand 
Vizir. They looked forward to the disappearance of the dragomans. 
Bulwer fought against a change. Apart from the mass of business it 
would place in his hands, by making him something of a maid of all 
work it made the representative lose caste and influence. This was 
the argument of Fuad who feared the Sultan would resent too intimate 
a relationship between his own minister and a foreigner. Bulwer, 
throughout his embassy, never ceased explaining the ways the dragoman 
system could be improved, but it was of no avail. In this as on other 
topics he tried to keep Turkish susceptibilities to the forefront. 
Evidently the Porte did dislike the changes. Buler-Russel1,29 Oct.
, '59, FO.78/1436.?*It has to be remembered that Bulwer had a different policy for those 
provinces which had almost achieved independence, namely Servia, 
Moldo-Wallachia, and Egypt. See above, Chapter II,p57-#, Diplomatic 
exigencies also obliged him to overlook a good deal in respect of the 
application of the capitulations in these same provinces.See below 
p.<7W.
every level, Bulwer considered the Porte could hardly "be expected 
to exert itself unless it was, by the co-operation of the Powers, 
given the opportunity to resume a practical, as distinct from a 
nominal, sovereignty. At the diplomatic level the proper task of 
the British agent was to see to it that the initiative of the Powers 
never went beyond the giving of advice. As far as it was possible 
the rayah population should not be encouraged by the example of 
European interference, to look for other masters.
A brief description here of the ends Bulwer had in mind, followed 
by a glance at his participation in I860 in the work of keeping 
before the Porte the need to fulfil its promises, will explain the 
assumptions underlying Bulwer's thinking on the Newr Eastern question 
in all its aspects. ¥e shall observe that Russell and Bulwer, 
anxious to see Turkish sovereignty buttressed, would refuse to harry 
the Turks, and made a point of adhering strictly to the I856 settlement 
Even so it will be evident that Bulwer was intenser than Russell on 
the subject of reform. This would result from his holding that 
Prance and Britain together should make their financial co-operation 
dependent on Turkey’s willingness to employ European administrators 
on a large scale. Russell never entertained such a notion though he 
would have been glad if Turkey, of its own accord, had used European 
skills. Moreover, Russell's faith in the Empire’s continued exis­
tence, never very pronounced, was seriously undermined by the Syrian 
massacres,^* and he was more disgusted than Bulwer, by Sultan Aziz's
■^Russell-BulwerjPS Aug.'60,F0.78/2436,expressing his horror at Turkish 
collusion in the massacres,went on:'nor would it be of any use to 
conceal from the Porte that either the whole system of Ottoman 
Government must be replaced by one founded on integrity and justice, 
or the Sultan must prepare himself for the abandonment of his 
cause by his best and most persevering allies'.
However, the ambassador'sincompetent handling of his ministers, 
ray of hope would be extinguished by his failure to persuade his 
government to guarantee a loan.
Bulwer probed to the heart of the matter when he insisted that
the Turks had been frightened by the publicity given to far-fetched
principles of equality. 'What has alarmed them', he wrote, 'has
been the theory that the rayah and the Turk are equal, and the
deduction drawn from it, that consequently the rayahs, being most
numerous in many places, would, were such a theory acted upon, be
ere long masters, in which oase the Moslem knows well he could not
2long enjoy the toleration he would have practised*. To stop making 
a fuss about principles, and raising false hopes, seemed to Bulwer 
the obvious thing to do. Unspectacular but useful changes might 
then be gradually worked out. As it was, the declarations of ideas 
were actual impediments in the way of reforms. Heferring to the 
Hatti-Humayoun, he explained:
'It did nothing in the way of legislation, and I doubt much 
whether, by pointing too suddenly and extensively at an 
entire alteration in manners and feelings, it did not 
give rise to many of the evils which usually follow such 
experiments'. 3
The reform the Forte ought to be encouraged to make, in Bulwer's
opinion, should rest upon the fundamental assumption that the Ottomans
would remain for a considerable time the ruling race. The centres
'1’*Russell-Bulwer,27 Jan. '62, FO.78/1637» Be was sceptical of the ability 
of the ruling clique and with 'the character of those who have 
hitherto been entrusted with the management of public affairs'. He 
added, tentatively: 'The want of technical knowledge and experience 
on the part of Turkish statesmen may render it advisable to employ 
foreigners of known character and ability in the administration of 
2 the finances of the empire and of public accounts'.
,*Bulwer-Russell, 8 Jan.*61,FO.78/1637 *
■Bulwer-Russell, 16 Nov. '60^F0.78/l657* v
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of power had to he retained hy them, otherwise the doctrine of the 
maintenance of Turkish integrity was so much verbiage.^- He wrote:
'It will he impossible, moreover, to attempt to carry a plan 
into effect with the assent of the ruling race, which should 
have for its evident object the placing of any other race 
over it'. 2
In any case the Turks alone could maintain the uneasy truce existing 
between sect and sect.^ As for the manner in which the Turkish 
supremacy should be consolidated, Bulwer held it should be through 
the agency of the institutions in being. An amalgamation could not 
usefully entail more than this. He confessed:
'I think it would be vain to attempt to amalgamate entirely 
into one common system the different sects and races.
Each now in a great measure governs itself and is accustomed 
to its own habits and mode of administration; and whenever 
it is possible for this still to be the case, it should be 
so' • 4
As part of his scheme for winning the respect of all subjects,
he held the Porte should take immediate steps to adjust its judicial
and local government system. The importance of such reforms being
small and progressively, but gradually, applied, he could never
sufficiently emphasise. Aside from Turkish fears and the incubus
of rayah and Muslim prejudice, one more obvious factor restricted the *
„‘Bulwer-Russell, 12 Nov. '60^0.78/1513.
^‘Bulwer-Russell, 26 July '59^0.78/1637.
^'Criticising the philanthropic element in British Near Eastern policy, 
he commented: 'Whether there was much consistency in the attempt to 
maintain the Turkish Empire and to sap its foundations is one thing - 
but whether, when you have done so much as you have done in one 
direction you can stop short, is another. The experiment of amalgamating 
the various races and religions of the Ottoman Empire, has been 
commenced and must continue'. Bulwer-Russell,12 Nov.'60>F0.78/1513 .
*Bulwer-Russell,26 July’59»F0.78/l637«Tke obverse side of this was the 
laicisation of the organisation of the various millets and the 
secularisation of their property, which were effected by 1862.In this 
way the power of the patriarchs and rabbis would be mediatised,and thus 
the rayahs brought more immediately under Turkish rule. In Engelhardt's 
words the Hatti-Humayoun ' established a close correlation between the 
religious rights of the rayahs and their political duties’, p.138,
✓ Oo
opportunities for reform, namely the lack of able Turks, aggravated 
"by the struggle inside the ruling clique. This conditioned Bulwer's 
approach to administrative reform more than anything else. He declared:
'It is likewise to he considered that the reformers in Turkey 
are, after all, as yet hut a very small body of men in 
Constantinople;••.hut partly from a jealousy of younger 
aspirants, partly from an actual want of any number of 
persons fit for public employment, there are few to whom 
they can confide the execution of their designs, and thus 
they are either themselves overpowered by the multitude of 
details which crowd upon them, or they see their wishes 
frustrated by the incompetence of the agents they employ'. 1
The practical details he had in mind were limited to four, the
separation of local justice from administration, the increase of the
2power of the pashas, the appointment of Christian vice-governors 
especially in predominantly Christian areas, and lastly, the enforcement 
of stiffer penalties on Turkish officials convicted of any sort of 
corruption. As he put it himself, ’responsibility must be concentra­
ted, punishment inflicted, and rewards given, peculation discounten­
anced, adequate aLaries afforded, and a class of honest and capable
3officials formed', a task of which he really despaired. 12
1‘Bulwer-Russell, 26 July '59>FQ.78/1637« Five years later he
considered it 'the difficulty to vanquish’. Bulwer-Russell, 12 May
2 *64,PRO.30/22 9 3 .
‘They were hampered by local councils or Medjlisses, products of 
Mahmoudian reforming efforts,* see Engelhardt, p.255» and Bulwer- 
Russell, 7 March '59,F0.78/1429» 'In each province there is at 
present a sort of Council placed by the side of the Pasha. All 
matters of every kind are or may be indifferently brought before this 
council. A portion of its attributes is judicial. In theory this 
i nstitution seemed likely to be beneficial but in practice it has 
proved exactly the reverse. When the Pasha is a man of influence 
and ability, the council is generally a mere engine in his hands. 
...When he is a weak man, on the contrary, the central authority 
which he represents is completely absorbed by the local authority... 
and thus the orders which the Porte gives in a general and 
enlightened spirit, are counteracted or disregarded by the narrow 
, views and bigoted passions of a particular district*.
‘Bulwer-Russell, 16 Aug. '59,F0.78/1637* ’
/<=>/
’The only chance of introducing good government into 
Turkey', he explained,'is, for a time, from the centre; 
because there alone the influence of enlightened Europe 
is felt. The plan to pursue is to make the Government 
of the Porte responsible for its agents; to make agents 
responsible for their conduct to the Porte; and....by 
individualising, as much as possible, responsibility, 
keeping things clearly in a particular direction'. 1
He was, too, 'for placing Rayahs as the Representatives of the central
2authority in responsible situations in the Provinces*. 'These
would*, he considered, 'in the end discipline their own race, and
at the same time...teach by degrees the dominant one to respect it*.^
Feelings of nationality on the one side would join them to the
Christian communities, while on the other, 'linked by position and
interest with the ruling Government...they would finally become a
constituted and moderating power'.^ As for the councils, in effect
Bulwer looked forward to their disappearance as executive and judicial
5bodies. They should function entirely as consultative assemblies.
Instead he wanted to see established separate tribunals, civil and
criminal, while religious tribunals - one for each sect, and mixed
ones for mixed cases - would deal with matters such as marriage,
divorce, and property.** To supervise the work Bulwer realised an
7enlightened and somewhat ruthless man was essential. 1 Lacking such
a person the reform of the Empire ought to be entrusted to a special
council of, say, six Mussulmans and two Christians. Four of them
would stay in the capital to sift the complaints and reports of the
^■'Bulwer-Russell, 5 N«c. '60„ibid.
\ *Bulwer-Russell, 8 Jan. '61>FO.78/1637*
J’lMd.¡rlbid,
?*Bulwer-Russell, 26 July '59,ibid.
E*Bulwer-Rttssell, 7 March ’59,F0.78/1429*
'*BuiI««r-Russell, 30 Nov. *59,FO.78/1437*
other four, who would separately investigate four districts into
which the country would he divided for this purpose. Occasionally
the itinerant commissioners would exercise extraordinary authority
if they found some particularly blatant instance of bad government.^
'It seems to me', he concluded, 'this system would have the double
advantages attending on provincial and central authority; and it
is authority now which they are wanting, for if the defects of a
Government is a bad thing - the effect of having no government is a
, 2worse one'.
Such were the ideas Bulwer turned over in his head during his
3first two years of office. They were simple, directed as they 
were merely to providing a swift and uncomplicated means of giving 
justice and security. For in many areas the Hatti-Humayoun had 
not even been published, andAwas either venal or non-existent. More 
often,in other districts, 'perhaps, in most, its provisions are 
disregarded’.̂  They were practical suggestions based on undoc­
trinaire assumptions, and a knowledge that the prevalent mood of the 
Turks, no less than the social situation, prevented anything more 
elaborate. Above all they constituted the first coherent and
i‘Bulwer-Russell, 8 Aug. '60.F0.78/1510.
, Ibid.
^‘Bulwer-Russell, 26 July '59.FQ.78/1637* looked forward, not with much hope, to withdrawxg other branches of administration from 
Turkish supervision. With an assurance which was immediately 
condemnatory, he explained: 'On the other hand, as to many branches 
of administration, namely those which concern Finance, the Army 
Navy, Telegraphs, Public Works etc., these can only, in my opinion, 
be placed on an European basis with sufficient rapidity to meet the 
crisis with whioh Turkey is threatened, by the employment of 
competent Europeans; and the great thing is to persuade the Turks 
of this necessity,and to facilitate, as far as we can, the removal,
. of obstacles that exist,or any prejudices they entecbain against it. 
^‘Russell - Bulwer, 18 Oct. '60, F0.78/2436
studied attempt by ambassador or Foreign Minister, to harmonise 
ideas on reform with the pre-eminent demands of British foreign 
policy. It was an intelligent synthesis, based on the need to make 
the ideas complement interests. Three factors prevented the ideas 
being realised. As mentioned above the diplomatic situation after 
I856 prevented any individual ambassador pressing his schemes beyond 
the bounds of courtesy. Secondly the several representatives were 
very careful to check anything which might enable a colleague to 
increase his prestige and influence. For instance, after the 
experience of those critical months following Gortchakoff*s proposals 
for the Balkan Christians, Sulwer, complaining of the hopelessness 
of a situation in which France, Prussia and Russia antagonised Turkey, 
and where Austrian influence was 'in a great degree annihilated*, 
went on to say*
'Nor is this alls if any measure I suggested did obtain the 
adhesion of Bussia and those Powers who act with her, it 
would immediately become suspicious in the eyes of the Porte'. 1
As a solution to this problem he offered the usual advice to
Bussell} how seriously it is difficult to be certain about. A close
Anglo-Turkish alliance, he felt, would meet his difficulties, 'making
it evident to the Turks that they must do what we tell them to do,
2and assuring them, that if they do, they may then rely upon us'.
l.Bulwer-Russell, 22 Jan '¿1, FO.78/1^37. """"
2.Ibid. To make matters worse, Bussell disapproved of Bulwer's attempts 
by intrigue or personal representations to the Sultan,to make ground. 
Only when asked advice was Bulwer to address the Padishah on reforms, 
and then only in the most innocuous and general language-'rather than 
expatiate on the details of a Firman,or the nomination of a Minister'. 
Eussell-Bulwer,24 Sept.*61,FO.78/2436.Palmerston on this issue was 
more realistic.He wrote to Bussells'I saw the other day that you have 
cautioned Bulwer against being too active in placing and displacing 
ministers at Constantinople.Your caution is very just in itself}but 
in a place like Constantinople, one is sure that somebody or other
will be trying to influence such changes, and if our,,man does not use his influence for good,the Frenchman,or the Eussian,or some cont*.
The third factor was the existence of the capitulatory regime.
On this last subject Bulwer had especially strong views.^ *If 
foreign Governments wish to do anything seriously for the benefit 
of Turkey', he wrote, 'I mean, of Turkey as an independent national 
Power, they must occupy themselves seriously with this question, and
othe sooner they do so the better'. It was not just that he per­
ceived the illogicality of a system which made nonsense of a basic
tenet of the Treaty of Paris, that Turkey was an equal member of the 
European Concert. More to the point, if the Porte were to be
encouraged to reform its administration, and make it equitable so that 
rayahs and Muslim would respect it, then the Powers would have to take 
the necessary steps to place their own subjects and the proteges 
under Ottoman jurisdiction.
'The Turkish Government is called independent', he declared,
'Jpt there is not the smallest vice-consul who does not 
pretend to control it,andinthe simplest action of life 
a foreign hand intervenes to prevent the national authority 
from maintaining order and administering justice according 
to its own usages and laws'. 3
As he pointed out, the Turkish reforming movement, after the initial
efforts of Mahmud, had been to gain Europe.4 The Porte was not in a 
(cont. note 2, p.<°3.)* Turkish intriguer will be sure to use his
1.
2.
influence.» 12 Oct.,PRO.30/22 21,
See Nasim Sousa-The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey for a very lucid 
account of the capitulations in their judicial as well as their j
economic bearing.By them most consulates had civil and criminal courts I 
where they tried their nationals. By Treaty they had no jurisdiction < 
over cases involving Ottomans,but by the nineteenth century the Euro- ! 
pean Powers claimed the privilege ofttying a mixed case if the accused j 
was a European national.By the Porte's consent there were also mixed j 
commercial courts where the verdict had to be given in the presence j
of a dragoman.The authority of the Ottoman criminal courts over 
foreigners was in practice denied by the practice of the consular carts« 
However,when cases involving foreigners did appear before such courts, j a caBular delegate had to be present before a sentence could be ef&ctme.:
4.
Bulwer-Russell,30 Nov.*59,F0.78/1437 • 
Bulwer-Russell, 16 Nov. *60,F0.78/1637* 
Ibid.
/or
bewildered state and the Powers owed it to themselves to show in a
practical way that they were in earnest about reform. He explained
that a blunt intimation by the Powers of their intentions as to
reform, joined with a ’reconsideration of our Capitulations, with
a view to their gradual modification', would stimulate action on the
part of the Porte.^ He did not expect anything to come of his
2promptings, no matter how moderately worded they were. Nevertheless,
by his persistence and with the co-operation of the French ambassador
he succeeded in bringing the representatives to agree upon the general
principles laid down by the Porte in its Note, 11 September I860, to
the effect that Ottomans who renounced their allegiance must leave
the country after three months during which time they had to sell
their property.^ But, except in its long term effeots, this was
of peripheral significance.^ Too many Ottomans had already become
'foreigners'. Russell for his part never showdd any inclination to
modify the capitulations themselves. While Bulwer, on the one hand,
was 'to obtain the equality of Europeans with the native population'
he had also to remember that 'the capitulations rest on the principle
that Turkish rule and Turkish justice are so barbarous that exceptional
5privileges are rquired*. In a more explicit statement he countered
all Bulwer's reasoning in favour of change, by an extraordinarily
2*Bulwer-Russell, 26 July '59,FO.78/1637 
*At one stage he asked Russell to consider giving the representatives 
the power to modify the capitulations so that they could deal 'with 
difficulties as they practically arose'. Buiwer-Russell, 28 Feb.’60,,
, FO.78/1637.?*Note in Bulwer-Russell, 26 Sept. '60, FQ.78/15H.
4*See Sousa, p.101-2. The appointment of a mixed commission to consider 
how far the agreement should be retroactive was decided upon. Nothing 
came of it.
“ Russell - Bulwer, 12 May '60,F0.78/1638 .
insular argument, which, given Russell’s terms of reference was 
unanswerable. He stated that a state of conflicting jurisdictions 
’admits of no present remedy; and as long as it exists, it must he 
the duty of every British functionary...to maintain intact the 
privileges which he is appointed to watch over; and although this 
should he done temperately, it should he done firmly as the heat 
means of avoiding angry discussion with the Porte’.* He added, 
referring to Bulwer’s repeated suggestions in favour of a common 
jurisdiction for all foreigners:
’The institution of the Consular court at Constantinople 
will not only he an invaluable boon to British subjects, 
hut will also hold out an example to foreign Powers and 
to the Turkish Government itself, and will in all 
probability work a silent but most important improvement 
in the administration of justice whether foreign or native’. 2
Nor did Russell ever alter his view-point. No matter how hard Bulwer
xfought against the anomalous position of the legal establishment,
and the undignified spectacle of foreign jurisdictions defending their
own subjects against each other, his opinions were never welcomed.
The immediate consequence was that the Porte still could not appropriate
such foreigners to itself/because they cannot be under its laws and
«‘Russell - Bulwer, 7 Jan ’60,FO.78/1495. 
f‘Ibid.
^‘The British consular Court under Sir Edmund Hornby had, since 1857, 
insisted on a strict application of the letter of capitulations. The 
combination of English litigiousness and laws of such scope of course 
made nonsense of Turkish sovereignty. So Bulwer attacked on two fronts. 
Fist, the legal establishment contradicted Turkish sovereignty. 
Secondly, it opposed the merging of the English system with a common 
jurisdiction for all nationals. Bulwer-Russell, 17 Jan. *60, nos. 27 
and 28, FO.78/1503» His arguments against the capitulations applied 
with equal force to the protegiji system whereby Ottomans acquired 
foreign nationality without having to reside in the foreign country.
By a regulation of $  August 1863, as a result of a Turkish circular, 
April 1862, the numbers an embassy or consulate could employ were 
limited. Further Ottomans could not be hired except by special 
arrangment with the Porte. See Sousa, p.102-3.
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jurisdiction'.^ Europeans would still be unable to own or exploit
Turkish property, and the Turks continued to refuse to employ them
in its own administration. His efforts to re-educate the Foreign
Office thus achieved negligible results. Even the granting of the
loan was not as Bulwer wished. The loan should have been the
means of enforcing reforms by a European agency. Furthermore,
the persistent advocacy of his ideas served to emphasise the
differences between Russell and himself, perhaps to his great
disadvantage from the career point of view.
On the other hand in I860 he succeeded in thwarting the
2Russian initiative in favour of the Balkan Christians. Though
Bulwer and Lobanoff would be sincere in trying to use the Porte’s
embarrassment to oblige it to do something about provincial 
v 3maladministration, the subject of reform acted as a screen behind
which the representatives, notably the Russian and the British,
sought solid political and diplomatic advantages.
As the diplomacy is sketched in elsewhere, it is only necessary
here to point out that throughout these months Bulwer and Russell
were disposed to act with the French. They were above all at one
in thinking that Russian machinations had to be defeated.^ At first
Thouvenel had inclined to Gortchakoff's view that an ambassadorial
2*Bulwer-Russell, 26 July '59,FO.78/1637.
'See below Chapter IM» Part 13̂ , pp•/??-$- 
^‘For instance Bulwer urged Russell to seize the opportunity to come 
A  forward with the offer of a guaranteed loan. See above, p. •
4‘Hence Temperley's suggestions that Bulwer acted without the French 
and without consulting his Cabinet sufficiently are without 
foundation, see Temperley, 'British Policy towards Parliamentary 
Rule and Constitutionalism in Turkey (1830-1914)',C.H.J.1933 Vol.IV 
no. 2,163.
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committee or a commission on which, foreign representatives would 
sit should investigate the condition of the Christians of Bulgaria, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro.'*’ However, Russell had been 
adamant that the representatives should take no part, even with­
drawing from his previous commitment to France that the representatives
2might have a watching brief over Turkish commissions. 'The Foreign
representatives may meet separately after the Turkish commission
has reported', he instructed Bulwer.^ Within a week of his hearing
of Gortchakoff's move^, by his single efforts Bulwer persuaded the
Porte 'to take the step I have long been pressing on it, that of
her classing the Empire under divisions to be thoroughly inspected
5 -by competent persons'. These persons, he explained were, 'first 
to seek and correct abuses and punish offenders: secondly, to inquire 
especially into the oases brought forward by Russia and others: 
thirdly, to examine into the practice of reforms I advised last
February twelvemonth, or devise others for safeguarding the Christian
6population'. A week later Lavalette was in general agreement.
Having at first hotly denied Russian accusations of the prevalence
7of violence, of corruption, and injustice, Bulwer eventually half- 
admitted they were correct. This troubled Russell, chiefly because 
of the opportunities it provided for Russian diplomacy. Leaving the 
details of the improvements to be made in his ambassador's hands, he
concerned himself more with Gortchakoff's motives.® He explained
1. Bulwer-Russell, 4 July '60,FO.76/16}7»referring to a despatch of 
2 Cowley to Russell, 13 June.
See Charles-Roux, p.291.
* §£ssell-Bulwer,25 May*60,F0*78/1496«Ia October Bulwer tried to act on 
. the instruction.7* Bulwer-Russell, 13 May'60,ibid,
>  Bulwer-Russell, 23 May, ibid. 
y  ibid.
I* Bulwer-Russell, 13 May,ibid.
* Russell - Bulwer, 7 June,FO.78/1497-
that if the Turks failed to reform abuses, and 'if Russia should 
still be able to point to those defects in the administration which 
you described in February 1859, it will remain to be considered what 
should be done*."*' Rus5ell, pointing to the Treaty of Paris which 
stipulated that a contracting Power should ask for mediation before 
resorting to war on the Empire, held that 'no separate right of war 
on the Empire on the part of the Five Powers is to be deduced from
- 2Turkish abuses'.
At the end of May the Grand Vizier left with a Commission of
Turks, Muslim and Christian, for Varna to investigate the complaints 
3made by Russia. For his part Bulwer was 'now disposed to think that 
the recent proposals may be looked upon as the opening to a series 
of measures which if anything like a favourable opportunity offers 
would be at once carried out'.^ Believing the Empire would 
disintegrate in three or four years unless measures were taken, he 
applied himself, during Kibrisli's absence, to learning as much as 
possible about the condition of Turkey. He circularised the British 
consuls, posing them a series of questions to do with the state 
of the various provinces, the improvements made, and the reforms
5which might be practically applied. The answers he received 
differed in detail but were consistent in their implications of
Turkish inefficiency and corruption. They all pointed to the
1. Russell-Bulwer, 7 June '60,ibid. -
2. Ibid-
3. See Engelhardt, p.162. Bulwer-Russell, 30 May^PRO.30/22 88. The Grand 
. ■ Vizir assisted owing to French pressure.
Bulwer-Russell, 30 May ibid. He felt 'much must depend on France*.
In the event the all or nothing attitude of Russia allowed the Porte 
_ to do nothing.
« 11 June, see Engelhardt, p.170-3.
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uselessness of the local councils* ̂  The consuls showed no liking 
for Bulwer's pet scheme, namely the appointment of Christian musteshars 
or vice-governors. There was a general concurrence that the 
farming of the revenues should he swiftly abolished and Christian 
evidence be accepted in the courts where, generally speaking, it was 
not. Roads needed to be built and banks set up. Judging from 
these reports the condition of the Empire seemed a nearly hopeless one.
After Kibrisli's return Russian machinations again obliged
Bulwer to press upon the Porte the need to satisfy Russian eomplaints
2as far as possible. Not only did Gortchakoff object to the Grand
Vizir’s coming back before visiting Bosnia-Herzegovina, he renewed
his demand for a mixed European Commission of enquiry ’partly basing
his demand on the example in Syria’.^ Russell merely reminded Bulwer
of the instruction to have the representatives discuss together the
reforms which might usefully be suggested to the Porte.^ Subsequently
^'e.g. see Finn (Consul at Jerusalem)-Russell, 19 July, FO.78/1521,
Abbott(Monastir)-Russell, 9 July ibid, Blunt (Smyrna)-Russell,28 July, , 
FO.78/1533»Zohrab(Bosnia Serai)-Russell,50 July FO.78/1530.See Engel- , 
hardt,p.172,who concluded that the various consuls wished the medjli- 
sses to be more representative.This is to misread the evidence. Finn 
stated the Christians were too servile and progress had to depend on 
enlightened Turkish officials.Abbott was anxious for justice to be 
taken entirely out of the hands of the medjliss and given to the pasha. 
With much reduced powers it should then be made more ^resentative. 
Blunt from Smyrna held the councils to be 'the most corrupt in the 
country’ and bis because local government was entirely dominated by 
Christians,especially by the Greek Primate, Zohrab wanted the 
medjlisses to be elected so that more Christians would be represented.
2 But again he wished their functions to be severely circumscribed.
*See below,Ch IV,part Il̂ i,p E v e n t u a l l y ,at Bulwer's instance,the 
Porte agreed to send the Commander-in-Chief of the Roumelian army to 
visit Bosnia-Herzegovina which Kibrisli had not had time to see.
, Thus a major criticism of Gortchakoff was answered.See Engelhardt,174» 
'•Bulwer-Russell, 16 Oct. ’60,FO.78/1512 .
4'Russell-Bulwer,18 Oct.,FO.78/2436.His efforts to have Bosnia visited 
are described elsewhere.See below,Ch IV,part 11^ P
///
Bulwer sent his colleagues an elaborate memorandum giving his views
on reform, also enclosing the consular returns.^- His main proposition
2entailed converting the Great Council into the kind of executive 
tody which he had always advocated. Half of the members would 
remain in Constantinople and the other half visit the provinces, to 
make sure the laws were observed and delinquent functionaries 
punished.^ He wrote*
'This institution may be liable to objections but it would 
have for its effect to raise the central authority, restore 
personal responsibility, enable the Government to dispense 
with pashas of the highest rank, in many instances replacing 
them by more enlightened persons of lower grade and of the 
rising generation: relieve the Grand Vizir, in a certain 
degree, of much of the business which now overwhelms him, 
and be at le^st the commencement of a new order of things'. 4
The reforms they should carry out were, some of them, contrary
5to the ones advised by his consuls. He still wanted to see 
Christian vice-governors appointed. He hoped the question of 
Christians being admitted into the army would be considered by the 
representatives, and multi-racial schools established. The consuls 
had rejected all three propositions as being incapable of realisation. 
However, the obnoxious suggestion required that dragomans attend 
meetings of the Turkish commission resident in Constantinople, at the 
investigations of complaints against any local functionary. Prom
our examination of the way Bulwer's mind was apt to work on these *25T #7 - - - - - - - -- -- --
2 Bulwer-Their Excellencies the Representatives, 15 Nov«, FO.78/1513*
‘The Great Council consisted of all the ministers of State, and 
sometimes the Sheik-ul-lslam.It was the centre of the Turkish
, bureaucracy.
5‘cf. Engelhardt, p.171» again misconstrues the evidence.Buiwer did not 
wish to confuse the judicial and administrative bodies in the provin­
ces. He had always advocated special civil, commercial, and criminal 
courts quite separate from the medjlisses. His idea was that the 
supervising body-the substitute for the strong man-should have , 
extraordinary powers. .
4-. i ./ « * * ’ * £  Bc.//e>i£«cs ,  I f  t"0 - 7 9 / l f l  3 ,
S. t p' j - 7 3 .
questions, it is highly unlikely he seriously meant a proposal
which was a derogation of Turkish sovereign rights. Yet the
possibility has to be considered. Certainly Bulwer had put to
Thouvenel, in 1859, a similar scheme.1 So without agreeing
entirely with Engelhardt that Bulwer's views were extreme merely to
2ensure their rejection, the most likely explanation, and the obvious
one, is that the ambassador simply wished his colleagues to discuss
his idea. In the event Russia refused to co-operate as Bulwer knew
it would.^ The Porte likewise violently rejected what it believed
4to be interference. Bulwer concluded*
•Under these circumstances there has been nothing for me to 
do but to urge the Porte to adopt such measures at once as 
will satisfy any reasonable expectations, and thereby prevent 
the necessity for that advice which it appears unwilling 
to reeeive*. 5
There the matter rested. The Powers never again, during Bulwer's 
embassy, confronted the Porte so directly with its problems. Already 
the Turkish ministers had produced a scheme for reform which involved 
the abolition of the dimes where possible, and of the ilitzams, an
6improvement in the police, and the establishment of criminal courts.
7In February they received the Sultan's sanction.' It constituted the
Osole result of the effort, begun in October 1859» to make the Porte 
realise the gravity of its predicament.
1.Trois Années.p.358. Thouvenel had replied* *ghe permanent coalition 
Of which you speak, between the best ministers of the Porte and the 
representatives of the missions at Constantinople, would not be 
possible and would not produce much effect»unless the Powers consented 
in some way to neutralise Turkey diplomatically,that is to say,to 
0 stop their rivalries'.
;•Engelhardt,p.173 •
^"Bulwer-Russell, 18 Nov.j?0.78/1531*
^Russell-Bulwer, 17 Nov.,ibid} see Engelhardt,p.174- 
*?*Bulwer-Russell, 5 Dec.» FO.78/1637’
7*Bulwer-Russell, 12 Nov., FO.78/1513.
1*Engelhardt, p.174.
*See above, p.17-80.
Thus, by 1865 certain changes had been made to do with the
protegitf system, and the trade tariff, and the Law of the Vilayets
had been enunciated in 1864«^ The changes were effected entirely
at the Porte's instance. The Turkish ministers discussed other
2measures though again the Powers' advice was not sought. The upshot
was that in I865 as in I856 Turkey's administration lacked system and
vigour, its finances were in a chaotic state and the revenues mortgaged.
Owing to the growing reaction against reforms, Sultan Aziz was more
wayward than ever. The day indeed approached when the Powers for
political as well as financial reasons would have to exercise a closer
control over the Ottoman government.^ Turkey could not reform itself.
Bulwer anticipated such an eventuality in his frequent suggestions
to Russell that only a guaranteed loan, applied by Europeans, and
an administration in the hands of Europeans, could save Turkey. May
be, too, he seriously meant his proposal in November I860 that
provincial functionaries should.be tried in the presence of the
dragomans of the several embassies. Whatever his intention, he
had not persuaded his government to view Turkey's plight in his way.
Anything savouring of economic imperialism or political oontrol was
out of the question. Moreover, his intensity was not matched by a
similar concern in London. Though Bulwer did not understand how
deeply the malaise went he had observed sufficient to make him
realise that drastic political solutions were needed because the
^* See Pavet de Courteille et Ubicini - Etat Present del'Empire Ottoman, 
p.90.An attempt to implement it was begun late in I864 in a district 
composed of Silistria, Widin, and Nish.The new law reinforced 
Mussulman predominance.
*Temperley,'British Policy towards Parliamentary Rule and 
-Constitutionalism in Turkey (1830-1914)', p.l60.
^‘Engelhardt, p.256.
reforms, which had to he gradually applied, would not take effect 
in time to prevent disintegration. He did not clearly realise the 
logical conclusion of his ideas; hut he was honest enough to 
disagree with the official line on reform, not only because it did 





The most trying problems which Bui we r bad to deal with were 
those connected with tbe Balkans* Russian intrigues and Seep 
social discontent kept tbe outlying areas of European Turkey ever 
before tbe attention of Bulwer and bis colleagues* To prevent 
tbe local outbreaks and insurrections from being used by Russian 
emissaries and diplomatic agents for furthering pan-Slav designs, 
and France from increasing its influence by its support for tbe 
policy of nationalities in the Balkans, were constant preoccupations 
of Bulwer. Though bis store of patienoe proved not inexhaustible, 
we shall see that in tbe minor orises which followed one after 
another, he maintained a steady course and with a oertain good 
temper. First, however, we shall glance briefly at the historical 
background of this group of Balkan problems.
Before the outbreak of the Crimean War the dominating influence 
in the Balkans had been indisputably Russia. Austria had finally 
conceded this pre-eminence to Russia in 1791 when by the Treaty of 
îsfcova, the Emperor Joseph gave up his gains made in the war with 
Turkey. Catherine, the Tsarina, kept what she had won and gained 
much in prestige. By the Austro-Russian agreement of 1781 Joseph’s 
share of the spoils would have been Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro 
and part of Servia. When this opportunity had slipped by, and
later, when lietternich reshaped a polloy which was to persist
until 1859, th? initiative passed completely to Russia. Under
Russian protection the provinces of Moldavia-Wallachia, and Servia
made swift progress towards independence of the Sultan* Servia,*
which had been seriously misgoverned by the Turks, and had recently
suffered much at the hands of the Janizaries, was the first to
2take advantage of the situation* Between 1804 and 1815 two 
insurrections persuaded the Porte to yield to the Serbs* By a 
treaty of the latter year, though the Turks were to regarrison the 
Servian fortresses, Serbs were allowed to earry arms* The 
difficulties between Prince Milosh of Servia and the Porte were to 
revolve about the interpretation to be given to Article 8 of the 
Treaty of Buearest which stated;
'It has been deemed just***to come to a solemn agreement 
respecting their (Servian) security* Their peace must 
not in any way be disturbed* The Sublime Porte will 
grant the Servians, on their petition, the same privileges 
whioh her subjects in the Islands of the Archipelago and 
in other parts enjoyj and will, moreover, confer upon 
then a mark of her generosity, by leaving the administration 
of their internal affairs to themselves - by imposing 
upon them moderate taxes, and receiving them only direct 
from them and by making the regulation requisite to this 
end by an understanding with the Servian nation themselves.'
By 1850, in fulfilment of the promise made in the Treaty of
Adrianople (1829) to carry out the Acte separe relatif a la Servie,
**The material for this introductory account concerning Servia is 
2 taken from H. Temperley - History of Serbia.
^'In the wars of the fifteenth oentury the Serb aristooraoy had been 
liquidated. Consequently the Serbs were never threatened in the 
way their neighbours were - i.e. by a gradual conversion to Islam 
via a nobility willing to change its faith to keep its lands* Hence 
t$ere were no serious divisions amongst the peasant proprietors 
who constituted the mass of Serbs of Servia* They all hated the 
Turk and tax-gathers*
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signed at Akermamn in 1826, the Porte had oonoeded to Milosh his 
own interpretation of the Buearest Treaty. Thus» the whole internal 
administration of Servia was in Serb hands; ecclesiastical affairs 
were subject entirely to Servian direction; and no Turk could 
live in the country except in the fortresses. Host important of 
all the Sultan agreed that the succession should be hereditary in 
Milosh's family. The ensuing years witnessed attempts by the Porte 
to seize any opportunity occasioned by domestic strife in Servia 
to counteract its previous concessions» and it was so far successful 
as to be able to discard the principle of hereditary succession.
As for the lesser members of the Slav family in the Balkans»
namely those inhabiting Albania»^ Bosnia» Herzegovina» and Montenegro»
theirs was a more violent» a more chequered» and a more unfortunate
history - with the exception of Montenegro. In 1702 the people of
the Tohernagore» faced with the threat of slow assimilation into
the Muslim faith» had risen and massacred the Turks who were never
able again to reinforce even a nominal sovereignty. For in 1711
Bussia recognised Montenegrin independence; Austria concluded an
alliance with the country in 1779} and. in 1799 the Sultan issued
a firman explicitly recognising the autonomous status of Montenegro.
In the next half-century the remarkable lack of Turkish rule in this
and1the surrounding provinces encouraged something approaching
2endemic strife» in which» however the Prince might try to preserve
neutrality» the Montenegrins persistently succoured their neighbours. *
^Securely Muslim, Albania caused little trouble to the Porte after 
2 the 16th century.
*In 1893 Montenegro declared itsdf an hereditary principality.
In 1831-2, 1853» 1857 and, to come to the period under special 
consideration, in 1861, the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
rose against their oppressors, until at last in 1858 Turkey was 
provoked into declaring war on their abettors, the Montenegrins•
It was the exclusive influence of Russia till 1854 that 
stimulated the nationalist movement in Moldavia-Wallaohia.
Essentially political, and quite unconnected with the kind of 
social discontent whioh encouraged rebellion against the Turk 
elsewhere, the nationalist movement depended entirely on foreign 
aid* The Reglement or garni que, the law by which Russia administered 
these two provinces, paid homage to the principle of their real unity. 
During the conferences in Paris in 1856 Walewski, and espeoially 
Clarendon, declared in favour of it though the latter would shortly 
change his policy owing to strong Turkish opposition. Nevertheless 
the nationalists had been successful in winning over the majority 
of Rumanians cause of independence of both Russia and
Turkey. A vigilant watchfulness by French agents would see to it 
that the intrigues of Austria and of Stratford did not frustrate 
the general feeling.
In 1856, the international context was favourable to the
efforts of Montenegro,^ the Moldo-Wallachian provinces, and Servia, 
to,obtain independence. Further the leaders of the separatist
movements in these countries had their task made even easier by
the new order of things instituted by the Treaty of Paris. This
treaty required that before resorting to force in the Balkans a 1
1’Prince Danilo had protested against the Porte's attempts at the 
Paris Congress to record Montenegro's vassal status. See Holland, 
p.257.
contracting Power - including, of course, Turkey - had to seek the 
mediation of the other signing Powers* By article 22 the 
Principalities were guaranteed in their immunities* There could 
he no separate right of interference in their internal affairs*
Also article 27 stipulated that, 'No armed intervention can take 
place without previous agreement between those (Contracting) Powers'* 
Similarly, neither Turkey nor any other Power could Intervene without 
the consent of the other contracting Powers* Servian rights, 
embodied in several Imperial Hatts were placed under the collective 
guarantee of the Powers* Everything conspired to plaoe the initiative 
in the hands of the Balkan rulers, and to render the Suzerain 
powerless* The diplomatic engagements which took place in the 
ensuing years, and in which Bitain took part chiefly to save Turkish 
face, would seem like mere fussing* In fact, the results of the 
European protectorate if not its actual tortuous workings, were 
intelligent and deserve to be viewed more sympathetically than has 
been fashionable* This protectorate had a stabilising influence, 
checking the pace at which the provinces moved towards their goal, 
and giving the Powers time in whioh to adjust themselves to the 
changes*
Further, confronted by the tardiness of the protectorate in 
answering their demands, each province would tend to act in support
of the other when the opportunity presented itself* From his 
accession in September I860, Prince Michael of Servia would look to 
closer relations with Prince Couza of the United Principalities of
Moldavia and Vallachia* The two leaders worked together in 1862.<
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Michael also obtained a vital advantage for Montenegro.^*
In the diplomatic struggle at Constantinople the significant
development, for Britain, was the effacement of Austria, and
during the years of Bulwer's embassy Vienna's equivocal policies
2towards the southern Slavs. Britain was not interested enough 
in these areas to engage in a determined policy of retrenchment 
with a shaky Austria and an impotent Turkey.
Bulwer's response to the whole drift of events was fairly 
predictable. Striving to persuade the Porte to anticipate certain 
demands of its vassals, or to yield to them in time, to grant, for 
example, a port to Montenegro, to concede the Servian government 
Jurisdiction over Turks residing outside the fortresses, and to 
strengthen Couza's position against the hostile Assembly which desired 
a foreign prince, Bulwer made a virtue out of necessity. His 
instinctive sympathy with the Justice of some of the vassals' demands 
was less important than this sure, intmtive knowledge of political 
reality. Turkish survival depended, in part,- on the friendship of 
these nearly independent countries. His anxiety on this score, 
in practice, tended sometimes to make him seem less to the point 
than Malmesbury and Russell. However the telegraphic system 
2*See below Part III,p.3.11 •
‘Austria,traditionally interested in events affecting the fate of the 
southern Slavs, 'was bound by the condition of affairs to face the 
possibility, however repugnant, of the dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire'. (C.H.J.1925»Vol.I,No.3,p.324t'Eeohberg and Bismarck on 
the Eastern Question 1859*60, 1878,a. Instructions of Rcchberg to 
Count Thun 4 Dec. 1859»' Elizabeth Malcolm-Smith)• In dread of the 
establishment of independent states in the region, Vienna prepared 
even to allow Russia a free hand in the Straits provided Austria 
obtained Servia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro, should the 
Turkish Empire disintegrate. *
restricted Bulwer's freedom of action, and the result was, generally
!
speaking, a signlfie&nt participation by Britain in the eoncert 
diplomacy affecting Balkan issues. Britain worked with France orer 
the Double Election and the Legislative Union of the Principalities, 
though tending to be more pro-Turkish over lesser issues like the 
question of the Dedicated Convents. Compromise was the characteristic 
feature of British policy in 1862 during the Servian crisis, and 
Bulwer and Russell were pleased enough with the results. AScJ?J3ga£&§■ I|
Montenegrin affairs, Britain kept in the background. Malmesbury's j
negative response to Bulwer's suggestion that the Porte might give ]
j
an outlet to the sea to Montenegro, was of little real importance !
since Turkey would not contemplate it."* - Perhaps Russell's very 
competent handling of specific Balkan questions may have been a
2consequence of Britain's comparative lack of interest in the area. 
Bulwer proved himself to be, in negotiations, a diplomatist of 
extraordinary endurance, though on occasions he lacked judgment in 
his general appreciation of a difficulty.
The following analyses will show how successful were chief 
and agent in extracting from the fluid state of political relations, 
the greatest advantage possible. More could hardly have been 
expected.
^*in 1866, significantly when French hegemony at Constantinople was j 
already something of the past, France like Britain opposed granting ! 
such a port though the Sultan had consented, see Temperley - 
o History of Servia. p.256. I
*As distinct from Russell's unfortunate policies towards Egypt.




ghe Double Election of Colonel Couza
The germ of the future successes of the nationalist movement
in the Principalities lay in the failure of the Paris Congress to
come to an agreement respecting Moldavia and Wallaohia. During
the conferences» January to February 1856, the Powers, fearing that
the signature of a general treaty might he postponed, had referred
the issue to future conferences to be held in Paris. In the
meantime the Sultan, according to Artiole 24 of the Treaty of Paris,
convoked a popularly elected Divan ad hoc in each province.^ A
European Commission, including a representative of the Porte,
sitting at Buearest, investigated the condition of the Principalities
with a view to proposing the bases of a new organization for the
government of them. This compromise, which relied for its success
on the concurrence of views of a popularly elected body and an alien
commission powerless and reflecting the divisions of the Powers,
quickly foundered on the rock of Stratford dc Rcdoliffe's
intransigence. The Settlement of the Principalities beoame again
a subject for the consideration of the Cabinets when in July 1857
the European Commission refused to have dealings with the Moldavian
Divan. It clearly did not represant the wishes of the people.
The Emperor Napoleon, attempting to settle the business by personal
diplomacy, had interviews with Clarendon at Osborne in August, and
These Divans shall be called upon to express the wishes of the 
people in regard to the definitive organization of the 
Principalities•*
with the Tsar and Gortehakoff in September which produced a fair 
measure of agreement though the French Emperor had compromised 
on the point of union under a foreign prince* As a result of 
these talks there were fresh elections to the Divans and these voted 
in October for the Four Points - autonomy, union, a foreign prince, 
and representative government* Between May and August 1838 the 
representatives at Paris debated the future organization of the 
two provinces in the light of these elections and the socio-political 
survey of the Buoarest Commissioners* So, when Bulwer took up 
his post in July 1838 the ambassadors in Paris were already 
concluding their labours resulting in the Convention of August 19*
By this instrument the new United Principalities of Moldavia and 
Vallaehia were to have two Princes, two Assemblies, two armies and 
one Central Commission and Supreme Court of Appeal at Foesani*
There was to be a narrow electoral franchise* The Central Commission 
composed of members from Moldavia and Vallachia, half of them 
nominated by the Prince and half by each Assembly, prepared legislation 
effecting both provinces, and referred it to the Princes and 
Assemblies* Ministries were responsible to the Assemblies and could 
be impeached by them or the Princes* The Assemblies had a veto on 
all fiscal measures* Thus, in spite of the intention that each 
prince should be the chief exeeutive power, the constitution was 
such as would produce a stalemate in the event of the Assemblies and 
the Princes disagreeing* The two armies were organised on a 
common plan, the Hospodars taking turns to appoint the Commander-in-
Chief*
As the eonfereness had proceeded along their tortuous way
Malmesbury, English Foreign Minister, had showed erery sign of
impatience with the constant negotiations* There was something
ridiculous about sensible diplomatists spending so much effort
trying to find an unobjectionable flag for the United Principalities*
Further, the Porte's refusal to accept Malmesbury's proposal for
the Eospodars to be elected for life annoyed the Foreign Minister*
'The idea is given up* Tell the Porte to remember it 
hereafter when at the death of every Hospodar the question 
of union will be inevitably raised again',
wrote Malmesbury to Bulwer*^
Buiwar's views differed considerably from his chief's, though
they were expressed in a very moderate, almost detached manner*
The time Eulwer had spent as Commissioner in Buearest had clearly
profited him for from the beginning his attitude was sympathetic,
his ex cathedra criticisms and comments well-reasoned and
consistent, and his information impressive* The oeoasion for his
initial comments was his dissatisfaction with the European
Commissioners' Report* He had differed with his Austrian colleague
over Consular jurisdiction* Bulwer looked forward to its abolition*
There were differences between him and his Turkish and Russian
colleagues over the Creek Convents, and he alone suggested 'conferring
on Jews in the Principalities the same rights they possessed in
2other portions of the Ottoman Empire'* Of immediate relevance
in view of pre-eleotion developments in the next few months and of
^‘Malmesbury - Bulwer, 10 July *58,FQ/78/1349»
^‘Bulwer - Malmesbury, 16 April *58, FO/78/1375*
Couza's inability later to find a ministry in either province to 
tackle land reform, was Bulwer's anxiety to obtain a broader 
franchise, one which was more complicated, but certainly makig use 
of the traditional organs of local gorernment, and the social 
geography of the country. He wrote:
'•••l was and am generally speaking in favour of all 
institutions that tend to confer rights and impose 
responsibility on the Citizen, deeming this the best 
means by which public character can be raised and 
morality permanently established in these Countries; 
whereas my Colleagues are rather of opinion that these 
effects must be produced by the Central authority and 
all depends on the choice of the Prince who is to be 
at the head of the Government*• 1
She practical details which Bulwer explained in his Project of 
Government required each Legislature to be elected in two 
degrees, the whole system being based on municipal and district 
councils. In a country dominated by the petty nobility and 
financially dependent on the small merchants, Bulwer's system 
had far more to recommend it than the one actually adopted. One 
commentator said of the latter:
'•••if it be true that the Conference at Paris has 
established that, to be an elector in the Towns it is 
requisite to be possessed of real or personal property 
in the Town of the value of 6,000 ducats, the consequence 
is that in most of the towns in Moldavia there will be 
no electors at all...' 3
Bulwer had also wished to lay down 'the Principle that in all
matters where the Imperial interests of the Ottoman Empire are
concerned, the interference of the Porte should be recognised as a
matter of course, whereas in all subjects purely local it should be 1
1. Buiwe r-Malme s bury, 16 April 1858, FO.78/1375.
2# Printed for use of F0., June 3C,'3d»ibid.The franchise would still 
, have confined actual power within the hands of the propertiedehsses.
Ongley(consul in charge at Jassy)-Bulwer,no.7f29 Sept.'58,ibid.
strictly forbidden'.*  The wisest pnposal of all was that the
Forte itself should appoint the first Hospodar in each
2Principality for a period of years. By allowing the Principali­
ties to inaugurate the new Constitution the population might 'feel ' 
that a new era is dawning upon them'.^ In a lengthy despatch 
Bulwer justified his policy for the area, referring to his previous 
attitudes. His explanation was a mild criticism of the Paris 
conferences then sitting. He explained that he had said 
earlier about the votes of the Divans ad hoo that they tended 
to independence which was contrary to the aims of the late war, 
and as he pt iti
'•••nor could the circumstance that the independence of 
the Principalities was not to he actually proclaimed, 
be taken by me as any argument in favour of its being 
virtually accorded*• 4
On the contrary, he thought that an outright declaration of 
its independence would have enabled the new state to come to some 
satisfactory agreement with the Porte about a defensive and 
offensive alliance:
'Whereas, any arrangement establishing independence in 
a more underhand and indefinite manner, whilst it 
would only lead ultimately to the same conclusion, that 
is, clear and positive independence, would do so through 
a series of disputes and quarrels, which would render 
any good understanding at the last, impossible'. 4
** Article III of Project of Government.
* He suggested too that the princes should not be hereditary since 
none was pre-eminent enough to command the necessary respect.
" He was not to have extensive powers for Bulwer feared that a 
prince who could, would do what he liked. Bulwer did not allow 
for the tension between the men of '43, now returned, and landed 
interests,which would have been aggavated by the limitation of 
_ the Hospodorial rank to the Grand Boyards.
Bulwer - Malmesbury, 13 July, FO.78/1378. ' .
Bulwer - Malmesbury, 27 July, FO.78/1365»
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Events would show how right Bulwer was in this appraisal of 
the possibilities.« He went on to conclude that as independenoe 
was out of the question, a 'clear and positive' dependence should 
have been defined for the Principalities«
'But this being done, I wish to be distinctly understood 
to say that instead of thinking that the power of the 
Porte in the Principalities nay be increased by its 
constant and unsolicited interference in the affairs of 
the Principalities 1 an convinced that the extent of 
its power will be almost in exact proportion with its 
abstinence from such interference'« 1
This extreme moderation of Bulwer's resulted from his not 
appreciating how intensely Austria worked for a conservative system, 
nor how much emphasis the French government placed on advertising 
Union because it had already given promises at Osborne which 
prevented its obtaining real Union. Further,Bulwer had yet to 
experience the actual diplomatic conditions at Constantinople 
and to witness the hectic speed at which affairs would move in the 
Principalities once the new order was commenced« He had not 
picked up the actual tempo of affairs when in Paris en route to his 
post he advised Malmesbury*
'•••that it is more for the advantage of Turkey to 
make certain concessions, these not being of first rate 
importance, if they satisfy the French government, and its 
national susceptibility, than to resist them successfully, 
thus leaving France mortified and fancying herself injured'« 2 1
1. Bulwer - Malmesbury, 27 July '5$, ibid« • . ■ • ”
Bulwer - Malmesbury, 14 June '58, FO«78/1362«Soon after settling 
down in Constantinople Bulwer advised the Crand Vizir,A'ali Pashas 
'that the policy of the Porte,in respect to the three Principali­
ties,should be to leave them as much as possible to themselves, 
and only interfere,when the great interests of the Empire were 
especially concerned,or when such interference was required by 
the Principalities themselves,and was likely,by its judioious 
exercise,to increase the prestige of the Porte and add thereby,in 
almost the only manner in which it is practicable,to its real 
authority«'(Bulwer-Malmesbury,14 July,FO«78/1364)Such fine gilt 
would soon rub off to reveal a rougher metal«
t% S'
His manner soon became more urgent after two months at his
work. By this time he had already been confronted by tension in
Servia, and Montenegrin intransigence. Very shortly the violent
outbreak of Muslim fanaticism at DJeddah thickened the atmosphere
in the eastern metropolis. Colquhoun, Consul at Bucarest, plied
Bulwer with complaints of the iniquities of the administration
in Moldavia. Soon after the establishment of an interim government
there, according to an agreement between the Powers, he expatiated
on crimes of a different kind by the new order.^ As a consequence
of this mounting pressure against the Porte, a drift towards
a more pro-Turkish attitude began to influence Bulwer*s policy.
It was only by a policy of supporting the Porte that he could
ensure the carrying out of the Convention of 19th August in the
spirit in which it was intended. It was only by such a policy
that he could counter French influence, both at Constantinople
2and especially in the Principalities. Already his worst fears
about the electoral laws were being confirmed. Not only were there
difficulties in interpreting the Convention as it applied to the
different Principalities, there were forces at work trying to take
^'Before the institution of the Caimacamie ad interim of Balliano, 
Philippesco and Mano, Colquhoun despairing, moaned« ' • •.never 
during the 24 years I have resided here, has the ministry of the 
Interior been in the state it now is, never has the administration 
of the Districts been so corrupt, so demoralized.The prefectures 
; with one or two exceptions,are in the hands of men of no character 
whatever,who commit delicts for which in other times the consequents 
2 would have been the salt-mines.' To Bulwer 13 Sept.*58 FO.78/1378. 
Thouvenel,though energetic in pressing his country's wishes, 
nevertheless disliked French policy in the Near East after 1836.
Soon he had to admit«'Sir Henry Bulwer,with the best facade,will 
certainly not come to an understanding with me to reconstruct the 
position of Bussia at Constantinople'. Thouvenel-Amedee Outry,
18 Feb. '59 Trois Annees. p.337»
advantage of the absence of authority to promote party interests - 
boyard in fallachiay and nationalist in Moldavia. Contrary to law 
the Caimacamies dismissed Prefects in the localities and replaced 
them with safe men while in Moldavia itself» two of the Caimaeaas 
worked against the third» Etienne Catardji» the Minister of the 
Interior. Bulwer» increasingly irritated by such an exhibition of 
blatant indifference to the wishes of the Powers and the Porte, and 
his attitude towards Prance hardening, saw the answer to the various 
problems in the appointment of an authority whose decision would be 
supported by the Powers and therefore carried out in the Principali­
ties.^ Quite early he sounded Malmesbury on the advisability of 
helping the Porte to execute the Powers' wishes by according it 
support in its interpretations of the Convention's meaning. The 
representatives should give their advice to the Turkish government 
in this task. Bulwer wrotet
'There are many questions arising out of the late Treaty 
which when the new Constitution comesinto operation 
will require explanation or we shall have all the 
difficulties over again that occurred on the last occasion.
The Porte should, 1 think, be advised to demand explana­
tions on these questions from Congress. The delay of an 
additional week should be allowed for this purpose.' 2
Malmesbury exhibited his oustomary anxiety to speed things along
in this area, and negatived the proposal, though some three weeks
later» when the Paris conferences had finished Bulwer returned to the
scheme. He feared that when the Imperial Firman embodying the
^* See FO.78/1332,Nov-Dee. several Despatches; Bulwer-Malmesbury,
20 Dee. '58»FO.78/1352?'The whole affair in Moldavia is said to be 
got up by the French Consul in a democratic spirit most hostile 
to the Porte'.
*Bulwer-Malmesbury, 27 Sept., FO.78/1349.
conferences' proposals for a caimacamie ad interim reached Buoarest 
and Jassy the Powers would he even less willing to interpose their 
influence« H« urged:
'As questions arise with regard to the interpretation 
of the Convention of Paris relative to the Principalities 
on which it is hard for any one Power to force the Porte 
to give way, and as Congress can no longer pass any 
opinion thereon, would it not he better ones for all to 
deolare that such questions are to he decided hy a 
majority of the Bepresentatives of the Powers parties to 
the Treaty at Constantinople, including the Porte'? 1
This was a drastic solution indeed whioh involved a mere 
majority of diplomatic agents deciding the meaning of a Treaty 
irrespective of the interests of the several governments« The 
Foreign Secretary naturally declined the suggestion« Nevertheless 
seen against the background of events in the Principalities Bulwer's 
demand had merely involved the agents giving their advioe and 
support to the Porte in making quick decisions not of principle 
hut on the actual application of principle to a complicated 
situation. Conditions in one Principality were as different as 
could he from those in the other. Explanations would only he of 
local importance and to prevent their assuming a wider significance 
swift decisions were necessary«^ Buiwer added, clearly indicating 
what grieved him most:
'•••it would he expedient for the sake of the dignity of 
this Government, that it should he at once able to give 
' an explanation of its own decrees founded upon the
.Treaty, to which it was itself a Party« But the Porte 
will not venture to give its own interpretation without 
some general authority for so doing'««»4
^*Bulwer-italmeshury,19 Oct•, FO«78/1349’
‘Malmesbury-Bulwer, 11 Nov. '58,no. 340,FO.78/1352«
^‘Later he explained:'If nothing could he decided hut by reference 
to the Courts, either the treaty would not he carried but for months 
or would he carried out hy the authorities in the Principalities . just in the manner they thought proper' .Buiwer-Malmesbury 17DsaBhl371
4 ‘Bulwer-Malmeshury, 27_Oot •«»o • 3O6, FO • ̂ 8/1 3 6$ • _  '  7S/1
In fact, M s  concern for Turkish dignity made him adopt an 
unwarranted interpretation of the Treaty* He held that since 
the Forte issued the Firmans conreying the Powers' decisions it 
was the executor of the Treaty* Should there not be time to 
consult the Powers:
'as the Ottoman Government is responsible for the elections 
being fair, it seems to me authorised in preventing them 
from being^unfairly influenced and conducted'* 1
It was a characteristic piece of sophistry*
He was also perturbed at the prospect of a nationalist victory
in Moldavia whnh he anticipated would be a prelude to a similar
result in the other province* 'The democratic party', he wrote,
'•••will not submit to be beaten in the other province by the
system which a faction of an extremely opposite character is carrying 
2on there'* The military reoccupation of the provinces, render^ 
'their future destiny gloomy and undertain', was, he thought, 
within the bounds of possibility as tMngs were developing.^ In 
this Bulwer showed prescience* Only the tension between France 
and Austria in January - February of the following year would 
prevent Austrian military intervention.^
In the event Bulwer, in spite of his having received no en­
couragement from home, and even contrary to the opinion now expressed
5by his agent in Bucarest, was able to organise diplomatic action*
l.Bulwer-Malmesbury, 15 Deo., FO.78/1371*
_*Bulwer-Malmesbury, 24 Nov.,no* 382, FO*78/1370*
Bulwer-Malmesbury, 2 Dec.,Fd* 78/1370* 
c'B.W.Seton-Watson- History of the Rumanians. p.265- *
3*Colquhoun-Bulwer,no*54, 27 Nov., FO*7d/1378.Having objeoted to outside 
interference he went on:'***the Kaimaoams yielding before the 
counsels of those persons who really are desirous of keeping 
matters quiet and orderly have long ceased from making further 
changes, except in cases when the evidence of misconduot fully 
justify their removing the obnoxious employed'*
nsl
At the invitation of the Porte, the representatires in Constantinople 
expressed, their dissatisfaction with the behaviour of the two 
Moldavian Kaimacams. Though passing over most of the aets of the 
government in Moldavia they condemned the treatment of the Ministry 
of the Interior, the third Kaimacam, 'or the whole elections would 
he illegal'. They also reproved 'the insolent conduct of said 
majority in Moldavia towards the Porte and its Commissioner'
Two weeks later the Porte at last decided that it could no 
longer tolerate the proceedings so humiliating to itself, and a 
proposal for a delay in the elections was made. Thile the Powers 
failed to respond to this overture, the Moldavian elections took 
place. Even Malmesbury, impressed no doubt by Bulwer's insistence, 
had come to believe that something had to be done quickly to stop 
the farce. At Bulwer's instance he proposed another Paris con­
ference to interpret the Convention. The resulting Anglo-French 
initiative was, perhaps in pique, turned down by the Porte. But, in 
any ease, the time when the actual course of events in the 
Principalities could have been stayed had probably gene when the 
task of inaugurating the new regime had been given over to the 
two Kaimaoamies ad interim. It was not easy for the Powers ligatly 
to abandon the work already accomplished, and to begin again with 
no hope of discovering another method of instituting a new system.
Be that as it may, the Porte in rejecting the French proposal which 
Malmesbury had enoouraged, turned down the last opportunity of 
obtaining some assistance, however slight, in asserting some control 
over the affairs of its awkward vassals. It mattered little, too *
*#Bulwer-Malmesbury, 28 November, FQ.78/1352.
»•?"3
that Bui we r who had interested, the Foreign Office in a Congress
'to determine on the points at issue'^ thought now that 'eonferenees
might reopen to deoide on principles, the execution of which might
2he left to the Porte and Representatives here'. He was impressed
by the Porte's 'great objection' to allowing Paris to be the arbiter
in eastern affairs.^ One may also hazard a guess that just as
Bulwer during these very months fought hard to make the consular
4system revolve round the Ambassador rather than the Foreign Office,
5and to keep the Dragoman system unimpaired to underline his own 
authority, so Bulwer returned to his original idea of leaving 
decisions in the hands of the representatives at Constantinople for 
similar reasons*
On the 17th January 1859 Moldavia elected Colonel Couza as 
its Hospodar* Yallachia chose him as its ruler on 5 February* As 
if this double election were not enough to introduce a serious 
tension between the Powers, the Serbs had deposed their Earageorgevic 
Prince in December and after his superfluous abdication on 5 January, 
they proceeded to elect the exiled Milosh in his place* Most 
ominous of all Napoleon 111 had declared at his New Tear reception 
that he feared Franco-Austrian relations were not as good as they 
might be and thereby sent tremors round the Chancelleries of Europe.
In the Balkans hopes burned brighter* 1
1. Bulwer-Malmesbury, 22 Dec., no* 450, FO.78/1371» '
_* Bulwer-Malmesbury, Tele.23 Dec*, ibid*
Bulwer-Malmesbury 23 Dec.,ibid.
See above, Ch. III,p.?0. also Bulwer-Malmesbury,13 July '58,,F0.78/ 
1364,and Bulwer-Malmesbury,27 Oct.'58,no.307,FO.78/1369*'Might it 
net be better as a rule that**.the Embassy should first decide, if 
it thought it could do so,and transmit its decision to the Foreign 
Office and the grounds for it,or refer to your Lordship should it 
feel itself incompetent to form any positive opinion,pointing out 
e the grounds of difficulty'.
* See above Ch.Ill,p.%.also Bulwer-Malmesbury,10 Nov.'58,F0.78/1369.
The pro-Austrian Tory Cabinet pursued a very active policy 
during the next two months in the hope of limiting an Austro-French 
war if not of preventing it; consequently the problems of Turkey 
had to be subordinated to this central issue* It was the beginning 
of that process by which the increasing attention given to German 
and Italian problems would eventually allow Servia and the United 
Principalities to achieve the substance of independence*
Malmesbury's attitude towards Couza was unequivocal from the 
first** If he was not likely to be mischievous the Porte ought 
to accept him* After the second election Malmesbury was opposed 
to a Conference unless^a measure of agreement as to facts and
i2illegalities had been previously achieved. He was apprhhensive
lest the problem should be settled not on its own merits but rather
^'Malmesbury - Bui we r, 21 Jan.yF0.78/1422t 'The Porte should aot for 
itself as much as possible keeping within its rights by the Treaty* 
Consider whether the recognition of Couza would be mischievous or 
if he is a man to be made harmless'* Malmesbury-Bulwer, '59» ibid: 
'Var with Austria is probable* Ve know an attempt will be made 
to raise the Turkish provinces against her* This will end in 
their independence* Let the Porte accept any Government that 
2 is less dangerous than a rewlotion such as I describe*' 
'Malmesbury-Bulwer, Feb.7th. *59, ibid* Referring to his former 
proposal for a conference in December which Austria and Turkey had 
rejected, Malmesbury went on to explain that: 'The Conference if 
it had been convened when proposed by Her Majesty's Government 
might have averted the more recent irregularities: but the 
opportunity having been negleoted, it appeared to Her Majesty's 
Government that the question of appealing to the Conference 
could only thereafter be advantageously reverted to when the 
Principalities had more deeply and completely committed themselves 
by a systematic disregard of the Provisions of the Convention, 
and when on the other hand the Porte had shown that it had 
exhausted all means of conciliation, but had failed to impress 
upon the Principalities the obligation of confining themselves 
within the limits laid down by Treaty for their proceedings*'
In other words, the double eleotion was not as terrible as - 
all that*
Throughout he wasas part of the Fraaco-Austrian quarrel 
determined to act with a majority of the Powers in $$te of Turkey 
and Austria*
Buiwer, who had wanted a conference after the first election
of Couza because of the serious situation within the Principalities,
quickly advised the Porte to convoke a conference without expressing
its views fully on the subject 'until it knew those of the Powers
2on idiom it could rely'* This was to reinsure the Porte against
any subsequent rebuff* But the Porte at once protested against the
double-election, for, as Bulwer stated, its line was 'either to
oppose resolutely or to acquiesce absolutely in what has taken place**^
He wished it 'to see whether the first course was possible before
altogether repudiating the second'*^ Feeling that Couza was merely
the tool of a violent party Bulwer expected the most to be gained
was Couza's giving up Wallachia, though he anticipated that Couza
5would not agree*^ Couza appeared impressed when Churchill, the
English Consul at Jassy, communicated to him that he might be
assured Moldavia if he gave up the other Principality*^ Prokeseh,
Bulwer, A'ali and Fuad eonsquently held a meeting on 15 February at
the English ambassador's instance, to deoide whataEuropean Conference
should do* Owing to Austria's involvement elsewhere all that could
be agreed upon was that Bulwer should oontinue to press Couza and
^’Malmesbury - Bulwer»7 Feb** ibid*
‘Bulwer-Malmesbury, 8 Feb., ibid.
'•Ibid, 
c* ibid*2‘Bulwer-Malmesbury, 10 Feb*, F0*78/1423*
‘Hiker - The Making of Rumania* p*217
refer a plan of colleetire intervention, whereby commissioners 
should go with a Turkish army of occupation, to the British and 
Austrian governments¿to he recommended at the proposed conference.^ 
But Bulwer's importance, on a par with the other representatives', 
was negligible. This was essentially a western rather than an 
eastern question, and had to he subordinated to the larger 
consideration of European balance. It was a matter for Cabinets. 
Under French pressure Malmesbury quickly determined upon accepting 
Couza as solo Hospodar. No doubt chagrined by the Turkish 
rejection of his advice in the previous year in favour of hereditary 
hospodars and later £of a conference to deal with election abuses, 
he quickly accommodated himself to the circumstances,especially 
as Cowley had promptly reported Walewski's frank espousal of the 
Roumanian cause. He wrote to Cowley, at this point on his Vienna 
peace missions
'You could at the same time at Vienna sound Buol as 
to our admitting the double eldetion of Couza, provided 
we fortified the suzerainte of the Porte and the divisions 
of the provinces by stringent declarations, stating 
our admissions to be favours, and contrary to the original 
convention'. 2
Preferring to await the opinion of a conference^ before stating 
his views openly, Malmesbury assumed that Couza would be recognised 
in which events
''The men who put up Couza as a sham would be caught in 
their trap * • 4
2*Riker, p.218.
*Memoirs of an Ex-Minister.p.156.entry 13 Feb. 1859»Tkis was in the 
event to be the substance of the Protocol of 13 April,the basis of 
- the final agreement of 6 September '59*
^*Malmesbury-Bulwer,14 Feb*F0.78/1423.Walewski suggested a conference 
.which would allow the double election but not union or independence. 
^'Malmesbury - Bulwer, 14 Feb. '59»FO.78/1422.
Malmesbury's tone became more imperative as the European
crisis loomed larger* First» he was urging the Porte to grant
Moldavia to Couza at once;^ then» a week later» that Couza be
2recognised as sole Hospodar* By the first week in March
Malmesbury» assured by Musurus» Turkish ambassador in London»
that the Porte would retire 'leaving things to take their chanoe'
if Congress were to recognise Couza» also contemplated retiring
xfrom a conference if the Porte would not yield to the Powers.
Malmesbury's was» indeed» an awkward predicament* He was confronted
with a choice between the policy of the preservation of Turkish
integrity at all costs» and one of apparent sympathy with the
rising nationalism of a Christian people* He was embarrassed by
the Porte's unyielding hostility to Couza*
'This country'» he explained» 'will not stand a Hospodar 
being forced down the throats of the Roumans» but on the 
other hand we cannot force the Porte.to submit to a 
breaeh of Treaty we have so lately made'* 4
Somewhat exasperated Bulwer pointed to the fact that Couza
was not so important as the spirit which had dictated the recent
5developments* It meant independence* Of oourse he was right*
A policy of yielding gradually» he felt» could but end in the 
ascendancy of Franoe and Russia on the banks of the Danube* He 
recommended three courses!
'•*.standing firmly by the late Convention; inducing 
the Porte to propose modifications in it under the 
proviso that the execution of the Convention thus 
modified will be clearly provided for by a special
2*Malmesbury-Bulwer, 14 Feb*,op.cit* •
.‘Malmesbury-Bulwer» 21 Feb*, ibid*
^‘Malmesbury-Bulwer, 6 March» ibid. 
f*Malmesbury-Bulwer» ibid*
^‘Bulwer-Malmesbury, 15 Feb•, FO*78/1425»
/?Sr
arrangement as to intervention, or the total abrogation of the guarantee of the Convention in favour of much
extended concessions as may give the Principalities at 
once all that they desire; and which if neither restrained 
nor satisfied-they will assuredly seek to obtain'. 1
However| Bulwer was galvanised ito action as soon as the war
between France and Austria became imminent and he agreed with
Malmesbury that it would be advisable to settle the question one
2way or another without delay. Bulwer spared no pains in 
persuading the Porte to submit to the will of the Powers.
She Porte was at a great disadvantage. Fuad knew that 
whatever he might do he certainly oould not withdraw from a Congress. 
Further, if too much time were to slip by it was hard to prediot 
whether Couza could withstand the pressure to dispense with 
investiture altogether and declare the Principalities independent. 
Yalewski,in February, had suggested that a guarantee might be 
devised to prevent other infractions of the Convention. Now, in 
March, Austria was speaking a similar language, and the British 
government did not like the idea of being publicly outvoted at a 
Conference - 'worse than any other eomplication to England *
Other things being equal all that was needed now was a decent and 
dignified time to elapse before an official assent to the recent 
treaty infraction would be forthcoming from the Porte.
Duriag the months before the outbreak of the Italian war, Bulwer
had flooded Malmesbury with suggestions for the solution of several
^'Bulwer-Malmesbury, 22 Feb., ibid.
^'Bulwer-Malmesbury, 16 April, FO.78/1430»
^'Malmesbury-Bulwer, 26 Feb., FO.78/1423«
difficulties. It was the internal situation in the Principalities 
which chiefly concerned him. Not that he had avoided the error 
of assuming that diplomacy could solve what were essentially social 
problems and questions of internal politics. Simply, he was 
prone to expanding on a pet theme, namely the weaknesses and 
failings of the constitution. The point that the Constitution 
needed revising in its entirety and the electoral qualifications 
made more logical, was sound and reached the heart of the matter.
At the time it was a ridiculous suggestion.^ Another proposition 
that Couza might he given a probationary period of 18 months as 
Caimaoam to prove his ability, after which he might be made Prince, 
would have provided a basis for resolving the international 
complications, but in terms of local Rouman polities was silly. 
Bulwer insisted to the point of weariness that 'nothing permanent 
can be done except by standing firmly by the Treaty or by making 
great and radical changes in it'.
Bulwer suggested in March 1859» that the election of A prince 
in either province should be by an Assembly for the purpose and not 
the Legislative Assembly - a measure to give the prince the kind 
of freedom which Couza lacked at that moment, that is freedom from 
the groups who had carried him to power. He should at first be 
named by an outside authority to implement the constitution for 
four or five years. The electoral laws should be revised for, as 
they were, they kept out the main body of the peasantry in rural
2*Bulwer - Malmesbury, 8 March, PO.78/1423.
‘Ibid. One suspects he must have wearied both Malmesbury and 
Russell by this '1 told you so' attitude.
<M4-<
districts and made the votes in some towns too exclusive.’1’ Bulwer 
did not quarrel with the Principle of Union which might have 
teen compatible with dependence, but with the overlooking of the 
Sultan's opinion and the infraction of Treaty rights. A respect 
for both was the only manner in which he could obtain prestige 
for himself, and further British policy. it was a matter of 
interests but he glossed this over in somewhat self-righteous 
languagei
'...if treaties are to be lightly esteemed, if the 
parties who signed them are to allow their agents 
to act against them, when the ink with which their 
signatures were written is hardly dry, what trust 
can be placed in the only substitute we know of 
for contention and war?.•.The constitution, such as 
it is, has more chance of working well, under the 
conviction that it must be obeyed than it will have 
with the mere sanction of the double eleotion of 
Prince Couza, under the idea that its regulations 
may be disregarded'. 2
And after asserting that in the latter case the Principalities 
and Europe would be kept in a constant state of irritation, he 
stressed the need to discover:
'the mode guaranteeing something like obedience to 
whatever plan, which••.may be adopted'. 3
Throughout this crisis Bulwer chafed at his enforced inactivity.
His government's line destroyed his policy before he could put it
into practice and he would have done better to have confined hheelf
to finding ways of ingratiating himself with Couza, perhaps by
expressing sympathy with him in his attempts to cope with the
awkward internal situation. Malmesbury had to aot quickly and
2#Bulwer-Malmesbury, 23 March *59,F0.78/1429. -
Couza had to fight a long battle with his political foes^ ending 
with his plebiscite of May '64 before he was able to extend the 
, franchise.
Bulwer-Malmesbury, 23 March,ibid.
Buiwer*s awareness of this ought to hare dominated his thinking, 
for in any case the question was being settled in Paris.
The Russian view that there should he no alteration whatever 
in the Treaty of Paris, and that a conference should meet before 
a Congress on Italian affairs was supported by Malmesbury who 
merely stipulated that the representatives of the Powers should be 
able to advise when the casus interventus arose.1 Consequently 
France and Russia insisted that it should be a unanimous decision. 
Valewski refused to act until he had reached a preliminary agreement 
with the British government which was eventually satisfied when 
a sufficiently strong formula on the integrity of the Convention 
presented itself. On 7 April Britain and France reached an 
understanding. Walewski was able to introduce the pre-arranged 
formula (15 April) amounting to a declaration that the doüie-eleotion 
did not conform to the Convention of 19 August. The Porte was 
asked to invest Couza as an exception, it being understood that 
any further infraction of the Convention, so deolared by the 
representatives of the Powers, would be dealt with by the Porte 
according to a fixed procedure. Coercive measures were the last 
resort. Cut short by the outbreak of thé Italian war, the 
conference could not await the results of its efforts.
As Austrian troops entered Piedmont Malmesbury urged immediate
2acceptance and praised Couza's moderation. Expecting the worst 
1#Riker, p.225.
’Malmesbury - Bulwer, 31 May *59>FO.73/1432.
in Europe, Bulwer thought that Turkey would hare to join a league 
of armed neutrality with England, the Low Countries, Prussia and 
Sweden. He used very strong language to the Porte to get it to 
yield to the simple form of the Protocol of 13 April. However it 
demanded conditions about intervention which would have required 
another general agreement. Hiker suggests that by his separate 
action Bulwer was trying to impress the Porte with the fact of his 
abrupt volte face, and to get back his personal prestige.^ The 
suggestion that Bulwer for personal reasons was the cause of 
Lallemand's inability to bring the Representatives to combine to 
press the plan on the Porte, is inaccurate. Austria could never 
have joined in such a combination. Nor could Bulwer have taken a 
step which might have emphasised a disagreement with Austria in 
the Near East. How Bulwer's hint to the Porte that the whole 
question of the treatment of the Christians might be taken up by 
Russia if it did not yield on tis question may be construed as
intrigue whereby Bulwer hoped to 'banish the bogey of Russian
2ascendance', it is difficult to imagine. The most that can be
said is that Bulwer, once the war had commenced, was fearful lest
Turkey,in her isolation, might turn to Russia. It was an hypothesis
which Bulwer expected his chief to examine at his leisure.^ What
Bulwer aotually said to the Porte was that should it withold its
sanction from Couza, the latter would do witnut it, and that the
~'Biker, p.228.
,'Biker, p.227-8 .
^'Bulwer-Malmesbury, 3 May,PO.78/1431* 'The idea nevertheless may be 
chimerical and it is not from this remote corner that I can judge 
ef its feasibility'.
Porte's action would, make 'an unfavourable impression on the 
Cabinet of St* J a m e s * A  declaration of independence would be 
concurred in by the Powers, including Britain, and it would be 
followed by one from Milosh of Servia. Complications with Bussia 
might ensue resulting in a Russian occupation of the Principalities.
As there was nothing in the Turkish Treasury, and the Porte was
2trying to raise the next year's revenue by a sacrifice of 50# 
in interest, Bulwer was, may be, not as erratic as at first sight 
appears. The rest of Europe could have done nothing to halt 
Russia. Malmesbury however was able to reassure Bulwer that the 
intentions of Russia and Franoe regarding Turkey were satisfactory.
Again Biker's statement that Bulwer was lenient to the Porte's 
manoeuvre to add conditions to its acceptance of the Protoool of 
13 April is not enough. The Porte's acceptance would have inoluded 
a clause allowing either one of the Principalities to vote for 
another Prince through its Assembly, and leaving Turkey free to 
accede. Omission was advised,in the event, by Bulwer, owing to 
his colleagues' hostility.^ Bulwer went so far as to write to 
Fuad telling him that in submitting to the fresh Protocol the Porte 
would be better off than before, for it was binding on the Powers who 
if sincere would have to help the Porte with measures against a
future infraction of the Treaty.^
> .. 'During July the Turkish counter-projeot involving the addition
of the Protocol of 13 April to the Convention as an 'acts additionnel'
2*Bulwer-Pisani(head dragoman), 29 April,>¿430.
‘Bulwer-Malmesbury 28 May,FO.78/1430»The Grand Duke Constantine's 
, itinerary in the Greek Islands also warranted suspicion. 
?*Bulwer-Malmesbury, 28 May, FO.78/1431.
4#Bulwer-Fuad Pasha, 18 May, FO.78/1431.
was similarly given up.^ The conference,meeting at Paris on 
6 September, confirmed Couza as Hospodar of both Principalities. 
Even the declaration of 13 April that the reeent acts were contrary 
to Treaty was not repeated. The Porte was given the right to 
point to any future illegality though the Powers had to agree upon 
the 'casuMnterventus' and the measures to be taken. This was 
instead of allowing the Porte any initiative in taking action in 
which the Powers afterwards would be invited to coneur.
Russell, taking over the Foreign Office from Malmesbury in
June, resigned himself to the situation created by the Treaty of
Paris and acknowledged the strategio limitations which were more
important than the psychological ones which had embarrassed his
predecessor. After 4 few months in office he revealed what his
future line would be. It was a policy of wait-and-see. He wrote*
'The Porte has agreed not to send troops into the 
Principalities without the consent of the Great Powers 
„of Europe. But it is difficult to imagine a case 
short of an open declaration of independence, which 
would induce the Powers of Europe to agree with 
unanimity to a Turkish intervention.
While there are such obstacles in the way of the 
assertion of authority by the Sultan, Great Britain 
and France, havigg no access by land to the 
Principalities and no right to send fleets into the 
Black Sea cannot give any efficient suooour to the 
Porte.
Such is the condition in which the Principalities 
1 are left by the Treaty of Paris.
In this position Her Majesty's Government are very 
unwilling to pretend to an authority which they 
cannot exercise.•.The time is not yet come, however, 
when the Porte is likely to arrive at any final and 
complete arrangement'. 2
1#Malmesbury-Bulwer,14 July,F0.78/1487.Turkey was isolated as soon as 
' Malmesbury informed Bulwer 'that H.M.'s Govt.are not prepared to 
support against the objections of other Powers the conditions which the Porte proposes to attach to its recognition of Prince Couza'._ See Hiker, p.247
2,Russell - Bulwer, 13 Dec. *59,PO.78/1427
Russell implied that the assent of the Porte to the Principali­
ties' actual independence would not he objectionable to England* 
However, other preoccupations, as with the Porte's dignity, would 
determine British foreign policy towards this area.
Bulwer's conclusions were couched in a similar vein* He 
referred to the chronic wrest in the Principalities but went on 
to say that the best thing to do was to maintain*
'•••whatever the Congress of Paris and the recent 
Conferences have affirmed with only such changes as a 
practical working out of the principles agreed to may 
gradually and absolutely require; and 1 believe 
moreover that the interests of the Porte are more 
engaged in supporting the Hospodar it is about to 
confirm, than in provoking the chances of other <• 
contingencies'* 1
So after the settlement of the first problem arising from the 
Convention of 19 August the Foreign Office had written off the 
future Rumania as forming part of the Ottoman Empire vital enough 
to be included in the traditional policy of Britain. Moreover, the 
defence of British interests, diplomatic ones in this instance, 
required the co-operation of Franoe rather than Austria* In effect 
Malmesbury's policy had been based on the assumption of Frenoh 
ascendancy in the East* Russell, in the despatch quoted above, 
paid homage to the fact, and he would not fail to trim his policy 
accordingly, in spite of Bulwer's occasional aberrations* These 
last would be stimulated as much by temper as by calculation* 1
1*Bulwer - Russell, 14 Sept. '59,no. 155, FO.78/1435.
l± -7
*B'
Towards Legislative and Administrative Union
After Couza had attained power in February 1859, Bulwer'a 
policy, very broadly speaking, was to give the Hospodar the 
support he needed to secure his internal position.^ The defeat of 
the Radicals would thus enable Couza to fulfil his obligations to 
the Powers* To a degree Bulwer accepted Couza at his face value 
and in sympathising overmuch with the Prince*s difficulties was 
not always clear in his own mind whether Couza would want to fulfil 
his obligations anyway* However, since domestic affairs in the 
Principalities made Couza dependent on the good-will of the Powers 
for his tenure of offioe, here was a situation whiGh might have 
allowed the application of a well-conceived policy, carried out with 
determination - that is if the Powers had been agreeable*
Bulwer's policy, though by no means a line of least resistance, 
was generally speaking a reasonable compromise between interests 
and circumstances* But he failed to consider sufficiently the 
limits of British influence, as in the previous crisis* Such a 
consideration might have moderated the strong tone with which, with 
no corresponding success, he voiced his opinions*
The international situation during the period when the 
legislative union of the Principalities was the most prominent 
of Balkan issues (till December I860), was not nearly as uncompli­
cated as it had been during 1859* The Porte was generally the
^‘Bulwer'e sympathy was constantly blunded by Couza's handling of 
specific issues, namely the application of the Capitulations in his 
country, the secularisation of the Dedicated Convents and the 
entry of arms into the Principalities*
the enemy of Couza, continuing to hold the view expressed by
Fuad Pasha in 1856,^ that the developments in the Principalities,
if permitted) 'would loosen the bonds which attaoh them to the
Empire, and consequently destroy, for the Empire and the
Principalities, that moral but real force which their actual
2position gives them today'. Owing to the predominance of France
at Constantinople and Napoleon Ill's warnings,^ Turkey could do
little of her own. Further in the particular instance of the
demand for legislative union, the Porte was from the first influenced
by Bulwer's sympathetic arguments in favour of giving Couza what
he asked. Russia became increasingly unsympathetic towards the
Couza regime. In the first place Russian diplomatic support to
France and the pro-union policy had only been a 'quid pro quo' for
French help in the event of the Tsar's government being able to
reverse the clauses of the Paris Treaty pertaining to Russian
neutrality in the Black Sea. Cortchakoff hoped that something
might benefit Russia from union. Perhaps his candidate the Duke
of Leuchtenberg might yet obtain the hospodariat and at one stroke
supplant French hegemony. Couza's francophil tendencies never
ceased to cause resentment in the Russian Chancellor.^ The latter
tried to recover lost ground by recruiting partisans among the
old boyards.“V The oonfisoation of arms in December by the
Principalities government, coupled with the frequent comings and
goings of emigre Poles and Hungarians could not but make Russian
^’Circular to the Diplomatic agents of the Sultan, 21 July. See 
2 P. Henry - L'Abdication du Prince Cuza, p.13- 




support for a pro-Couza French policy less assured.^- Thouvenel, 
the French Foreign Minister, found it a trying business keeping 
Russia in line* Hence it was doubly imperative that Britain 
should not be antagonised* The conservative Thouvenel was 
naturally irritated by Couza for his handling of the rights of
foreigners and then for his confiscation of the arms landed at 
2Galatz. These gratuitous acts of provocation certainly did not
make any easier Thouvenel*s task of working with Britain in support
of Couza's proposals for administrative union*^ Despite the
situation in the Principalities the Liberal Ministry in England,
glad enough to see Couza ruler rather than risk another major change,
could only play second fiddle to France at Constantinople. No
matter how tentative iiB alliance between France and Russia, it was
inconceivable that Britain should co-operate with Russia in the
^*For the larger causes of tension between France and Russia see 
_ above Chapter 11*
‘See below, p.(7£, for an account of negotiations concerning 
. Capitulations in the Principalities*
^‘French sympathy for Rumania gradually declined after this (though 
Riker, determined to see things in black and white, makes the ■}
most of what was left of that sympathy)* In January 1863» the new j 
French Foreign Minister, Drouyn de Lluys, even more ocnservative j 
than Thouvenel, would react very strongly to Couza's collusion with j 
Michael of Servia over the importation of arms* By this time the 
Principalities were as much of an irritant to France as to other 
Powers* No help was forthcoming from Paris when Couza eventually 
fell* Similarly Russian antagonism seriously oonoemed the European: 
Powers after 1863 when Couza's attitude to the Dedicated Convents, 
the rights of foreigners, and a new agrarian law, became unyielding*; 
See P* Henry p*41 and p .109, Jean Alecsandri to Baligot, 8 April 
'63* 'Decidedly Lord Jofcn Russell has succeeded in passing us off 
in, the eyes of other governments for liege men of Russia'•
Ibid, p .111, Alecsandri - Baligot,19 Jan* '64* In a conversation 
with Aleosandri, Budberg, the Russian ambassador in Paris, stated« 
'The Emperor (Napoleon III) is less calm than his Minister (de 
Lluys) and the other day he explicitly declared to me that the 
‘infraction committed by Prince Couza in theConvention would not be ; 
‘ tolerated'. Ibid, 113-4,»20 February '64* 'So everything 
conspires to show Austria as really upset by our armaments and 
makes me attribute to the irritation of this Power the .ill-humour of 
M* Drouyn de Lluys against us***'
event of her detachment from France - as for example after the
Polish rebellion. So the alternatives were supporting France
'  ̂with a bad grace or retiring altogether from the Balkan arena.
She second choice was out of the question.
During the late summer of 1859 several hints of other '
problems put the diplomatists on their guard. The Bulgarians
were turning against the Greek regimen; in Servia Hilosch felt
his way towards a policy directed against resident Turks; and in
official circles much was made of the rumoured comings and goings
of emigre Poles, Hungarians, and revolutionary Italians in the
Principalities. The Spring of I860 would break with dramatic force
over Syria with the sMghter of the Maronites by the Druse Arabs.
The sending of French troops to the area did not make Anglo-French
relations any easier while the Syrian occupation would embitter them
until June 1861. Gortchakoff*s demand for an enquiry by a
European Commission into the condition of the Balkan Christians
(May *60), accompanied, it seemed to Bulwer, by suspicious troop
movements on the Bessarabian frontier, presaged, it was thought, a
further period of intense Russian activity. It was within these
pressures that the European Powers, notably Britain and France,
shaped a very moderate and conciliatory policy towards the
Principalities.
Russell and Bulwer kept a close and intelligent watch upon
Rouman internal politics during the months following the latest
^'Austrian diplomatic activity was restricted by Austria's involvement 
„ in other more important affairs. -
^’Bulwer - Russell, 8 Feb. *60,and 30 May *60,PRO. 30/22 88.
concession to Houman nationalism in the September Protocol*  The 
first scare came soon after* In December '59 the Central 
Commission at Foosani proposed a thorough reorganisation of the 
Convention, including organic union and a foreign prince* Seeing 
that such an event was likely, Bulwer had alerted Russell somewhat 
dramatically*
'...the Central Committee in point of fact proposes both 
the union and independence of the Principalities and 
disregards altogether the terms of the Convention.
...my idea is that to put an end to constant difficulties 
on this subject there are only two courses* that of 
strictly enforcing the Convention, or that of 
abandoning all control over the Principalities'* 1
Russell's phlegmatic reply, that 'H.M.'s Government are very
2unwilling to pretend to an authority which they cannot exercise', 
was sufficient to make Bulwer turn more determinedly to the possible 
ways of conciliation* Fortunately, too, Couza had to prop his 
not too secure position by obtaining legislative and administrative 
union from the Porte, rather than as a concession to internal 
factiousness* The Central Commission was dissolved, likewise were 
the Assemblies* During the next few months Bulwer, always 
soeptical of the practicability of the regime, learned to sympathise 
with Couza in the midst of his unyielding political difficulties*
The Prince's opportunities for choosing the right ministers were 
few and the constant changes in them did not improve matters* The
only slight improvements he had been able to make were in the 
personnel of the administration* A lack of prestige, preventing 
his allying with the radicals who would have worked for electoral
2*27 Nov. '59,FO.78/1426.
*Russell - Bulwer, 13 Dec* ibid, see above p
reform,* and hostility to the Boyards who fought to prevent real 
agrarian reform, persuaded Couza to seek the help of the Powers to 
deal with the crisis which fumed on his horizon* The recent gains 
of the nationalist movement were in danger of being lost should 
he fail to steer clear of the Scylla of the Radicals and the 
Charybdis of the Boyards* A moderately worded Note to Negri
explained the embarrassment of having a capital at Focsani where'
ordinary comforts did not exist, consequently where it was difficult
2to find men of talent who would go, and where a Court of Cassation 
would eventually be established.
Thouvenel quickly sounded Russell as to the propriety of moving 
the Central Commission to Bucarest, or of allowing it to meet 
alternately at the Vallachian and Moldavian oapitals* Russell
immediately favoured a change*^ He wrote to Bulwer:
.
'As far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, they 
consider that the removal of the Commission from Fokshany 
would be desirable rather than otherwise; but I have to 
desire you to report to me your opinion upon this question'* 4
, - ■<
Bulwer was disturbed at the prospects in the troublesome .!
He
provinces* A Veil-informed by two vigorous and percipient consuls,
Green at Buoarest and Churchill at Jassy,Athere was little that
slipped his notice* He took his cue from Russell's request,writing
^'According to Protocol no* 9»10 July '58* 
f*Biker, p.291-
^'Riker - The Making of Rumania, gives an erroneous account of the 
workings of British diplomacy, seeming to despise diplomacy anyway 
and ¿nly forgiving the French because they advertised their support 
of nationalism* Russell reaoted instantaneously and sympathetically* 
That be oould have done little else is not to the point* One 
wonders why Hiker makes the odd sarcastic interpolation, for 
example, 'strange to say, even Russell expressed the opinion',
(p*296) when a straightforward reading of the material makes 
.Russell's favourable policy to the Principalities obvious to banality* 
4#23 April '60, no.169*,FO.78/1496.
backt
/rj i.
'The two extreme parties conservative and radicaly have 
united against the Government - the first in order to 
ovaturn Couza...the last in order to get the Prince to 
place his administration in their hands.
It seems almost probable that the present Hospodar 
will have to undergo a Revolution or make one* The 
Constitution moreover is an unmanageable one» made 
without the slightest reference to the wants or 
condition of the country and will have to be modified.
’•••a popular chamber cannot govern a country} and as 
there is nothing between that chamber and the Prince 
with governing powers - and the Prince has hardly 
any power-government exists nowhere. ...What I 
advise is, that Couza should if possible come here 
and explain his difficulties'. 1
In his official despatch he suggested that Couza should prove
his case at Constantinople while the Porte should recommend the
changes to the Powers. The Central Commission would best meet
2alternately at Bucarest and Jassy.
Though Negri had refused to do more than sound the ambassadorst 
hoping that Couza's eventual trip to pay his homage to the Sultan 
would do the trick, the response had been favourable. Austria 
of course remained hostile.
In the Principalitiesy the parties by stifling Couza's attempts
to implement the requirements of several Protocols unwittingly
prepared the ground for another initiative. In June Couza penned
an elaborate Memorandum to Negri referring to these difficulties
in the way of good government. The main points were the union of
the tw6 governments and the assembliesy and a revision of the
electoral laws. La Yallettey and Prokesch did not encourage Negri,
while only A'ali besidef saw the Memorandum. As time appeared to
i*Bulwer-Russell, $  May '60y G &  D 3 0 / 2 2  88 
c *Bulwer-Russell, no.255, 16 May '60, F0.78/1506
be running out, Couza, in connection with his coming visit to the
Sultan, gave it out that he would retire 'unless on going to
Constantinople he .received certain concessions at the hands of
the Porte'«^ Russell quidiy instructed Bulwer 'to take such
steps as you may consider best in order to induce His Highness 
2not to resign'« Meanwhile, the same month, Couza united the
two ministries of War with a central direction at Bucarest which
was to be his chief residence« Plied by Russell with instructions
to urge Couza to prevent any infraction of the Treaty 'without
3the consent of the Powers', Bulwer obtained a clear promise from
the Prince "that he would oppose all attempts to change the treaty
'motu proprio' by the Principalities whilst I undertook to represent
his difficulties to you*- and to endeavour to strengthen his hands
against the attempts which might be made for overturning the
Constitution a l t o g e t h e r « U p o n  A'ali Bulwer pressed the
necessity of a conciliatory policy while at the same time he
advised Couza to work with the Porte 'in a friendly and proper 
5manner •
When at last Prince Couza paid his respects to the Sultan, .
6he was warmly welcomed and feted« Upon Bulwer he made 'a most 
favourable impression, and 1 have no hesitation in saying that he 
is a man above the common, and with a mind which seems likely to
> 7improve by responsibility and experience'« In spite of
i'Russell - Bulwer, 25 Aug.,FO.78/1499*
,'Ibid.
'•Bulwer - Russell, 10 Deo., FO.78/1514*
¡T'Bulwer - Russell, 12 Deo., PRO.50/22 88.
?*Bulwer - Russell, 5 Dec«,F0«78/1514.
'Couza arrived 6 October.
''Bulwer - Russell, 16 Oct«, no« 6Q0AF0.78/1512.
numerous provocations this opinion did not change till 1864 when 
a dictatorship seemed to he an immediate possibility* Answering 
Russell's despatch of 21 September 'and the general question of 
what policy to pursue with respect to the several wishes of Prince 
Couza tending more or less to unite the government of the two 
Principalities*, the ambassador produced a long statement minutely 
entering into all the reasons why it was necessary to concede 
Couza's demands* The state of the Empire had to be considered,
the feelings, running high, in the Principalities, and the likely 
alternatives to his policy* As for the supposed Russian 
proclivities of the Rouman provinces, Bulwer scotched this myth in 
no uncertain fashion* 'They dispute with Russia the possession 
of a portion of Bessarabia', he wrote. How did the Porte's 
interests figure in all this?
'All real resistance to the project of Union', declared Bulwer, 
'when Prince Couza assumed the rule of the two 
Principalities was vanquished! the national feeling in 
favour of- it, instead of diminishing, has gained ground*
The Porte has less power than it had for opposing it! 
nobody, if the point came to a practical issue, would 
oppose it* Many of the reasons for our contending 
against it have disappeared* ***all that the Ottoman 
Empire can expect***is a friendly neighbour* Its 
policy is to grasp at this substantial advantage, and 
to run no longer after a shadowy one'* 1
To contend for Treaty rights, Bulwer thought, would be to court
disaster in the Principalities, 'and then the question of a Foreign
Prince1 naturally comes forward'* The Sultan should officially
ask Couza what he wanted and content him as muoh as possible*
Cowley's suggestion of making possible concessions coterminous with
^'Bulwer - Russell, 30 Oot. '60, no. 702,FO*78/1512
rule by a native Prince, Bulwer toned down. 'I would bear that 
suggestion in mind without bringing it too prominently forward’.
But, on the other hand, the Porte could recommend ’that whilst the 
Prince lives and reigns, certain concessions adapted to the situation 
in which he finds himself should be made in his favour'. Such a 
step could be retraced only with difficulty, but 'would be naturally 
retraced if two Princes were again named to them'. In this way 
Bulwer tried to avoid creating unnecessary difficulties. It was 
best to leave future solutions to future problems. In brief the 
Porte should act quickly and make its concessions appear to 
result from the Prince's recent visit, thus enhancing his prestige 
and preserving his loyalty.*
let by the time the first arms crisis had interfered with
the course of this affair, Couza had still to obtain some official
2gesture from the Port*, though A'ali had promised to make haste.
The geographical situation of the Principalities, surrounded 
by Russia, Austria, restive Servia, and Turkey, gave to the 
introduction of French arms into Galatz an importance which the size 
of the transaction hardly warranted. Cavour in the war with Austria 
had been anxious to use the Hospodar for Italy's advantage. The 
upshot was that General Kiapka reached Jassy and possibly signed 
two conventions with Couza. The object was to enable Hungarian 
patriots to establish arms depots in the Principalities. Couza 
was to be givejj rifles from France. Whatever the truth of this, in
i‘Bulwer - Russell, 30 Oct. *60 no. 702,FO.78/1512• 
^‘Bulwer - Russell, 10 Dec., FO.78/1514 .
the event Couza had been advised to keep quiet and not to oreate 
complications• After Tilla Fr&nea, Cavour, however, was not
restricted hy his French ally and determined to use the Principalities. 
Intrigues multiplied and Austrian fears increased. Hungarian 
emigrés passed constantly through the Turkish province to join the 
Hungarian Legion in Italy. Finally, in December, it came to 
light that two Sardinian vessels, the 'Unione* and the 'Mathilda', 
had unloaded arms at Galatz. The three which had been detained 
at Sulina at Austria's request, returned to Constantinople escorted 
hy a Turkish warship? Baron Prokesch, the Austrian Internuncio, 
had quickly taken up the question and with some violence, which was 
his undoing for it provoked the prince into adopting a stubborn 
attitude. Originally assuming he might be able to confiscate the 
arms, Couza had perforce to change his mind owing to the irritation 
of Thouvenel and Russia oaused by the enrolment of Moldo-Wallachian 
officers in Viotor Emmanuel's army. Bulwer, sick with pleurisy 
during the last week of December,^ was strangely enough galvanised
into action, having till then effaced himself, allowing Prokesch
2to take the lead. Austria, in spite of her own oonsul's objection 
against such an impolitic move, had insisted that the arms already 
landed should be sequestered under oonsular surveillance, thereby 
questioning Couza's good faith. Bulwer then associated himself 
with -̂ he other representatives in hacking the Porte's request that 
the arms should be simply sent to Constantinople. But it was evident 
that French views had changed.^ Couza was suspioious, correotly
J'Bulwer - Russell, 2 Jan »61, 30/22 89.
•Riker, p.278 n.2 .
r'Bulwer - Bussell, 28 Deo. G&D 30/22 88 and Riker p.280-1,
assuming that the Porte's aim was to keep the arms once arrived.
By the end of December when the French inclined to the
opinion that the arms should be simply sent out of the country,
Bulwer had taken over the direction of negotiations. Cautioned
by Russell to be careful to co-operate with the representatives
in any move to deal with the Arms,^ Bulwer rejoined by sponsoring
2the French compromise. He had full discretionary powers after
this to settle the problem.^ Both he and Russell especially were
chiefly disturbed at the prospeot of European complications arising
from this and the presence of suspicious characters in the area.^
Apart from these preoccupations Bulwer was only concerned in getting
the difficulty of the arms out of the way. At no point did he
emphasise Treaty right, in contrast to his perverse insistence on
5this in the negotiations upon the Dedicated Convents. Russell
certainly thought along these linest
'Are the cannon and arms re-embarked at Galatz?
Whether they are sent to Constantinople or Genoa 
this step is quite necessary',
he wrote to Bulwer^.
During the first weak of January the Representatives agreed
to ask Couza to send the arms out of the country, Bulwer declining
to discuss 'the further question as to what should be done with them
7when they have left Galatz, until they have done so'. The prince
had already made it clear that he would assent to such a request. *
«•Russell - Bulwer, 28 Deo. *60, FO.78/1514.
Bulwer - Russell, 30 Dec.,FO.78/1514, 28 Dec., PRO.30/22.88, 
^‘FO-Bulwer, 1 Jan.'61.>F0.78/1559.^'Russell - Bulwer, 1 Jan '6l,no. 3,F0.78/1559»
?*See below, p.f§5 •
«•Russell - Bulwer, 7 Jan '6l,F0.78/1559.
**Bulwer - Russell, 9 Jan., G&D 30/22 89»
If Bulwer hoped to have the arms confiscated on their reaching 
Constantinople, his scheme was nipped in the bud by Russell's 
instructions. He explained!
'We ought to be satisfied with the punctual execution 
of the order given by Prince Couza. If it has been 
agreed that arms are to go back to Italy, the Porte 
should adhere to that agreement. If not, let them 
be sequestrated and not confiscated by any means. Be 
friendly to Prince Couza in all matters you think 
safe for the Sultan'. 1
Quite possibly Bulwer had some 'arrilre pensee* on the
subject. Prokesch, however, by insisting on the confiscation of
the arms by Turkey had made no other eourse possible than that of
2returning the arms to Genoa. The Danube froze giving the 
representatives more time to think. Though he saw the arms 
business in the context of the more dangerous internal crisis 
in the Principalities, with the greatest taot, Bulwer continued to 
keep before Couza his original promise to send the arms away.^
'It is difficult', he complained, 'to come to any 
settlement as to the Principalities and the demands 
of Prince Couza until the arms question is disposed 
of'. 4
5Russell felt the same. He instructed Bulwer!
'Any favour shown by the Porte to Prince Couza ought 
to be dependent on the bona fides of his oonduot 
in regard to the arms.•.If.•.he acts with loyalty 
and good faith, you will do well to advise the Sultan 
to make him any concessions compatible with his 
position and the Treaty of Paris'. 6
1.Russell - Bulwer, 9 Jan '61, FO.7 8 / 1 5 5 9 , '  ■■-, 
^’Bulwer-Russell, 8 Jan'6l FO.78/1559*. Bulwer-Russell,23 Jan’6l,PR0.
> and administrations.Bulwer had passed it on to FO. 
Russell-Bulwer, 21 Feb.,no. 105, FO.78/1559.
Significantly, he added that the concessions would of course 
devolve on his successors since there would he no way of preventing 
this*
At last Couza asked whether an English ship might transport
the arms to Genoa. Prokesch assented to the proposal.^ With
2Russell approving, Bulwer took the necessary steps, previously 
informing all the other ambassadors, 'and especially M. de 
Lavalette* ,** and requesting them to assist 'in any way in the 
operation'.^ Only Lavalette raised objections, which Bulwer tried 
to accommodate especially by looking for the Sardinian agent who 
could convey the arms away and promise to take them out of the 
Turkish Empire. But no agent came forward who could prove his 
right of possession.
In the third week of Marcfc, unknown to Lavalette and the
others - saving Prokesch and A'ali - the arms were shipped away on
the 'Banshee' and the 'Psyche', two British ships.^ To all intents
and purposes there was no longer any problem, though the Italian
agent, Durando, supported in all probability by the French ambassador,
vcontinued to storm at Bulwer for the next month. A'ali Pasha agreed
^’Riker, p.284 holds that the idea was Prokeschj&'s and that Bulwer 
9 took all credit for it.
!r*Russell - Bulwer,20 FebFO.78/1559.
'•Riker, p.284, takes Lavalette's view that he was not informed. 
¡TBulwer-Russell, 27 Feb. '61,no.152, FO.78/I567.
5’Lavalette took for granted that Couza would not consent,which
persuaded Bulwer that if Couza's and the Porte's assent had not been 
obtained first the French ambassador would have seen to it that 
Couza did not co-operate. It was just a matter of personal pique. 
r  Bulwer-Russell, 2 April,no.239> FO.78/1568.
’Bulwer-Russell, 21 MarchjFO.78/1560} Bulwer-Russell 13 March,
7 PRO.30/22 89. -
'•Bulwer-Russell, 2 April '61 FO.78/I56O, 3 April,no.348,FO.78/1569; 
Bulwer-Russell, 20 March *61 PRO 30/22 89, 27 March «61, ibid and 
17 April ibid.
to Bulwer's proposal that the arms should he kept in deposit at 
Constantinople until a party came forward proving his right to them.
He would have to guarantee to take them out of the Empire.^ Only
oin November 1862 did the arms finally leave Turkish waters.
At no time had either Bulwer or Hussell lost sight of the 
great object, which was to succour Couza in his struggles against 
the factious politicians who for one reason or another would have 
brought him low. On the whole their opinion of Couza's value 
as the only obstacle to a foreign Prince remained unchanged: 
hence their moderation in the arms affair. Couza's refusal to 
be pushed into extreme policies partly resulted from his knowledge 
that he had a sympathetic hearing in Constantinople.
But the workings of diplomacy were slow. All parties,
including the Austrian, were of the opinion by now that Couza's
predicament made further delay highly dangerous. Bulwer set to
work to hurry th4 Porte in the task of replying to Couza's Memoirs
3of the previous June. Long before the Moldavian Assembly's vote
for union with the Wallachian Assembly Bulwer anxiously plied A'ali
g’A'ali - Bulwer, 28 April, FO.78/1570* *Riker, p.286 n.2>not having examined all the material makes a 
mystery of this episode. He found in FO.78/1658 a clue. In FO. 
78/1659 He would have found the answer; Erskine-Russell no.68,
12 Nov* 'With reference to I.L's despatch no.615 of 17 Ootober, 
stating your expectation that the Porte would not deliver up the 
arms brought from Galatz...until some assurance was given that they 
would not be handed over to the Italian volunteers, I have the 
honour to enclose herewith copies of a correspondence between the 
Italian Minister and A'ali Pasha in which the former has pledged 
his word that the arms shall be conveyed direct to Genoa and shall 
be used only for the Eoy&l Army. The arms are consequently to be 
delivered to the Marquis de Caraocioli in the course of today or 
tomorrow'. *
Hiker, p .307 and 3Ht comments that Hussell was not too interested 
at this stage. The description is neither true nor pertinent.
There was an English ambassador at Constantinople acting on 
instructions•
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and Fuad with, hints and suggestions on the necessity of swift and
conciliatory action.^- The Turkish statesmen listened attentively
to his proposal for a letter to he sent to Couza acquainting him
with the Forte's sympathy and asking him what he required. Cannily
Bulwer had explained that the Forte should point to the arms crisis
as the delaying factor. Such a letter was drawn up and the matter
2brought before two Councils at the Forte during March. But owing 
to Austrian and Russian advice the Forte still hesitated,^and after 
a month had passed, Bulwer, in spite of A'ali's agreement and M. de 
Lavalette's support, despaired of the Forte's ever acting in time.^
For Green in Bucarest he produced a string of arguments in support of 
Couza, always ending with the same refrain:
'I see no chance if he is overturned of naming two native 
princes, one for Moldavia, and one for Wallachia, and no 
chance for naming any other native Prince for Moldo- 
Vallaohia. We might thus have to pass through a state of 
intermediate confusion, which would lead to a foreign 
occupation- in order to arrive at the question of a foreign 
Prince, the selection of whom would be a great European 
difficulty’. 5
Russell, unimpressed by the Prince's political abilities, but 
concerned with the urgency of his political problems, already foresaw 
a foreign intervention.To Bulwer, keeping before him the need to 
watch events 'carefully*, he gave the warning»
'The Boyards (in Wallachia) may very probably call for a 
foreign force, but according to the Treaty of Paris an 
agreement of the Representatives of the Powers would be 
> necessary to make such a measure legal*. 6
1. Bulwer - Russell, 7 Feb. '61 no. 97.^0.78/1566.
3l Bulwer-Russeil,6 March'61,no.171, FO.78/1567,20 March,PRO.30/22 89,
4» Bulwer feared any complications which might give an advantage to the 
Slavs.Bulwer-Russell,6 March op.oitt'The great point I look to is 
e Bulgaria and Servia'*
2* Bulwer - Green, 5 March *6l,F0.78/1567•
* Russell - Bulwer, Secret, 9 March *61,FO.78/1560.
On learning of Thouvenel's positive support of union Russell
sensibly gave Bulwer considerable discretion in these Rouman
affairs, merely stipulating 'that Couza should be able to maintain
his authority, and that he should strenuously support the Sultan
who is interested in the welfare of the Principalities and ready
to assist the Prinoe so long as he adheres to the Treaties by
which his position is defined’
It only-needed the vote of the Moldavian Assembly to bring
the dissentient Austrian and Russian cabinets into reluctant
2agreement with France and Britain. The spectre of permanent
union without the Porte's permission presented itself. Russell 
xcautioned Couza. Thouvenel assured him that the Porte had 
responded to his overture of the previous June.^ A’ali at last 
produced the draft of a note to be sent to Couza. This acceded 
to Union of the governments and assemblies during the Prince's 
lifetime.
'1 am certainly constantly doomed here to vexations and 
disappointments', sighed Bulwer, 'and frequently see my 
advice unattended to just at the moment when it would most 
profit..•’ 5 12
1'Russell - Bulwer 14 March '61,see Riker p.313,mfers to the Porte's 
learning of the British government's support for Bulwer in April. 
They yielded to his pressure as a consequence. In fact Bulwer 
and Russell as is apparent above had followed one undeviating
2 line and the Porte had no cause to think otherwise.
'Bulwer - Russell, 17 April,PRO*30/22 89« On 8 April the Assembly 
had passed a resolution requesting the Wallaehian Assembly to 
i join them at Focsani to settle the rural question brought up in 
the Central Commission by the boyards in the Summer of I860. 
'•Russell - Bulwer, 27 April,FO.78/I56O,
£*Hiker, p.31°.
2'Bulwer - Russell, 17 April, PRO.30/22 89.
°'Bulwer - Russell^ 30 April,no.31.2,1*0.78/1570. Dated^l'May the 
Rote asked Couza to draw up a/scheme for electoral, reform for the 
Porte and/the Powers to consider. It proposed/the union of the 
assemblies and governments for the Prinoe's life. The Central 
Commilssion was to be-abolished.
In two weeks' time the Wallachian Assembly would meet so 
the snake was merely scotched, not killed, until the Porte 
despatched the Note. But the moment was lost.
'So long in preparing notwithstanding all my repeated 
counsels and efforts, backed by those of the French 
ambassador, that the events which we wished to prevent 
have already had a commencement',
Xwrote Buber.
The Wallachian chamber had voted in the same sense as its 
fellow. Much of the explanation of Couza's bad tactics in the 
coming December just at the time he would finally receive his 
sovereign's long awaited Firman lay in the bitterness and 
humiliation he must have felt during this period. Bulwer hit 
off the magnitude of the Porte's blunder in a few telling sentences!
'The great fault has been by this delay to seem to i
yield to a necessity than to originate a concession, ;
which, at an earlier period, would have been regarded 
as a boon. 1
'Nor is this all. .J The Prince had he been able to say «
that by his negotiations he had obtained this concession would have had his hands considerably strengthened and 
been bound by gratitude to the Porte. j
*His position indeed has become most critical! the party 
of the Boyards, and the extreme Democratic party having ■ j
combined for his overthrow'. 2 i
i
]For the time being Bulwer worked to induce Couza to accept a
3moderate Conservative alliance. Eventually, after many *9
^'Bulwer-Bussell, 30 April,no.312,F0.78/1570.Dated 1 May the Note askedj 
Couza to draw up a scheme for electoral reform for the Porte and ! 
the Powers to consider.lt proposed the union of the assemblies and 
governments for the Prince's life.The Central Commission was to be
9 'abolished.
^*Bulwer-Russell, 30 April, FO.78/1570.
^'Ibid.I do not accept Biker's thesis that everything that happened toj 
cause the Powers embarrassment was to the Prince's advantage,and 
that every internal trouble oould easily be got over by a little 
cleverness.Greater wisdom on Couza's part in the arms crisis and a 
little sense of urgency in the Porte might have brought Couza the 
union he was seeking some seven or eight precious, and in the event j 
irritating,months earlier than he actually obtained it. A strength­ened Couza might have proved a different Couza.
vicissitudes in Couza's political fortunes this came about.
It. took some of the sting out of the boyard opposition which had 
concentrated on the Porte*s reference to changing the electoral 
laws. Of course such a change implied a threat to the boyard's* 
economic interests.
For the next months Russell showed a single-mindedness in
what he did, all the more remarkable because it was in pursuit of
an object which the Forte really disliked. And although Russell
had favoured the union of the Principalities, in power he tried
to respect the Porte's wishes. Moreover, the first divergence
between the views of Bulwer and Bussell appeared, the latter
being more keen than Bulwer to sink differences in detail in
order to settle the big issueAustria fought a rearguard
action against concession. Gortchakoff, directing Russian
policy, seemed to be impelled by a perverse desire to irritate
France, now backing French and British diplomacy, now working
for definitive union, now seeking changes in the electoral laws
first, presumably to ensure that the boyard-Orthodox Church
interest would control a unified state in the interests of Russia
2and the Orthodox Church. Perhaps the object was to remind France 
that Russian friendship was not expendable.^ Be that as it maŷ  
Russell early on sought his ambassador's opinion on the new 
developments.^ His terms of reference offered Bulwer considerable 12
1'During July Bulwer convalesced.He had had an heart-attack in June.
Pleurisy was the complaint,though one dootor took a less serious
2 view,diagnosing pneumonia.Erskine-Russell,19 June'61,PRO.30/22 89.
Couza's handling of the Convents was a constant irritant toRnssia. 
^*Bulwer-Russell,12 June '61,PRO 30/22 89«
^‘Russell - Bulwer, 18 July, F0.78/1562.
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scope for manoeuvre in any future negotiations. Underlying all M s
suggestions was the assumption that Bulwer would use this latitude
to bring the Powers together. Russell stipulated simply that the
introduction of a foreign prince should not be permitted.1 Nor did
he approve 'a democratic law of Election which would shake all
rights of property, and in all probability force Prince Couza to give
2way to a foreign prince* • With Russia in mind he went on*
'But what Her Majesty's Government desire above all is to 
maintain the Suzerainty of the Porte over the Principalities 
and to prevent their falling into the hands of any other 
Power'. 3
On the method by which the concessions were to be made, 'whether 
an exchange of Notes, or a Conference at Constantinople, or a 
Conference at Paris', Russell merely referred Bulwer to the existing 
conditions in the Principalities and at Constantinople.^ Bulwer 
was ordered to speak 'unreservedly' to A'ali Pasha on the subject.
The manner in which Russell would keep right on top of the question 
showed perhaps impatience in the Foreign Secretary, and perhaps 
distrust of Bulwer. Certainly the ambassador's attempts to make it 
easier for the Porte to deal with future infractions of the Treaty, 
thereby introducing unnecessary delay into the negotiations, 
necessitated such treatment.
Bulwer replied to Russell's request for advice by advocating
the simple communication of Notes by the several Powers to the Porte's
communication of 1 May, this 'giving the Porte greater power, since in
a Conference of Representatives it will probably not be supported by
i*Ibid.
*#Ibid.
'•Ibid.4,Russell - Bulwer, 18 July,FO.78/1562.
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a majority* ? "  What he actually meant was contained in another 
remark*
’It might he the policy of the Porte to agree to Union 
as proposed if additional safeguards are given her against 
further changes and that her efforts should he directed 
to obtain these'• 2
In a conference Bulwer knew such a proposal would certainly
have been out-voted. The *if' in the remark indicated a mean
bartering spirit reflecting, more important, a lack of a sense
of urgency which had previously characterised his earlier efforts.
Russell rejoined that 'a good electoral law might be sanctioned by
the Conference* and that 'the Porte must be supported in all
3reasonable requests'. A sympathetic insight into Russell's 
policy would have enabled Bulwer to have taken advantage of the 
indefinite nature of these statements. Unfortunately his 
irritation with Couza's bad handling of the political situation, and 
with the supposed French intrigues in Bucarest favouring it, got 
quite out of hand, culminating in the angry outburst in October.
Russell and Thouvenel had reached an understanding based on 
immediate acquiescence in the principle of administrative and 
legislative union during Couza's life-time. Russell, however, 
insisted that the reform of the electoral laws was a question which 
only a conference in Constantinople could reach a decision on.
To Chateaurenard, French chargé d'affaires in London, he expressed 
the’ desire that A'ali should introduce the changes proposed by 
Couza 'and state the views of the Porte upon these' changes
^'Bulwer - Russell, 7 August, FO.78/1562.
4'Ibid-
'¡'Russell - Bulwer, 8 Aug., FO.78/1562.
4'Russell - Bulwer, 3 Aug., no.519,FO.78/1562,.
/¿»■ r
To counter any waywardness on the part of Russia it was agreed that
Lallemand and Bulwer should attend a Conference provided nothing
beÿond the Porte's circular should he discussed.^ Shortly after,
Gortchakoff gave up his insistence on electoral reform preoedig
2a decision on union. Unfortunately, A'ali emphasised the necessity 
of introducing fresh guarantees against further infractions of the 
Treaty,^ which caused France,Rüssia, and Prussia to join against any 
addition to the Convention in this matter of interference.
Bulwer took advantage of the divergence to press for an 
elaborate arrangement, which would have necessitated the co-operation 
of Couza and the Assemblies, in the drawing up of a new electoral 
law. He also pressed the Porte's view regarding coercive measures. 
This went against his government's instruction that union should be 
deoided first. Concerning fresh guarantees Russell, sceptical, 
wrote*
♦Her Majesty's Government can say no more than that if 
the occasion should arise, they will scrupulously 
regulate their conduct by the Treaty of Paris, and by 
the subsequent convention and protocols.*4
He did not like Bulwer's tergiversation when it was apparent
that all were agreed on the essential thing. Worried by Green's
reports from Bucarest that union would be announced anyway, with or
without a Firman,** and very angry with Buter's indiscretion in
instructing Green to inform Couza, 'that neither his Highness nor
the 'Principalities will be permitted to infringe the existing
^'Russell - Bulwer, 22 Aug., ibid.
Z 'Hiker, p.329•
yBulwer - Russell, 25 Sept. *61, PRO.30/22.89 and Riker p»330.
Russell - Bulwer, 21 S e p t  • ,  n p * 5 7 Q , T O » 7 & / 1 5 6 3 .?•Green-Hammond, 9 Sept.̂ F0.78/1583* Green-Russell,17 Sept.ibid.By the 
end of November Couza was in precarious control of the situation 
again. Green-Russell, 2 6  Nov., no.95, ibid.
Constitution in the question of the union, and that such
proceedings would he repressed, if necessary, even by force',^
2Russell promptly rebuffed Bulwer. So it was perhaps convenient 
for the expedition of a speedy settlement that Prokeseh refused to 
meet in Conference his Italian colleague* Separate notes to the 
Porte would have to do.** As for the reform of the electoral law 
that could easily be left to the Assemblies^, as Bulwer had already 
been told, while with reference to the use of force he ag&in 
repeated himselft
'Better leave the question as it stands in the Treaty of 
Paris and subsequent protocols'* 5
Bulwer, somewhat lamely, apologised for not as clearly 
understanding 'as 1 ought to have done* his instructions, going on 
to explaint
'I should not have dreamed of coming to any decision upon an 
important point nor even expressing any opinion which was ;
to constrain my future conduct without reference to you'. 6 1
1. Green-Bulwer, no.68 8 Oct.,FO.78/1583* • ■' ~ -
, Bus sell-Bulwer, Tele 30 Sept.,FO 97/419.
Russell-Bulwer, 6 Nov./0*97/419iBulwer-Russell,13 Nov.PRO.30/22 89. ! 
Russell-Bulwer, 7 Oct* FO.78/1563»
2* Russell-Bulwer, 1 Oct. FO.78/I563.
* Bulwer-Russell,l6 Oct.GAD 30/22 89*The following is a remarkable j 
letter as much for its fulsomeness,as for its ambiguity*Buiwer- 
Russell,23 Oct.PRO.30/22 89t'l do not like to oonclude without one 
observation.! think my dear Lord Russell that by one or two of your 
last communications you think I am too prone to take upon myself to ;■ 
decide matters without referenoe.I am not too conscious of this, 
but so many questions of all kinds come before me here,on which I am 
o bliged to decide at once or you could never have a moment of re- 
pose-that it is very possible that in some way I may have fallen 
into the error I allude to,and I am very much obliged,if such be the 
case,that you call the fact to my notioe. ...I respect by long 
habit and conviction your ability and judgment far too highly ever 
' to set my own opinions against those you entertain. ...the invariabtoj 
- practice of the French is to spare no pains and to scruple at no 
* perversion of truth to injure a diplomatist when they do not think • 
their own representative has at certain places a superior position 
to his.I say this, but X know at the same time that the 
observation to you is useless'. .
/ 7 o
Apparently Buiwer had forgotten his recent indiscretion*
The Porte made its final hid in the third week of October,^- hut
it failed chiefly because Russell would have nothing to do with new 
2guarantees* In the next fortnight the Firman had been prepared* 
Bulwer's only objection to it was that 'it would doubtless have been 
more acceptable in the Principalities and to some of my colleagues, 
if it did not bring forward so prominently the fact that the 
arrangement made is merely temporary, and that things will revert as 
a matter of course to their present condition in the event of a 
vacancy.'*' He was right on both counts* The objections of 
Lavalette he was able to smooth over quickly, but Lobanoff did not 
like any reference to the temporary nature of the union nor to Protocol 
6, September *59» covering the use of force.^ Very ingeniously 
Bulwer induced the representatives to send two communications to the
Porte, one simply accepting the Firman and the other 'containing
5any remarks each has thought proper to make concerning it'* The
French ambassador was in agreement with Bulwer and only the Russian
ambassador made reservations in his seeond note, withdrawing his
government's assent to any measure on the occasion of a vacanoy unless
there were a previous understanding between the Great Powers and the
Ported The Porte's Note accompanying the Firman, referring to it^.
*’Bulwer - Russell, 23 October PRO.30/22*89.
Russell - Bulwer, 22 Oot.no.630.FO*78/1563,& Tele 25 Oct. ibid.
^’The Firman was ready to be despatched 3 Dec.It contained no mention of 
the use of troops, declared the union of the two ministries and 
assemblies,and stated that in the event of a vacanoy in the Hospodariat 
the Constitution as settled at Paris would be in force again.This last 
, point was to cause some difficulty* »
^’Bulwer-Russell,21 Nov.FO.97/419«
£*Bulwer-Russell,5 Pec* ibid**Buiwer-Russell, 5 Pec* ibid*
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attitude should there he such a vacancy, did not mention the 
necessity of a preliminary agreement with the Powers. All the 
Powers, save Austria, issued reservations about this.
The responsibility of government now rested entirely upon the
shoulders of Couza. He had what he had asked for. By this time,
however, the problems caused by his not being a distinguished scion
of some great European dynasty, had not lost their urgency, but,
on the contrary, were more pressing. These past two months of
November and December showed him utterly incapable of anticipating
small difficulties and in fact he created them. Out of mere pique
with the implacable boyards he refused to mention the Firman,
already published for the world to see in the Paris ’Moniteur’
6 December, in his speeoh opening the Wallachian Assembly. Only
later did he rectify this omission. But clearly no one liked the
Firman with its implied declaration against permanent union. Some
satisfactory attempt to resolve his country’s basic social and
economic problems might have helped Couza to strengthen his position
during the next few years. However, already the forces arrayed
against him, extreme liberal and reactionary boyard, had determined
not to facilitate his task. Only by keeping up a running quarrel
with the guaranteeing Powers, and at last by the repudiation of the
Constitution, would Couza be able to prolong his rule. As Green
noted, already the introduction of a foreign prince was being mooted
and Couza encouraged the agitation.l ,
■̂‘Green - Russell, no. 106, 27 Deo. '61, F0.78/1583* Green - Hammond, 
28 Deo. ibid.
t v * L.
' C
Rights of the Powers
The diplomacy in these last fev months owed much to Russell's 
grasp of what was needed and to his persistence in carrying out 
his policy. Of course it was upon the French initiative in 
Rouman matters that Russell relied* On the other hand, Thouvenel 
quite as much relied on English support* That it was readily 
given resulted in a great measure from the Syrian complication. 
Palmerston, especially, could not rely on Frenoh good intentions in 
Syria, occupied hy French troops* It did not help that the Suez 
canal project continued, in the background, to maintain irritation 
between the two governments* Tet these considerations apart,
Russell had an interest in strengthening Couza in order to avoid 
a foreign prince and a possible quarrel between Russia and Turkey*
Bulwer's reflexes were slow, not surprisingly in view of his 
lack of sympathy with Russell's too generous policy* His delaying 
taotios were badly conceived for he knew that his only allies 
were Austria and Turkey. With the first he disagreed over the 
very principle of union. The sensitivity he showed for Turkish 
dignity was consistent but unfortunate. Nevertheless by the 
November and then through December he applied his energies very 
effectively to overcoming the Austrian objection to Sardinia's 
presence in the conferences, and in nullifying Russian insistence 
on keeping Turkey from interfering in the Principalities in any 
future eventuality. Bulwer actually committed an indiscretion and 
slyly skirted instructions at one period* The fault lay essentially 
in his lack of faith in such mere tampering with a radically unsound
n *>
constitution and sprang, in part, from the paternal spirit in which 
he viewed provincial problems.1 He could not hut he irritated 
when a prince refused to do what he was told for his own good*
On the whole, even so, Bulwer had done creditably. Further,British 
diplomacy in the conditions was astute. Bussell had no business - 
nor time - to look to future eventualities. He had seen the 
quickest remedy to the immediate difficulty and bad applied it.
From I863 till I864 the Liberal Ministry faced another, quite 
different problem) how to deal with a de facto independent country 
actually violating international obligations. It presented itself 
in three phases, a discussion - which began as early as 1859 - overthe 
validity of the Capitulations in the Principalities; in a spasmodic 
quarrel over the rights of the Greek Convents in the area during 
the years 1859 - 64 but being particularly acute in the last years 
1865 * 64; and the last phase, the second arms crisis, 1862 - 3« i
Now that the provinces had obtained union these other difficulties 
came into the foreground. The dreary exchanges upon the 
Capitulations and the Greek Convents do not concern us except in so 
far as they illustrate Bulwer's contribution to the formation of 
British policy. His efforts, backed by Bussell, were directed to 
supporting Treaty right. He could have done no other without 
jeopardising the traditional friendship between Britain end Turkey. 
Nevertheless it is strange that Bulwer with Bussell's approval
assumed the role of chief defender of the rights of the Greek Church.
> ! 
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1#Bulwer-Green, 29 March,F0.78/1649* 'I have yet to learn the possibility 
of establishing a permanent and well-ordered Govt.on the double basis 
of an elected Chief and one popular representative body'.
*This arms crisis concerned Prince Michael of Servia more than Couza ! 
and consequently is only mentioned here.For more detail,see below
n  4-
This should have been the part played by the Russian agent, though 
oddly enough he tended to he quiet throughout the whole affair.
One suspects that Bulwer might have tried less hard. As it is, 
the policy he and Russell pursued would merit the charge which 
Disraeli made in another context. It was meddle and muddle.
Russell fully appreciated the powerlessness of Britain by itself to 
affect issues in the Principalities. His concern for keeping well 
with Turkey and for keeping the Greeks friendly to the Sultan should 
not have made him forget this.
The Capitulationŝ * quite early troubled the relations between
2the diplomatic corps and the authorities in Bucarest and Jassy.
There was no money in the treasury when Couza took over the
Government, and the country suffered from an economic depression.
There were no credit facilities, no national bank, but a great deal
of faction and hostility in the Assemblies. Couza became increasingly
unpopular and embarrassed financially. To deal with both problems
he deoided to bring foreigners and prot£g£s within the fiscal
system, in spite of the Capitulations which'guaranteed their immunity.
This was a subject upon which all the Powers might agree, including
France and Russia. That they might, but would not act as if they
did, of course tended to encourage the kind of polioy which Russell
would pursue. Britain would have to protest. The security of Turkey
was bound up with the maintenance of certain treaties. Consequently
it was dangerous to allow these treaties to be broken by some
p For the significance of these laws, see above Chapter 111,75*..
'During the months preceding the settlement of September *59 Vienna 
refused to recognise Couza de facto, so Austrian subjeots were placed 
in May ’59 under local jurisdiction. Austria came very quickly to 
terms. See Riker p.231.
unilateral decision* It would have serious repercussions throughout 
the Empire* Moreover there were British subjeots in the Princi­
palities to take care of* The economic advantages, of course, were 
plain and precious*
Bulwer was in a quandary. He wqs not antagonistic, rather 
sympathetic, to the claims of the government of the Principalities; 
hut he would not budge on the question of letting Couza dictate to 
the Powers. Here, an insurmountable obstacle was the unwillingness 
of the Powers to resort to the ultimate sanction in face of outrigit 
French objections to such an extreme course* There was the added 
difficulty in Bulwer's refusal to negotiate with Couza upon a subject 
which was really a matter between the Porte and the Powers* He 
insisted that the autonomy of the provinces as determined in the 
Convention did not include the treaty rights of the Powers* In that 
same Convention the Capitulations had been confirmed*
Bulwer's line was to work olosely with the other representatives 
in declaring to the government at Bucarest what the rights of the 
Powers were* His voice was in favour of yielding everything except 
consular rights in civil and oriminal cases. A legalistic attitude 
was inevitable given British policy for the area* Its obvious 
shortcomings were a result not of a particular mannerism of Bulwer, 
but of the odd situation consequent upon the divisions of the Powers, 
and the inadequacy of the Treaty of Paris* *
The local government's infractions of the treaty were threat 
the objection of the Principalities to the presence of Consuls in 
native couttst their assumption of rights to tax foreign artisans 
and retail traderst and the refusal to allow passes and passports
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from Consuls to serve as licences for travel through the country. 
Adamant on the first point, Bulwer was moderate enough otherwise:
'With respect to the second, it appears to me that the 
most that foreigners can expect who reside in or carry 
on retail trade in a country is that they should he 
as favoured as native subjects. Anything beyond this 
would be an injustice to the native.
...In regard to the third question, 1 conceive that 
Consuls may give papers or passports to British 
subjects, but that the Authorities have a right to 
insist on their signature of visa being affixed thereto.' 1
The answer of the government to the Powers' first move, an 
identic note from the Consuls, was uncompromising. It had no 
share in the making of the treaties granting exterritoriality and 
the only jurisdiction it could recognise was that designated in 
the Convention. The implication was that it was sovereign in 
domestic affairs. Bulwer gave Churchill support, though the other 
Powers were from the first inolined to leave matters alone.
Russia had political motives for not wishing to press her rights.“* 
Naturally the initiative was with Walewski who at one and the same 
time did not wish to offend the Principalities nor ignore French 
interests. He drew up a memorandum, largely a rehash of citations 
from the Report of the International Commission of 1858. Certain 
privileges were unsound. For the moment Consular jurisdiction 
should remain until the setting up of a Court of Cassation, as 
decreed by the Convention, when such jurisdiction might be revised. 
The consuls were quietened and the complaints from them became
1. Buiwer-Russell, no. 82, 3 August '59.F0.78/1434*2 Identic Note dated 29 June,_  . . *
Russia had been chiefly responsible for the failure of the
International Commission to study the problem in 1858.
less urgent
It was the granting of legislative union for the Principalities 
that caused the representatives to play another variation on the 
above theme. Copies of the Firman granting union were sent to the 
Consuls in December 1861 with explanations as to its meaning, and
2identic instructions agreed upon by the ambassadors at Constantinople. 
They were to the effect that notwithstanding the fresh changes, the 
treaty rights of"the Powers w^re still valid. Ignored by the 
consuls, the identic instruction wav repeated,enjoining upon the
3Principalities the necessity of not infringing the rights of Powers.
Russell was opposed to yielding to the pretensions of the corrupt
Courts in the Principalities, already extending their jurisdiction
to cases between foreigners. However, his attitudd was not narrow,
though his views showed a great deal of muddled thinking. When
Arsaky» Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Couza's government, had
sent a reply to the consul's injunction, which reply he published,^
Russell wrote the following instruction to Bulwert
'In the first place it will be right to put H. Arsaky's 
letter aside with.a strong assertion that Moldo-Wallachia 
cannot be considered as an independent State. ;
Next Sir E. Hornby should be consulted by your Exoellency I
¿July '60, FO.78/1560*'••.the Consuls are perpetually compelled, in 
order to oover their own responsibility, to address comp&ints to 
the Authorities, frequently on trivial matters, but whioh are not 
the less breaches of treaty rights. On the other hand the Authorities, 
Civil and Judioial, systematically repudiate Consular interference 
and authority, and thus arise conflicts of jurisdiction (in which) •••: 
the foreign agent finds himself involved in an irritating correspon- j 
2 dence from which he can discover no esoape but in silence'. ;
'With greater wisdom than the ambassadors, not wishing to rake over 
* old sores, the consuls did not act on them at first. Buiwer-Russell, : 
, 31 Jan. FO.78/1648.
2#Bulwer-Russell, 3 Feb. '62 FO.78/1642.
4*Much to Bulwer's embarrassment. There were only two ways of dealing 
with the manoeuvre; ignoring it or negotiating o n  it. *Bulwer 
would not do the latter.
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as to what can he remitted of the Capitulations in 
Turkey proper: for H.M.'s Govt, can never submit 
British subjects to venal or incompetent courts in 
Moldo-Wallachia while they refuse to submit them to 
similar tribunals in Turkey*••
At the same time difference of practice long existing 
must be taken into consideration*• 1
Both Bulwer and Russell were reduced to making ineffective 
comments which could not advance any policy* Bulwer repeatedly 
reminded Russell that here was a question of power not warranty. 
Having underlined the fact that the Capitulations were violated 
everyday, Bulwer had already explained:
'The question, as your Lordship says, is whether the 
Governments of the Guaranteeing Powers will collectively 
punish such violations. At all events they are now 
after the recent declaration more pledged to do so 
than previously*. 2
Nor were the Powers more committed than they had been. Bulwer 
merely indulged in wishful thinking. Also he was not consistent.
At this point Churchill in Jassy had advocated making a virtue of 
necessity by allowing the Moldo-Wallachian authorities the right 
'either useless or difficult to maintain, or fallen into disuse', to 
jurisdiction in criminal cases involving native subjects.** Bulwer 
rejected the idea in no uncertain terms:
♦We might.•.strenuously assert and maintain firmly our 
pretention to interfere'. 4
The strange comment may only be accounted for if one assumes
that Bulwer, trying to be logical, feared that alterations for one> '
area meant complications in another. He deolared:
2'Russell - Bulwer, 29 May *62, FO.78/1644.
^'Referring to the identic instruction to the consuls in February.
_ Bulwer-Russell, no. 68 19 Feb. '62, FO.78/1648.
, Buiwer-Russell, 30 April F0.78/1650.
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'The habit of Foreign, Consuls sitting in judgment on 
mixed eases in common with Turkish judges fell into 
disuetude in the Ottoman Dominions generally; but we 
have reasserted our claim on this subject in Turkey; 
and the Porte has not gainsaid it, and as long as 
justice is so badly administered in the Principalities 
and the Ottoman Empire, we must have some control of 
this kind, tho* 1 agree in the inconveniences attending 
such oontrol and admit of its being modified according 
to places and circumstances*. 1
let in October after a general conversation with the Austrian
Minister, Count Rechberg, in Vienna, Bulwer very persuasively
explained that although Artiole 42 of the Capitulations permitted
a Consul to be co-judge in mixed criminal cases, 'I am quite
2convinced that the Principalities will never accept this *• He 
concluded!
’...Such a right is given us - but it was long disused at 
Constantinople. The French and other governments have 
not exercised it, being satisfied with the assistance 
of a Dragoman at the trial, nor has anything beyond this 
been, to the best of my belief, ever claimed by us in 
the Principalities*. 3
Except by himself, Bulwer might have added. He proliferated 
schemes in the hope either of blurring the issues for the government 
in Buoarest, - in which case he failed hopelessly - or of actually 
settling a matter of principle by modifying the detailed application. 
More likely he intended the latter. As he put it himselfs
'The principle of interference cannot then be abandoned, 
but admits of modification'. 4
If Bulwer thought in this way he had overlooked the obstinacy of 
the Principalities in their stand on principle. Until a solution to 
this problem was found all Bulwer's schemes were so much paper and 
i*Ibid .
,Bulwer-Russell, 15 Oct. FO.78/1658.
^*Ibid.
4#Bulwer-Russell, 30 April '62, FO.78/I65O,
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verbiage. As for the flexible attitude which he invariably
adopted on such questions, again it availed little while there was
a refusal to acknowledge the 'de facto' situation wherein Couza's
government was sovereignHowever, it is interesting to note
that Bulwer as part of a general agreement would have had the forte
consult with Servia and the United Principalities before concluding
commercial treaties affecting the Empire. Upon the Capitulations
proper Bulwer, characteristically, refused to negotiate with the
Houman authorities. The choice for him lay in 'insisting on a
right, or quietly foregoing one - unless we saw the possibility of
2making great and general alterations'. let, he continued)
'this would require taking into consideration what could be 
granted if asked for by the Forte, since, again I agree 
with Sir E. Hornby-*- we should not entirely separate one 
question from the others'. 3
Bulwer was losing his patience. In December '61 - January '62 
the representatives had agreed on identic instructions reaffirming 
the rights of the Powers under the Treaties with the Porte. At 
the instance of the several governments they had requested in May 
their consuls to report what might practically be permitted and what 
not in the Capitulations. When the report duly arrived it was 
accompanied by an exposition on the subject by Arsaky in which the 
autonomy of the Principalities was assumed in all things. Now matters 
were allowed to drop because Moustier, French ambassador, hadJ
received instructions 'not to pursue the subject further'.^ All
Bulwer could do was to recommend an agreement of all the Powers to
^’Russell's policy was impractical for this reason as Bulwer hinted.
.Howwver,Bulwer had no choice but to make suggestions while Russell 
«stuck to his policy. •
t *Bulwer-Russell, JO April '62 FO.78/1650.
¿Ibid. -f...Judge of Supreme Consular
■ *Bulwer-Russell,13 Sept.'62 FO.78/1657* Court.
examine the whole Capitulatory system as it applied throughout the 
Empire* ’But*, he wrote, 'it is better not to enter upon any plan 
of this kind without the intention to come to some decision and 
to carry that decision through*More to the point, the consuls 
should be given wide discretionary Powers to cope with the anomalous 
situation in the Rouman provinces* In a not too veiled criticism 
of the policy of the cabinets, Bulwer explained that nothing could 
be done* He preferred to wash his hands of the subject, though 
he had 'little doubt that Sir Edmund Hornby who is absent but whom 
1 will consult on his return, will not be disposed to consider that
2any portion of the Capitulations can be remitted in Turkey proper'* 
Bulwer did not agree with Hornby but, he pleaded, 'opinion must be 
more ripe on the subject and the European policy towards Turkey must
be more clearly defined before any modifications I might advise can
3 4be satisfactorily considered'* In effect the matter rested there*
Throughout the negotiations on the Capitulations, France played an
ambiguous part* It was so in I860 when Thouvenel initially promised
5support in favour of Green at Bucarest* Nothing transpired* The 
pattern repeated itself in 1862-3* la such a situation Russell 
might have done well to have made a virtue of necessity, certainly 
after the demarche of January '61* He need not have advertised
a concession for that would have induced the Porte to ask for general1
changes in the system and for this Russell was not prepared* As
^*Bulwer-Russell, ibid.
‘Bulwer-Russell, 11 June '62 FO.78/1652.
'•Ibid.4*Moustier effectively halted another move in Nov* '63 based on the 
_ agreement of Jan. '61. See Erskine-Russell,no*24 12 Nov* '63.
5#F0. - Green, 13 Nov. •60,FO.78/1517 . ~
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for Bulwer he had no sympathy with the part he was cast for. It 
seemed illogical to him that he should be expected to try to 
accomplish something in spite of the disagreement amongst the 
Powers, especially in view of his own chief's acknowledgment of the 
fact that Britain could not act alone. Constantly thwarted and 
frustrated in his desire to have the whole Capitulatory regime 
swept away and replaced by different arrangements in conformity 
with the situation in the Empire, Bulwer seemed not to have found it 
easy to watch calmly and wait with the stoic assurance that almost 
certainly the opportunity would not arrive. Something of his 
successor's* cynical resignation would have assisted him in his 
thankless task.
Nor was Bulwer better equipped, diplomatically or temperamentally,
to deal with the Dedicated Convents questioh. Nothing oould be
achieved unless England, France, and Russia were in agreement.^ In
the event, French policy was less ambiguous than in the negotiations
over the capitulations. In fact, far from being ambiguous, it
was positively favourable. From the commencement of the diplomatic
fencing in 1859 to the drawn out conferences held in 1864 France
stood forward as the defender of the views and actions of the
2government of the Principalities.
While Bulwer's instructions would explicitly require him to 
protest against the arbitrary actions of Couza and to work with the 
^’Austria and Turkey would have come into line.
2*This is not to say that French governments were not irritated by 
Couza's handling of other issues,such as the arms crisis 1862-3»aad 
his inability to cope with the internal difficulties after the death 
of Catardji June'62 till the assumption of dictatorial powers by him 
in May 1864«The notion that Couza was a tool of the Russian govt, 
gradually began to find acceptance. P«Henr.y-L'Abdication'du Prince 
Couza. p.23̂
v. ♦ -Lord Xvon« ___— '    .:   —    ........- -..-..... —  - 
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Powers for the solution laid down in the Paris Treaty, Bulwer was
in any case predisposed to teach Couza a lesson« Owing to Bulwer's
frequent bouts of irritation with Moustier during the critioal phase
of negotiations in 1863, Bulwer actually came forward as the leading
protagonist of the Greek Church. It was bad tactics and certainly
not required of him by his instructionsAs in the case of the
Capitulations Bulwer's reactions were a complex of sympathy with the
Bojunan government attempting to deal with evident injustices,
irritation at the methods used to achieve its goals, and frustration
2because of an inability to effect very much anyway.
In Wallachia, some quarter of the country's acreage was in the 
possession of the Greek Convents, in Moldavia about one-third." j
Much of this landed wealth had been dedicated by the founders to
I
certain Holy Places situated in various parts of the Empire, The
condition was that the profits from this land should be used primarily
for local philanthropic purposes. Any surplus after this would then j
be sent to support these Holy Places. Some of the conventual
**Apart from these difficulties over Capitulations and conventual rightsj 
Bulwer tried hard to help Couza in his internal struggle against 
the boyards who wanted neither him nor agrarian reform,and the 
2 liberals «ho preferrdd a foreign prince to agrarian reform.
*See Bulwer-Russell,26 July 1839 PO.78/1432* 'There can be no doubt 
that the Greek clergy,whose titles to the property they hold are in 
many cases,to say the least,dubious,has at the same time been en­
deavouring to shirk the obligations,which such property imposes'.
Even so Churchill was instructed to refer Couza to the 13th Protocol 
of the Conference at Paris.See Hiker,p.353**̂ he interested parties 
shall be invited to come to an understanding among themselves by I
means of a compromise; in case they do not succeed in coming to an j 
understanding in a year's time,it will be settled by means of j
arbitration.In oase the arbiters do not succeed in coming to an 
understanding,they will chose an over-arbiter.If in turn,they find it j 
impossible to agree on the choioe of this over-arbiter, the j
Sublime Porte will confer with the Protecting Powers for the 
purpose of designating one'.
property was under native administration! and during the 1830s had 
actually been brought under State Control. The bulk of this wealth 
was at the disposal of the Stated For the rest it was seldom 
directed into social and religious channels; much of it left the 
country; and all of it was under foreign administration. Thus the 
Convents owned some eighth of the lands of the Principalities most 
of the profits from tàiich went to line the pockets of a small
privileged class of farmers of revenue, or to support alien instit-
2utions. There was hardly any contribution to public needs.
In 1838 Russia thwarted the attempt of the Commissioners at 
Bucarest to lay down the principle that the State should take over 
the administration! paying a fixed annual sum to the Holy Places.
Henoe they agreed that should the Monasteries and the Principalities 
be unable to come to a friendly agreement! the matter would be 
referred to arbitration. By January 1862, owing to Couza's 
unwillingness to have the business taken out of his hands, the 
situation remained unaltered except in one thing, namely the anxiety 
of successive Assemblies and Couza to decide the question themselves - 
a direct result of the union.
In January 1862 Bulwer consulted his colleagues. They agreed 
with him on the wisdom of allowing Coaza another six months in whioh 
to reach a friendly settlement with the Monasteries.^ His 
sympathies were with the government in Bucarest.
i'Riker, p.354*
, Ibid p.356.
^‘Bulwer-Russell, 8 Jan. FO.78/1648. Originally three months was 
suggested, but see Bulwer - Russell, 16 April *63, FO.78/I734.
'That the Principalities should, to a man, rise up against
such a state of things is not astonishing', he wrote.^ However, for
Bulwer, this was not to the point. 'As it was laid down at the
Treaty of Paris that a certain mode of dealing with this subject
2should he adopted, that mode ought to be followed'. As in January 
1863 the representatives had again dllwwed a delay - to last till i
the end of April - the arbitration would not come into operation
till then. And Bulwer had no illusions about its probable success.
The issue, as he knew, was too fundamental, as he admittedt
'The Principalities object more to the interference of the 
Convents in the internal affairs of the Principalities 
than even to the loss which the Principalities undergo 
in having so considerable a portion of the wealth of the 
country applied in a manner foreign to its interests'. 3
He grumbled that the Russian commissioner had thwarted his
scheme in 1838 to have the Convents paid an annual sum in lieu of
the property! and that the Creek Convents 'badly advised' found such
a proposal inadmissible now. So only arbitration offered a way
4out.
By this time the belief that Couza looked forward to his own
5dictatorship had become current. No doubt Russell and Bulwer felt 
he sought possession of the monastic revenues to finance his 
grandiose scheme.^
1. " “ : ’ : “ ;




5*In November *62 all the revenues of the dedicated convents were 
sequestered. Prom August to December Russell pressed Bulwer to git 
his colleagues to support the Porte's demand for the execution of g the arrangements in Protocol 13. Russell - Bulwer 16 Deo. *62,PO*78/1642 
®*They certainly thought so in February '64, Russell - Bulwer, 3 Feb.
PO.78/1797«
In April Bulwer brought the matter before his colleagues
again, the period for a friendly arrangement having terminated.
Though Austria, Russia and Prussia agreed to Eulwer's proposal for
the commencement of an arbitration, Moustier objected that Couza
would simply use the revenues to fulfil the engagements which the
Convents had for a long time ignored. The residue would return
to the Creek Convents and if they were dissatisfied they might
refer the question regarding compensation to arbitration.^- Bulwer,
angered at Moustier's attempt to make the other representatives the
executors of French policy, replied that the suggestion might do
2well but was not protocol. The matter must be referred to the
3 -Cabinets. A few days later Bulwer proposed that if the
Principalities and the Convents did not appoint arbiters in three
months - and assuming they did not come to an amicable arrangement -
then the Porte and the Powers should.4 Moustier's natural rejoinder
was that the matter was now before the Cabinets. Bulwer out of
pique with Moustier had made a blunder in allowing the matter to
pass out of the hands of the representatives, though in the long run
the result would have been the same. Moustier advocated leaving a
settlement to the parties in dispute, though the Monasteries first
2*Bulwer-Russell, 16 April, no. 190,FO.78/1734.‘Bulwer was not always a stickler for Protoool. When by October it 
was plain enough that France supported Couza, Bulwer proposed a 
complicated plan whereby the Principalities, first of all having 
agreed that the properties were bona fide the property of the Holy 
Places, should buy them all up. Bulwer-Russell, 5 Oot. *63 F0.78/ 
1739* Evidently Bulwer insisted on Protocol as the only means of 
carrying out his country's policy and protecting British interests. 
The policy of course suffered from an inherent failure. Once the 
major battle was lost, the usefulness of preliminary skirmishing 
, had gone.
Bulwer-Russell, 16 April, loo. cit. .
4‘Riker, p.364.
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would have to renounce all right to the property they claimed.*
What happened subsequently had little consequence. To all 
intents and purposes the recent French action had put Couza behind 
a wall of immunity. Bussell continued to storm against the arbi­
trary acts of Couza even against the measure changing the liturgical
2language from Greek to Roumanian. ’The Representatives’, he wrote,
’should inform Couza that such proceedings are illegal, tyrannical, 
xand subversive'. He also suspected France of designs for giving
the Latin Church a predominance over the Greek at Jerusalem.4
It was strange that Bulwer had to tell his chief:
'Nothing short of compulsory measures on the part of the 
Powers and the Porte, or the menace of such measures 
could avail...’. 5
Eventually, in December, Couza with the assent of the Assembly
expropriated the Convents. By this time, even Austria had agreed
with France to limit the scope of arbitration to the simple question
of indemnity,^ while the Porte's attitude from June onwards had been
. 7remarkably luke-warm. Ultimately the English government had to 
accept the principle of compensation as a proper object of the
**Bulwer - Russell, 4 June, FO.78/1736*
^'Russell - Bulwer, 18 June, FO.78/1730.
^*Ibid, and see Russell - Bulwer, no. 366, Aug. 10 '63» ibid,
4'Russell - Bulwer, 10 July ’63, FO.78/1730.
5#Bulwer -Russell, 24 Aug. »63,F0.78/1738.
6*Riker, p.370.
^•Riker, p.367» holds that there was collusion between Moustier and 
A'ali to get the problem settled according to Couza's wishes.
It seems very likely judging from the odd comments in the
PRO. and FO. material, see Bulwer - Russell, 24 Sept. *63» F0.78/
1738} Bulwer - Russell, 4 June *63» no. 264, FO.78/1736-
attentions of a conference on the dedicated Convents 1
As in these issues so in the more crucial one of Couza's
2 3policy for a dictatorship, the Powers were hopelessly divided*
So it mattered little that througiout the twelve months from
January 1863 there was moderation and sense about Buiwar’s anxiety
to help Couza to establish another Constitution giving him more
powers* Even when Couza was about to execute the plebiscite, in 
May 1864, Bulwer looked to capitalising on this event by having the 
Porte invite Couza to Constantinople. Only the objections.of 
Prokesch and Novikow, the Russian ambassador, had halted this 
manoeuvre which Bulwer had persuaded «en Moustier to support.^ When
Prokesch overcame his initial ill-will towards Bulwer over this
issue, even he had to agrees
'You could not have pushed the Porte to a rupture (i*e* with 
Couza) while your Government wanted to cultivate France*
We could not inspire in the Porte more heroism while it 
had the presentment that it would not be supported in the 
consequences’* 5
*Bulwer-Prince Metternioh, Austrian Ambassador in Paris, 19 Jan '64» 
T/77* Bulwer-Russell, 1 Sept. '64 FO.78/1799* ’Couza has given way 
and offers the million and a half required by the Porte for 
compensating the Convents* 1 see no other way of avoiding 
difficulties...'
Though insisting that the Porte and Clergy should be agreeable 
(Russell-Bulwer, 3 Sept.*64 FO.78/1799) Russell had climbed down 
sufficiently to be able to advise his ambassadors 'it must always 
be recollected that it is a matter in which Her Majesty's Government 
have no immediate concemj •• «provided a peaceable compromise can 
be made, and the Great Powers can be brought to agree, the British 
Government will be fully satisfied'. (17 Sept.'64 FO.78/1799)
As early as February (Russell - Bulwer, 3 Feb. '64, no.2 FO.78/1797) 
Russell had warned Bulwer not to exclude the principle of 
. secularisation 'which is not in itself repugnant either to the 
principles of equity or to the well-weighed merits of the Convents 
_ themselves'. This was a remarkable volte faoe on Russell's part. 
'Bulwer and Russell referred in this way to Couza's schemes for 
increasing his powers. In fact the new Constitution of June 1864 
did not create a dictatorship, though Couza was greatly strengthened
3*lîf^âeton -Watson - History of the Rumanians. p.309„ 4‘Bulwer-Novikow, 19 June ltio4»T/77. .5.Prokesch - Bulwer. 18 June. ibia.
!
But Bulwer acknowledged his mistake in all his dealings with 
Rouman issues. He had accepted Couza at his face value. The 
policy adopted towards Couza on his double election and towards his 
demand for union had been expedient and right; and though Bulwer's 
views had diverged somewhat from the official policy, Bulwer had 
contributed much to it by his sympathy for Couza. Malmesbury and 
Russell saw to it that Bulwer's desire to strengthen the Porte did 
not impede the course of negotiations. It had been politic to 
work with France, especially in the conditions. Further it was a 
British interest to take measures to prevent a foreign prince being 
introduced into the country. Bulwer's policy in the arms crisis 
in the Winter of 1860-1 was a logical outcome of the general policy.
aIt was^skilful performance. However from 1862 it beeame increasingly A
apparent that Couza was not the man he was thought to be. ' Russell 
trod very carefully, instructing Bulwer, Green, and Churchill to find 
a middle way between the contrary pretensions of Couza and the coalition 
against him. Bulwer had generally favoured giving the prince his 
head. /
'I have up to this time', he wrote to Green, 'been always 
disposed to support him to the full extent that a sense 
of justice would admit of'. 1
Disillusioned, angry, and apprehensive lest an intervention of
some Power might introduce fresh complications, he at last turned
against‘Couza. "
'Considering', he stated, '...that there is little probability 
of arriving at peace or regular Government in those provinces, 
or peace and satisfaction on their frontiers, as long as the 
present ruler pursues a line of conduct vthich I see no
■'■‘Bulwer - Green, 28 March *64, Private, T/68.
indication of his being willing to alter « 1 now incline 
somewhat towards the opinion that his downfall may be 
the necessary accompaniment of a new and better state of 
things in which the rights of Foreign Powers and the Porte 
should be more strictly observed on the one side, and 
a greater latitude as to framing their own institutions 
be given to them on the other*• 1
He had felt that British policy had been wrong in not
emphasising sufficiently the Porte's rights. In fact it could not,
intelligently, have been very different. Bulwer's sympathies had
been wrong and one suspects that it was his growing awareness of this
that made him reduce the issues of the Capitulations and particularly 
2the Convents to personal battles between himself and Moustier.
The latter had backed a cause, independent of Couza. Bulwer never
forgave Couza for something he was not entirely responsible for.
With some bitterness he announced his change of front to the Prince:
*If you continue to irritate us (si l'on continue ces 
continuelles taquineries) always playing at empire and 
independence, bear in mind my words: Europe will 
tolerate much and more, as one suffers a fly a long 
time which buzzes in your ears when you want to sleep, 
but in time one takes the trouble to get up and 
kill the fly'. 3
*Bulwer - Green, ibid.
*In 1867 the offer of Compensation to the Convents lapsed. So the 
United Principalities had had their own way entirely. See Seton- 
, Watson, p.308.




The endemic strife on the ill-defined borders of Bosnia, 
Herzegovina, and Montenegro was always likely to provide a bone of 
contention between a Power hostile to the Empire, and the Porte*
Quite independent of Turkish rule, except in name, the Montenegrins 
were never slow to accept a challenge. A Turkish incursion into 
the neighbouring countries to suppress some especially serious 
rising occasioned by Turkish inability to provide a minimum of 
order and elementary justice, would be the signal for the highlanders 
to leave their farms to aid the peasants against their Mohammedanised 
lords and the Turkish troops. So it was in 1858, and just as 
Austria, with its own Serb population to think about, had decisively 
intervened in 1853 to protect Montenegro from the consequence of 
its actions, so in 1858 the Concert, prompted by France and Russia, 
stepped in to prevent the Turkish troops from pursuing its war 
with the vassal state.
Malmesbury, apprehending that France and Russia might co-operate - 
in supporting Prince Danilo's claims of independence, was anxious 
that the question of sovereignty be shelved and the warfare stopped. 
Bulwer went to Constantinople ejjoined to implement this polioy with 
all haste, irrespective of Turkish susceptibilities. Speed was 
particularly imperative in view of Russian moves to bring up the 
general question of the treatment of the Balkan ChristiansIn order
^’Alison (Chargé d*affaires) - Malmesbury, 13 April ' 58, FO. 78/1347.
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too, to prevent France from aoting entirely with Russia, it was 
necessary for Malmesbury to see to it that the Porte pursued a 
conciliatory policy. The Porte agreed to hand the Representatives a 
memorandum on what had not been done to fulfil the Hatti-Humayoun and
order in its own districts. In spite of Turkish appeals, Malmesbury
Montenegrin boundary - for the time shelving the question of
By the second week in May, Walewski, French Foreign Minister, agreed
to urge the Montenegrins to evacuate Grahovo, on condition the Porte
consented to the Commission. Even a Franco-Russian threat to
acknowledge the vassal's independence failed to change the Porte's
mind.^ Hoover, the Montenegrin victory at Grahovo produced the 
5desired result.
Difficulties raised by Danilo, sensitive on the score of his
sovereignty delayed a settlement until November when at Bulwer's
insistence^ the Porte, equally sensitive in this respect, became 
7more amenable.
The boundary suggested was based on the status quo of I856, a
line determined by an arrangement between Austria and Turkey in 1053«
«’Alison - FO. 19 April, FO.78/1347.
*’Alison - FO. 8 May '58, ibid.
Alison* - FO. 9 May, ibid.
5’Alison - FO. 15 May, ibid.
2’Alison - FO. 16 May, ibid.
’Bulwer - Malmesbury, 2 Nov. ibid.
'’Malmesbury, at this point, also urged Bulwer to co-operate with 
Austria in a protest against the exactions of the Beys in Bosnia, 
(Malmesbury-Bulwer, 8 Nov. *58, ibid) though the ambassador had been 
anxious to inculpate the Christians. Bulwer-Malmesbury,8 Aug.*58,
FO.78/1350.
why not,^ but positively refused to suspend hostilities against the
2Montenegrins at Grahovo. It insisted that it was merely restoring
pressed forward with his proposal for a Commission to settle the
Commissioners on the spot were to examine it, settle the details and 
arrange for compensation to he paid to either the Turks or Montenegrins 
who would he embarrassed hy the definitive settlement of the Boundary*
Two years later they reported on the results of their labours,which 
were negligible
As the Commission of Engineers wearily attempted to execute
its mission, the Franco-Russian design to leave undisturbed all
Montenegrins, in short to make a boundary for Prince Danilo's 
2convenience, provided fresh opportunities for strife between Turkey, 
provoked by Montenegrin incursions, and Montenegro* It was found 
convenient to let the boundary settlement be put on one side. In 
any case, as far as Britain was concerned, the Sultan's authority 
over Montenegro was nominally unimpaired, and to that extent the 
original aim of the Conservative government had been achieved* Bulwer j 
did not like to leave things as they were, correotly anticipating j
that what the Commissioners had been unable to do peaceably would j
be effected by the sword*^
Shortly, seizing upon the opportunity provided by the embarrass­
ment of the Porte by the Syrian massaores, Gortchakoff, in May I860, 
brought forward the question of the condition of the European ]
provinces* Again British policy was conditioned less by circumstances ; 
in these areas than by a desire to act with France in countering j
the Russian pressure at Constantinople* France, for its part, would 
have to meet Britain half-way owing to Italian developments and the j
5#See Holland, p*23$* n.6* Protocol of 17 April '60.
_*Bulwer-Russell, if March '60, FQ*78/1505.
^*Bulwer-Russell, 3 April '60, F0.78/1505* Russell had agreed to 
the termination of the Montenegrin Boundary Commission* Russell -
Bulwer, 9 May, FO*78/1496.
meeting of the three rulers of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, in 
Warsaw in September.^-
Russell kept before Buiwer the need to get the Porte to do 
something to show it was concerned that its Empire should not be a 
prey to the misrule of which Gortchakoff had aecused_it. On the 
other hand, Russell's instructions to Bulwer emphasised the 
importance of preventing any European participation in the commission 
of enquiry to the provinces, which Bulwer was working for to 
exonerate the Turks.
'The British Government', wrote Russell, 'by no means 
wish to have Representatives of Foreign Powers forming 
part of a Commission.
The Foreign Representatives may meet separately after 
the Turkish Commission has reported*. 2
Very quickly Bulwer and Lavalette, French Minister, came
together to press for a purely Ottoman Commission to examine local
complaints and for the Grand Vizir to visit the provinces to deal
out justice.^ By June, this policy had been implemented and the
immediate danger had passed.^ Further, in response to the news
from Warsaw, Russell advised Bulwer to persuade the Porte to send
the Grand Vizir, returned from Roumelia, back, this time to Bosnia 
5and Herzegovina. Bulwer took Kibrisli Pasha's view. He held:
'•••it was useless for him to go at this time. He 
objected also to Omer Pasha who, he said, was disliked 
by the Mussulmans.' 6
1#S«e Charles-Roux,p.281. At this last meeting Gortehakoff would come 
forward with the proposal that a Conference at Constantinople 
should deal with the grievances of Bosnia which the Grand Vizier, 
j, in his recent tour, had not visited, 
f*Bulwer-Russell, 25 May '60, FO.78/1496.
^’Bulwer-Russell, 29 May, FO.78/1497.
^•This minor crisis provided Bulwer with an opportunity to press 
c forward his ideas on reform. See above, Chapter III.fog. 
¿’Bulwer-Russell, 1 Nov. '60, FO.78/1513.
’Bulwer-Russell, ibid.
Not satisfied, with this reply, Eussell telegraphed* 
*If the Grand Vizier cannot be spared to go to Bosnia, 
an efficient Turkish Commissioner or Governor should 
be sent.
The enquiry into reports of the consuls by the 
Representatives of the Great Powers should commence as 
soon as possible with special reference to the 
Hatti-Humayoun'• 1
Indicating that he felt it was time to call a halt to this policy 
of warding off Russian pressure, Bulwer, after acknowledging his 
instruction, stated*'
’I do not see what further he could do elsewhere, that 
would give content to those who now censure his 
(the,Grand Vizier’s) proceedings*. 2
Later, in April 1861, Osman Pasha went as Governor to Bosnia, 
following an official notification^ to the Representatives, that the 
Albanian coast was under blockade, while in the Autumn, the 
Montenegrin coast was similarly subjected to a Turkish blockade, 
in spite of Fran co-Russian pressure.^ With troops now available 
from Syria the Porte clearly was determined on putting an end to the 
constant border feud. The difference between 1858, when the Concert 
effectively intervened, and 1861 lay in this determination. In 
addition it had the moral advantage of having tried to satisfy 
European demands by sending the Grand Vizier and an Ottoman Commission
into the provinces. Perhaps, too, Russell’s refusal to favour any 
sort of interference with an essentially Turkish concern stiffened the
^‘Russell - Bulwer, 2 Nov. *60 FO.78/1513. For the predictable sequel 
to thesecond suggestion, see above Chapter III, p. . 
^‘Bulwer-Russell, 6 Nov., no.723, PO.78/1513.
^'Bulwer-Russell, 21 April *61, FO.78/1570. Official notification 
. was 28 March in Bulwer-Russell, 1 April *61, FO.78/1568. 
4*Russell-Bulwer, 11 Oot. *61, FO.97/419 and Bulwer-Russell, 16 Oct.
*61, PRO 30/22 89
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Porte's will to resist Franco-Russian pressure.*1 Of some%
significance, when considering the pacification of the Balkans, 
was Russell's conciliatory policy towards the Bulgarian Orthodox
*’ 2Bishops and priests. Whatever the motives Behind this policy,
5such it had Been from early in I860, and By March 1861 the
Patriarch had had to yield to nascent Bulgarian nationalism.^ This
* 'possibly helped to quieten the agitation which had made the Balkans
a potent source of embarrassment for the Porte.
Russell's astute policy of making the Porte take half a step
for every stride Russia urged, had Been demonstrably successful.
As Gortchakoff made no other move, there was no further British
diplomatic activity on issues to do with Montenegro, Bosnia, and
Herzegovina. However, this did not prevent Bulwer putting forward
his ideas. While the Porte despatched ships to Antivari Because
of the discontent in Herzegovina and a threatened landing By
' 5Garibaldi; and also sent three Battalions to Scutari, Bulwer, a
■ gmere witness to the diplomatic duel Between LoBanoff and Prokesch, 
explained*
*’Russell-Bulwer, 11 Oct. '61, FO.97/419» Russell's firmness here, 
contrasts with Malmesbury's anxiety to have things settled as soon 
2 as possible, no matter what the Porte felt.
’Almost certainly the consideration uppermost in Russell's mind 
was the need to appease the Evangelical Society (Buiwer-Russell,27 March '61, FO.78/1568)• Such a policy was naturally favourable 
to Russian interests. Palmerston - Russell, 20 July *60,PR0/50/22.21; 
'With jthe Russians in Bulgaria and the French masters of Syria, the 
Eastern Question, as it is called, would Be pretty nearly settled,
_ though not much to our liking*.
'•Russell - Bulwer, 8 March *60,FO.78/1496.
^’Bulwer - Russell, 27 March, FO.79/1568.
j?*Bulwer - Russell, 22 Jan. 1862, and 1 Feb., no.41 FO.78/1721.
’December '61. The Austrian incursion into the Sutorina to destroy 
some Montenegrin forts tended to obsoure other issues and to under­
line the important one, viz* that Montenegro was the preserve of j 
either Austria or Russia.
/f6
’I see nothing for the Powers to do at this time in the 
question of Montenegro'. 1
Even were Montenegrin independence recognised by some of the Powers,
Bulwer could see no change taking place in the real situation.
Montenegrins would still invade neighbouring territories, and Turkey
would still be prohibited from entering Montenegro by the state of
European opinion cn this subject, and Russia would still be the
2protector of that country. Yet, Bulwer went ont
'Were the Turks to grant the Montenegrins a considerable 
extent of cultivable territory, which territory being 
so exposed to the attacks of a Turkish force that any 
insult or assault could be punished by a Turkish army - 
were the Prince to do homage for that territory, and 
were also some suitable provisions made for the 
communication of Montenegro with the sea coast, it is 
possible that the Montenegrins, becoming more wealthy 
and civilised...another order of things might spring 
up - and to this project, a project not for making 
Montenegro independent of Turkey, but for rendering 
Montenegro, for itB own advantage, more dependent 
on Turkey - not for exciting other Principalities to 
look after independence as a consequence of rapine 
and indolence, but to look after solid benefits, as 
the consequence of nominal submission, I should myself 
be well disposed.* 3
A better example of Bulwer's ability to mask realpolitifc behind a 
facade of generosity and quasi-liberal thinking, it would be 
difficult to find.^ Nothing came of the suggestion of a port for
i'Bulwer - Russell, 19 Feb. 1862, no. 71,FO.78/1721.
'Bulwer - Russell, ibid.
'Bulwer - Russell, ibid.
4'PRO. 30/22 89« Bulwer - Russell, 7 August *61. Bulwer 
suggested that Spitza might be used by Montenegro, 'but I 
despair under great extremities of getting the Porte to agree. 
Haughtiness and the groping at a great shadow in preference to 
a smaller substance are still its main defeots'.
Montenegro, as Bulwer might have expected.^- In any case Bulwer
had been instructed not to interfere with Turkey on Montenegrin 
2affairs* Moreover, he favoured the Porte’s attempt to bring the
vassal state to submission, though he continued to hope it would
3see an advantage in being generous*
Complementing this policy of non-interference, especially when 
from August to October the Turkish forces were pressing forward,
eventually to crush the Mountaineers near Scutari, Hussell kept the
a 5ring for the Porte. While approving the Porte’s course, yet
instructing Bulwer not even to advise the Porte on the terms of
peace, he protested at St* Petersburg against the interference of
Russia.^
The Turks imposed their terms on the defeated mountaineers in
August; By this treaty Turkey was to build through the country a
road protected by military blockhouses* The idea at once invited
sceptical commeht. When the plan, in the February of the following
year was given up under French, Russian and Austrian pressure, Bulwer
1VbuIwer^15 Dec. ’58, no.434» FO.78/1552» Malmesbury wrote* 'as 
regards the suggestion that a port on the Adriatio should be 
assigned to Montenegro, Eer Majesty's Govt, earnewtly trusts that 
the Porte will not make any such concession*..it might be possible 
to place any port nominally possessed by Montenegro, but of which 
the Ruler of that Country might allow a foreign Power to have 
unquestioned occupation, in such a state of defence as to be 
rendered nearly, if not entirely, unassailable; and it would thus 
become a source of danger and anxiety to some at least of the 
Powers of Europe whose territorial possessions or commercial 
communications might at any moment be interfered with’.
^’Russell - Bulwer, 11 Oct. *61,FO.97/419- 
'j’Bulwer - Russell, 50 July '62, PRO.50/22 89- 
4*Holland, p.528, n.l. 51 Aug. '62 Turkey enforced terms which 
included the right to build a military road through Montenegro. 
•̂’Russell - Bulwer, 8 Sept. '62,FO.78/1726* Russell - Erskine, no. 1 
s  22 Oot. '62,FO.78/1727 .
’Russell - Bulwer, 14 Sept. *62, FO.78/1726 .
commented*
'The Porte can«•»make two decent fortresses, one on each 
end of the road which will probably be more useful and 
less likely to cause quarrels than small intermediate 
stations running through the Montenegrin territory«
For my own part I always felt this the safest plan in 
a military and political point of view'. 1
Even this was an optimistic view for the Porte had no money for
roads of greater consequence than the one proposed for distant
Montenegro, and without roads, as the foreign office was aware, the
situation between Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina on the one side,
2and Turkey on the other would remain unaltered. For the moment
3calm slowly returned to the area, and pressure from Austria, trying 
to re-establish 'the good relations with Montenegro which were 
formerly of immense importance to them',^ from France and Russia,
5ensured that nothing came of the offensive treaty. Erskine,
British chargi d'affaires, merely advised the Grand Vizir, A'all
5Pasha, to implement the reforms promised for Herzegovina in 1851» 
and expressed to Russell the hope that the projected road through
Montenegro would be forgotten, for it would only serve, he thought,
6to increase the possibilities of collision between the two sides*
A little later Erskine reported that he understood the only blockhouse
built as a result of the treaty was not even in Montenegrin
territory, 'and 1 should not be surprised hereafter to find that there
i'Bulwer-Russell, 19 Feb. *65,5/70 .
'Holmes (Bosnia Serai) - Russell, 25 Sept. '62^0.61^0.78/1727. 
^'Churchill (Scutari) - Russell, 23 Sept. *62,no. 26, ibid.
^'Bloomfield (Ambassador to Austria) - Russell, 4 Deo. '62,no.416,ibid. 
5*Erskine-Russell, 1 Jan. no. 1,FG«78/1732 • ;
b*Erskine-Russell, 7 Oot. '62 op.cit. A remarkable suggestion to put 
to the Foreign Office, that the best means of keeping, or rather 
obtaining, good relations between suzerain and vassal was to put as 
great a distance as possible between them.
is no intention of persisting in a project which has met with such 
general opposition'.^- Such was the case.
Elsewhere, Montenegrin autonomy had been more effectively secured 
by the part of the Servian agreement which stipulated for the 
demolition of the fortress of Udshitze, commanding the Serb-Montenegrin 
border. Turkish ability to strike swiftly in that part of its 
Empire was thus seriously reduced.
The defensive policy of the British Government had achieved its 
object in containing the struggle in the western Balkans, and providing 
the Sultan's government with an opportunity to pacify the area, 
however temporarily, in spite of French and Russian policies.
Austria's prominent intervention, in December 1862, on behalf of 
Montenegro nullified the immediate gains of the Turks. Yet, it is 
doubtful whether the Porte had desired anything more than to reassert 
her authority in some striking and dramatic fashion. So its inability 
to capitalise on the treaty of August was not unexpected. For the 
time being, partly as a consequence of Russell's moral support and 
success in destroying the acknowledged, though not real bases, of 
Russian policy, by making the Porte act as if it intended to remedy 
grievances in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this region ceased to trouble the 
Porte unduly, or the Powers for the remainder of Bulwer's embassy. 
Radical solutions not being possible at the time, this was perhaps 
a measure*of the success, however undramatic, of British policy. 
Russell, in the process had consolidated his victory over Gortchakoff
of May I860, when the latter had brought forward a second time the
2condition of the Slavs of the Ottoman Empire.





To the settlement of the Servian issues raised in 1862, Bulwer 
contributed much more. But recently recovered from a serious 
illness in July '62, by a remarkable display of energy and endurance 
he was able to win the chief laurels in this diplomatic contest. 
According to the Internuncio, Prokesch:
'The great and principal merit in the conduct of the 
negotiation belongs to Sir Henry Bulwer, whose just 
survey, faculty of work, wealth of conciliatory ideas, 
politeness of manner, and calm dignity in discussions 
joined with the weight of his public character, refuted 
from the beginning the position of the ambassador of 
France and the Minister of Russia...' 1
The second phase of the Servian question had begun with the
2victory of Russia in 1829« Hence, with the aid of Russian good 
offices, Prince Milosh Obrenovitch of Servia determined to regulate 
internal affairs as he chose; in effect, to turn the country into 
a national and sovereign state. But in a land of peasant 
proprietors, equal in status, and in their hostility to government, 
little could be effected to strengthen the central power, without 
resorting to despotio methods. Allowing nothing to deter him from 
attaining his object, Milosh, having extorted the privilege of 
vesting the succession, by hereditary right, in his own family, went 
on to undermine the traditional constitutional machinery, which had 
also been legalized by various Hatts. The latest Hatti-Sherif of 
1830 explicitly stated*
^'Quoted in Riker, p»380.
'See above, Chapter II, p.4-5. The first phase had ended in 1813 when 
Milosh had forced the Turks to acknowledge the autonomous position 
of his country.
'Prince Milosh (shall) continue in the name of the 
Sublime Porte to administer the internal affairs 
of the country, and to settle them in concert -with 
the council and assembly of the chiefs and elders 
of the nation'. 1
It also demanded that*
'as long as the chiefs and elders, members of the council 
of which mention has been made before,do not render 
themselves guilty of any grave offence towards the 
Sublime Porte and towards the laws and constitution 
of the country they shall not be dismissed, nor shall 
they be deprived of their offices without cause, or 
without having committed some fault'. 2
In fact, Milosh centralised all executive power in his own
person, suppressed the Skouptchina and Senate, and reduced the role
of the National Court of Chancery to that of a simple judicial body.
A Servian Code based on the Code Napoleon did not assuage the
arbitrariness of Milosh's rule so that by 1835* though supported by
3Prance and Britain, it was not approved of by Russia which sided
with the malcontents. Seizing this golden opportunity, the Porte,
with Russian consent, issued in December 1838 a Firman re-establishing
a constitutional regime. No Senator could be dismissed unless
his crime had been proved to the Porte* judges held office for life;
and monopolies were abolished. The Senate alone could sanction
taxation. Most important of all, with the permission of the
protecting Power, the elective principle had, de facto, been
substituted for the hereditary one.^
Milosh had to leave the country; the contest was postponed.
The great change in the situation when he returned to power in
^*In Longworth (Consul at Belgrade) - Bulwer, 22 April *60,no.6,PO.79̂ 515 “ Ibid.
^*They attempted to make ground in the provinces that they had lost 
.at Constantinople by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. „
4*Temperley - History of Servia. seems to think that the Porte was 
acting ultra vires. It was not.
2.0-2L
1859 lay in the substitution of the collective guarantee for the
single Russian guarantee of Servian immunities. The Porte was
solely responsible to the Powers for the interpretation or execution
of any Hatt, Cstav, or Treaty. Another alteration, giving cause
for immediate quarrel with the Porte, was in the latter’s non-
observance of its own Hatts in so far as they pertained to the
evacuation of Mussulman subjects from Servia.
By the Hatts of 1829 and 1850 no Turk could reside in the
principality except within the Turkish fortresses. No exception
was made in favour of Belgrade, though by a Firman of 1833 the
Porte claimed, as of right, that Mussulmans could continue to
reside in the city of Belgrade, the argument being that from a
strategic view the whole city was within the fortress.̂ " In 1858
the Turkish settlement in the city of Belgrade did not figure in
Servian complaints, though indeed it might have done. For through
Servian neglect, the old gates dividing the old city from the
suburbs had been left standing, and the Turks had sentries there,
2taking the gates to be an extension of the garrison. To aggravate
the situation, the Governor of the Belgrade citadel, for his pat,
had always, whether by policy or from mere carelessness - possibly
both - permitted Christians to reside within this space between the
3  'Gates and the actual fortress. In I859, not only were Mussulmans
settled all* over the country, the Porte claimed jurisdiction over
^’Dalyell (attaché) - Bulwer, July 24 *58»T/12. The problem was
complicated by the Firman of 1838 which provided for the destruction 
of the Gates of the old city - later referred to as the Faubourg.
In 1862 Turkey's legal right to live in the space between the 
2 fortress and the gates would be questioned.
*Fonblanque (Consul at Belgrade)-Bulwer, 16 March'59»no.9 & 14 March, 
, FO.78/1439^•Bulwer-Russell, 11 Sept. •62,FO.78/1657*
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them, also over the non-Servian Christians residing thereClearly 
the provisions of the Firman of 1833 should not have been extended 
in this way. They had provided for a different state of things 
'viz: the period following the conclusion of the struggle between 
the Porte and the Principality, at nhich period the Turkish proprie­
tors were probably for the most part residing in the suburbs and 
neighbourhood of the garrisoned fortresses'. In April 1860,Milosh 
sent a Deputation to Constantinople to voioe his grievances vdaich a 
system of mixed jurisdiction, conflicting militias, and police caused. 
The Deputation demanded the recognition of the hereditary succession 
in the Obrenovitch line, and the withdrawal of the Mussulman 
population from Servia according to the Firmans.
From the first, Bulwer looked to conciliating national opinion 
in Servia by timely concessions, and he had advised the Porte in 
this sense before the Deputation arrived. His language on the 
subject had been moderate, even delicate. *
**Servia was unfortunate in this respect. lioldo-Wallaohia was not 
similarly bound to allow Mussulmans to live within its frontiers. 
There was a lighter side to this. Fonblanque in Belgrade remarked 
that he knew 'a Bosnian Spahi who calls himself Abdoul-Abdoulievitchl 
„ Fonblanque - Bulwer, 1 Feb. '59>ao. 4,F0*78/1439.
Dalyell - Bulwer, 24 July '58, T/12. j
^'Longworth - Bulwey, 22 April '60, no.6 FO.78/1515* The Servian 
authorities made the Turks shut up shop on Sundays, though 
the Turkish authorities did not - and could not - make the 
Serbs close on Fridays. The Turks refused to improve the 
appearance of the Belgrade market place because it would have 
involved the removal of some tohbstones. Dalyell-Bulwer, 24 July 
'33, T/12. As for the Mussulman population scattered up and 
down the country, though the Turks refused to allow them to be 
placed under Servian laws, they were unable themselves to 
exercise jurisdiction over them. Equally aggravating was the 
existence of two sets of policy, Serb and Turkish, both fully „ 
armed and both patrolling the old city, and mutually hostile. !
Fonblanque - Malmesbury, 14 March '59» FO.78/1439
5L*>4-
'The adoption of Michael (Milosh's son) by anticipation’, ,
he wrote, ’would be rather a bitter pill, and is difficult 
on any fixed principle. Upon the whole, what I should 
recommend to the Porte is to draw up by anticipation 
instructions to th$ Pasha at Belgrade to use instantly 
on old Milosh's demise; and which would be to the effeot 
that if his nomination would be popular, to assure him 
that even at the request of the Senate, or any national 
authority, or even on any plausible pretext, it should at 
once be sanctioned'• 1
Somewhat to Bulwer's dismay the suggestion only became acceptable
2to Milos^h at Russia’s instance • The Porte did write to Osman 
Pasha at Belgrade, instructing him to communicate to Prince Michael 
the Porte's assurance that he would be recognised on Milosh's death.^ 
Bulwer took the opportunity to warn Milosh 'to take care what he 
was about, since by attacking the state of things guaranteed by 
Treaty, he would be assailing not only the Porte but the Great 
Powers*.^
The Serb deputation made two categorical demands, that the
constitution be abolished and the principle of hereditary succession
be reaffirmed, and that the Turks outside the fortresses should leave 
5the country. Naturally suspicious of Milosh's designs, Bulwer 
thought the objections to the constitution should be specified so 
that the Porte could discuss changes with the Representatives of the 
Powers. Otherwise he favoured the recent demands, though he went 
on to explain*
'It will...be difficult to preserve the fortresses not on 
the DanUbe when the Turkish population around them is 
withdrawn, and perhaps the wisest thing eventually will be 
to destroy them'. 6
1. Bulwer-Russell, 25 Jan '60, PR0.30/22.88 . " " .
, Bulwer-Russell, 17 Feb. '60, ibid.
Bulwer-Russell, 14 March *60, ibid •
c Bulwer-Russell, 14 Mar.'60,ibid*Prokesch &  Lallemand joined him in this. 5* Bulwer-Russell,11 April ’60, ibid.Bulwer-Russell, ibid. When the Servian crisis blew up the next year, 
this was one of Bulwer's first assumptions.
He had always in mind the suspicion that Russia might easily 
capitalise on Servian discontent. 1 Further, considerable unrest 
in the provinces, especially Bulgaria, also in the capital itself, 
the troops being ill-paid, and the agitation in the Moldo-Wallachian
Principalities made it imperative that the leading section of the
o 'south Slavs, theSerbs, should be kept quiet. However, Russell’s
astute manoeuvring between Russia and France, ably backed by
Bulwer's drive in keeping before the Turks the need to implement 
3reforms, contained the situation.
Prince Milosh died in September. His last act had been to
declare to the Skouptchina, convoked in August for the purpose,^
that the Suzerain's decision over the recent Servian demands could
not be respected. Despite these strong words, when Michael
succeeded his father the task of establishing the government on &
sound basis of law and order, and of giving it security from
external aggression remained. Government had to be regularised,
likewise the fighting force. The necessary concomitant to his
civil reforms and the introduction of conscription, in fact, even,
the prerequisite for the success of both, was the need to have the
Mussulman problem settled. Competing jurisdictions and authorities
2*Bulirer - Russell, 17 and 22 Feb. and 16 June *60, ibid.
'Russia had put its army in Bessarabia and the Caucasus on a war 
footing and now agitated the question of the condition of the Slav 
provinces, (Bulwer-Russell, 8 Eeb. '60, ibid.). Russian projects, 
Buiwer explained, 'are to substitute for former plans of external 
aggression, plans of internal dissolution, which only at a 
propitious time would be supported by a military force. A force 
sufficient for the purpose of backing a general insurrection, or 
a state of internal convulsion will probably be kept in readiness.•' 
, (Bulwer - Russell, 16 June '60, ibid). .
^*See above, pj^and Chapter III, p.ios.
4*See Temperley, p.240.
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impaired Michael's sovereignty. These would he the factors 
underlying the demand, whose immediate significance might have 
appeared to be meraty personal, for the admission of the hereditary 
principle.
Again, however, the Porte, in its Berat, skated around the
question simply stating Michael to have the essential qualities
for administering Servia.^ Russell quickly asked Bulwer for his
opinions on the situation, and on Michael's proposal that the Turks
living in Servia 'should continue to reside, but under Servian law
2and police, than that they should be expelled'. The ambassador 
rejoined*
'This was the view always taken both by myself and Monsieur 
Thouvenel on this question, and I have more than once 
mentioned it ta the Servian Representative here'. 3
This of course received official approval.^
When Garashanin headed another mission to Constantinople to
negotiate withdrawal of the Turks outside the fortresses, and to
demarcate the spheres of jurisdiction, the Porte was grappling with
5the gravest financial crisis of these years, was preoccupied with
disturbances in Albania and Bcsnia-Hefzegovina of which, it felt,
Garibaldi would take advantage, and, with Britain prodding from
behind, was striving to get the French out of Syria. In the midst
of these troubles it could hardly have tackled another problem so
full of administrative complexities, especially when there seemed to
■̂‘Enclosed in Buiwer-Russell, 31 Oct. *60,no.f09»and dated 20 Oct*
9  FO.78/1512.
f‘Russell - Bulwer,2 March '61,no.130,F0.78/1560 .
^'Bulwer-Russell, 25 March '61,F0.78/1568 .
Russell-Bulwer, 9 April *61, op.cit.
^‘Negotiations were on foot for the notorious Mires loan which would 
have obtained £8 million for the Porte at a oost of £16 million*
207
no urgent reason why it should. Nevertheless, Bulwer seemed to he 
oonvinced the Forte should do something to meet Garashinin's request. 
He wrotet
'The proposal is not only plausible hut just, nor do I see 
any reason why the affair should not be settled amicably'• 1
On the other hand, Turkish indecision made him suspect that the
2problem would have to be brought before the Powers. Already a 
note of anxiety had sharpened Bulwer's occasional reflections on 
a worsening state of affairs. After Milosh in the previous August 
had flung down the challenge, Bulwer whose communications hitherto 
had tended to be a little frivolous - to the effect that Milosh 
was dying as usual, and that a nation of swineherds, unless as a 
part of a general and foreign sponsored insurrection, could not 
be dangerous, commented:
'1 shall advise the Grand Vizir.•.to open the door for further 
negotiations, but the result of what finally takes place 
will probably depend on circumstances i&ich will have 
little to do direotly with the correspondence between 
the forte and Prince Milosh'. 3
Not much insight was required to see that even an Obrenovitch could
not completely control the nationalist movement which was constantly
stimulated by the petty local grievances. The event proved the
ambassador right. In June 1862, after months of bickering, the
tension mounting up in the old city, or Faubourg, could no longer
be contained by the authorities, and there resulted an open clash
2*Bulwer-Eussell, 5 May »61, no.346, FO.78/1570.
_*Bulwer-Russell, ibid.
'•Bulwer-Russell, 28. Aug. '60, no.552, FO.78/1510.
4*Unpopular rulers like 'the Miloshes' would even go so far as to 
turn attention towards external grievances, so-called, through 
'fear of otherwise losing their hold over Servia what (sic) opinion 
is now beginning to run against them*..as a means of sustaining . 
their own power', reflected Bulwer.Buiwer-Russell,22 Feb.*60,PR0. 
30/22.88.
(15 - 17 June) between the residents, ending with the bombardment 
of the town by the fortress artillery» It was a panic action, yet one 
for which the Serbs had clearly hoped. Michael's levying of 50,000 
men in 1861, contrary to treaty stipulations, had not been an idle 
gesture» During the incident the Serbs had quickly captured the 
walls of the Faubourg which they occupied, and barricades went up»
The Turkish fortress was in a state of siege and for the next four 
weeks, that is until the Conferences to settle the issue began their 
sittings, another outbreak between the Serbs and the Turkish forces 
could not be discounted»
While the Consuls helped the Commandant of the fortress and 
the Sepvian Prime Minister, Garashanin, to come to a temporary truce, 
and the Porte dispatched a new Governor and a Commissioner, Ahmed 
Vefyk to enquiry into the affair,^ the business had begun of brix©.ng 
it within the bounds of negotiation.
Austria took the initiative in asking for a Conference of the
Powers at Constantinople» Russell, who took a serious view of the
2incident and of its significance, assented to the Austrian
2*Bulwer - Russell, 16 and 23 June, F0.78/1644»
'Russell - Bulwer, 3 July *62, F0.78/1645» Russell wrote this despatch latert 'The engagement by which it is stipulated that the 
Principality shall continue to hold of the Sublime Porte has been 
openly attacked and naturally denied. The dedaration of the Prince 
(Hilosh) and of the Skouptchina by which it was declared that the 
Prince alone was entitled to carry on relations with foreign powers; 
and by which the Constitution of the Principality was set aside 
without the sanction of the Sultan; the provisions by which an 
.hereditary authority was conferred on the Prince (Milosh) in contempt ; 
of the Firmans and Hatti-Sheriffs of the Sublime Porte and lastly |
the decree by which 50*000 men were to be levied and armed in i
support of this usurped authority grievously affected the territorial , 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and therefore, were according to 
the Treaty of Paris to be considered as matters of general interest’, j 
See Temperley on this incident.Hiw view that the Turks had abused j the various Firmans,thus creating the difficulties at Belgrade,is not I justified by the evidence.Nor had the Treaty of Paris,as Temperley. j holds,altered the situation vis-a-vis the Turkish fortresses* Ibid,̂ 245 .j
proposal,^- and instructed Bulwer to communicate with his Austrian
colleague should the question of intervention arise. Russell
had dropped his previous idea that a mission composed of the
Representatives at Vienna should go to Belgrade 'with power to
order Austrian regiments to occupy Belgrade for a short time to
2establish a truce between the contending parties'. Maturer 
reflection had made Russell sceptical of the use of any intervention. 
He. 'would be best satisfied if the question were not raised at 
all'.^ The Porte itself had objected to this, while clearly 
Russia and Prance could hardly have favoured it.^
Bulwer, as mentioned above, had strong opinions on the kind of 
relationship which should exist between Sultan and vassal. He had 
argued*
'She only sensible view to take of these Provinces is that 
of considering them as a neutral frontier, the population 
of which has not to be ruled by the Porte, but to be 
conciliated by it. Their nominal vassalage to the 
Ottoman Empire is the best and safest guarantee of their 
real independence against neighbours more ambitious, 
and more powerful. And this it is probable they will 
themselves understand and appreciate, if the connection 
which such vassalage imposes does not too violently 
shock their feelings, and too materially injure their 
interests'. 5.
2*Russell - Bulwer, 22 June '62, FQ.78/1644- 
-'Russell - Bulwer, 19 June, ibid.
^'Russell - Bulwer, 26 June, *62, ibid.
^’Temperley,'p.244* France and Russia had consistently supported 
Michael's innovations in respect of the army and the constitution. 
Now, in July, they came to an agreement to reduce the menace of 
the Turkish occupation of Servia, and to settle the question of 
jurisdiction in Servia's favour. Riker states that Russell came 
to suspect such an arrangement in September. In fact, he knew of 
- it early in August. Russell - Bulwer, 11 Aug.,PO.78/1645»
^'Acting Consul Lytton (Belgrade) - Bulwer, 19 March '60,P0.78/1505»- 
quoted Bulwer’s instructions and went on to suggest that his two 
months stay in the country had persuaded him that nothing else 
could be looked for. Bulwer and the Foreign Office greatly 
respected Lytton's judgment.
He Had written in this sense to Longworth at Belgrade, instructing 
Him as to His Hearing towards Michael, and tHe advice He sHould 
give Him on tHe subject of tHe Hereditary title*  THe despatch 
showed Bulwer at His paternal best:
'It appears*..that He is rather...childishly anxious 
about the Hereditary title... THe policy of the Porte 
and of the Prince is to endeavour to live on good 
terms together. Get His Highness to conform as much 
as possible to forms. I would on the other Hand get 
the Porte to meet His wishes, as far as possible, as 
to things. You will Have seen the reception given to 
Prince Couza, a new policy on the part of the Porte 
with respect to the outlying Principalities. Let the 
Prince come into this. I Have personally a great 
respect and regard for Him, and consider Him a perfect 
gentleman'. 1
His views Had suffered no change by the recent events. On 
the other Hand His tactical judgment, always suspect, was unsound. 
He asked Russell whether he might take His leave of absence - long 
over-due - and turn it to advantage by Having it in Belgrade to
2facilitate a private arrangement between the Serbs and the Porte.
A secret desire for a little gLory seems to Have prompted Him, for 
already He Had been instructed to attend a Conference of the Five 
Powers.^ With remarkable nonchalance He explained in His private 
letter*
'I think, if Fuad will do now what Narvaez did in 1842, 
that in a few days I could settle matters at Belgrade 
as I did formerly at Tangiers. Let Hig, in short, and 
He seems so inclined, give me carte blanche to finish 
things as best I can*, in taking my leave, I sHould 
naturally pass by Belgrade, and in three days I could 
see what is possible, and turn it into an arrangement.
All this might be done perfectly quietly, and nothing 
more is necessary than to give Vefyck absolute orders 
to sign what I assent to'. 4
2*Bulwer-Lytton, 21 Oct. '60^0.78/1512.
*Bulwer-Russell, 27 June,P0.78/1644.Russell-Bulwer, 25 June, no.340,ibid.
^'Bulwer-Russell, 25 June, PROiJO/22.90•
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Encouraged by the Grand Vizier, Fuad, and by A'ali, who presumably 
sought to get out of a scrape, Bulwer actually proposed that the 
Conference should be presented with a ’fait accompli' which 'could 
not be otherwise than accepted'.^ The astonishing idea showed a 
rare inability, in a diplomatist of 30 years experience, to grasp 
the political realities beneath the diplomatic situation. Kussell 
gave it short shrift, stating*
'Her Majesty's Government do not wish you to go to Belgrade. 
The Representatives should meet at Constantinople and have 
before them the proposals of Vefyfc and of the Prince of 
Servia.
It is necessary that deliberations should be in common, 
and that all the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris 
in 1836 should be represented in Conference'. 2
The specific instructions enjoined him to discover, why the Serbs
had attacked the Gates which the Turks held by treaty, whether or
not a renewal of the conflict might shortly take plaoe, what the
Treaties involved and how they had been violated, and if the
3Treaties needed to be changed. Russell was anxious to get the
Conference assembled as soon as possible, and oould only be irate
as a month slipped by without the Representatives meeting because
the Russian had no instructions, and the Austrian objeoted to the
presence of an Italian representative.^
The first meeting of the conference took place on 23 July.
Bulwer had a clear notion of what he wanted and also what his
bargaining pieces would be. He felt it would be inviting trouble
to have the Turks and Serbs again together in the Faubourg which
2*Bulwer - Russell, 27 June, op.cit._*FQ - Bulwer, 28 June, ibid.
^’ftussell - Bulwer, 25 June, no.340,FO.78/1644*
^'Russell - Bulwer, 15 Julyj Bulwer-Russell, 21 July, FO.78/1662
‘Lt‘2-
fronted the fortress. The essential thing was to make the fortress
secure, ’giving up the rest’.'*’ By this he meant that the Turks
should give up the Faubourg, and the two smaller fortresses in the
interior, namely Sokol on the Bosnian frontier, and Udshitze in
the Sanjak of Novibazar. These fortresses depended exclusively on
2outside supplies, and were consequently indefensible. But Bulwer 
added 'this cession should be kept back till the last and not made 
too easily*.^ He expected no difficulties from the Porte. At the 
first conference he took control, the initiative remaining with 
him till the end - chiefly because he bid low. The conference 
agreed on sending a joint telegram to the Consuls in Belgrade 
instructing them to impress upon the Servian government the need to 
keep the peace^. The real business began at the next conference.
It indicated the way the future negotiations would develop. The 
battle between Moustier and Bulwer began in earnest.
Stressing the critical state of Belgrade, Bulwer urged the
conference to press the Servian government to withdraw the advanced
sentries and take down the barricades. The Porte also should take
measures to improve the atmosphere. On Lobanoff’s and Moustier's
insisting on the barricades remaining, Bulwer asked for his proposal
to be recorded. At this Moustier climbed down, and expressed his
willingness to assent to Bulwer's disarmament proposition providing
it were linked With an outline of his views of the political settlement
he had in mind. The Porte had obviously been primed beforehand for
i*Buiwer-Russell, 9 July ’62, PEO.30/22 90.
_*Bulwer-Russell, 11 Sept. no. 60Q,F0.78/l657- 
^‘Bulwer-Russell, 9 July.op.cit.
4*Bulwer-Russell, 24 July ’ 62 ,F0.78/1662 .
Bulwer suggested ’that the citadel should have a sufficient rayon+, 
decided "by military authorities, and all those whose houses were 
demolished should he indemnified'.V Moustier and Lohanoff said they 
would ask for instructions*
Bulwer's confident expectation that the Frenchman would shift 
his ground sprang from his sure insight into French policy on this 
issue* He recognised its limitations* Crowing over his tactical 
victory, he wrote to his chief:
'My notion is that Moustier was told to obtain all he 
could by influence, obscure threats, and indirect 
promises, but not to pledge his Government to insist on 
anything directly or to place it avowedly in opposition 
to us or to liiat we might reasonably expect'. 2
Bulwer's plan now was for the Porte to be difficult, and thus to
secure him and Prokesch in their position as mediators*^ For a
change, agreeing with the policy he was attempting to carry out,
and perhaps relishing his good health, Bulwer quite evidently
enjoyed the struggle, cheerfully commenting on the personal situation:
'The greatest harmony exists between myself and Prokesch; 
and M. de Moustier is,at least in form,- the Marquis - 
every inch of him, and so rounds the oorners of his 
phrases that he appears polite when he begs the Turks 
to give up all they possess', 4
and on the diplomatic possibilities:
'I think if.two or three useless fortresses are demolished, 
the whole affair may be settled on Thursday when we 
meet again'* 5
The progndstication proved false* On 31 July the Russian and
French representatives demanded that the fortress of Belgrade be




5#Bulwer-Russell, 28 July. F0.78/1662.«»> 'Rayon' or 'Esplanade' was the word used to describe a 'no-man*s-land
given up to the Serbs. Bulwer simply asked the conference to
discuss, paragraph by paragraph, a project he had prepared, ’and
after much discussion we agreed on all but the two most important
points, the extent that should be given to the Rayon around the
citadel of Belgrade, and the number of fortresses the Turks should
keep’.̂  Other points which produced differences, were the
limitation of the Servian army which, as the only check on its
size, i.e. the Constitution, had been tampered with, Bulwer held
ought to be settled by the Powers and the Porte; and the indemni-
fication of the Mussulman population whose property had been
pillaged in the recent fracas. While Moustier hnd Lobanoff
disliked these last two suggestions, the former at least was prepared
to consider the Turkish offer to give up the two fortresses in the
interior, and there seemed to be a possibility of compromise on the
question of the defence of the citadel. As the conference closed
Bulwer threatened that if a settlement were not soon arrived at,
he would raise difficulties about Servian armaments and the barricades,
2while the Porte would take measures to defend itself. Bulwer had 
countered the stiff French terms by offering the two Turkish 
fortresses. He had to make it clear that this was his last major 
concession. In the next few days, Moustier changed his ground, 
became obstinate, and tried to bully the Porte into giving up all 
the fortresses.^ Bulwer held his ground, assuring his chiefs *
2*Bulwer-Russell, 1 August, FO.78/1662.
**Bulwer-Russell, 1 August, FO.78/1662.
^*Bulwer-Russell, 4 August, ibid.
'Prance would prefer an arrangement entirely in favour of 
the Servians, hut does not want to have the responsibility 
thrown upon her of having provoked a collision thro' her 
unreasonableness'. 1
Finally, at the-conference of 13 August Moustier overplayed
his hand* The Porte had already given distinct assurances as to
the two fortresses, and the withdrawal of the Mussulman population -
2rather than leave it under Servian jurisdiction* Neither touching 
on the strength of the Servian forces, nor an indemnity for the 
Turks, Moustier's project stipulated for the destruction of the 
Belgrade citadel and the five fortresses* After this Bulwer 
gained the Prussian minister to his side while even the Italian 
representative was sympathetic*^ It seems that each side waited 
for the other to give in,but Bulwer, confident in the ability of 
the Turkish army to crush the Serbs, preferred to keep the minor 
concessions until the French should radically alter their views*
And for a time Bulwer suspeoted Moustier had tempered his opinion*
'As to the French Ambassador', he wrote, 'his conduct 
seems to have caught the fever of the climate, and to 
have its alternate hot and cold fits, so that one 
conversation always makes one surprised at the other*
He is now, however, I hear, in a cold stage, and I 
cannot help thinking that the firm but moderate tone 
we have taken up, has contributed to this result'* 4
Till this point Russell had left his ambassador considerable
latitude, approving of his not having brought forward the question
5of culpability, which he himself had emphasised in the original
*  6  ■ " instructions, and of the manner in which Bulwer had handled the
2*Bulwer-Russell, 6 August,PRO.30/22 $ 0 .  
z*Bulwer-Russell, 11 Aug.*op.cit.
?*Bulwer-Russell, 20 Aug.,PRO.30/22 $ 0 • 
jl'Bulwer-Russell, ibid-
gBulwer-Russell, 12 Aug.,no*526,F0*78/l656- 
'Russell-Bulwer, 27 Aug., no.515» FO.78/1645»
conference He instructed him now not to make any more
concessions, and to tell the French ambassador of this.
'This is the last word', he wrote, 'of Her Majesty's 
Government on the affairs of Servia'• 2
On Bulwer's requesting Houstier's specific and detailed
objections to his project of 31 July, the latter, instead, produced
another project, in substance much like Bulwer's scheme but very
offensive in tone.'* He demanded that not a single Servian building
be touched, however necessary a rayon for the fortress, that the
two interior fortresses be demolished at once and the others be
examined 'to see if any more can be destroyed',^ that under no
circumstances should the town be bombarded, and, while a military
commission should examine the citadel, it should be 'to see if
advanced points disagreeable to the Servians cannot be altered'.
The subject of the Servian forces, upon which the strength of
Turkish garrisons would be assessed, was entirely ignored. Ho
mention was made of an indemnity for the Mussulman population. In
short the whole intention of the project was to concede everything
to Servia, and to treat it as an equal Power rather than as a vassal.
'Another difficulty', as Bulwer explained, 'is in the amour pro-pre
of the French negotiator ?ho wishes the paper signed to be drawn up
by him.’̂  He also complained of Moustier’s draftmanship,'there
being no suite in the articles and each treating of a variety of
things'. Having persuaded the French ambassador to withdraw his
2*Russell - Bulwer, 23 Aug.,no.508, F0.78/1645 •
,,’Russell - Bulwer, 22 Aug., ibid*.
J’Bulwer - Russell, 11 Sept., no.600., F0.78/1657* c’Bulwer - Russell, 27 Aug., F0.78/1662- 
5*Bulwer - Russell, ibid-
’Bulwer - Russell, ibid. -
'’Bulwer - Russell, Sept. PR0.30/22 91*
declaration that the document he accepted in toto, Bulwer, presumably
in deference to his pride, and thinking it ’better not to have
muoh discussion' took the project away with him.^ With the aid
of A'ali, and especially Prokesch, Bulwer produced a counter-project
2at the conference held 2 September, which in accordance with the 
latest suggestions of Russell, who had insisted to Thouvemel on the 
justice of an extended rayon to compensate for the loss of the 
faubourg,^ included two compromise proposals. One touched on the 
problem of a Rayon, and the other agreed that the Porte should give 
a moral guarantee not to bombard the town except under the strongest 
provocation.
Moustier had kept back his instruction to agree to a rayon, 
providing the Servian Cathedral, seminary, and one or two other 
buildings were left alone.^ He now yielded, accepting Bulwer's
5counter-project which he proceeded to alter in one or two details.
One of these, a new idea, that a Military Commission to decide on 
the requirements of the rayon should include a Servian Representative, 
Bulwer promptly rejected.*’ They agreed in the final conference 
(4 September) to leave the Porte and the Servian government to reach 
2‘Bulwer-Russell, ibid*
-‘.Bulwer-Russell, 11 Sept., no.600,FO.78/1657 ■^ Russell-Bulwer, 11 Aug., FO.78/1656; Bulwer-Russell, no.525»12 Aug« 
ibid, and Russell-Bulwer,28 Aug.,F0.78/1645* *M. Thouvenel's despatch 
to St. Petersburg read to me by the French chargé d'affaires speaks 
of only two points, first that no Servian houses should be destroyed 
to enlarge the rayon, second that a moral guarantee should be given 
against bombardment, except in case of necessity. As to the first, 
I think consent of Servian proprietors should be obtained and 
indemnity promised. The second 1 think is reasonable. Endeavour to 
a reduce the French demands to thdse two points', 
c*Bulwer-Russell, 12 Aug., FO.78/I656 -
5‘Bulwer-Russell, 11 Sgpt. no.600, F0.78/l657fand Bulwer-Russell, Sept. 
6 PRO.50/22 91.
‘Bulwer-Russell, 4 Sept., FO.78/1662 *
a friendly entente as to the size of the vassal's militia. And, 
as Moustier rejected the idea of leaving the Military commissioners 
to decide which Servian properties, apart from the buildings 
already excepted, should be destroyed to facilitate the construction 
of an-effective Rayon, Bulwer, at the last, acted on Russell's 
suggestion that the Porte should come to an arrangement with the 
Servian government for purchasing the necessary Servian houses.
It was an important concession, because the Porte, again, had to 
make it.
'I carried it at the very last by consenting to the 
arrangement as to the rayon which Tour Lordship’s 
telegram of the 28 August mentions, but which 1 
myself had never consented to if all the other points 
had not been agreed', explained Bulwer. 1
On the other hand the barricades and other fortifications had to
come down before the Porte issued its Firman. The ambassador
concluded*
'I have only to add that I think Tour Lordship will find, 
on comparing my original proposals with our ultimate 
agreement that after all the dbormy debates that have 
occurred, we remain pretty nearly on the same ground which 
we took up at the commencement of our discussions'. 2
Apart from the failure to indemnify the Mussulmans - and it 
was not certain whether they ought to have been -and the Porte's 
having to reach an agreement with the Servian government over its 
militia and the purchase of Serb properties, Bulwer's statement was 
correct •> The failure to reach a more satisfactory arrangement on 
the militia was serious, but Bulwer seems, by his conduct, to have
^'Bulwer-Russell, 4 Sept., FO.78/1662.
^*Bulwer-Russell, 11 Sept., FO.78/1657*
been glad enough to have persuaded Moustier Hat it was even a 
proper subject for discussion.^
According to the new arrangement the Turks would demolish its 
fortresses at Udshitze and Sokol - to the great benefit of 
Montenegro and Herzegovina. The fortresses on the rivers. Drina, 
Save, and Danube, namely Shabatz, Semendria, and Fethislam, and 
little Zvomik on the Drina, and the island of Adakaleh on the
2Danube, remained, forming part of the defence of Belgrade itself.
Though the Faubourg was to be given to the Serbs no military work
could be constructed on it, and the rayon or esplanade which was
to be enlarged chiefly in the former Mussulman quarter, and was to
provide the space of ground separating the garrison from the Serbs,
would also have no fortifications. The guarantee against another
bombardment included a stipulation that the Commandant of the
Fortress should inform the consul and the inhabitants of the Town if
3a similar bombardment were contemplated in some future eventuality. 
Hussell praised Buiwer's efforts*
'You have shown skill, promptitude, judgment, and all the 
conciliation compatible with your instructions, and the 
rights of the Porte*• 4
All these qualities he had given proof of. Moreover, his powers
of restraint, his remarkable endurance and good temper, put him in
the rank of first-class negotiators. His initial aberration does
■'■'Artiole XI of the new treaty expressed the Porte's belief 'that the 
Servian government will not keep a number of men superior to what 
is necessary for the maintenance of the tranquility and internal 
order of the country'. Treaty enclosed in Bulwer-Russell, 11 Sept., 
2 no. 600,FO.78/1657-'Bulwer-Russell, 11 Sept.> no.60CV FO.78/1657- -^'Enclosed in Bulwer-Russell, ibid, Porte-Governor of Belgrade. 
^'Russell-Bulwer, 6 Oct. '62, FO.78/1646.
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not ¿«tract from the performance. Though he had made most of the
concessions early, in the diplomatic context this was a wise policy,
for Ihouvenel, no supporter of the Russian entente, could hardly
have insisted on the exorbitant and insulting demands Moustier
originally put forward. More important, Bulwer, supported by
Prokesch and the Porte, refused to be browbeaten, and while the
French ambassador could not contemplate Turkey and Servia putting
the issue to the test.of war, there was little he could do but climb
down. The tardiness with which French policy became conciliatory
possibly reflected a need to impress the Russian ally.
There was a curious aftermath in the second arms crisis. Bulwer,
in Cairo on a leave of absence, received from A'ali a letter stating
arms and munitions, thought to be destined for Servia and Bulgaria,
had crossed the Russian frontier into Moldo-Wallachia.^ Couza had
rejected a request by the Porte for their sequestration. He held
that the request was an infringement of his country's autonomy.
Further, Couza said that Prince Michael had claimed the arms, thus
preventing him from seizing them.
Russell's instructions to Erskine required the chargi d'affaires
to do nothing except in support of a Turkish initiative, and when the
2question of a Commission, to stop the illegal acts of Couza, was 
bruited, he was toldt
, 'Her^Majesty's Government are not prepared to act without 
French as well as Austrian co-operation. Be very explicit 
on this point...' 3
2*A'ali Pasha - Bulwer, 8 Dec.,PRO.30/22.90.
’According to the Convention of August '59 the Porte could investigate 
an infringement of this said Convention and bring it to the notice 
- of the Powers.
^’Russell - Erskine^27 Dec., FO.78/1662-
Russian indifference to the outcome of this arms question prompted
Rechberg to suggest, in accordance with Turkish proposals, that the
Representatives of the four Powers should accompany a Turkish
delegate to Bucarest to implement the Convention.^ Naturally
2nothing came of this, and when Eulwer arrived the situation remained 
unaltered.
Meanwhile, on 28 December, the wagons of arms under Wallachian 
escort, crossedriè** fiddin into Serm. Moreover, Prance was now 
reluctant to question the conduct of either Prince after Michael had 
given a positive assurance of loyalty, explaining that the purchase 
of arms was made immediately following the Belgrade incident. All 
that remained, for evidently nothing could be done to persuade the 
Prince to disgorge the arms, or to chastise Couza for his collusion, 
was for the Powers to salve the Porte's wounded pride. Bulwer, 
returned from Egypt in the second week of the New lear, took upon 
himself this task. He put his views before Russell*
'With regard to the Principalities and Servia, I think the 
Porte quite justified in demanding explanations as to arms, 
and Couza quite wrong in his conduct and manner. I 
believe, however, the arms were purchased by Servia previous 
to the late arrangement, and not afters which solely 
affects the character of the transaction.
To get arms back now, impossible; to send a Commissioner 
to provoke disputes that cannot be settled, impolitic; 
to leave things as they are, generally unsafe, and to the 
Porte humiliating*. 3
He considered any step idaich would humiliate Couza in the eyes of
his rivals, as dangerous. On the other hand, a commission
i'Russell - Erskine,18 Dec.jFO.78/1647*
‘Russell refused to act without France. Russell - Erskine,27 Dec.
, FO.78/1647.
^Bulwer-Russell, 18 Jan. ’63, FO.78/1743.
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might strengthen Couza’s position fcy bringing the parties and Couza
to a better understanding* So he was for a Commission less to deal
with the arms problem than 'for explanation and conciliation' . 1
In the conference, convened to discuss the matter (20 January),
Bulwer suffered a defeat owing to French and Russian objections*
All that could be obtained was an agreement that the Representatives
should advise Couza and Michael to send 'proper explanations' to the 
2Porte. Trying to place this somewhat ignominious proceeding in a 
decent light Bulwer wrote*
'If things are placed on a suitable footing and the Porte’s 
dignity maintained, I think this, under the circumstances, 
is all that can be done'. 3
According to the Conference's decision, Bulwer, like his colleagues, 
wrote to Couza requiring him to give the number of arms and to state 
whether or not they were brought in secretly.^ The letter to Michael 
of 28 January asked for an assurance that the arms were to be used
5by the Servian militia. While Moustier hesitated to write this
second letter, awaiting further instructions for the Russian, Novikoff,
Bulwer received instructions to be 'very prudent in regard to the
6  /Principalities and Servia'. Russell went on*
'Prince Gortchakoff bias changed his language, and has 
become more friendly to Great Britain. The insurrection 
which has broken out in Poland will make the Russian
1#Bulwer-Russell, 18 Jan. '63,F0.78/1743.,*Bulwer-Russell, 22 Jan., ibid.
*̂Bulwer-ftussell, ibid.
4*Bulwer~Russell, 30 Jan^no.46,F0.78/1732. Enclosed Bulwer-Couza, 
c 21 January.
5#Bulwer-Michael enclosed in ibid. Michael had already informed Bulwer 
that he had only received 20,000 of the 40,000 muskets. The 
£ latter felt this was not an excessive number.
.* Russ ell-Bulwer, 26 Jan.'63, F0.78/1743-
Government unwilling to foment rebellion elsewhere.Neither will France support Prince Couza or Prince 
Michael in revolutionary schemes. The Porte has only 
to be fair and prudent*. 1
In short, the improbability of disturbances in Bulgaria and 
Servia meant that general measures of conciliation were not 
required. So on 27 January Bulwer simply asked Moustier to act 
upon his promise to write to Couza suggesting he send a delegate 
to Constantinople. Moustier offered to do it instantly. He 
promised also that his letter to Prince Michael would not be 
indefinitely delayed on account of Russia. As for the Commission 
which Bulwer had so.earnestly desired, Bulwer gave it a discreet 
burial - presumably because of Russell’s latest injunction. 'If 
we could be sure that its object would be honestly and heartily 
carried out', he wrote, '(he) would not be sorry to see our end 
attained without it, and to keep within my control, which would be 
the case, if what passed, passed at Constantinople, all the 
proceedings'.^ If the Princes gave satisfactory replies to the 
notes,the Porte's answer, Bulwer considered, might terminate the 
affair^.
In the third week of February, Negri, Couzq's Kapou Kiaya,
arrived with verbal explanations and assurances as to his general
5sentiments towards the Porte. The same week letters from Michael 
and Couza settled the affair. Refusing to send a special delegate,\ . . . .  s
simply aoting through his resident agent at Constantinople, Michael
i’Russell - Bulwer, 26 Jan.*63, FO.78/1743.
, Bulwer - Russell, 28 Jan.,no. 41,FO.78/1732.
*?*Bulwer - Russell, ibid.
See Hiker, p.400*Gortchakoff agreed to act with the other Powers. 
^‘Bulwer - Russell, 19 Feb., no. 84,op.cit.
stated that his assurance of loyalty should he good enough and that 
his agent would supply the necessary explanations of his recent 
conduct* Commenting on these letters, Bulwer wrote:
'It appears to me that if their tenor is not in all respects 
satisfactory, it is sufficient to close this affair without 
wouhding the dignity of the Porte, and that as nothing 
more can he done effectively in the matter, as to getting 
the arms, it may he better to bring the discussion to 
a close*• 1
2And there the matter did rest* The rights of the parties
were not immediately obvious* Bulwer had simply supported the
Porte's right to ask for explanations from the Prince of Servia, and
to act on the Convention of August 1859 to discover the offence of
Couza* Whether Bulwer felt it was expedient for the Porte to ask
is not so certain* For he quickly emphasised Michael's having
purchased the arms after the Belgrade incident as an extenuating
circumstance* In addition he had not considered the quantity of
arms excessive.^ Couza, whom he believed to have been culpable in
importing arms into the Empire, contrary to treaty, he was reluctant
to embarrass because of the internal situation in the Principalities*
It is to be suspected that with Bulwer the initial support for the
Porte's request was a matter of habit - the Porte's dignity was at
issue* Even the personal rivalry with Houstier^ did not make Bulwer
press the request with much enthusiasm* His preoccupation, a
\’Buiwer - Russell, 5March,no*105,F0.78/l732- 
,'See Hiker, p.401.
'•Bulwer-Bussell, 2 6  Feb.,PRO.30/22 92.
4*Bulwer-Russell, 29 Jan., ibid: '.*.1 hardly see how to get on 
satisfactorily with anything with Moustier who nevertheless is 
probably the reflex of his Government* One can never get on any 
subject a clear and general idea} a oonstant splitting of hairs 
on details} and a general indisposition to do anything are the 
chief, if not the only, characteristics of French policy here, and 
wear one out•••'
%%s
sensible one in a British ambassador at Constantinople then, was
merely 'to bring things between the Porte and the two Principalities
*back again to a. decent condition'.
Early in the crisis Bulwer thought co-operation between the 
Moldo-Wallachian Principalities and Servia out of the question.^
His views remained the same. Servia was harmless.
'The Prince may be ambitious', he wrote, 'but the people 
are not so, and a course of conciliation might separate 
the one from the other'. 3
Later, he reflected:
'•••the only important point, in my notions, is to keep 
the fortress secure. The taking of this is the only 
important mischief the Servians can do the Turks...
A poor, thrifty people attached to the cultivation of 
their lands, with no aristocracy or military clanship,
1 can't look upon them as conquerors on a great scale: 
they will go on probably quarrelling about some small 
point of little value either to themselves or the 
Turks. It keeps their little political pot boiling'. 4
-Bulwer sounded the right note. Humours of impending insurrection
5amongst the Slavonic races did not cause Bulwer to alter his tune. 
Foreign intrigues and support might achieve much, but the answer to 
these threats lay in Turkish ability and willingness to provide an 
effective administration and an equitable system of justice in 
outlying areas such as Bosnia-Herzegovina.^ Good relations between 
Servia and the Porte might affect strategical considerations, but 
could not extirpate the real causes of discontent. As for the 
i*Bulwer-Russell, 29 Jan,,ibid *
^•Bulwer-Russell, 9 July.PR0.30/22 90- 
?*Bulwer-Russell, 5 Feb., ibid/91*
¡rBulwer-Russell, 19 Feb., PRO* 3 0/22 91»
?*Bulwer-Russell, 25 June and 30 April, ibid/92 .
0’Holmes-Bulwer, 14 Aug. in Bulwer-Russell, 12 Sept.»60, F0.78/1511» 
The situation had not changed from the one Holmes, at Bosnia,Serai, 
described then. Turkish rule was such, according to Holmes, that 
there was hardly any rule at all.
United Principalities, Bulwer had not dropped the idea of a
Commission as the best way of resolving the political turmoil there,
hut Franco-Russian opposition prevented, and would continue to
prevent, anything being done to influence the course of events.*
He was convinced that a dictatorship of Couza or the introduction of
a foreign prince was just a question of time while the Powers
2continued not to intervene. Though he was justified in this 
belief, one suspects that too much zeal carried Bulwer along in his 
anxiety to bring about a more satisfactory settlement in the 
Rumanian Principalities. The diplomatic situation made any 
intervention - one might almost add, in any likely eventuality - 
impossible. Russell had already underlined the strategic obstacles 
in the way of effective, single intervention by Britain. As these 
applied even in the case of the foreign Prince becoming a possibility, 
the best thing Bulwer could have done was to wait until the European 
political situation altered* to press his more sweeping ideas. He 
would, in this way, have accomplished in Balkans diplomacy as much as 
he did in fact during his remaining period in office. Further 
the illiberal element in British policy would, thus, have been 
less pronounced. *
**Bulwer - Russell, 19 March *63, op.cit. $ 1 *
2'Bulwer - Russell, 26 Feb. '63 ibid, 92.
CHAPTER T
Egypt: The Suez Canal
Of All the Near Eastern problems, the one which most nearly 
affected British interests was the one involved in the project to 
link the Mediterranean and Red Seas by means of a canal. To be 
built by Frenchmen through a country whose wayward government 
was dangerously under French influence, it seemed to offer a major 
threat to the safety of British communications with India. However, 
on no other question did the British government pursue a policy so 
confused in conception and application. How it could have been 
any other than confused it would be difficult to imagine, given the 
over-riding necessity to prevent the construction of the Suez Canal. 
Everything conspired to facilitate Ferdinand de Lessepÿs task.
By the end of I860 it was apparent that France had determined to 
push the project; that the Viceroy Said favoured it; and that the 
Porte could not and would not do anything to stop it. From the 
winter of 1859“60 Bulwer tried to persuade his government to 
examine the problem with these factors in mind. After his visit 
to Egypt in November and December 1862 he redoubled his efforts to 
make his chief compromise. Bulwer, impréssed by the progress on the 
canal, had to admit that the canal was going to be constructed with 
or*without British approval. A few months later, having also at 
last agreed that the canal was technically feasible, the British 
government yielded to Bulwer’s policy of compromise and approved his 
Subsequently, the diplomacy over this issue of the canalefforts
resolved itself into hard hut petty bargaining.
There were only three policies the British government could 
have pursued. I.t could have held aloof and waited till an 
embarrassment elsewhere obliged the French government to stand down. 
If the issue were of great importance, as it was in spite of 
Russell's occasional indifference or uncertainty,̂  then the use of 
force should not have been quite discounted. In the event it was 
never contemplated. The third alternative, offered by Bulwer, 
involved subordinating the Canal to the larger problem of influence 
at the Porte and in Egypt, especially the latter. It was French 
hegemony in Cairo and Alexandria that made the canal possible and 
also made it dangerous. If this influence were destroyed or 
replaced by an Anglo-French condominic(/»7, then the canal would cease 
to hold out a latent threat to British communications. Bulwer 
slowly came round to this idea as he became aware that Britain's 
diplomatic isolation in this question was a luxury which could not 
be afforded. Russell took an unconscionably long time in being 
persuaded, and in fact his willingness to compromise came too late to 
affect the other issue, that of influence.
The question which naturally poses itself is whether Russell, 
with a very poor hand, played a bad game, or a skilful and very
subtle losing game, despite the poor hand. A short analysis here of
> • the motives determining government policy towards Egypt during
Bulwer's embassy will help to answer this and will also explain the
distance between the preoccupations of London and those of Bulwer
at Constantinople.
See below, p.2.W . <
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There were a combination of influences affecting the policy
decided upon by Russell and Palmerston. To begin with, Palmerston
had opposed the scheme from the time it was first mooted in this
second phase of active interest in it. When Palmerston returned/
to power there was a whole range of well-matured objections,
pecuniary, political, and philanthropic, some more pertinent than
1others according to the moment.
Of primary importance were the strategical objections. These
were considerations not to tog ignored particularly when it was
remembered that Britain had witnessed two serious attempts on the
part of the French to make Egypt independent, attempts thwarted by
Britain, as the Liberal government was always reminding the Sultan's
ministers. Merchant ships were now as large as frigates so that
the passage of the Canal would always be possible, no matter what
the guarantees. A short route to India and the ability to threaten
our trade communications would clearly be of advantage to the
French, or at least that sort of reasoning was urged in despatches.
But Russell and Palmerston did not exaggerate this danger in their
own minds. After all, the now completed Alexandria-Suez rail-
track, made by a British company, cut the distance by half as
effectively as a canal would do and thereby offered, to a certain
extent, the same dangers. The Foreign Minister sometimes believed * -
the strategical objections barely plausible, as is evidenced by
^*In the rough draft proceeding the despatch to Bulwer, No.44*21 Jan 
’60,FO.78/1556,in the Memorandum of Correspondence respecting 
Suez Canal with an appendix made up of generous extracts from 
'Diaries and Correspondence of the Right Hon. George Rose *»printed 
for use of the Foreign Office,28 Deo. *59» FO.78/1489,and a Memo 
entitled 'Insuperable objections of H.M.'s Govt.to the Projected 
Suez Canal,' FO.78/1556.
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the despatch to Bulwer 21 January *61. This stated that in a 
conversation with Musurus, Turkish ambassador in London, he (Russell) 
had declared that providing the Turkish Empire was not endangered, 
the interests of the British Empire certainly would not suffer by 
the completion of the Canal. In the rough draft of this despatch 
we find the strategical considerations examined and put on one 
side*
’...It is obvious that the opening of a new route to 
the East by Egypt and the Red Sea wou^d be an advantage 
to Marseilles as against Liverpool'.
The pencilled comment in Palmerston's hand is:
’and to Malta as against Marseilles’.
The despatch goes on»
'It is not to be denied that in time of war a canal 
300 ft» wide might when its Entrance was not blockaded, 
afford facilities to ships of war going from Toulon to 
Indian Seas'.
Palmerston’s comment above had answered this but in any case the 
danger was not so terrible, as the despatch states*
'Nor are the British arms by Sea and Land in such a 
state of inferiority that they need dread an advantage 
to an enemy which skill and courage on their part will 
enable them to counteract*.
Curiously enough Palmerston had underlined the word 'enemy' and 
remarked at the side*
'I think this courts a construction, after Toulon has been 
, named, which may have escaped notice*.
- 1
Apparently, such was Palmerston's confidence, likewise Russell's and 
Bulwer's, in the superiority of the British fleet that by their 
own reasoning the strategical objections were not a sufficient
+ FO 78/1556
explanation of British policy. The fact that later having been 
induced by Bulwer to negotiate, the ministry easily dropped these 
arguments, was significant »/» i-taBlf:* often Palmerston was not so 
confident in English naval strength - or else he was very inconsistent.
Another fear that was certainly more justified was that France 
aimed at making Egypt dependent on France. The first step towards
this end was to secure Egyptian independence of the Sultan. What 
gave colour to the view was the belief of the Foreign Office, since 
1855, that the fortifications erected by French engineers along the 
Mediterranean coast of Egypt, had been planned by the War Office 
in Paris, as a defence against the Turkish fleet. Said’s construction 
of the Great Nile Barrage was part of the same policy, namely to 
protect Egypt from the Turkish forces advancing up the Nile. To 
complete the edifice there was now to be a canal, cuttig off Egypt 
from Syria and the Empire, a military necessity to prevent an 
invasion ffom that direction. The Egyptian government would be ■]
taught to look to France for support. By abusing the system of 
the Capitulations the French colony to be developed along the banks 
of the maritime and fresh-water canals, notably at Port Said, Suez,
Cantara where the Syrian caravans passed, and Timsah (Ismailia), i
ŵould usurp the real power in Egypt. And should the clash with j1 i
. - • ’ |Egypt eventually take place, the Canal could be blocked and fortified 1
1. Elsewhere, however,in the Memo entitled 'Insuperable objections.of 
HM’s Govt.to the projected Suez Canal'(FO.78/1556)we find it stated:; 
'...if war should unfortunately arise between England and France, 
France would at once seize hold of the two ends of the Canal,which j 
would thus be open for France and shut for England.A French 
expedition might start at once and carry by a coup de main, Aden, j 
in time of peace weakly garrisoned and not fortified against an | 
European force'. - !
More striking was the admission that the English Mediterranean 
fleet was not prepared for such an emergency.

at each end. Warehouses and other Company buildings were 
potential fortresses, likewise the dry Docks at Suez which were to 
"be constructed, by the Messageries Imperiales, a government 
sponsored body. The Foreign Office had a poor opinion of the 
Egyptian army. Limited by treaty to 18,000 men, it was felt that 
it could not put a sufficiently strong army into the field and man 
the Nile Barrage at the same time. Obviously the French 
government would,supply the necessary troops. It was felt that 
another Straits question was developing. From January I860 
onwards the large grant of land to the Company and the possibility 
of its colonisation formed the substance of British objections to 
the Canal. That the government would not attempt to overcome these 
obstacles by negotiation until persuaded by Eulwer, and then with 
great reluctance, indicates the strength of feeling, on the part 
of Russell, against concession.
Commercial difficulties there were none. If anything the 
small gatherings which met Lesseps on his tour of England in 
April-July 1857 were favourable to the Canal.1 Russell was quite 
certain that from a commercial point of view Britain had as much• 
to gain as France. The chances were that the canal would be of
little benefit to anyone owing to the tremendous fuel costs for the
Y'- 2steam-ship lines, and the expense of vast coaling stations.
l.hf.Mange-The Near Eastern Policy of Napoleon III,p.127 quotes 
Hansard,Ser.3,vol.146, 1043-1045,7 July 1857,for Palmerston’s 
reaction to LessepSjf success in England! 'The scheme is founded 
in hostility to the interests of this country - opposed to the 
standing policy of England in regard to this connection nf Egypt 
with Egypt with Turkey..The obvious political tendency of the 
undertaking is to render more easy the separation of Egypt from 
Turkey. It is founded, also,on remote speculations .with regard 
» to easier access to our Indian possessions...'
‘That Stevenson and the other British experts could possibly be . 
wrong in their judgment as to the feasibility of the canal and its
. ..cont ....
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Forced labour on the Canal works was commenced on a large 
scale in May 1861 not to end until 1st June I8 6 4, and this supplied 
the government with its most profitable source of objections, 
providing inspiration for eloquence in Parliament, and embarrassment 
for the country which had first proclaimed the rights of man.
One complication was the fact that the railway built by an English 
Company had been constructed with the help of forced labour. |
It is not easy to explain British hostility simply by the ;
arguments outlined above. By the early months of I860 the government j 
still refused to commit itself to negotiations about the concrete
objections, i.e. the land clauses and the possibility of the use 
of the Canal by warships. By the end of 1859 the Canal had been 
admitted by the Emperor's government to be a French interest. The 
use of force did not enter Russell’s calculations. He merely 
shifted the emphasis of his 'policy' slightly, permitting Bulwer 
to use apparently conciliatory arguments while refusing to consider 
a substantial concession. His attitude was unaltered. The 
strangest aspect of the affair was Russell's refusal to acknowledge 
openly, or even to himself, that here was a British interest of 
prime importance. It was a Turkish interest. That Russell 
was embarrassed by a purely commercial venture which could not be
j /Parliiopposed on political grounds, if only because Lament would be the
obvious answer. In which case, the French government's willingness
(P£$5,îj.2 conti) commerc^ap potentialities naturally did not occur to 
Palmerston and Russell who constantly referred to them in Parliament. 
The report of the International Commission (January 1856) might 
at. least have caused a doubt. It was not until March 1863 that the 
Foreign Office would be finally convinced by Mr. Hawkshaw's 
memorandum, that the Canal oould be made.
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to be a party in guaranteeing the Canal, and to sign a treaty or 
other diplomatic instrument with England which would have made her 
fears baseless, was of small account. But Russell did not concede 
that it was a commercial venture. That the ministry should have 
feared the activities of the Company, which, using forced labour 
in defiance of the laws of the Empire, had begun the works without 
the Sultan’s permission, and when ordered to stop these works had 
carried on with the help of European labourers, was not surprising. 
But here the real danger lay in the decrepitude of Egypt which 
allowed the company to take such liberties. . Its geographical 
situation and the tenuous nature of the relationship with the 
Sultanate made it especially prone to the dangers inherent in the 
Capitulatory system. Such an extreme remedy as Bulwer was to 
suggest for this particular malady was not palatable to Russell.
The Capitulations were there to safeguard British interest and lives 
from Mahometan barbarism."*- ,
The whole complex of fears and intuitions which was the basis 
of policy towards the Suez Canal might have been justification enough 
for that policy. But its inadequacy, quickly apparent to Bulwer 
in the later months of 1859, might equally have provoked an attempt 
to Refine more clearly the interests involved. The attempts made 
in 1861 to clarify English objections merely illustrated uncertainty 
and confusion. So, at the time of the next French diplomatic 
initiative in December 1861, the liberal government was as unprepared 
as it had ever been. -
^••Russell-Bulwer, 12 May ’60, F.O. 78/1637.
As fo r  the obvious co n trad ictio n s between the various strands
in Bulwer*s policy, these will be seen to be never more than apparent.
Someties he would wish to place greater emphasis on Egyptian 
autonomy and the Viceroy’s whims. He would urge that the just 
influence of France should not be undermined.
Occasionally he wished to support Turkey, A l’outrance, in 
subduing the Egyptian government, once for all, and in spite of 
France. It is difficult to say whether, in this mood, he was 
threatening Russell with the long-term consequences of actual policy 
or whether he really thought that Turkey was interested in bringing 
Egypt back to the fold. .
At the back of his mind there was always the wish that Turkey 
would discipline its vassal. For he attached great importance to 
the connection between Constantinople and Cairo-for Turkey and Britain. 
In addition a vassal’s insubordination always irritated Bulwer. His 
own inability effectively to counter French influence at the Porte,in 
this as in other issues, resulted chiefly from the opportunities for 
furthering French aims offered by the ambitions of the vassals. Bulwer 
may have actually hoped, if Russell had been favourable, to press an 
English alliance upon Turkey with the object of bringing Egypt into 
line. He would have failed in any case with the Porte which . 
acknowledged its limitations. It could‘do nothing unless France and 
Britain agreed.
Yet above every consideration waw Bulwer’s determination to get 
the Suez canal controversy settled amicably so that there should be 
as little bitterness as possible between France and England in Egypt.
Patient negotiation offered the only practical solution. There 
were subtle nuances, the passing arriere-pensee,.occasioned in a fit 
of pique and ill-considered, or encouraged by a momentarily 
favourable turn of events; but these emphasise Bulwer's quality 
as a responsive diplomatist and underline his singleness of 
purpose rather than show muddled-thinking.
On examining the development of Bulwer’s policy, we shall see 
the ambassador gradually absorbing all the relevant data and 
presenting it to the government with such force and lucidity, that 
his arguments became irritatingly unanswerable. Russell was 
hostile to Bulwer towards the end of his embassy for several reasons. 
One of them, one suspects, was his independent view which he 
insinuated more than asserted and especially in his handling of this 
subject. The Foreign Secretary chafed under this treatment, likewise 
the Prime Minister because of the way they were led towards Bulwer’s ; 
solution in spite of themselves. Palmerston’s criticisms of Bulwer 
in his last two years may have been caused partly by this. On the 
other hand Bulwer, showing courage in questiaing the official line, 
thought he deserved a peerage for the part he played in the 
negotiations over the Suez canal. ■
> A significant promise had been extracted from the Grand Vizier, 
A ’ali Pasha, just before Bulwer's appointment. In March he gave 
Alison the formal assurance that the Turkish Government would not 
give its consent to the construction of the Canal until the British
G o v e r n m e n t  s a n c t i o n e d  t h a t  u n d e r t a k i n g .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  S u l t a n  c o u l d  .
2not give a decision until the Great Powers had reached an agreement.
The Porte allowed itself a loophole by requesting its Foreign
Minister to draw up a statement setting forth the Porta’s readiness,
to view Lesseps’s proposal in a favourable lifeht on certain
conditions, which the Company would be unable to agree to, so that
in the event of a change in public opinion in England Turkish
xinterests would be safeguarded. The Foreign Office, for its
part, was obliged to have reasons other than political ones for
objecting to the canal, because of the tacit agreement (1854 Dec.**
Jan I8 5 5) with France that neither government should press its views
on the Porte beyond the bounds of courtesy, neither Power having
a particular interest to forward.^
British advice to the Porte and the Viceroy from 1855-58» had
therefore to be based upon the impracticability of the project, the
expense it would involve and the political implications for Turkey
5of the severance of Egypt from Syria by this wide canal.*  In fact
political considerations, in spite of the understanding with France,
■̂‘Mange, p.129* The Grand Vizier denied having compromised himself.
„ Of course, he had.
*The Porte, the Powers and the Viceroys would continue this kind of 
shadow-boxing, and inevitably leave the real initiative to the 
, Company. ■ ■ . .
^'Moore (attache) - Alison (charge d'affaires), 4 Jan.1858,FO.78/1421.
*Jjtange, p.112..
^‘The Foreign Office was supplied with reports from Commander
Mansell, dated 3 November 1857» and from Captain T. Spratt, dated 
11 March 1858, which showed that a Suez Canal was dependent for 
its suocess on harbours at each end. At the northern end the 
nature of the litoral at this exposed.point, the shallowness of 
the water, the fogs and the strong currents from West to East, 
would make a harbour impossible.
Even so the Foreign Office found the reports unexpectedly 
favourable.
were urged on the Porte. The Canal it was said was part of a scheme
1to "bring about Egyptian independence.
These years witnessed de Lesseps at Constantinople trying to
obtain a Firman authorising the concessions at Paris keeping the
difficulties of British opposition before the French government:
and in England where he succeeded in publicising the favourable
2attitude of the commercial classes there. All the while he constant­
ly came up against Palmerston's hostility in England,and Stratford de 
Redcliffe's opposition at Constantinople where the various ministers
of the Porte,Ali, Fuad and Reschid,at different times seemed at worst 
3unconcerned. By the late summer of 1857» such was de Lesseps's
tenacity that, assured of Napoleon's personal support,and the good
offices of the French representatives at Constantinople, and in Egypt,
and taking advantage of the approval of the other Powers,he had
organised a Company,which in December was given legal recognition by
Imperial decree*^ Though unsuccessful in his efforts to persuade
1#At this stage English Governments had not objected to the fresh­
water canals.They were schemes for internal improvement.lt was 
_ merely regretted that the Viceroy had not stipulated to make "thanhinseLf. 
_*Mange, pp.116-129»
■fthlblmerston's hostility there is a remarkable comment in Mange,p. 125 
N.118,based on so disinterested a source as Lesseps,Lettres Ser.2r 
pp.185-6,Lesseps-Ali,April 4th 1858,to the effect that Palmerston 
had let it be known to Lesseps that if he were favourable to a 
. British occupation of Suez then British opposition would ceasel 
^*Two concessions and an explanatory codicil formed the bases of the 
contract between Lesseps and Said.From a strictly legal point of 
view the contract did not exist until the Sultan's permission 
(actually given in March 1866) had been obtained according to the 
terms of the original concession?dated November 1854.The articles 
which were to be the cause of so much contention later were:
'Art.4» The works shall be done at the expense of the Company,to 
which all the land needed and not belonging to particular 
individuals shall be freely granted.The fortifications that 
the Government will erect will not be at the charge of the 
Company.
'Art«7* Should the maritime canal follow an indirect route,and shauH 
the Company need to join the Nile to the direct cutting in 
the Isthmus, the Egyptian Government would abandoncont...
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the French government to take measures to have the neutral status 
of the Canal settled, he could he confident that sooner or later 
French amour-propre would be necessarily preventing the defeat of 
his plans» In any case, as Mehemet Said wanted the Canal and the - 
Porte neither could nor would stop him» Then England’s opposition 
could at most only he a nuisance.
(cont. p.ltl note.4) t . ■
to the -Company for the duration of the Concession, the 
public domain now uncultivated, which would he irrigated, 
fertilised, and cultivated hy the efforts and at the 
expense, of the Company*.
The lease of the land would last for 99 years after the opening of 
the Canal.
The original concession was replaced hy a more specific one to the 
Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez (5 Jaru,’56). The 
important detail was the grant of the-Ouadi Toumilat area for the 
purpose of linking the Suez passage to the Nile hy a sweet-water 
canal. The grant was for the duration of the lease and conditional 
on the construction of the fresh-water canal. It was free from all 
tax. In addition to this an explanatory codicil (dated 20.7*56) 
stated»
’The number of workers shall he set taking into consideration 
the seasons of agricultural work’.(cf.Landes,-Bankers and 
Pashas, p.181 n.2)
With this qualification, the Egyptian government engaged to provide 
at least four-fifths of the workers to he employed on the canal.
■'■’Mange, p.l55> though Marlowe erroneously holds in his hook 
Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1953, that support for the scheme 
depended on the personal welcome Lesseps received in Paris.
Not only was Lesseps never other than welcome in Paris - he was 
the Empress’s cousin - the support for his scheme did not 
depend on this factor. See Mange, p.108:
’Keeping such international situations (referring to the 
Eastern and Italian problems) in mind, it is not 
surprising that Napoleon limited his championship of 
the enterprise to a hearty personal and moral support 
> until the existence of the Suez Canal Company was 
endangered in 1859*•
From 1854 the Canal had been favoured at the Quai d ’Orsay as a 
French interest, and only political considerations, i.e. the 
entente with England, had prevented a policy of open support.
Bulwer came upon a strange situation, bewildering by reason
of the hesitation of the parties concerned, namely the French
government, England, the Porte, and the Viceroy, to admit openly
their interest in Lesseps* s project. Nor was there to be any 
radical alteration in this state of affairs for the next twelve
months. No urgent crisis necessitated Bulwer's making a conspicuous
effort towards, on the one hand, coming to grips with the legal and
political niceties inherent in the Suez question, nor, on the
other hand, his making any remarkable contribution to ife settlement.
He properly absorbed the information from the Consul-General in
Egypt, and passed it on to Russell or Malmesbury. European Turkey
occupied his attention. This negative policy permitted the Company
to make some progress. The French government would become more
engaged in the success of the venture as the Company’s achievements
made more likely the completion of the canal»
During August and September Lesseps had crossed his Rubicon.
The Viceroy’s permission to begin work on the fresh-water canals
was obtained, and the Company's prospectus drawn up.^
Eight months' later, 20 April 1859» at Port Said, Lesseps
turned the first sod during a formal ceremony. The Egyptian
government used force to stop further work on the canal, but Said
could not long withstand the kind of pressure well-calculated to
upset him. No direct French intimation of displeasure was. needed.
^"'November 5th was the day subscriptions would be received. At 
Bulwer's instance Malmesbury went so far as to give instructions 
that not only the scheme for a maritime canal, but also the fresh­
water canals should be opposed. It is difficult to believe that 
the docile Porte, anxious not to offend the Emperor, would by 
jfeelf have objected to the fresh-water canals. “ More likely Bulwer 
persuaded the Porte to demand explanations from the Viceroy.
A shrug, a meaningful aside, the indirect insinuation, a silence,
would he sufficient to break his nerve. So Lesseps was able to 
enjoy his first triumph. He was also given permission to study 
the ground and to use twenty labourers not to be furnished by the 
Egyptian government. Though small this success, it might have been 
sufficient to show the Foreign Minister in London the ineffectiveness 
of its policy of verba non res,‘, but it did nothing of the kind.
While there was much activity at Port Said, building materials being 
assembled, artisans arriving, the first huts going up and the bases 
of a light-house laid} and while Sabatier's apparent lack of 
concern was itself favouring this progress, Malmesbury was only able 
to instruct Bulwer*
'M. Lesseps has gone so far as to lay the first stone of 
his Canal without the Sultan's firman and the Porte should 
give positive orders to stop a work which is a political 
and private piece of swindling.' 1
Examining the events in Egypt within the wider context of the
troubles fomented by the Franeo-Austrian war, Bulwer for the first
time began to see the delicaoy of the whole situation. Where were
the means of defending British interests should a revolutionary
war break out? Bulwer felt that foreign interference might produce
the severance of Egypt from Ottoman rule, and that if 'one or more
great European Powers were to attack Turkey, and others did not
2come to her support, she would fall to pieces'• The Viceroy,
'unreliable to friend or foe', could not be depended on to refrain
^‘Malmesbury - Bulwer, 17 May, FO.78/1489«
‘Bulwer - Malmesbury, 21 June, PRO. JO/22 88.
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from taking advantage of the preoccupation of the Great Powers
with European affairs.1 Turkey was too weak to defend her interests.
Although reassured by Malmesbury on the score of Turkey and
Russian designs, Bulwer was quite unable thereafter to approach
the Egyptian problems in the mechanical way of his early period at
the Embassy. Further he would become more embarrassed by the
2isolation- of Britain so vividly dramatised during the war. When 
calm returned he confessed;
'...I sometimes, as an Agent, regret the loss of our old 
traditional policy, - which bound us up to certain Allies 
on idiom we could rely, and who could rely on us'. 5
During the critical months Bulwer had urged acting Consul-General
Walne to be very firm with Said, and to see to it that the Yizirial
letter, 1 June, asking for the works to be stopped immediately, was
implemented. Unfortunately for Bulwer's policy the labourers were
not Egyptian.
Said's was a tricky position for it seems likely that he had 
given credit to finance the'etudes préparatoires', in which case 
they were lawful, and the consuls could not interfere with their 
nationals any more than Said could. Also there was the point
Lesseps brought up in his reply to the Cherif Pasha's circular
- . Arequesting the consuls to restrain their nationals. De jure non**
g’Bulwer - Russell, 6 July ibid.
*Bulwer's policies may only be explained in the context of the Zurich 
period and the war. Bell * • Life of Lord Palmerston does not touch on 
it. Consequently he is able to say that after his tour of inspection 
of the canal works (Dec.’62) the ambassador wanted to sabotage the 
scheme. This is not only to oversimplify Bulwer's policy but to mis­
understand its motivation, i.e. to help the Porte and the Viceroy 
, to take a line that would not offend France.
^’Bulwer - Russell, 23 November, op.cit.
^‘Cherif Pasha's circular dated 7 June. Memo of Lesseps-Cherif 
Pasha,9 June,FO.70/1489»
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existent^the 'Company' would not have formed de factorwithout the 
Viceroy's permission. Said did the only thing possible. He refused 
to take fur.ther action lest France,victorious, vent its wrath on him.
He wrote to the Porte asking whether the canal might or might not 
be made and to communicate its wishes to the Ambassadors of the 
Powers
For Bulwer this was a shameless advertisement of Egyptian 
weakness. Annoyed at the flagrant but quasi-legal disregard of the 
Laws of the Ottoman Empire, he could only hint at the larger problem 
for he could be sure of the responses
'...The position taken up by Foreigners in Egypt is 
surely one which requires attentionl' 2
It was not until September that Bulwer's influence prevailed
sufficiently to obtain a Vizirial letter (Sept.19) requesting the
several governments to halt the work carried on by their nationals.
Then, Muktar Bey,Minister of Finance,went to Egypt and saw to it that
3the Foreign nationals ceased their activities.
■̂‘A shrewd move,it might have succeeded with the Porte,equally
sensitive about the results of the war. At least Bulwer thought so.
He knew that theGrand Duke Constantine had brought the Suez Canal 
question before the Sultan(May).It was shortly after this the Sultan 
decided to visit Egypt,to do a deal with the Viceroy,it was ramoured. 
The Sultan turned back at Scio,chiefly because of Bulwer's persistent 
warnings to Fuad and A'ali that the English alliance was at stake 
(Bulwer-Russell 17 August,*59,PRO.30/22 88). Further by the first 
? week in August the British fleet had anchored outside Alexandria.
*Bulwer-Russell,24 Aug.PRO.30/22 88* B\Hwer-Russell,25 Jan.'60,ibid: 
'We shall probably have malgre nous and malgre the Porte a French 
colony of no small extent in Egypt.Indeed,the fact is that anything 
like power and independence in this govt.-without the capitulations 
are re-examined,and their meaning,and application to existing 
_ circumstances refixed-Is I fear a delusion'. Also see below,p, .
 ̂‘Mange, p. 133 »accepting Lesseps's evidence, suggests that Bulwer’s 
violence was such that Thouvenel yielded under duress,as it were, 
to Muktar's mission. This is highly improbable.
The consuls complied with the Vizirial letter in November. ,
After the Treaty of Zurich in October ’59, the French 
government, as Bulwer had anticipated, took up the question with 
renewed vigour. Having had the opportunity of observing at close 
quarters the recent antics of the Porte and the Viceroy, and now 
only too aware of the shortcomings of his government’s unyielding 
attitude, he prepared for the fray.
France was anxious to obtain British co-operation at the moment 
for settling the Principalities. So Waleirski opened the attach as 
gently as he could. The French government, he explained, wished 
to enter into any engagement to obviate British objections to the 
canal.^ This offer was rejected. Walewski then agrily explained 
to Cowley that the Emperor must now interfere. He had already told
Thouvenel to support the demands of Lesseps when he arrived in 
Constantinople.
The French Government circularised the Powers, requesting their
2co-operation in the question of the Canal. , By the late December, 
Austria, Russia and Italy had replied favourably, Prussia assuming a - 
passive attitude.
.It became evident to Bulwer after some preliminary enquiries 
that the Porte could not resist such pressure. He quickly took 
note of Turkish attitudes} then tried to make the Porte promise as 
much as he could reasonably expect it to. All the time in his 
despatches and letters to Russell he would be advising compromise.
His method would be to keep in front of Russell the radical alternative
1#Cowley - Russell,9 Oct., FO. 78/1489.
2‘Mange, p.134. Walewski to the representatives of the Great 
Powers except Turkey and Britain, November 3rd. '
to negotiation, and, on the other hand, to feign disgust with 
the Porte’s concessions which he would pretend to submit to 
rather than heartily welcome.
No longer on friendly terms with Bulwer, Thouvenel, in the
meanwhile,did not mention the subject for the next fortnight,
and waited, watching the wretched efforts of the Porte to rid
itself of responsibility.-*- The Porte was less anxious than
ever to offaid France by making a blunt refusal.
Following a conversation with Fuad, Bulwer sent Russell a
pessimistic analysis of the immediate possibilities. His first
remark to Fuad, that the Porte was at liberty to destroy the works
constructed without its permission, had produced a swift reaction.
Bulwer went on to ask the minister if he would oppose the granting
of the Firman. Fuad commented:
’...though we are opposed to it on our.own account, I 
do not say that, if you and France were agreed, that 
we might not consider any proposals brought before us.' 2
. It was enough. The moral for those with eyes to see was - 
plain. The ambassador described the alternatives, if only by 
implication:
'...I feel it will be difficult to get the Porte to resist 
the French Government in any decided and positive manner . 
unless we will give her a clear and positive assurance 
that we will stand by her whatever the consequences which 
may attend resistance'. 3 , : -
■^'Bulwer - Russell, 23 Nov.,PRO.30/22 88 and Bulwer - Russell, 8 Dec. 
FO.78/1489. See Mange, p.134 ni.lQô, quotes Hallberg-Suez Canal 
p.170, Walewski-Thouvenel, 3 Nov. '59. Thouvenel*s coldness 
towards Bulwer resulted from his instruction to avoid as far as 
possible ’engaging himself in a struggle of influence with the 
Ambassador of Her Britannic Majesty'.
^‘Bulwer - Russell, 22 Nov.,No. 262, FO. 78/1489.
^‘Bulwer - Russell, ibid.
Under pressure from Thouvenel, supported by Austria, Russia, 
and tentatively by Prussia, the Turkish Cabinet was seriously 
divided during the first week in December. The Grand Vizier^
Kibrisli Pasha, was for keeping the matter in Turkish hands lest '
Turkey receive the law from Europe; Fuad for escaping from the 
scrape by leaving the business to Europe. Bulwer opposed the latter 
oourse since it would in effect have made the Emperor arbiter and 
diminished the importance of Turkish opinion. He considered that 
the upshot of the division in the Turkish cabinet would be a proposal 
to investigate the feasibility of the scheme.'1' •
Not having authority to insist upon the Porte's making a blunt 
rejection, and certainly no authority to offer Turkey British support 
in the event of such a rejection, Bulwer now held himself aloof.
In fact there was little he could do while his government pretended 
Suez was a secondary interest upon which he might only advise.
Russell,as Bulwer knew^did not contemplate assuming an open opposition, 
if only because this would have been an awkward policy to defend in 
Parliament. Equally certain it was that Russell would not yield 
with grace. Everything conspired to make Bulwer tread more 
delicately than he would have liked. ■ But it was a game he played well* 
To Russell he emphasised the proper role he had played in order not 
■j;o encourage an acrimonious spirit amongst the representatives; how 
tender he was to the Porte, leaving it to the ministers to come to 
him rather than embarrass them with advice* An occasional hint
■̂’Obviously the Porte would only adopt such a policy with Bulwer's 
encouragement. .
r e i n f o r c e d  h i s  e a r l i e r  a l l u s i o n s  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  a l l  m i g h t  h e  
w e l l ,  w e r e  o n e  g r e a t  P o w e r  t o  h i n d  i t s e l f  t o  t h e  O t t o m a n  E m p i r e . ]
R u s s e l l ' s  i n s t r u c t i o n  t o  t h e  a m b a s s a d o r  i l l u s t r a t e d  a  c e r t a i n  
i n h i h i t e d n e s s  i n  t h e  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r ' s  t h i n k i n g .  Why, he a s k e d ,  
d i d  n o t  T u r k e y  s t a t e  h e r  o b j e c t i o n s  b l u n t l y ?  B r i t a i n  c o u l d  n o t ,  he  
w r o t e ,  ' u n d e r t a k e  t o  make on b e h a l f  o f  h e r  s e c o n d a r y  i n t e r e s t  a
r e s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  s c h e m e  w h i c h  T u r k e y ,  on b e h a l f  o f  h e r  p r i m a r y
2
i n t e r e s t  s h o u l d  d e c l i n e ' .  B u l w e r  r a i s e d  t w o  b o g i e s ,  n a m e l y  t h e  
d a n g e r  f r o m  F r a n c e , a n d  t h e  t h r e a t  t o  B r i t i s h  p r e s t i g e  a n d  s e c u r i t y  
t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  E a s t .  I n  h i s  own min d  S u e z  was  l i k e  a  s h a r p  f r o n t a l  
a t t a c k  d e s i g n e d  t o  d i s t r a c t  a t t e n t i o n  a w ay  f r o m  t h e s e  m o r e  l e t h a l  
f l a n k  and r e a r g u a r d  a c t i o n s .  He c o m p l a i n e d :
'O u r  i n f l u e n c e  i n  t h e  E a s t  f o r  y e a r s  p a s t  h a s  b e e n  
c o n n e c t e d  m ore  o r  l e s s  w i t h  t h e  i s s u e  t o  b e  g i v e n  t o  
t h i s  S u e z  C a n a l  q u e s t i o n . . . C o n s e q u e n t l y , i f  we a r e  
o p p o s e d  t o  i t  now,  a n d  t h a t  t h i s  o p p o s i t i o n  t h o '  
e v i d e n t ,  i s  y e t  w e a k  -  i t  w i l l  b e  o v e r b o r n e  -  a n d  a  
g r e a t  b l o w  s t r u c k  a t  o u r  m o r a l  p o w e r  i n  a l l  t h e s e  
c o u n t r i e s . '  3
A d e t e r m i n e d  o p p o s i t i o n  o r  t i m e l y  c o n c e s s i o n s  made w i t h  s u c h  a  g r a c e
a s  t o  d i s g u i s e  t h e  a p p e a r a n c e  o f  d e f e a t  p r e s e n t e d  i t s e l f  a s  t h e  o n l y
2 ° B u l w e r  -  R u s s e l l ,  28 D e c . ,  n o .  3 1 2 ,  FO.  7 8 / 1 4 8 9 *
>jEven t h i s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m  was  a n  
‘i i  e x a S S e r a ‘t l ° n > f o r  i n  a  p r i v a t e  l e t t e r  t o  S i r  G-. L e w i s ,  R u s s e l l
re i n d i c a t e d  w i t h  some i n d i f f e r e n c e  a n d  much c o m p l a c e n c y  t h a t  h e  f e l t
t h a t  t h e  a t t i t u d e  he h a d  a d o p t e d  w o u l d  ac h ie ve  l i t t l e :  ' I  w i s h  
C l a r e n d o n  h a d  n o t  t a k e n  i t  up a s  an E n g l i s h  q u e s t i o n ,  b u t  i t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  a b a n d o n  t h e  g r o u n d  he h a s  t a k e n .  I t  i s  a  q u e s t i o n  f o r  
T u r k e y  m ore  t h a n  u s ,  a n d  i n v o l v e s  t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  E g y p t ,  b u t  we 
s h o u l d  k e e p  o u r  p a t h  o p e n  s o  l o n g  a s  we command i n  t h e  M e d i t e r r a n e a n . ' . 
PRO. 3 0 / 2 2  1 3 ,  1 9  D e c .  * ' 5 9 .
' " B u l w e r - R u s s e l l , 23  N o v .  ' 5 9 ,  FRO 3 0 / 2 2  8 8 .  He a d d e d :  ' I n d e e d ,  i f  
we f a i l  now,  I  am n o t  a l t o g e t h e r  w i t h o u t  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  t h e  I o n i a n  
i s l a n d s  w i l l  s o o n e r  o r  l a t e r  f u r n i s h  m a t t e r  f o r  a  new move o f  t h e  
s a m e  k i n d ' •
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s e n s i b l e  c h o i c e .  D i v i d e d  on o t h e r  i s s u e s ,  p e r c e p t i b l y  d r i f t i n g  
t o w a r d s  r a d i c a l l y  o p p o s i n g  p o s i t i o n s ,  F r a n c e  a n d  B r i t a i n  w e r e  n o t  
l i k e l y  t o  m a i n t a i n  f o r  l o n g  t h e  p r e t e n c e  o f  f r i e n d s h i p :
'A g r e a t e r  c a l a m i t y  I  c a n n o t  c o n c e i v e ,  a n d  I  m u s t  a d d  
t h a t  I  do n o t  t h i n k  t h a t  t h i s  q u e s t i o n ,  on w h i c h  p u b l i c  
o p i n i o n  i n  E u r o p e  w o u ld  b e  a g a i n s t  u s ,  i s  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
on w h i c h  t o  come t o  a n  i s s u e ' .  1
He was  a n x i o u s  l e s t  a  d e f e a t  ' i n  a n y  q u e s t i o n  o f  i n f l u e n c e '
h a v e  g r a v e  r e p e r c u s s i o n s  i n  P e r s i a  a n d  I n d i a  p r o v o k i n g  ' d a n g e r s  w h i c h
2
a r e  now s l u m b e r i n g  a n d  a p p a r e n t l y  u n c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  i t ' .  F u r t h e r ,  
C a t h o l i c  m a c h i n a t i o n s  i n  C r e t e  a n d  F r e n c h  d e s i g n s  i n  M o r o c c o ,  w e r e  
o f  e q u a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  w i t h  S u e z . ' '  Would i t  n o t  b e  w i s e  t o  l o o k  
t o  t h e  w h o l e  M e d i t e r r a n e a n ? ^
T h u s  a  p o s s i b l e  s t r u g g l e  w i t h  F r a n c e  f o r  a  p a r a m o u n t  p l a c e  i n  t h e  
M e d i t e r r a n e a n ,  a n d  a  p r o b a b l e  u n d e r m i n i n g  o f  E n g l i s h  p o w e r  i n  t h e  
c o u n t r i e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  C a u c a s u s  a n d  t h e  H i m a l a y a s ,  w e r e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  
B u l w e r  p l e a d e d ,  t h a t  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  n e g l e c t e d  b y  g i v i n g  u n d e  a t t e n t i o n  
t o  t h e  C a n a l .  T h i s  r e a s o n i n g  r e i n f o r c e d  B u l w e r ' s  d e s i r e  n o t  t o  t a k e
t o o  p o s i t i v e  a  l i n e  a t  C o n s t a n t i n o p l e .  Two c o n s e q u e n c e s  w e r e  t o
b e  a p p r e h e n d e d .  F i r s t ,  T h o u v e n e l ,  w i t h  whom, b y  t h e  m i d - D e c e m b e r ,  
B u l w e r  w a s  a g a i n  on f r i e n d l y  t e r m s ,  m i g h t  n a t u r a l l y  t a k e  a n
o p p o s i t e  l i n e  } a n d  t h e  d i v i s i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  two  c o u n t r i e s  m o s t  i n t e r e s t e d






B u l w e r  -  R u s s e l l ,  7 D e c . ,  i b i d .
B u l w e r  -  R u s s e l l ,  29 D e c . ,  F C .  7 8 / 1 4 3 9 *
B u l w e r - R u s s e l l ,  1 2  J a n .  a n d  8 F e b . , PRO 3 0 / 2 2  8 8 .
B u l w e r  -  R u s s e l l ,  4 J a n . ' 6 0 , i b i d :  ' W h i t  d o  y o u  t h i n k  o f  my p l a n  o f  
h a v i n g  a  c e r t a i n  n u m b e r  o f  u n a r m e d  s h i p s  a t  M a l t a ,  a n d  h a v i n g . . . a  
p o r t i o n  o f  o u r  g a r r i s o n s  t r a i n e d  f o r  n a v a l  s e r v i c e ? '
S e e  a b o v e  , p  . ‘2.4-6. I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o o  t h a t  B u l w e r ' s  own m o d e r a t i o n  
h a d  p a i d  d i v i d e n d s .  C e r t a i n l y  v e r y  e a r l y  i n  h i s  e m b a s s y  B u l w e r  h a d  
s i m i l a r l y  i m p r e s s e d  d e  L e s s e p s .  c f .  M a n g e ,  p . l 3 0 : ' A t  t h e  T u r k i s h  
c a p i t a l  h e  ( d e  L e s s e p s ) f o u n d  S i r  H e n r y  B u l w e r ,  a  p e r s o n a l  f r i e n d , i n ,
p l a c e  o f  t h e  a g g r a v a t i n g  L o r d  S t r a t f o r d . D e  L e s s e p s  b e l i e v e d  t h e  new 
a m b a s s a d o r  was  a n x i o u s  t o  p u t  a n  end t o  theaAto^oAtitvc, f**l»*<j
Bulwer with the time he needed so he should not he antagonised 
needlessly and inadvertently. Secondly, Bulwer had to persuade the 
Porte to adopt a policy approximating as nearly as possible the 
one Russell might eventually he brought to accept. An hasty , 
opinion on his part, might bring the Porte to ask for less than it 
might reasonably expect. Granted the Porte trembled before the 
migbtt of France,which could create difficulties in other areas, 
even so it might expect the French government to appreciate that the 
canal was a subject which concerned most nearly the two maritime 
powers. Of one thing Bulwer could be sure; the unfortunate Porte 
needed to preserve English friendship.
The internal stresses within the Turkish cabinet facilitated 
Eulwer's task, enabling him to show Russell that so adverse were 
the circumstances,it would be risking everything to urge an 
unyielding policy. The real choices of the Porte were limited to 
two. Thouvenel himself conceded that little could be accomplished 
without an Anglo-French agreement; hence a settlement by a 
congress, though such a possibility was useful for inducing a more 
compliant attitude on the English side, was not long seriously 
considered. So the choice remained between the Porte’s letting the 
Powers deal with the Suez Canal - leaving it to their mutual 
jealousy to protect the Porte's interests - and making France 
understand that previous to the Sultan's granting a Firman there 
must be an entente between the two maritime powers. .Bulwer informed 
his chief of Turkish equivocation. He hinted at a line of policy 
which accommodated this uncertainly. Perhaps^he offered, a reasonable
basis for a settlement might be found in a preliminary examination 
of the Suez project, and in an agreement amongst the maritime 
Powers as to-the security of the canal.^ Russell’s refusal to 
support Turkey in resisting the scheme, and his failure to suggest 
an alternative policy, obliged Bulwer to accept a plan of this sort. 
His hand was forced. He observed a tendency on the part of the 
Turkish ministers to favour granting the Firman immediately, and 
thereby obtain the good favour of France in imposing such conditions 
as would keep the Viceroy in dependence upon the Sultan; a course 
that would conciliate France, Russia and Austria. He thought it 
better»
*...no longer to resist what I saw it was the determination 
to adopt viz»- An appeal of some kind, somewhere or other;
but to endeavour to restrict that appeal within certain limits' • 2
He agreed with Fuad on a mode of procedure. The aotual scheme 
should be divested of its most obnoxious clauses and be examined 
with a view to discovering the advantages and the expenses of such 
a canal. It should contain nothing contrary to the Laws of the 
Empire. Bulwer emphasised that a special guarantee of the neutrality 
of the Canal to which England should be a party, would be the sine 
qua non of the undertaking.^ These conditions were inseparable 
and further, Britain and France would have to be in agreement on them 
¡before the Porte would enter into more detail.^ The alternative,
^‘Bulwer - Russell, 7 Pec., PRO. 30/22 88.
,*Bulwer - Russell, 28 Dec., no. 312, F0.78/1489«
^’Fuad's identic despatches to Musurus and Djemil Pashas,in London 
and Paris,reproduced these points.
^*This last point expanded A'ali’s promise to Alison in March 1858, 
so possibly Bulwer’s first ideas were gleaned in deliberations 
with the Turkish ministers.
b.e reminded the Foreign Secretary, was a close understanding between 
England and Turkey with the object of encouraging the Porte to 
reject outright the French demands.
' Bulwer apologised for raising the subject in such a way. At 
least, he wheedled, the scheme would be shown as a piece of 
charlatanism. He advised Russell to simulate dissatisfaction as 
he himself was doing, in this way the Porte might be made to 
'toe the line'.
Thus,Bulwer had encouraged small concessions only, but, he 
anticipated, sufficient to prevent the slicing of the Gordian knot.
Hot only aid Russell negative Bulwer's plan and the drastic 
alternative, he proposed nothing else.^ He objected to the idea 
that Turkey might consent provided she obtained certain guarantees, 
believing rightly, in view of recent events, that the Porte could
not successfully keep up a struggle at Alexandria, Constantinople, 
and Paris, should any clause in the concession be ignored or 
contravened. Russell did not like the policy recently elucidated. 
Were it to become effective the Sultan must know that*
'...he must not count upon the support of Great Britain 
to avert dangers which by his own acts he will have 
drawn upon himself*. 2
Russell, informed Musurus that the Porte was the best judge
qf the particular points to do with the Laws of the Empire} and
that, should the construction of Suez be compatible with the safety
of the Empire, Britain would not stand in the way, nor would her
"^It was not an alternative in fact for no party thought of resorting 
2 to military measures to obtain its ends.
‘Russell - Bulwer, 24 Dec., no. 254, FO. 78/1489. -
interests suffer.1 Further, though not encouraging Bulwer to act 
upon his views, Russell felt obliged to yield something to his 
arguments, doing so with the appearance of disagreeing. If the 
land clauses were withdrawn the Sultan might form an expert 
commission to examine the scheme; as it was, it violated the laws 
of the Empire; and, lastly:
'That were the plan divested of these provisions, it 
still would not be such that H.M.'s Govt, could give 
any guarantee of the nature suggested by the Porte'. 2
The plan Bulwer advocated was intended primarily to refeise the 
Porte from an intolerable pressure which it could no longer sustain. 
It was a manoeuvre to gain time. Bulwer's anxiety to see it
accepted by Russell indicates too a belief that it provided the 
basis of a settlement. Yet the guarantees necessary for its 
success the English government refused to give, as Bulwer knew it 
must. Bulwer possibly realised that a de facto reversal of the 
procedure he described might happen in spite of his or Russell's 
wishes. A commission might first report and declare that its 
fillings could only be implemented when the guarantees were given.
The evidence is lacking which would give us an insight into Bulwer’s 
thoughts. At a superficial glance.it seems, however, that Bulwer’s 
strong arguments in favour of the new proposals reflected more than 
a desire to gain time for the Porte. Perhaps he wished to take 
advantage of the situation to bring about a major change in British 
policy.
*T
^‘The Turkish Note was dated 4 January. Communicated to FO. 17 Jan.
‘Russell - Bulwer 21 Jan., FO. 78/1556«
‘L-Sf-
Bulwer was obliged to do nothing and to wait on events.
In May Fuad complained to the French government that the works were 
being continued despite the Porte's wishes. The following June 
the Company made further progress. The Viceroy pledged himself 
to the Company for 87 million francs. Colquhoun reported with 
some naivete:
'...I am unwilling to believe this, for it will place the 
Viceroy in the light of one who has deliberately deceived 
those he ought to consider his best friends'. 1
But it was a fact. De Lesseps promised to make no call on
the Viceroy for two years to enable him to pay off his floating 
2debt. Said had thus officially confirmed that he had given the
Company the wherewithal to declare itself constituted in French 
3Law. The Viceroy conceded that he did not 'know whether
commercially speaking the scheme be a good one or not,' but he
was sure that his name would be immortalised if the canal were
accomplished under his auspices, in his time.^
If the Porte could be badgered on the question of the prompt
payment of loans, and consequently have to pay more attention to
the demands of the Powers, so much worse was the position of the
Egyptian government which participated in a French Company.
2* Colquhoun <® Russell, 2 June '60, ibid.
*The relations between the Company and the Viceroy were shortly to 
be defined (August '60) in an agreement bearing on the first 100 
francs per share. By consenting to pay his liabilities to the 
Company - for the most part unpaid on his death - by means of ,
_ Treasury bonds, Said imposed ,the burden oh his successors.
^*In 1858 Said had accepted 64,000 shares in the new company, and had' 
been -willing to take up to 96,000 shares, the total allotted to the 
Ottoman Empire, but the 178,000 (44$ of the capital) which Lesseps 
put on his account were not altogether welcome. The official pledge 
. now made that decision irrevocable. -
*Colquhoun - Russell, 3 June '60 F0. 78/1556.
Bulwer hardly exaggerated when he telegraphed Russell that the 
Viceroy had pledged himself in favour of the Canal 'placing Egypt 
in the hands of France'. Bulwer claimed;
'The Porte thinks of calling him to order, and invoking 
the late agreement (presumably a reference to Fuad's 
note of Jan.4)s tut nothing short of his deposition would 
succeed} and as this would be a serious act, the support 
of Her Majesty's Government would be required, if it were 
decided upon'* 1
By the last phrase Bulwer meant that fcis government’s support
would be necessary if it allowed him to press for the Viceroy's
deposition. The response to this overture was negative. The
2status quo must be preserved at all.costso After pressing that 
a person with authority should be sent to Egypt Russell urged that 
the Sultan should warn the Viceroy that he had not the power to 
appropriate the revenues of the state to the Canal. Russell failed 
to appreciate that so long as the Viceroy paid the tribute he could 
do just that. Even so, he was sufficiently impressed by the new 
development to forget for the moment his attitude to the three 
guarantees which Fuad has asked for, to write to Bulwert
'The Sultan should declare that if a Canal to Suez is 
to be made, he will undertake it himself after enquiry 
by Engineers, naval men and merchants;...' 3«
Bulwer had, at last, persuaded Russell that the situation was 
»critical. Here was a significant turning point.
Preoccupied elsewhere, the English government had been fortunate
in not meeting with embarrassments that would have resulted from a
^‘Bulwer - Russell, 15 June, »60,FO. 78/1556. -
^‘Russell - Bulwer, 18 June, F0 78/1497«
^‘Russell - Bulwer, 19 July, no. 342, F0. 78/1556.
forward policy on the part of the French government, equally busy 
in other areas* Bulwer had now to contend witly Viceroy*s openly 
expressed determination to accomplish the project. During May verbal 
orders had bean given for 10,000 fellaheen to be sent to work on 
the canal. Later it was rightly suspected that a further 40 - 50 
thousand had been promised.
In Egypt the company was faced by serious obstacles in the 
way of the construction of the harbours at each end of the route.
Its striking success was its purchase in November from the Viceroy 
of the Ouadi Toumilat estate through which the Pelusium branch 
of the fresh-water canal would pass. This was some 24,000 acres 
over and above that granted on each side of the oanal in the 
original deeds of the Concession.
Colquhoun's chief anxiety was the plan of the Messageries 
Imperiales to construct the dock just outside Suez, at a point 
commanding the entrance to the channel. As the good offices of 
the French Consul-General were vital to the Egyptian Government 
in evading the demand of Laffitte, a French banker, for the whole 
of a loan of 28 million francs, it was felt that aivantage was being 
taken of this circumstances by the French government to press for 
the docks concession. lhat was of more importance was the 
possibility of the docks being built on land actually allotted to 
the Company. Questions of privileged title and exclusive 
occupation might arise. A special secret clause, allowing the French 
government to take over the docks in the event of hostilities, was 
thought to be in the contract. In addition it was known that
Based on map enclosed in Colouhoun-Russell,no.52>17 June 1861, 
PO.78/1715.
the Comptoir d'Escompte, almost certainly with official support, 
had advocated the supervision of the Egyptian budget and treasury.1
These factors tended to give the Canal a significance such 
as obscured what was of real importance, namely the paramount 
influence of France.
. As soon as the Syran affair was concluded Palmerston was 
looking to a completer harmony between France and Britain. In a 
letter to Russell he expressed a suspicion of the projects encouraged 
by French capitalists, but hoped»
'...that the Impaial Government harbours no such designs 
on Egypt as these transactions are by many supposed to 
indicate*. 2
However, as soon as Thouvenel suggested a European Commission
to examine the practicability of the scheme, Palmerston reverted to
3his former negative attitude. He explained:
'The proposal...sounds fair and plausible, but would be a 
dangerous measure.
It requires only a glance at the map of the world to 
see how great would be the naval and military advantages 
to France in a war with England to have such a short ' 
cut to the Indian seas when we should be obliged to send 
ships and troops round the Cape. Thouvenel proposes, 
indeed, that the passage of ships of war should be forbidden 
as at the Dardanelles, but I presume he only expects us 
to receive such a proposal except (sic) with a decently 
suppressed smile*. 4
1.
2.Landes, p. 109, n.2
4.
Palmerston - Russell, 23 Nov. '61, PRO. 30/22 21 
^*This was the beginning of the inversion of that procedure which 
Fuad had proposed.
Palmerston - Russell, 8 Dec. ibid. All this was contrary to his 
reasoning in the Memo of April '60. His only positive suggestion, 
was that Britain and France should cease to interfere on political 
grounds, and leave the question to be settled by the experience 
of the money marketl
Not so afflicted with Franco-phobia,Russell simply enjoined
Cowley to keep silent for the moment. Refusal would look had
while acceptance would send up the shares. Colquhoun had suggested
that the bubble would soon burst, and Russell was hoping that such
an event might save him from further embarrassments. This was
certainly a possibility. By the end of 1862 300 francs were
called up per share, tripling the Viceroy’s immediate liabilities
to the Company, from over 15 to nearly 46 million francs.
Bulwer tried to discover means whereby the Viceroy might be
released from his dependence on French monied interests.^- The
only political remedy he had to suggest was the usual one, the one
which entailed giving the Porte full diplomatic support and an
2acceptance of the consequences of this. It was Eulwer's.way, 
one suspects, of underlining the impossibility of accomplishing 
anything while the French and English Cabinets were at odds on 
this issue as over others. He went on to point out that it was 
likely that the Sultan and his court had been bribed in the previous 
December during the Viceroy's visit.^ Thus, it .yras doubly 
imperative that the Viceroy be not embarrassed to such a degree that 
he would yield any further to the French. He persuaded A ’ali
^*It was learned in May 1862 that the dock concession had finally 
been given to the Messageries Imperiales. Beauval, the French 
consul in Alexandria persuaded the Viceroy to grant the French 
group of Pastre, Valensin, and Dervieu, the privilege of remitting 
the tribute to England when the present concession should lapse.
_ A form of tender had been adopted till then.
‘Bulwer - Russell, 21 Jan. '62,F0. 78/1648. ~
^‘Bulwer - Russell, ibid.
Pasha to assent to the loan which Said wished to obtain through
Oppenheim.'* ' The idea in Bulwer's mind was that the Porte's
2consent to the loan might be made conditional. Advantage could
be taken of the financial situation in Egypt to enforce the Porte's
suzerainty, to the benefit of British long-term interests, by the
establishment of a Financial Council in which the heirs to the
3Pashalik should be represented. Its purpose would be to control 
expenditure, limiting it in the future to the Viceroy's net income. 
Inevitably nothing came of the scheme, in spite of Foreign Office 
support.
In November 1862 Bulwer, with Russell's approval visited 
Egypt. He had no specific instructions, for the trip was a short 
holiday, Bulwer not having had the time to take his delayed leave 
of absence.
He went representing the policy of subjecting Egypt to the 
Porte's authority - that is, in as much as he was the agent of a 
Government which desired this. What Bulwer would do as we shall
2*Rather than through the French interest, Dervieu.
*This was nothing more than 4 quick adjustment to a change in 
atmosphere. The Turkish cabinet were inolined more than ever to 
give in during these early months. Its depression coincided with 
Said's anxiety to obtain money. There was a pressing need to 
strengthen the will of the Porte. The imposition of Turkish 
authority in Egypt was the bait which Bulwer used. If suoeessful 
the ambassador would have found himself in a stronger position at 
Constantinople. But it was only a passing phase. Bulwer's basic 
notions had not changed, i.e. though he was still orthodox on the 
Canal, his preoccupation was with his actual and potential 
diplomatic isolation because of the policy of simple* obstruction. 
Hence the manoeuvre over the loan in spite of Russell's hostility, 
to any loan. Russell - Bulwer, 19 Jan '62^F0. 7^/1728.
**Loc. Cit.
see would be to impress on his own government that its policy was 
stultified by its lack of influence and inability to bargain: 
that it was inadequate for dealing with a situation where Bulwer, 
could neither protect the Viceroy from foreign dictation, except 
by exerting political pressure, nor prevent the country from becoming 
a French oasis, save by instigating a commercial struggle.
Full of paternal good-will, official maxims, and the saving 
grace of being able to interpret these in such a way that it seemed 
he was doing the Viceroy a favour, Bulwer had nothing with which to 
tempt the Pasha. He would be blunt with him, but the Viceroy would 
retire behind a smoke-screen of confessions of weakness leaving 
Bulwer greatly disturbed for the future of the country under such a 
ruler.
The Pasha’s opening gambit was for Bulwer’s benefit:
’As for me, I'm done for. I shall not get over this 
sickness, and even if I do I’ve seen enough of affairs.
Nobody has understood me. Moreover I have made serious 
mistakes. I am conscience stricken for the way in which 
I have misdirected the Treasury funds*. 1
The Viceroy expanded on the evil-eyed rumours of his friendship 
for the French, his relations with the Porte, and his ability to 
defend the country with 80,000 men and the Nile barrage, from any 
foreigner who threatened his independence.
Bulwer assured the Viceroy that British policy was for things 
to remain as they were regarding Egypt’s connection with the Sultan. 
Professing satisfaction at hearing the prince speak so resolurtely 
he explained that his government:
Bulwer - Russell, 15 Dei.’62,F0. 78/17151.
'...cou}.d never permit any other foreign power either 
forcibly to possess itself of Egypt or indirectly to 
acquire a greatly preponderating influence over it*. 1
He emphasised the danger of colonisation. He held that the
canal was impracticable, and used up resources to the detriment of
2the country's agriculture. It opened up Egypt to any strong
maritime power, which knowledge would add to European tension.
In fine the best thing to do was to drop the whole project.
There were no illusions as to the tangible result of this
tete-a-tete, a mere promise that the Viceroy would do nothing yet
about the loan being urged on him. Bulwer felt that this, without ,
the Ponte's sanotion, was an attempt to create a precedent for
3future transactions of the same kind. The Viceroy also promised
not to take any step which might complicate the Suez business still
more by another financial agreement with Lesseps? and that.was all.^
Bulwer only half-realised how tricky and untrustworthy was Said.
After a tour of the Canal works the ambassador tried to place
5the question on an entirely new basis. He was so impressed by 
what he saw that he had to conclude that a drastic revision of 
British policy was urgently required, lest his government lost all
2*Ibid.
‘Mange, p.136, note.199. I& 1863» a good year for cotton, Ismail 
would find it particularly galling. The effective abolition of 
_ forced labour was a question of time after this.
'‘Bulwer - Russell, 12 Dec. *62,FO. 78/1652.
^‘Eulwer - Russell, 15 Bee.,FO. 78/1715«
■'‘Bulwer, even before his tour of the works, was pondering over other 
possible policies. Bulwer-Russell, 16 Nov. '62, PRO.'30/22 91*
'My opinion in short is, that we should be quite wrong in slumbering 
quietly on the fact that the project we look at is impracticable.
The thing to feel sure about is, whether the plan which the French 
look to is impossible'.
means of influencing the eventual settlement. No doubt existed in
Bulwer’s mind as to the feasibility of the Canal.1 He stressed
the point that it was possible and would be accomplished. Although
Bulwer had no knowledge of the Company’s negotiations during the
previous months for new heavy machinery, finally to supersede
force lab.our, he was nevertheless unprejudiced enough to accept the
2fact that the Canal was going to be built. Whatever financial
straits the Company got into Bulwer refused to agree that money
difficulties would halt the project. He examined its advantages
compared with those offered by the railway, shortly to be improved,
and reached the conclusion that*
’...the Canal will very probably not greatly, if at all, 
benefit commerce? but if it does, we shall receive as 
much as any nation, except Greece,the benefit of it.
If I see then no great advantage to us from the Canal,
I see no loss, neither do X think it will in itself 
cripple our maritime power’• 3
But this was to examine the whole affair out of its context.
Given viceroyal pusillanamity and duplicity, the financial power
of European capitalists, and a system of consular influence
synonymous almost with corruption, the whole thing took on a new
aspect.^ In the long run too, the increasing abuse of the
capitulatory regime would aggravate these problems. It was easy
for the French to take advantage of a situation which theForeign
p'Bell - Life of Lord Palmerston.completely misinterprets this phase. 
‘Bulwer - Bussell, 3 Jan. '63, FO. 78/1795* Bulwer - Russell,
16 Nov. ’62, PRC. JO/22 91» where Bulwer comments on de Lesseps 
with some enthusiasm* ’Whilst being a charlatan, he is a great 
, charlatan'•
;‘Bulwer - Russell, 3 Jan.,PRO. 30/22 91.
^‘Bulwer - Russell, 10 Nov. ’62,PRO. 30/22 91*
Office deplored and sought to reform. An English consul could not
have adopted the means at hand. It was the long-term consequences
of this situation rather than the Canal that worried Bulwers
'Port Said, Timsah and Suez will be French towns - the 
new lands called into cultivation will become.•.French 
territory, and governed actually by French authority'...1
The first change should be in the Canal scheme for, amongst other
things, it might create a position for France, 'such that she may
find it impossible to recede from a ground which, on the other
hand, it will involve her in great difficulties to maintain'. Mere
obstruction now was not enough; a more imaginative policy was
called for, which involved to.an extent, taking France into one's
confidence so that the dangers inherent in the Canal scheme might
be dealt with the more easily. Bulwer did not think the Canal
in itself to be dangerous to British interests or maritime power,
rather the manner in which it was to be constructed and the terms of
the concession. The solution was, briefly, to purchase the French 
2Company out. The Canal should be carried on by the Egyptian
Government according to its convenience; the Canal and Egypt to be'
placed under a special guarantee. The accession of a new ruler in .
3January 1863 provided an opportune moment for a change of direction. 
The new Viceroy had not had time to take up a positive line, and was,
, g'Bulwer - Russell, 3 Jan., FO. 78/1795*
‘Russell's reply was that it would be an excellent proposal if the 
Canal were likely to finish. But should the Canal fail there 
would be no point in wasting £2 million in the purchase of the 
Company's rights. Bulwer's suggestion was not so ridiculous for 
it has to be remembered that in a little while Ismail would be 
_ anxious to buy up the ordinary Suez shares. See below, p.W^x.X • 
■'‘Said died 18 January 1863.
A s w i f t  E n g l i s hi n  f a c t ,  e m b a r r a s s e d  b y  a l l  t h e s e  c o m p l i c a t i o n s ,  
i n i t i a t i v e  l e a d i n g  t o  a  s e t t l e m e n t  c o n d u c i v e  t o  b e t t e r  r e l a t i o n s  
b e t w e e n  h im  and t h e  P o r t e ,  a n d  t o  a  l e s s e n i n g  o f  p r e s s u r e  f r o m  E n g l a n d  
a n d  F r a n c e ,  w h i l e  s t i l l  p e r m i t t i n g  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  C a n a l  
m i g h t  end  t h e  c o n s t a n t  e m b a r r a s s m e n t  w h ic h  t h i s  p r o b l e m  c a u s e d  t h e  
L i b e r a l  m i n i s t r y .  F o r  B u l w e r ,  R u s s e l l ' s  r e p l i e s  w e r e  c o n s i s t e n t l y  
u n h e l p f u l :
' I f  t h e  S u l t a n  m a k e s  a n y  p r o p o s a l  on t h e  s u b j e c t ,  y o u  w i l l  
r e f e r  i t  t o  H . M . ' s  G o v t ,  a n d  w a i t  t h e i r  a n s w e r ' .  2
a n d :
' . . j r o u  w i l l  b e  c a r e f u l  i n  no way t o  c om m it  H e r  M a j e s t y ' s  
G o v e r n m e n t  t o  a n y  c o u r s e  o f  p o l i c y  r e s p e c t i n g  i t  w h i c h  
s h a l l  n o t  h a v e  p r e v i o u s l y  r e c e i v e d  t h e i r  e x p r e s s  s a n c t i o n ' .  3 .
T h e  m o s t  d e f i n i t i v e  w a s  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n :
' T h e  B r i t i s h  G o v e r n m e n t  c a n  i n  n o  c a s e  g u a r a n t e e ,  p r o m o t e  
o r  f a v o u r  t h e  S u e z  C a n a l ,  w h i c h  t h e y  w o u ld  w i s h  t o  s e e  
a b a n d o n e d ' .  4
P a l m e r s t o n  com m en ted  on t h i s  a p p r o v i n g l y :
' I  s e e  y o u  a r e  s e n d i n g  a  g o o d  a n s w e r  t o  B u l w e r  a b o u t  S u e z  
C a n a l .  H i s  p r o p o s a l  o f  a  G u a r a n t e e  o f  t h e  C a n a l  t e n d s  
t o w a r d s  i t s  c o m p l e t i o n  w h i l e  on t h e  c o n t r a r y  o u r  i n t e r e s t  
t e n d s  t o  t h e  g i v i n g  up o r  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  s c h e m e ' .  5
Q u i t e  u nm o vd ^ by  B u l w e r ' s  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  h e  went  on t o
s a y  t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  f o r c e d  l a b o u r  w o u l d  r u i n  t h e
Company>
^ ‘ D u r i n g  h i s  v i s i t  t o  C o n s t a n t i n o p l e  i n  F e b r u a r y - M a r c h  I s m a i l  was  
Q c l e a r l y  a s s e s s i n g  t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  p a r t i e s , s e e  b e l o w  
" ‘ R u s s e l l  -  B u l w e r ,  2 6  J a n . ,  FO.  7 8 / 1 7 9 5 .
^ ‘ R u s s e l l  -  B u lT fe r ,  3 0  J a n . ,  i b i d .
^ ‘ R u s s e l l  -  B u l w e r ,  1 F e b . ,  i b i d .
g P a l m e r s t o n  -  R u s s e l l ,  1 F e b .  ' 6 3 ,  PRO.  3 0 / 2 2  1 4 .
‘ P a l m e r s t o n  -  R u s s e l l ,  1 F e b .  i b i d .  I s m a i l ' s  f i r s t  a c t  a s  r u l e r  w a s  
t o  a b o l i s h  t h e  c o r v e e .  H o w e v e r  f o r c e d  l a b o u r  on t h e  w o r k s  d i d  n o t  
c e a s e  t i l l  1 J u n e  ' 6 4 *
Russell wrote in this vein to Bulwer in spite of the latter's 
insistence.that financial difficulties would not halt the progress 
of the Company.
In Egypt, Bulwer did what he could to improve matters, applying
himself to the problem of the weakness of English influence in
that country. Ha tried to remedy this by the only means left
to him, by supporting the power of the Viceroy as a means of
insinuating Colquhoun into the Pasha's favour. He encouraged
Said to make a stand against consular pretensions and to lean on
British support to defeat the intrigues of the consuls. It was
unfortunate, Bulwer felt, that he had to rely on the too courteous
Colquhoun. He was not the person for the task Bulwer had in mind."*"
As there was little the consul could do to alter the situation
radically, Bulwer considered that he ought at least to be more
' 2.self-assertive and command more respect. Colquhoun, frittered
away a certain reserve of influence which was always contained in
the very name of the English agent, by complaining to the Pasha
about everything. As Bulwer saw it, there were certain fundamental
problems, such as forced labour, the.Suez Canal and viceroyal
relations with the Porte, upon which a British representative
might have to take a stand. It was important that at the critical
junctures when these problems should confront him, tlterf the ruler
^‘Bulwer - Russell, 19 Feb. '63, FO. 78/1733* 'Mr Colquhoun has, I 
think, suffered himself to be too much effaced, and though great 
courtesy makes you loved in the East, one must also at times show 
the spirit which inspires fear*.
‘Bulwer - Russell, 26 Feb., PRO. 30/22 $2t 'I fear Colquhoun is 
getting too old lady-like for the post Egypt will'now become*.
should he favourably disposed to listen to him, because of the 
agent's moderation on other occasions. Bulwer thought the English 
consul's task was to reinforce viceroyal authority when foreign -
influences were jeopardising it.'*' This could only be brought 
about by the agent's supporting the Viceroy as far as possible in 
all matters of internal administration. Bulwer especially 
complained to Russell of the consul-general's common-sensible 
arguments in favour of the use of forced labour in a country where
2the use of wage-labour inevitably would entail foreign exploitation.
During these months Bulwer applied himself to the task of making
British objections more specific and capable of forming the basis
of a practical policy. In particular he tried to persuade Russell
of the rightness of such a policy. He asked for the endorsement
of this policy which was:
'First, to get out of the present Canal scheme.
Second, if possible to get the scheme of a Canal set 
aside either formally or practically altogether.
Third, to arrive at these ends without putting the 
Porte in such a situation as it has not the force to 
sustain*. 3
Bulwer thus described British objections in such a way that Russell
could hardly sanction them for, by implication, the statement
contained a positive procedure. The latter seemed to have suspected
this for his response was not a simple approval: .
'Your views are correct, but I must request you not to 
take any step as to Suez Canal without referring the 
question home’. 4
^‘Bulwer-Russell, 13 Feb. ’63, FO. 78/1795 and Bulwer-Russell, 19 Feb.
PRO.30/22 92, and Bulwer-Colquhoun, 27Feb.,F0. 78/1753.
‘l ‘Bulwer - Russell, 2 6 Feb.,PRO. 30/22 92.
^‘Bulwer - Russell, 4 Feb., FO. 78/1795.
^‘Russell - Bulwer, ibid. "
I
The ruthles.s logic with which he had defended his scheme for 
dealing with the Company, rather than the Canal, was, evidently, 
not enough to undermine the official policy.'*' He had explained:
.’There are three courses then for the Viceroy to adopt:
First, to stand on the legality and risk all the 
consequences. Second, to repay the Company and undertake 
the work. Third, to let things take their course and 
trust to the Company's becoming bankrupt and stopping 
in the natural course of things’. 2
He added, to emphasise his point, that he feared the debt of the
Pasha'was a government debt, in which case the first possibility
might be put on one side. But if it were adopted,then British
support's toute outrance' was needed. As to the third suggestion,
’it would be in my opinion a very hazardous one: too much of the
1*He also exposed the weaknesses in Russell's nebulous ideas. He 
enquired whether Russell's aim was to'leave the task to the highest 
bidder without there being anything profitable in a newly.devised 
contract. Buiwer-Russell, 4 Feb., FO. 78/1795* He was not even sure 
what Russell meant when he said that 'the Sultan should come to a 
compromise about Said's shares'. Bulwer went on: 'This - if it
alludes to the Sultan's buying the said shares -besides being 
ruinous to Turkish finances would enable the company to continue 
its labours. It also says, 'Suez Canal should be left to private 
speculation'. But in this case would not the French Company have, 
thé first right to be the speculators...and little perhaps would 
be gained by the overturning of one foreign company in favour of , 
another asfhf as Egyptian independence is concerned unless a 
Company started altogether on a different basis'. The occasion 
of the recent accession of Ismail proved to be the only real 
opportunity Bulwer could have used to settle the Suez question 
with Egyptian support and without loss of face for Britain. Though 
Bulwer underestimated French determination to see the French 
company succeed, the Company's funds were particularly slight at 
this stage. In any case, support for the Viceroy would at least 
have prevented the Company obtaining further advantages from the 
Egyptian government. Russell's and Palmerston's reactions.to 
this we have already observed (see above, p.iéS'.) After a whole 
month had elapsed (Russell-Bulwer, 13 March, FO. 78/1795) Russell 
would approve of concession but the Viceroy would'then have no 
.confidence in English support.
^’Bulwer - Russell, 4 Feb., FO. 78/1795*
Thus, Bulwer was prevented from taking a d e f in i t iv e  step.
work has been done and can he done with the money at the Company’s 
command to render failure likely’.1 At all events, he concluded, 
'there is an urgent necessity, if Egypt is to he saved, that the<
French Company and the rights of the Company should he set aside*.
To Ismail, on a visit to Constantinople, Bulwer stated the
official objections to the canal project.^ The concrete proposal
he put’to him was that he and the Porte should take their share of
responsibility in getting rid of those conditions in the contract
which were pernicious to Egyptian independence. Ismail was subdued
on the topic.^ On the previous occasion Bulwer had met him he had
been the,avowed opponent of the scheme. Colquhoun's weakness did
not account for everything, so Bulwer assumed that the Porte was
hesitating again. He had a conversation with A'ali and the Viceroy
together. It became apparent that they were loathe to antagonise v
5the Emperor. Bulwer considered he had exorcised this fear, having 
persuaded them that if no party suffered pecuniary loss then none 
was hurt, and the Emperor had no cause to be irritated. The Viceroy 
agreed to answer questions which the Porte would ask in an official
hwd,
**Ibid.
^’Naturally he made a point of adhering to the official line where 
the Viceroy was’ concerned. At the Porte and in his correspondence 
. with London he inclined to search for alternative solutions, 
i*Bulwer had been much deceived in his first impressions of Ismail, 
believing that this solid landlord type thought as he did about the 
_ Canal. The Pasha was in fact feeling his way.
^'More significantly, ever sensitive of the Sultan's rights, the 
Egyptian ruler found it irksome to co-operate with his .suzerain. 
This was the greatest"difficulty Bulwer had to contend with. Till 
the end of his embassy he would never quite succeed in producing 
harmony between the two parties.
2
note. The Porte was to base on th e  answers a declarat ion  to
England and France. Nevertheless, before departing, Ismail 
confided to Bulwer that the Porte would not give him power, nor 
take on itself the responsibility that should go with power.
He pleaded for better support from Colquhoun, and insisted that the 
Porte's instructions should not be delayed long, for the Company 
was pressing for labour to finish off the fresh-water Canal to 
Suez. Ismail could not make excuses for longer than the next 
three weeks. As the Viceroy seemed unconvinced that England would
firmly support him, or that the Porte would send clear instructions 
Bulwer sent him word*
'...That the character of the Porte's instructions as to 
clearness eto. must depend very much on the Document from 
him which it would have before them and that therefore 
he must bear this in mind with respect to what he now 
stated'• 1
Bulwer was experiencing the same uneasiness he had felt when 
he had chatted last to Said. There was nothing firm here. One 
thing only could prevent the success of the Canal, and this was 
a direct intimation by Russell to the French government that 
England refused to permit the construction of the Canal. To have ' 
expected any Pasha,even supported by the Porte, to have done more 
than he was prepared to do was unreasonable. Bulwer’s insistence 
’that the only alternative to negotiation was a willingness to support i 
Turkey a l'outrance in a policy to halt French schemes, had at |
least the merit of being logical. . In the light of Eulw^r's comments j 
Bulrer - Russell, 3 March '63, FO. 78/1795* !
Russell's hopes that something might happen to cause the Company 
to ■wind. up. its affairs were not justified even had the Company 
havfe "been dependent on forced labour for its s u c c e s s A s  Bulwer 
constantly repeated, the French government would not allow the 
scheme to fail just because of a lack of funds.
2Russell, yielding to the arguments in Mr. Hawkshawe's* 
Memorandum, quickly approved of the tentative negotiations between
3the Porte and Egypt which Bulwer was directing. This relaxation
on Russell's part was too late for on the Pasha's return to Egypt
French pressure for a definitive arrangement, in a sense contrary
to Bulwer's ideas, became irresistible. Ismail came to a
financial agreement with Lesseps, confirming that of August I860
regarding the first 100 francs per share. The remaining 2/5ths. ' 
(35 million francs = £1,500,000) were to be paid from Jan. 1864
in monthly instalments, - i.e. £720,000 yearly. There was also a 
new agreement with the Company whereby the Egyptian Government was 
to construct, under Company supervision, a Canal from Cairo to the 
Ouadi•^
The Porte made its move, consenting to the Canal provided its 
neutrality were guaranteed. Forced labour and the alienation of 
Egyptian territory were to be forbidden. Meanwhile no forced 
labour was to be used on the works. After the initial shock of
^‘Landes, p.180-1. Gang labour, as the Foreign Office should have 
known, was at this stage, no longer economical»
*An official employed by Admiralty.
^*See above, pp
^‘Landes, p.231, n^. 1 The Company, whose funds were running low, 
technically forfeited its privileges by requiring the Egyptian 
government to build any section whatsoever.
Ismail's academic reply in which he confirmed - seemed in fact 
pleased to confirm - that the debt contracted by Said was a 
government debt to the Company, Bulwer vigorously urged that Notes 
should be written to the Porte’s ambassadors at Paris and London, 
and to the Viceroy, pressing the compromise tentatively fore­
shadowed in previous negotiations.^
All might be well again, Bulwer thought, in spite of Ismail’s
lack of enthusiasm. The English Government was satisfied that the
terms of the Notes, yet to be sent, placed things on a not too
objectionable footing. So, persuaded as he was that he had solved
the Egyptian riddle, Bulwer, when he learned of Ismail's fresh
determinations, lost his temper, and could only believe that
2Colquhoun had let him down. He complained:
'Whilst I have been settling the Canal business here and 
catried my point, Colquhoun has allowed the Viceroy to 
make a new Convention with Lesseps. It is too bad*.« 
after this I can answer for nothing*. 3
Though not an unjust accusation - Colquhoun was ailing and
not showing enough energy - on the other hand Bulwer was scarcely
warranted in making him a scapegoat. The truth was that in spite
of the little faith he professed to have of any real benefits
coming from his talks with Said and then Ismail, even so Bulwer
had rated the value of them too highly. Further, when he had
decided that the great issue was one of influence and that British
policy should be so adopted as to make allowance for French
"'■'Forced labour and the land clauses were to be abolished, then the 
Porte would take the other clauses into consideration, seeing to 
it that there would be no pecuniary loss if the Company were 
obliged to give up as a consequence. The Sultan would look for 
ways to continue the project without the present risks.
_*See above, p.VS * A peerage was also at stake. -
'''Bulwer-Russell, 6 April, FO. 78/1795*
susceptibilities, he had not taken the French minister into his 
confidence,-the obvious next step. Perhaps it was simply because 
he assumed that legitimate French interests were compashended in 
his plan, or more likely his dislike of Moustier - shared by all 
the representatives at the Porte - prevented his taking him into 
his confidence. There was no doubt that without French concurrence 
the plan could not succeed. If he hoped by his own personal 
representations at the Porte, and with the support of a revitalised 
Colquhoun, and the Viceroy, to give these parties sufficient courage 
to enforce this compromise on the French, he sadly miscalculated both 
as regards the backing he could expect from London, and with regard 
to the interests of the Porte and its vassal. And, of course, the 
time was past when he could have exploited a fairly fluid situation. 
He might negotiate such a compromise with the French, but to arrive 
at one without them could only be in French eyes part of a policy 
directed against them.
Soon after the Sultan's sanction to the measures Bulwer had
concocted with A'ali, Moustier objected to them so violently that a
Great Council was held at which the Sheik 'ul Islam and all the
dignitaries of the Empire were present«^- Even.so, eventually
■̂’Russell's reaction was characteristic: 'If the Sultan is deterred 
by menaces from carrying these measures into effect, he in fact 
abdicated his sovereignty in Egypt...if the principle is abandoned 
by the Sultan, the independence of Turkey is abandoned by the 
Sultan, and can no longer be supported by England*. Russell-Bulwer, 
2 April,FO. 78/1795. Palmerston was under the impression at this 
stage - in spite of his derogatory expressions later about Bulwer's 
exertions - that some sort of settlement was now to be expected. 
Roused by the Council’s stand to write to Russell he commented:
'We fought one round of this battle very successfully in 1840 and 
’41«•.now we have the Pasha on our side, and that makes the thing 
much more easy. ...I scarcely think the French will not give way. -
cont
despatched 6 April, the Porte's Note was in accordance with Bulwer's 
wishes.*'
The visit of the Sultan with Fuad, the Grand Vizir, to Egypt, 
in the second week of April produced no change in the situation.
The Viceroy, refusing to answer the Vizirial letter, seemed to he 
hoping that London and Paris would settle his difficulties for. 
him. Prince Napoleon was expected to arrive during the next few 
days, and it was perhaps because of this that Ismail refused to 
commit himself in the questions of forced labour and the land 
question. Fuad, likewise, refused to take any further step. Bulwer 
actually suspected that he wished to back out of the position he 
had taken up.
2At last the Pasha respnnded. He sent Nubar to Constantinople.
It became plain that the Viceroy sincerely desired to obtain the 
lands ceded by Said and was willing to pay for them. He would 
continue the works himself. On the other hand forced labour could 
be peremptorily abolished only with the direst consequences. Bulwer
emphasised his government's determination to see these uncivilised
(cont. p £33,note l) ~ ' ' "" ' ’ ” .
At all events our honour and our interests equally require that we 
should give the Sultan and the Pasha our active support.' 5 April 
PRO.30/22 14» Apart from showing a lamentable ignorance of the real 
situation in Egypt, this reasoning failed to comprehend the
opportunities - or rather lack of opportunities1 - for bargaining., See Mange, p.136,for details of negotiations between the Viceroy 
and the Sultan. The Vizirial Note to the Viceroy was dated 
. 2 April and the Note to the Porte's ambassadors, 6 April.
'The Note, in a great measure the end product of so much British 
diplomacy, significantly began: 'It does not enter the consideration 
of the Sublime Porte to wish to prevent the realisation*of an 
enterprise which might be of general utility’. It is enclosed in 
2 No 171, missing from FO. 78/1795» and actually in FO 78/1796.
*cf. Mange, pp.136-8, for an extremely ingenuous account of French 
diplomatic activity from 186J to 1865»
habits discontinued, but he was obliged to admit after long 
discussions with Nubar, Fuad and A'ali, that theBritish Government 
could not reasonably expect either party to offend France by 
carrying out English wishes. The French Company had to be accepted 
as the agency which should carry out the enterprise. This was 
fundamental. Bulwer accepted the fact and tried to devise a 
scheme which he hoped his government would find unobjectionable.
What he stressed was the need for an immediate settlement, for 
any fresh development was bound to be adverse. He explained»
'First, that the Viceroy should accept the prescriptions of 
the Vizirial letter and agree to carry them out within a 
certain period, say four or six months...
Secondly, that if he can make an arrangement...with the 
Company for getting possession of the Fresh-water canals 
and the land.annexed to them, this should be considered 
satisfactory.
Thirdly, that forced labour should be declared abolished; 
but that regulations should be drawn up for supplying free 
labour, such regulations being equally applicable as to 
(sic) whether the present company or a new company or the 
Egyptian Government itself should continue the present 
seawater canal.' 1
In this way he hoped to leave the supply of labour in the
hands of the local government. The resources of the Company would
be less flexible when forced labour was effectively denied to them.
»The plan offered two advantages for the British Government.
It embraced the effective English objections to the project, namely 
*to the land clauses and forced labour, and it saved face. It also 
pointed the way to better relations with the viceroyal government, 
in the circumstances the only real security for British-interests. 
Bulwer's analysis of the specific advantages to be anticipated from 
this scheme was unanswerable»
-̂’Bulwer-Russell, 11 June '63,FO.78/1796.
’The purchase of the fresh-water Canals and the adjoining 
territory will necessarily put a certain sum in the hands 
of the Company, favourable to the construction of the 
main danal but on the other hand its resources on this 
head are at once and for ever limited; whereas now, looking 
at the value to which land at Suez, Timsah and Port Said , 
may rise, if the great canal is ever; constructed these 
resources are indefinite and almost incalculable'.....
'A question of this kind having advanced so far and 
having engaged so many interests, the fears of the Pasha 
and the Porte having to be counted upon as well as their 
interests, it is by no means easy, even with the best 
intentions and the soundest views both as to equity and 
policy, to arrive at a tolerable solution'...1
The sugar for this pill was the time limit within which the
Vizirial letter should be executed, i.e. within which forced
2labour should be effectivelya.bolish.ed.
Russell's approval arrived eleven days after the sending of 
this despatch. Gradually coming round to appreciate the sense 
of Bulwer’s views, Russell gave a positive instruction for Bulwer 
to act upon his views. That very day Bulwer had telegraphed 
for a quick answer for time was running short.
These were critical weeks that were to follow. Bulwer 
maintained a constant watch on the Porte and on the Viceroy, 
represented by Nubar. Both parties were under pressure to evade 
a possible agreement, and Bulwer had cause to assure Nubar that the 
French government would not use force to make the Viceroy supply 
forced labour. Indicative of the mood of Ismail and of what he
was intending was his declaration that he would not have Turkish 
troops in any fortifications to protect the Canal. As a means of 
anticipating the French wrath to come Nubhr hinted that a tacit
2* Bulwer-Russell, 11 June, ibid.
*By March 1864 the English government had agreed to an extension 
of this from six to eight months.
'‘Bulwer - Russell, 25 June,FO. 78/1796*
agreement "between the Sultan and the Viceroy to supply 6,000 
workers per month, free if possible, might be an effective reinsurance. 
Bulwer did not shift from the terms of the agreement. If French 
pressure were to determine it then the fresh scheme would in fact 
alter nothing.
1The Vizirial letter was sent. Requiring first of all a
sufficient guarantee that the Canal would be used exclusively for
commerce, that the fresh-water canal clauses in the contract be
suppressed, and that forced labour be abolished, the Porte intimated
that it only remained for the Viceroy to see to it that the lands
were retroceded and no forced labour was employed* All that there
remained to do was to await the outcome of Nubar's mission to Paris
where the negotiations with the Company were to take place.
All parties were heartily glad at the prospect of seeing these
tiresome and long drawn out negotiations brought to a timely end.
Late in the day Russell had yielded to Bulwer*s argument that
if Britain were not to lose everything in a single throw it must
2compromise on this point. The Porte and the Viceroy had to be 
saved further embarrassment*
The French government wished to see the enterprise succeed.
Questions of influence, dignity, and interest, were all intimately
bound up with the achievement. Otherwise, Napoleon, and especially
Drouyn de Lluys were heartily sick of the interminable affair. .
p*Dated 1 July, enclosed in Bulwer- Russell 22 July, F0.78/1796.
*F0. - Bulwer, 12 Aug. Bulwer's handling of the delicate situation 
received well-merited praise.
The Porte desired nothing more, and nothing less, than to be 
left alone. Its interest in Egypt was marginal.
Ismail was the weak link, Ismail the unpredictable. He 
rejoiced, of course, that he was permitted to negotiate directly 
with the Canal Company - whatever the cost of the privilege.^ And 
here now was the opportunity he had been awaiting to put into 
practice thé plan which he had communicated to Bulwer earlier in 
the year.^
1*cf. Landes,p.184 on Nubar's success ! 'Even the British ambassador 
felt that an important step had been taken toward the revision of 
n the concessions'. A curious comment.
*cf. ibid, pp.l82-7»where we find all the details of the scheme which i 
the writer puts forward as a mere hypothesis based upon the flimsiest ; 
of evidence. There is ample material in the Russell Papers on this 
episode. Bulwer-Russell, 5 March '6j, PRO.30/22 92:
'...the Viceroy intends on his return to see quietly if he cannot 
purchase all, or nearly all, the Canal shares.He will thus have 
it at his disposition and thus without any question on the 
subject, the matter will be in his hands. He told me this in the 
strictest confidence saying that if the plan got out it must fail..' 
There is an interesting reference in a letter from Bulwer's friend, 
Stevens to Bulwer, 1 April ibid:
'From the tenor of his (the Viceroy's) conversation I am disposed 
to believe that he will ultimately throw over de Lesseps and that 
if properly dealt with, it will not be a difficult task especially : 
if it comes to a question of his assuming the whole undertaking 
according to your original idea'.
Had Bulwer first suggested the scheme and in deference to Foreign 
Office susceptibilities given it to be understood that Ismail had 
fathered it? Or had Bulwer conveyed the impression to Stevens 
that this ingenious scheme was his brilliant device? There is no 
mataial which might provide an answer.
A more curious letter illustrated a certain ignorance on Bulwer's 
part, remarkable in this case because he was by now quite an
* authority on the subject in all its intricate details* Bulwer - 
Russell, 11 June, ibid:
'...The Viceroy has already a right to a large portion of the Canal 
shares. He is ready instantly to buy up a large majority of these 
shares which would probably be done by first producing distrust 
amongst the shareholders. In this manner His Highness would be, 
before the six or four months named are expired, sole master of 
the Canal, his right having been acquired in a quiet unostentatious 
manner: the Committee would be removed from Paris, and established 
at Alexandria, and be soon composed of the Viceroy’s functionaries., 
this project would not interfere for the moment with the other 
arrangement-but it would eventually supersede it'* cont...
Ismail's market dabblings achieved nothing. On JO January, so 
far had Nubar..failed to persuade the Company to negotiate on the 
terms in the Vizirial agreement, that the Viceroy was obliged to 
ask the Emperor to arbitrate between the two parties. Lesseps had 
refused to budge in the matter of the land grants and corvee - though 
he needed neither. Hs did not wish to give up valuable bargaining 
counters. After all, Ismail still owed 400 francs per share.
French pressure was exerted at Constantinople and Cairo in a 
more determined fadion than had been the case in the immediate 
post-Zurich period. Since the negotiations were in Paris there was 
not a thing the English government could do.^
Bulwer, on leave, had talks with the Emperor in Paris before 
returning to the Embassy. They illustrated nothing more than the 
Emperor's ignorance of the details which quite evidently did not 
interest him. People, Bulwer suggested to him, would look upon 
the scheme as one of 'French ambition and not of general utility' if 
Europe were not generally admitted to participate in the venture.
A specific reference to India gave some substance to the otherwise
nebulous arguments about the Porte's and Viceroy's interests. To the
(cent. p.ST^note 2): — —  ' ' —  ’ ' ”
That such a scheme should have been considered practical politics 
was typical of Ismail. Based as it was on the fallacious supposit­
ion that French opposition to his contract would not be encountered,
■ it could not but fail. If Napoleon wanted negotiations to succeed, 
Ismail could do nothing about it. In any case, no matter how many 
shares Ismail obtained, he could not acquire a dominating influence 
. without obtaining the preference shares as well.
* Very impertinently the French government hinted to the.Porte that 
at the Congress which it was hoped would be convened to settle 
European problems, it would not be disagreeable to the Emperor 
for the Viceroy to be present with the Sultan. Erskine-Russell,
9 D e c F O . 78/1796. Nor did the knowledge that Britain refused to 
attend such a Congress make the French government anxious to 
encourage an amicable arrangement. ••
Emperor's remark that the lands might he put up for sale, Bulwer
returned the answer that it would make no difference. A polite
comment, pointing to the only obstacle, i.e. the Company, followed
the Emperor's proposal that the Viceroy should purchase the landè.
With great assurance Bulwer also wrote to Russell about his
conversations with the Duc de Morny, who was in the Emperor's
confidence,„and, too, had a stake in the Canal projects
'The Duke...told me most confidentially, that he thought 
as I did, that if the Emperor wished the Canal to succeed 
as a general enterprise, it should be stripped of any 
particular character which seemed to advantage one Nation 
at the expense of another'. 1
During the first week in May, Bulwer learned of what actually
resulted from the talks between Morny and Lesseps and Nubar in
those months. On 21st April, by his master's order and encouraged
by Drouyn de Lluys, Nubar Pasha had signed an agreement with the
2Suez Canal Company. The provisions were of a far-reaching naturê , 
leaving the French Emperor to decide what indemnity should be given 
to the Company for the withdrawal of forced labour. The Emperor 
would decide whether the Company should or should not keep the fresh 
water canals. He would determine the sum the Viceroy was to pay 
for the lands bordering them, and which lands in the vicinity of the 
Canal were to be retained by the Company. These were the main 
^‘Bulwer-Russell, 12 Jan. '64, FO.78/1849
2"Originally the Viceroy’s request to the Emperor for a decision 
on 'certaines question' undecided by Nubar and the Company, was an 
attempt to implement the Vizirial letter of 2 April. It was just 
a question of minor details. The Moniteur, 7 March, had simply 
declared that as a result of the Viceroy's request the'Emperor 
had expressed a determination to appoint a Commission 'offrant 
toutes les garanties d'impartialité" et de lumières'} this Commission 
would facilitate his task of making the decisions. *
provisions of the agreement which provoked such a strong reaction 
on Bulwer's part. He commented:
'Now forced labour was never granted with the permission of 
the Sultan, and is against the laws of the Empire, Were the 
Emperor of the French to decide whether a concession against 
the laws of the Turkish Empire is valid, and whether the 
vassal can sanction acts affecting the laws of the Empire 
without the Sultan's sanction, the authority of Constantinople 
over Egypt is transferred to Paris'. 1
Concerning the lands bordering the canals and the fresh-water 
canals themselves, he dryly stated:
'The absurdity of purchasing a property which was to result 
from the Canals, without obtaining the Canals, is so great 
that it needs no comment'. 2
Ls for the last point he commented:
'The Emperor is alone to decide what lands are to be handed 
over to the Company as useful for the constructions it 
contemplates, or, in words more vague, the prosperity of 
its 'exploitation'. J
The whole thing was incompatible with the spirit of the five- j
power guarantee of 1841. The Emperor, Bulwer considered, had placed 
himself in a false position.
His scheme, worked out in the previous June, had thus come to
nothing owing to Egyptian and Turkish weakness and mutual distrust. j
j
Circumstances had radically altered within a month of Ismail's ]
. 1
accession. Bulwer never had another chance to direct the course of ' 
the negotiations, though in the months after the Compromise, he {
continued to produce scheme after scheme. They were savoured by 
tke government, never welcomed by it.
From this point Bulwer indulged in a series of rearguard skirmisb®|!
losing his hold on each position only when the odds were too great.
i . . ' , . ' ' • . . j‘Bulwer-Russell, 9 May, o£.cit. j
“Bulwer-Russell, 9 May, ibid.
'•Ibid. !
<£*2-
His government offered him little encouragement. He was in fact
' 1 out of favour} his days were numbered.
His initial reaction was to attempt to make the ’Compromise' 
less dangerous. He kept before his government the need to bear in 
mind that the Emperor’s dignity was involved. • Should the Viceroy 
think fit, Bulwer proposed, the Emperor might decide what sum the 
Viceroy should pay for the fresh-water canals and the adjoining 
lands. The Company should be assured of a supply of fresh-water. 
Then he explained*
’The Emperor should not, in my opinion, be given the power 
as to forced labour of compensating the Company, because 
after having infringed the law with immense profits, it is 
no longer allowed to do so, nor should he be left to 
determine what the force of that law is} but if the 
Viceroy is disposed to ask the Emperor’s advice, His 
Imperial Majesty may express an opinion to His Highness 
as to the gratuity which it would be generous to allow 
for the abolition of a privilege, upon which the Company 
might have counted, though it was illegally granted*. 2
The Porte alone had the power to decide which lands the Company
should have in the vicinity of the salt-water canal, though its
decision might be arrived at after an international commission of
European engineers had visited the spot. The Porte adopted this
reasoning and during the following months attempted to prevent
the French government from exceeding the scope of the Vizirial
letter of 2 April. For the moment it held its ground, demanding
’the retrocession of the fresh-water canals, and, as a result of
^‘Palmerston-Russell, 11 Sept. PRO 30/22 14! 'That you say of Bulwer 
is quite true. All the geese he hatches are swans, till their 
real character shows itself. About two years ago he wrote to me 
that having entirely settled the Suez Canal Question, he thought 
that great exploit entitled him to a peerage'.
. *Bulwer~Russell, 9 May,F0.78/1849*
Bulger's encouragement and inspiration, the appointment of a mixed 
commission to decide on the portion of land strictly required by 
the Company.
However, the determination of the French government to nut an
end to the business was strengthened by the Porte's irritating
tergiversations. On 2 July the Imperial Award, based, on the
recommendations of the Commission presided over by II. Thouvenel,
granted an indemnity of 84 million francs to the Company.'V To be
paid by the Egyptian Government, this was chiefly in return for the
2retrocession of the lands and for the withdrawal of forced labour.
Anxious to make the best of the situation, no matter how'bad
it was, and impatient to see the negotiations, now at last going on
with a purpose, terminated in as little disadvantageous a manner
as possible, Bulwer employed all his craft to persuade his government
that the Porte's ambassador at Paris, Djemil, could not be blamed,
nor the Viceroy criticised too harshly.^ His efforts on behalf of
both failed to impress Russell, and indeed they were transparently
misleading.^ The Porte he explained had placed the matter on an
business like footing in the Vizirial letter which offered the
Sultan's consent to the Canal provided the French Company resigned
forced labour and its territorial acquisitions. ' Thus the fresh-
^ ‘ c f .  M ar low ^ ,  p » 7 0 *  ' B r i t a i n  made n o  e f f e c t i v e  p r o t e s t .  T h i s  q u i e s c e n c e  
’ w a s  p r e s u m a b l y  t a k e n  b y  t h e  P o r t e  a s  a n  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  G r e a t .
_ Britain had retired from the contest’. This is erroneous.
‘The manner in which this sum was calculated invited astonishment 
rather than revulsioh. cf. Landes,p,224, and Bulwer to Russell,
, 16 August 1864, FO.78/1849»
^‘Bulwer-Russell, 25 May, ibid: 'I would profit by the intervention of 
the Emperor and the Compromise as far as it is possible to do soj 
.and try to get what is impossible altered'.
^‘Bulwer-Russell, 16 August, and 7 Sept. ibid.
water canals would have been placed in the hands of the Viceroy 
who would have been glad to compensate the Company for the loss 
entailed. Unfortunately, Nubar's initial failure led to his asking
the Emperor to arbitrate on the pecuniary questions. The Commission 
appointed by the French government drew up with Nubar a project of 
an arrangement, the Compromise, which embraced matters beyond the 
mere pecuniary question*  Ohly after the event did the Porte realise 
what had happened in Paris, and then protested* Ey telescoping the 
events of this month and emphasising the Porte's worthy attitude 
towards the Emperor’s final award in July, Bulwer contrived to gloss 
over the ignominy of it. Russell's.comment must have evoked a sigh 
of relief from Bulwer* It was exactly what he might have expected!
'Although the affair lasted thro' the summer and was 
notorious to all Europe, you state on the 7 ^  of September, 
that it was not clearly known to the Porte till that time*
How came the Porte never to enquire what was going on?' 1.
As an answer to Russell's question, what he revealed later,
while on leave in Paris, was a brilliant piece of diplomatic
manoeuvring on the part of the French government, and of crass
2stupidity on the part of the Turks* The Porte had enquired what
the powers of the Commission were* It enquired of the Viceroy
and the French government, the former returning no answer and the
other an evasive one* Djemil questioned Drouyn several times as
t6 the latitude given to the Commission. Drouyn returned that the
Emperor and the Viceroy's agreement prevented his interfering with
the deliberations of the Commission until its decisions were announced.
^Russell-Bulwer, 23 Sept.,FQ.78/1849»
*Bulwer-Russell, 30 Sept.fibid.
Seemingly, Djemil had at once made it plain that the Porte could 
in no wise he hound. As for the three days delay in informing 
Nuhar of his'fresh instructions, Djemil complained that when the 
Viceroy’s agent returned from Marseilles he did not come to the ’ 
Turkish Embassy. How was he to find his whereabouts? 1 Convincingly 
though the tale was told, Russell was not taken in.
By working on Djemil’s pric/e and keeping Djemil in ignorance 
of the exact details, which was quit^ a feat considering the 
proximity of all the parties concerned, the French succeeded in 
maintaining his isolation from Nuhar. Nuhar in turn was won over 
by the Due de Moray's assurance that the Emperor’s final decision 
would not he based on the Compromise. The-hint that any action 
embarrassing to the.Company, while the matter was pending, such as 
the cessation of forced labour, would be looked on by the Imperial 
Government as a threat, sufficed to dissipate what little determin­
ation Ismail had shown till then.
In a turgid atmosphere of mutual recrimination, Bulwer threw 
himself quite cheerfully into the task of exploiting the situation. 
After all, not all his arts could have brought the English government 
to pursue negotiations* If the present bases for talks were
unfortunate, at least the English government could not afford to
2keep out of the talks. Almost any opportunity to liquidate this
Iembarrassing'.problem was bound to excite Bulwer, daily confronted 12
1*Colquhoun-Bulwer, 7 May 1864,F0.78/1849» Strangely, Nubar had
2 called on Djemil on the Friday and Saturday preceeding 21 April. 
'Palmerston was suspecting at last, that the French government would 
see the Canal completed even at their own expense.With Tunis in mind 
he addedt ’They are pursuing their scheme of getting hold of all 
the Southern shore of the Mediterranean in order...to keep us out 
of it*. Palmerston-Russell, 24 Oct., PRO.30/22 14»
with the practical implications of French hegemony in the area, 
especially in Egypt.
His memory still retaining a vivid impression of the gracious
manners of the Emperor and his deferential attitude towards himself,
Bulwer preferred to believe that the Emperor would certainly be glad
to accommodate the Sultan's objections on certain points - to do with
the amount and location of land to be conceded. The Turkish
Ambassador, previously briefed by Cowley, should make a personal
appeal direct to the Emperor. Practical details Bulwer limited to
one, namely that an International Commission of engineers should make
an on-the-spot report upon the lands question, this to guide the
Sultan and Viceroy when they would decide upon the amount and location
of land. When the question of neutrality and guarantee should be
agitated, Bulwer reasoned, such a report would be a necessity.
Given the mode of the recent agreement how could other Powers, as the
question then stood, be brought to guarantee the neutrality of the 
1Canal?
Having previously approved of Bulwer's views on the lands question
Russell now had second thoughts, going so far as to repudiate Bulwer's
translation of opinion into diplomatic activity. Bulwer's argument
had been that* '
^*Bulwer- Russell, 16 Aug., FO 78/1849* 'The question of the lands 
twhich are to be given the Company involves a variety of political 
questions, over which the Porte is bound by her own interests and 
engagements with other powers to exercise a certain control'.
Bulwer was particularly anxious that the land given to the Company 
at Suez and Said, Timsah, and certain other points, should be 
restricted to a bare minimum. Otherwise his inclination was to be 
. generous for the sake of France's good will..
’A certain margin of land on each side of the Canal 
should be conceded to the Company for public purposes} 
this in fact would be property belonging less to the 
Company than to the Canal*..It is perfectly fair, also, 
that the Company should have a sufficient ground 
accorded to it at different spots for warehouses, and 
those other buildings which it may require, and I would 
even go so far as to say that the Porte’s consideration 
be extended to new wants in this respect, not perhaps 
- at present apparent! but it is equally just and 
expedient that the extent of this grant should be 
determined by a commission in which the Porte should be 
duly represented; that the nature of the buildings 
to be'made, the locality in which they are to be erected, 
should all be fixed by this commission*. 1
2Russell’s acceptance of these generous proposals was half withdrawn
a few weeks later when he telegraphed Bulwer the instruction, that
it was ’of vital interest to the Porte not to allow a dangerous
concession of land in Egypt to a foreign Company which may in the
end deprive both the Sultan and the Viceroy of all Independent
3Sovereignty, and of all domestic administration’. Unfortunately
for the Foreign Secretary, on the very day this instruction was
relayed, Bulwer had completed the negotiations in which he had
been persuading Nubar, recently arrived, and the Porte’s ministers,
hesitating before trying again the Emperor’s patience, to make a
joint demarche on the basis of his proposal for a commission of
4three to solve the lands problem. In a veritable sunshine of
optimism the ambassador explained:
*1 am happy now to think that there is not likely to be any 
’ necessity for our coming to any serious difference with the
Cabinet of the Tuileries hereupon, a matter always to be ' 
avoided if possible. ...I look...upon the communication
p*Bulwer - Russell, 7 Aug,, ibid. „
‘See above, p.̂ -7?.
'*FQ - Bulwer, 7 Sept.,op.cit.
4*The other main point was that a term be fixed for the completion 
of the Canal; ptherwise the retrocession of the fresh-water 
canals, conditional on this completion, would be worthless.
to be made by the Porte with the perfect concurrence of 
Nubar Pasha as of the greatest importance...When all 
differences are arranged, the intention of the Porte is 
that the Viceroy and the Company should make a new 
contract according to the terms agreed upon, and that 
the Porte should then give its sanction to this contract’. 1
From the moment Bulwer had learned of the final decision of
the Emperor (published in the Koniteur, 2 August), he had been
working feverishly to re-establish such a concord between the
Viceroy and „the Porte. He had been favoured by the Viceroy’s
positive alarm and irritation at the way he had been treated.
2The latter blamed the French in Paris for their venality.
3Quickly rejecting Bulwer’s proposal, Russell contemplated
exerting pressure in Paris to have the Emperor agree to the Sultan's
appointing his own agent to visit Egypt, and report on the quantity
and location of land to be conceded.^ Further, a fresh contract
5should be drawn up by the Sultan’s own confidential officers.
When it became clear that Bulwer had set the wheels in motion.Russell
6delayed and then cancelled his protest.
From this point negotiations were centred on Paris, and only
7to a lesser degree at Constantinople. Russell's response to his
2* Bulwer - Russell,7 Sept., FC.78/1849
*cf. Landes, p.226. He had quickly given orders to British firms 
, for machinery totalling £1,000,000.- 
^‘Russell - Bulwer, 20 Sept.,op.cit.
^‘Russell - Bulwer, 23 Sept.,ibid.
¿‘Russell - Bulwer, ibid.
^FQ-Crey,26 Sept.and Stuart-Russell,27 Sept .¿bids'The French govern­
ment had already agreed to the principal provisions...the appointment 
of a mixed commission to fix upon (delimiter)the amount of lands 
to be allotted to the Company and the transfer of the fresh-water 
„ canal to the Viceroy within a fixed period of six years'.
'‘Much depended on the meaning of the word 'delimiter’.See above note£ 
where the English interpretation is evident.The French contended tbit 
it meant to define what had already been granted.English pressure 
ensured that the land grant was restricted to one-sixth of that 
conceded in the Award of 2 July.
manoeuvres Bulwer could not refrain from gently criticising. In 
fact, his appaisal of what had happened and what might follow 
was little short of patronising, while his advice to D^emil, to 
have an agent sent to Egypt whose report might he the basis of the 
Porte’s instructions to its Commissioner in the Mixed Commission, 
could only have looked something like disobedience to Russell 
after his recent protests. Bulwer defended himself, pointing to 
the weakness in British policy?
’The fact is, that things were allowed to go on too many 
years unchecked} and it was. difficult, not to say 
impossible,,to alter their current after it had been 
permitted to run for so considerable a time in a direction 
that gave a sort of legitimacy to the dangerous privileges 
which the Company had been able to acquire’. 1
However, he begged many questions when he suggested that the
privileges could be modified if the available means of influence
were ’vigorously and firmly employed’. He knew only too well the
difficulties of achieving anything in that strange Levantine world
where rulers, especially Viceroys and Sultans, were motivated by
impulses as strange to an English gentleman as they were alien.
But the ambassador made a capital hit when he remarked:
’But almost every plan or policy depends less on the manner 
in which it is defined than the manner in which it is 
executed’. 2
Bulwer’s attempts to seize the initiative had been thwarted twice
by his government’s desire to watch and wait. Finally, he persisted
in his idea of a Mixed Commission, concluding:
^’Bulwer - Russell, 30 Sept. Paris,F0.78/1849 -
’Bulwer - Russell, ibid.
•¡.Ho
'There can be no doubt that the whole affair even with 
its reduced conditions, is favourable to French 
aggrandisement, but the Porte alone will not be able 
to resist this. The resistance must come from giving 
France-clearly to understand that there are encroach­
ments which Great Britain and other States would not 
submit to'. 1
Negotiations dragged on, the British government having given
its assent to the Canal scheme, 4 March 1865, insisting that no
excessive grant of land should be given to the Company} the Viceroy
requiring that he should have power of appointing its Director,
and the Egyptian government be the arbiter in disputes between
2natives and the Company. By 25 April, the Porte had assented 
to the terms agreed upon by Cowley and Drouyn de Lluys. The 
acceptance of the Imperial Award in the appeal from the Sultan in 
May was the quid pro quo for the Emperor's acceptance of a Mixed 
Commission to fix the amount of land to be given to the Canals
The English government could boast that it had put an end to 
forced labour, and the colonisation schemes presumed to be involved 
in the land grants, and that, in spite of Turkish waywardness and 
the refusal of the Porte's agents to execute their instructions, it 
had helped to put the questions of the fortifications and the 
maintenance of Egyptian jurisdiction, on a satisfactory footing.^
^‘Bulwer - Russell, ibid.
‘The Egyptian government and the Company settled their differences 
, in the Conventions of 30 Jan. and 22 Feb. 1866. See Mange,p.139. 
^‘cf. Mange, p.l39> for a melodramatic but insubstantial account of 
the reasons for. the Porte's conceding the Firman permitting the 
. construction of the Canal.
‘See 'Results of the Opposition of Her Majesty's Government to the 
Suez Canal scheme*. FO.78/1898
More to the point was the fact that the government had failed in
its initial determination to stop the canal being built. Palmerston
castigated everyone but especially the English public and Buiwer
for this. He protested that though Bulwer was 'a very clever
man, and according to his own statements he directs everything', he
1had 'no dignity of character’. Quite possibly, he suspected,
his influence was not very great. The Prime Minister looked forward
to ’a good ambassador at Constantinople and an energetic man like
Stanton' giving Britain 'the best chance of saving something out
2of the scramble*.,
Bulwer protested at once against the notification of his
3recall and its connection with the Egyptian negotiations. He 
justly lay the blame - if blame had to be apportioned - for the 
unsatisfactory state of affairs, at the feet of Russell. As he 
explained, it was his efforts in the previous year which had brought 
the .Viceroy and the Porte together, and:made an agreement , based . ■ 
on a Commission to calculate the amount of land for the Canal, 
feasible.
'The fact, indeed, is that when that Commission was 
proposed it was granted by Drouyn de Lluys and the 
whole affair settled*, he wrote. 4
5It was hardly his fault that Drouyn was able to back out, later to
agree again providing a French government representative sat on the
^*Palmerston-Russell,12 July, PRO.30/̂ 22 15. Palmerston was only con- 
- sistent in his inconsistency towards Bulwer.Pa#lmerston-Russell ,11 
July,ibid:'I have been reading those long but able despatches of 
p Bulwer about the Suez Canal*.
,,‘Palmerston-Russell, 12 July, loc.cit.
^’Bulwer-Russell, 18 June, PRO.30/22 9 3.
^’Bulwer-Russell, ibid.
^‘Ibid.
Committee, which Bulwer had intended should consist only of
. 1representatives of the Porte, the Viceroy, and the Company» He
complained he felt it hard 'to have the harb penetrate my heel
2where I thought it was invulnerable'. 'I think you let.the 
French a little too well off', he added, before going on to hurl 
a final shaft at his chieft
'If it was necessary that I should be immolated to procure 
you a "prosperous voyage to the Temple of Fame or any other 
such glorious place, I think I would screw up my courage to 
the act of sacrifice, but as all winds blow in your favour, 
and there seems no sort of danger of your vessel even 
being shipwrecked, I am rebellious at being a victim to 
the barbarous deities of Drcuyn de Lluys'. 3
Reluctant to leave his post, he felt that his contribution towards
a satisfactory settlement of the Suez question might have been in
his favour. 'You will not be surprised', he complained, 'that
after the zeal I have shown, the knowledge I have acquired, and the
success which has hitherto attended the affairs I have been
personally connected with in relation to the Suez Canal, I should
have thought my services concerning that affair more likely to be
useful to the Government than those of anyone else'.^ He felt,
however, that the full exposition of his views, recently, had
obliged the government 'to name an agent who had not declared
5himself in the same manner'. Significantly, he pleaded 'that as
long as I served under your orders, I should have strained every
nerve to make any plan you had adopted successful} whatever I might
have thought it my duty to say as to the dangers or"the difficulties
^* Bulwer-Russell, 26 April, ibid.
*Buiwer-Russell, 18 June, ibid.
^‘Bulwer-Russell, 18 June *65, PRO.30/22 93»
^’Bulwer-Russell, 2 August, ibid.
->*Ibid.
attending it’.̂  This was no flash of self-knowledge lighting up
the inner recesses of unfathomable darkness. Bulwer had been
advocating a policy different from that his government desired,
and though, of course, he had attempted to do his duty, his
personal predilections had at least encouraged those efforts towards
a settlement which French pressure induced. His sympathetic
understanding of the Porte’s difficulties was itself an obstacle
2in the way of persuading the Porte to stand firm. The tensions 
between the ambassador and his chief prevented Bulwer’s ever taking 
the initiative as we have seen above. However, Bulwer's independent 
line succeeded at least in easing the transition between antagonism 
to the whole project and obstinacy over the details. Given the ’
international situation,the British Government possessed no means of 
halting the Canal, though it delayed - not so much the construction , 
which went on despite English diplomacy - but certainly the settlement ; 
of its legal bases. This, of course, was-what had given Bulwer 
cause to rethink after Zurich, and later, after his trip to the Canal. \ 
If the Canal were to be made it would be just as well to have the 
details settled amicably in accordance with the views of the British - ! 
government and not as a result of a fight,for influence between 
France and Britain. He failed because Palmerston and possibly 
Russell were intent on overlooking the struggle for influence. The 
government always saw a principle at stakej Bulwer wanted to push 
it to the background as the sensible thing to do, and in the interest
2*Bulwer-Russell, ibid. •
’Especially in November-January 1859-1860 and February-April 1863»
of prestige the only thing to do.
He was ideally equipped to deal with the Egyptian riddle, 
hoth hy his remarkable resourcefulness and his adaptiveness to 
circumstances. Frustrated in his desire to adopt a different 
line by a government which was more aware of its strategic 
limitations than he was, Bulwer responded characteristically by 
producing an abundance of schemes, all of which found their source 
in a well-reasoned policy. This, comprehending the narrower 
issue, also took care of British interests in the East generally.
He tersely explained his approach in a letter to Consul Reade, in 
which after admonishing him about speculating and interfering in the 
internal affairs of the local government, went ons
'I wish you would just take up two or three great ideas.
We want not to pull down but to build up a Government in 
Egypt strong enough to control the usurpations of , 
foreigners and adventurers. It will be our only chance in 
that land of passage of keeping it from falling into the 
hands of everybody which is nobody.
We want moreover to be well with the government of Egypt 
for large questions and not to go out of our way to quarrel 
with it on small ones*. 1
Bulwer was vigorous in his insistence that the Viceroy’s rights, 
guaranteed by treaties, were as sacred as those of the Porte, and 
that just as Egypt should be held in its present relationship with 
Turkey so the Porte should not be encouraged in demanding more of the 
vassal government than was legal. 2 Bulwer,was half-inclined to_i.............. . ...... . .. .....—  ............. ... :___________ . .
^’Bulwer-Russell, 24 August '6 4, T/101 
*In his brilliant last despatch, 10 Oct. *6 5,FO.78/1898, to Stanton, 
he develops this?
’To make him independent of the Porte would be to withdraw 
from Egypt the protection it derives from being part of the 
Ottoman Empire. To sink him down to the condition of an 
ordinary Pasha would be to make the fate of Egypt entirely 
dependent on that of Turkey: whereas if any catastrophe 
befell other Turkish provinces, it might still be our wish
cent...
approve of the desire of Said, also Ismail's, for the establishment
of the law of primogeniture for the succession, but feared that
this would be too much of a shock to the laws of the Empire. Egypt
was, for Bulwer, a British question and it was his constant
■ 1endeavour to have it treated as such, though Bussell persisted in 
dealing with it as if it were a secondary interest, threatening that 
if the Sultan refused to insist on his rights in a problem of the 
first magnitude, Britain would consider itself bound no longer to 
preserve Turkish integrity. Cowley at Paris, and Eulwer in 
Constantinople, and Colquhoun at Cairo, had to take theeline^for the 
most partjthat they were merely reminding the ministers of the 
Viceroy and the Sultan of their own interests; that they were 
willing to help the Porte and the Viceroy against French pressure, 
but that, the question being of secondary interest to Britain, they 
must first of all make their position clear and stand firm. This
pretence was seen through, and ineffectual, inasmuch as both the
(cont. p .aî .note2) j ' '  . ~ 1 ” -
and our policy to preserve the territory which commands 
the Red Sea from a foreign yoke; and in such a case, it 
would be a great help to find a Government constituted 
and accustomed to exercise a sort of national authority'.
Where the Capitulatory regime and consular pretension affected the 
problem he felt:
'A little consideration, however, will show that hy these 
means we transfer power from a known legitimate and uniform 
authority, with which we shall always have great weight, 
to an undefined,.irreglar and divided authority, wholly 
independent of us. The small share that we shall have in 
. * the general usurpation will be of trifling national consequence' 
*Bulwer-A.H. Layard; 20 May '65»Bulwer Papers, T/102;
'...I can't help looking on Egypt as a thorough English 
question, . In fact I think our great fault has been not 
to state this openly from the first not as against the 
Canal but as against everything which gives to the Canal an 
exclusive character in favour of French interests'.
Sultan and his Vassal could seldom see what they ought to have 
seen as their interest, and when under British pressure they could, 
were reluctant to take a strong line. It also shackled Bulwer 
who would have preferred to have assured the Porte at the outset 
that Britain would stand by it in a policy they had agreed upon. 
Again Bulwer, as in the double-election crisis, over-simplified the 
situation, not fully appreciating the difficulties which such a 
strong line involved for a British government. ’
It was important tc remember, at least Bulwer f&t so, that thw 
Suez question was part of the bigger problem of British prestige in 
the East,: so that if we were not prepared.to win because the 
Government refused to take the only alternative, an alternative 
which really did not exist, the sensible policy, Bulwer felt, was 
not to antagonise France. And perhaps here, Bulwer was wiser than 
his Government. He outlined his views in a letter to Stanton, the 
new Consul General:
'It is therefore not desirable for us to have a quarrel with 
France on Egyptian matters, nor is it desirable for us 
that the Viceroy of Egypt should have one;’... 1
After explaining that the best thing was a good understanding :
b e t w e e n  t h e  F r e n c h  a n d  B r i t i s h  c o n s u l s  on t h e  s p o t ,  he  w e n t  o n :
’ B u t  i t  b y  n o  m eans  f o l l o w s  b y  t h i s ,  t h a t  we a r e  e i t h e r  t o  
a l l o w  t h e  F r e n c h  t o  t a k e  t h e  p r e c e d e n c y  o v e r  u s ,  o r  t o  
a d v i s e  t h e  V i c e r o y  t o  make t h e  s l i g h t e s t  c o n c e s s i o n  w h i c h  
i s  i n i m i c a l  t o  B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t s ,  o r - t h e . i n t e r e s t s  o f  ,
Egypt, or the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, I think 
we cannot make it too clear, practising all courtesy, that 
we will not allow France to assume directly or indirectly 
in a great or in a small- degree a predominant situation in 
Egypt, or over the Egyptian Government; and also'think we 
cannot make too clear to the Viceroy of Egypt that such is 
our view ' . 2
i*lO October, '65, FO.78/1898 
’Ibid.
^ 7
Bulwer added that Britain, nevertheless, should not encourage the 
Viceroy in any way to exclude French influence.
While Bulwer had tried to have the Canal accepted hy his 
government, refused to encourage anti-French attitudes in the Porte 
and at the Viceroy's court,1 and asserted Britain's right to an 
equal voice in matters pertaining to this area, he had clearly made 
an honest attempt to apply his ideas. What was said of 
Salisbury might with justification be told of Bulwer though in a 
different senses '
’He recognised from the first that to secure and consolidate 
our position there, and to do so without quarrelling with 
France, was a result only to be achieved at the cost of 
very substantial sacrifices in other directions’. 2
‘Especially in matters connected with financial projects and 
concessions.
‘Cecil -Biographical Studies. t>.57.
CHAPTER VI 
In Conclusion»
His disappearance from the Turkish scene had somethingt '
characteristically Bulwer about it. Just as his whole period of
office lacked the drama attaching to Stratford's last years, and
certainly the.glamour of Stratford's pre-war years, so Bulwer's
leaving had this same anti-climacteric quality. Enjoying a few
months leave of absence, January-May I865, in Paris, Cairo, the
Lebanon, and then again in Egypt, he still continued to mix business
with pleasure and convalescence. He criticised the last phase in
the Suez canal negotiations,^" and sent in reports on the pernicious
effects of the combination of French economic penetration, the
capitulatory regime, and a weak ruler. He seems to have been
temperamentally incapable of 'sitting back*  while the chargé d'affaires,
Stuart, carried on what was merely routine business. Russell's
chief concern was that the dividends on the guaranteed loan of 1855»
and on the loan of 1862, for which he felt some responsibility, should
be paid. He had decided that Britain should not be involved in the
. 2scheme for the conversion of the public debt.
From May until September, back at Constantinople, the only task
of importance Bulwer had to perform was to try with Moustier to
persuade the other representatives to agree on the expediency of
**Bulwer-Russell, 11 and 24 April, and 24 March 1865» PRO.30/22 93* 
‘Russell-Bulwer, 8 June '65,F0.78/1853* Bulwer was 'utterly to 
abstain* from giving any sort of advice. He was simply to remind
• the Porte of its liabilities.
inviting Couza to Constantinople, in the hope of averting another 
constitutional crisis in the United Principalities. He failed in this 
Yet the quietness of the exit and the undram&tic nature of the 
performance in these years should not lead us to belittle Bulwer's 
achievement« We have already debated his character, which, owing 
to the slight nature of the evidence at our disposal, remains still 
enshrouded in mystery, though certainly not in the romantic haze 
which traditionally surrounded it. This much has become apparent, 
that the man who had to leave Spain in 48 hours in 1848, had, during 
his years in lesser capitals, in a way in the wilderness, arrived at 
maturity. Still short-tempered except in the important meetings 
of the representatives, still inclined to evade instructions and 
capable of moral imprecision, and still giving fleeting glimpses of 
bad tactical judgment, nevertheless the overall impression is that of 
a sound ambassador. The power for detached observation, always 
his strong point, remained unimpaired, witness his views on Egypt 
even though he knew they were unpalatable in London, and the 
capable manner he conceptualised British policy towards the 
Balkans and Turkish reform. His intellectual calihre, one feels, 
should have impressed his contemporaries. As this did not, it 
is not difficult to understand why neither his character nor 
performance as a diplomatist did. I think no more may be said of 
his character than that it was unsympathetic. He could never do 
anything to satisfy unscrupulous missionaries and their English
3oo
audience.* And he must he blamed for this. The policy he had 
to follow was not an inspiring one, likely to kindle a flame within
the breasts of Victorian gentlemen, at once generous and hypocritical} 
nor was it a spirited policy. Even so, an essential quality Bulwer 
obviously lacked, the ability to make people feel they had received
something, when, in fact, they had received nothing. Then, aside 
from the image which he projected, he seems to have been too human in 
a little way, and indiscreet in his private life. In the heyday 
of Victorian England, to receive applause, it was necessary to be
at least respectable, and, if possible, largely human like Stratford 
de Redcliffe, or, like Gordon, and Kitchener, and Lawrence later,
even godlike. His contemporaries
what Theocritus said to Eumenes*
•Where you have come is not a 
This much you have done is a
But Bulwer's accomplishment has to
could hardly have said to him
little way; 
great glory'. 2
be seen like Eumenes' one idyll.
It was thorough and workmanlike. The skill he displayed in the *
**Bulwer had written to A'ali on the matter of closing certain inns 
near the Turkish bazaars where Protestant Missionaries had been 
preaching against Islam, and exhibiting Turkish converts.The result 
was that though the hawking of bibles could go on, doors of missionary 
establishments had to be kept shut, - all as before.Bulwer wrote to 
Russell of missionary complaints. Bulwer-Russell, 20 Oct.'64,PRO.
30/22 93* 'What do these gentlemen want that is not allowed except 
preaching publicly against Mahomet?...They talk of Stratford; they 
never attempted in his time what they have done reoently...It was 
easy to get privileges up to a certain point; beyond that it may be 
impossible to extend them* and even unwise to do so were it 
possible. As to the nonsense of my having done nothing about the 
»bible shop -¿there is my note to A'ali and his to me - why listen 
to such stories. The Hornbys are at the bottom of all this'. 
Bulwer-Russell, 24 Sept.'64,ibid, admitted he must conciliate the 
missionaries, but added* 'The misfortune is that these Missionaries 
are not very scrupulous as to their assertions, or they.are most 
2 grossly imposed upon by those who report to them'.
*C.P. Cavafy, 'The First Step', trans. John Mavrogordato.
%Q*
two arms crises, especially the first, was of an high order; the
patient manner with which he countered the ridiculous attitudinising
. 2of Moustier in the committees on the Servian issues, indicated 
not only unusual powers of endurance hut also good sense; while, with 
regard to Moldo-Wallachia, his contribution of knowledge, based on 
experience, and his sympathetic attitude towards Couza’s difficulties, 
proved an invaluable aid to the diplomacy of Malmesbury and Russell.
He had honestly opposed the official line on the Suez canal, having 
in mind the serious eclipse of British influence in Egypt. Sooner 
or later British policy would have had to adjust itself to the fact 
of the canal. It was to Bulwer’s credit that the adjustment 
happened earlier than it would have done unless he had so strongly 
urged a compromise.
As for the strength of British influence at the Porte when ;
Bulwer left, scarcely more can be said than that the days were gone
iwhen personality could succeed should the policy be lacking in j
attraction. However, Bulwer had tactfully refrained from worrying, . j  
the Turkish ministers on the score of reforms, and,^on the 1
missionaries,^ and on Hornby, whose support of the capitulatory rights i 
of British citizens was ruthless. Further, the Turks had been r. j
fortunate in having a representative who was such a perfect foil to the............... ' ' ' ____________ ;___  j
P*See above Chapter IXI, p.island Part III, p.2-2.2., ;
*See above Chapter ILI, Part III, pAi'X.
5‘Temperley, ’British Policy towards Parliamentary Rule and 
’Constitutionalism in Turkey (1830-1914)*, p.l6ls ’Bulwer from the 
fitst made it clear to the Sultan that he would not embarrass him by 
. pressing for more religious concessions’.
*Bulwer-Musurus (Turkish ambassador in London) 13 Oct.*64,T/52,stating 
he could not tell Russell that, although permitted in practice,the 
hawking of bibles must remain officially forbidden.’However, it is j 
not’, he wrote, ’an important question...If you take away the 
privilege the comparison between Stratford and me will be too obvious,> 
and I cannot expose myself to the public wrath which will fall on 
Turkey and change our policy’.
1
self-opinionated Houstier. In the Servian crisis, and during the
prolonged Suez canal negotiations, Bulwer never lost sight both of
Turkish interests and limitations. There is no reason to suppose
that Bulwer'a influence was any less than Moustier's, though exactly
how much influence either of them had at a time when the reactionary
tide was in full flood in Turkey, it is impossible to state with
confidence. The state of international relations was as fluid as
it had been in 1858. So, judging from the manner in which the
%ambassador had adpated himself in the previous seven years, I feel 
there was some unwisdom in the withdrawal of such an experienced man. 
He would have been a good agent to have had at Constantinople in the 
ensuing years. If only on the strength of these considerations, I 
suspect that just as his appointment to Madrid in 1845 was 
unjustified by his qualities, so his dismissal in 1865 was premature, 
and only to be accounted for by his moderate virtue.
"5.03
APPENDIX A
Bulwer had a running quarrel, with Sir Edmund Hornby. His
relationship with the occasional chargé d'affaires, Erskine, was
not an amicable one, while his quarrel with Secretary Lumley resulted
in a forced leave in London for the latter.
Sir Edmund Hornby, Judge of the Supreme Consular Court in the
Levant, was given to exalting his own importance, had nothing but
contempt for diplomatists, thought Lord Stratford was not a diplomatist
but an honest and straightforward man, and consequently in his dotage,
writing his autobiography, so-called, made a serious attempt to
ridicule Sir Henry Bulwer. The cause of their mutual antagonism
was clearly a natural antipathy. It was exacerbated by differences of
opinion over the application of the Capitulations and the various
laws that had been gathered under that omnibus term. This led to a
row over spheres of influence in which Bulwer, with the support of the
English Community, rejected Hornby's attempt to implement his literal
inspirationist approach to law.^
Unfortunately for Bulwer, Hammond was Hornby's protector. One
may perhaps detect a tension between the much respected under-secretary
2and the ambassador in two letters, one to Hammond, and one to Layard J
' ii
Parliamentary Secretary, in which Bulwèr complained of Hammond: j
_ •
*Bulwer-Hornby, 12 August *59 T/16. For the attitude of the community 1 
see J. McCoan»Bulwer 4 June *60,T/35« McCoan was the editor of the j 
’Levant Heiàâ whose grant from the FO. was stopped »for no fault under j 
Heaven but that I have given temperate voice to the universal public ) 
feeling about Sir E. Hornby and his Court - a species of "protection" j 
of abuse which will, to say the least, sound indifferently before j 
Mr S. Fitzgerald's Committee'. McCoan-Bulwer, 5 Jan»63,T/66. Hornby- j 
Bulwer 15 March '62,T/66, explained his own attitude to trial by
o J u r y - l o y  u ^ o f A f  i4 ‘ C-ou«<.i/  c .n c « ^ * o (,
*27 Nov. ’62,T/64. j 7
'In regard to our policy here and the ignorant attacks 
recently made upon it, there is no disguising, and it 
would be well that Lord Russell and Lord Palmerston will 
understand this, that it all or nearly all proceeds from 
the Consular Court, and with some experience I tell you 
honestly it will be impossible to maintain the one and the 
other, i.e. our policy and the Courts. It isnot only on 
account of the language and views of the Court itself, but 
also on account of the various persons sufficient to form 
an English opinion in an Eastern Town that it gathers round 
it. Clients, lawyers, all interested or ignorant, lounging, 
talking, catching travellers at the hotel table/s, etc.
...The institution (the separate legal establishment) is 
alike foolish and pernicious, and tho' Hammond's mind on 
the subject "squats on a hole", I am quite confident if 
he knew the country practically and looked at the greater 
objects we have connected with it he would share my opinions'. 1
All Therapia evidently knew about the differences between the
2Judge and the Ambassador.
This quarrel Bulwer extended to Gladstone who apparently had 
misgivings about British policy towards Servia and had defended Bulwer 
badly in a recent debate. The 'omission' made Bulwer feel insecure 
in his o f f i c e H e  wrote a bitter letter to Gladstone, explaining: 
'Every man is beset by calumnies here, my predecessor, if not more, 
as much as myselfJ
The quarrel with Erskine had its origins in Erskine's unthinking
occupation not only of the rooms offered but also of Bulwer's rooms
as well during his chief's absence in the previous summer. Twelve
months later, Bulwer raged to Layard: .
'Of all the disagreeable, cold-blooded fellows, critical par 
excellence, Erskine is the worst. It is impossible to 
, animate him into good fellowship and he seems lying in 
ambush for a quarrel'. 5
*‘11 June *63,T/70
, A'ali Pasha - Bulwer, 19 Oct. '64,T/79 
^’Bulwer-Sussell, 25 June '63.T/70 
¡rBulwer-Gladstone, 25 June 1863, T/70 
5*9 July *63,T/70
Further evidence of this tentative paranoia one finds in Bulwer's 
highly excited reaction to Secretary Lumley's misguided intimacy with 
Lavalette, chargé d'affaires of the French Embassy, and with Novikoff, 
the Conseiller of the Russian Legation. Lumley, for no solid reason, 
considered himself slighted, and poured out his heart to the French 
and Russian agents, in spite of Bulwer's previous efforts to establish 
a satisfactory working relationship with Lumley.^ Bulwer, however, 
expanded on the theme of disloyalty to such a degree that he clearly 
envisaged the whole of the capital conspiring against him.He protested:
'I cannot swear to the fact hut I believe Mr Lumley has been ;
in correspondence, and this on public matters, with Lord 
Stratford,and if I am not mistaken that letter Lord Stratford 
read in the Lords of the necessity of Union between France ;
and England was from Mr Lumley, and the one from Smyrna from 
our Consul Blunt.*.Moreover, a letter against myself and in i
absurd eulogy of Lord Stratford appeared in the Morning Post. j
I discovered the author to be a man who was sent away from the 
Ottoman Bank at Beyrout, and has been since employed by the 
proprietors of a new Bank at the head of which is a M. Revelacki- ! 
famous in our annals as the secret agent of my predecessor. j
Now, my dear Lord Jo&n, put all these intrigues together} add |
those of the palace, got up, I have every reason to think, by ! 
the Seraskier and others interested in destroying my influence, j
and X think you will see my only chance was to act with j
resolution} and at the same time that X crushed the plot 
wit£*l5ultan maintain my authority in my own Embassy, ...'2 1
• ' . 3Uneasy lay the head that wore De Redcliffe's crown. Though Bulwer, 
in spite of these suspicions conceded that 'these are my impressions - 
they may be wrong', he nevertheless must have given his government a 
very poor impression of his state of mind which saw little phantoms
in* every corner and transmogrified them into furious harpies.
1. Bulwer-Layard, 28 Aug. '60,T/93 " :
2. Bulwer-Russell, 1 Sept. '60,1/93
3* His preoccupation with Stratford rças quite obsessive.On the ocoasion 1 
of the latter's complimentary visit to the Sultan,Bulwer too easily 
1 ost all sense of proportion.Temperley states with some warmth,
(“The Last Phase of Stratford de Redcliffe, 1855-58',E.H.R.Vol.47,no. 
186,April 1932), that Bulwer's comment on the mission of his hero 
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